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ESTIMATE OF TON-MILES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1917-ROADS REPORTING TO DECEMBER 24, 1917, TOTALS FOR JANUARY-MARCH, INCLUSIVE.
(d) Ratio ton-miles January-September is to April-September (c)(b)---
(c) Revenue ton-miles all Class I roads April-September, 1917 206, 153, 354, 471 (f) Estimated revenue ton-miles all Class I roads JanuarySeptember (e) × (d)----
293, 547, 710, 346
ROADS REPORTING TO DECEMBER 24, 1917, TOTALS FOR OCTOBER, 1917.
Baltimore & Ohio.
Baltimore, Chesapeake & Atlantic. Bessemer & Lake Erie.
Boston & Maine.
Buffalo & Susquehanna.
Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh.
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville.
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western.
Lehigh & New England.
New York, Chicago & St. Louis.
New York, New Haven & Hartford.
Pittsburgh & West Virginia.
Toledo, St. Louis & Western.
Wheeling & Lake Erie.
Georgia Southern & Florida.
Mobile & Ohio.
New Orleans Great Northern.
Norfolk & Western.
(a) Revenue ton-miles, October, 1917.
(b) Revenue ton-miles, April-September, 1917_
(c) Per cent ton-miles for October were of April-September_ (d) Revenue ton-miles all Class I roads, April-September, 1917
(e) Estimated revenue ton-miles all Class I roads, October (d)X(c)
(f) Estimated_ton-miles all Class I roads, January-September, 1917_
(g) Estimated revenue ton-miles all Class I roads, January-
(h) Freight revenue Class I roads, January-October, 1916.
(k) Estimated revenue ton-miles all Class I roads in 1917
Estimate of freight and passenger revenue for calendar year 1917.
(a) Freight revenues, January-October, 1916_
(b) Freight revenues, 12 months 1916__
(c) Ratio, 12 months to January-October (b)÷(a).
(d) Freight revenues, January-October, 1917___
(e) Estimated freight revenues, 12 months, 1917 (d) × (c) -
(a) Passenger revenues, January-October, 1916_. (b) Passenger revenues, 12 months 1916-
(c) Ratio, 12 months to January-October (b)÷(a). (d) Passenger revenues, January-October, 1917.
(e) Estimated passenger revenues, 12 months 1916, (d) × (c)__
$2, 123, 708, 761 $2,557, 807, 255
$2, 355, 839, 798 $2,837, 385, 232
$585, 271, 004 $706, 149, 005 12.065334
$674, 882, 084 $814, 267, 775
Equipment in service on railways of the United States.
Reported by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
3 Computed by Bureau of Railway Economics from annual reports to Interstate Commerce Commission. NOTE. The only data available for 1917 are those shown in the monthly reports of freight operations to the war board, and these show only freight locomotives and nothing as to passenger cars.
THE PRESENT SHORTAGE OF TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, THE DISTRICTS PARTICULARLY AFFECTED, AND THE REASONS THEREFOR.
As will appear from other pages of this report, the demand for transportation in the United States has in the past year suddenly exceeded the capacity of the railroads in the limited but most important territory lying east of the Mississippi River and north of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers. In this territory are the chief munition plants and other basic industries upon which the United States is relying in its war preparations. The stimulated activity of these industries many of which are new and created since the United States entered the war-has created a demand for transportation in that territory which has caused a congestion in transportation. Railroad officers in that territory have for several years been urging the economic necessity of enlarging the plant, though, of course, none of them anticipated the extent of the present demand. The reasons why the plant was not enlarged more than it has been are part of the recent economic history of the United States, which have been urged on behalf of the railroads upon Senator Newlands's joint committee. Outside of the territory mentioned, that is to say, west of the Mississippi River and south of the Potomac and Ohio Rivers, there has been no such congestion as to delay materially the movement of all traffic offering. The railroads in this large territory have had their maximum traffic, but so far have been able to move it without material difficulty.
There have been "car shortages," that is to say, demands for cars in excess of the supply in this territory from time to time and temporarily, though some of them have been acute. These have been due not to the fact that the railroads in this territory have not supplied sufficient cars, but to the fact that their cars have been tied up in congested eastern territory. All special requirements of car supply have, however, through the endeavors of this committee and its commission on car service, eventually been met by arbitrary relocation of equipment out of the eastern territory.
We believe that the congestion in the eastern territory can be cleared up by the remedies now applied, and that with the sympathy and support of the Government authorities adequate transportation for all real needs can be provided in the eastern territory, as elsewhere in the country, without material immediate increase in the plant.
INFORMATION AS TO THE EXTENT OF THE USE OF PRIORITY ORDERS OF SHIPMENTS, AND ITS EFFECT ON TRAFFIC.
The use of requests for priority in car supply and movement has been very general for the past six months or more on the part of the Army, the Navy, and the United States Shipping Board. The original plan contemplated that the commission on car service should be furnished with copies of all such requests, but the method of handling, especially by representatives of the Army, has been lax, and it is believed that there were a great many such requests made on the
railroads, direct copies of which never reached us. Furthermore, much of the movement represented by these requests extends into the future, so that it is not possible to make any figures that would fairly represent the volume of traffic that has been handled by the railroads in compliance with requests for preference. It is proper to state that the careless manner in which preference requests have been handled heretofore has now been corrected.
As stated above, however, the blanks for the purpose were used freely and the volume of traffic handled in this manner was undoubtedly large; but it is quite impossible to state in figures what effect this has had on the movement of other traffic. It has, however, been a burden obvious to all in touch with the subject. The Pennsylvania Railroad reports that at one time 85 per cent of the traffic on their Pittsburgh division was handled under preference orders. It has been claimed also from time to time, especially by some of the smaller lines, that all of their available equipment was required to take care of Government shipments.
The foregoing relates to preference shipments for account of the United States Government. Added to this have been shipments for account of the allies, amounting to many thousands of cars, which have been given a degree of preference by special order.
THE AMERICAN RAILWAY ASSOCIATION,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE,
Washington, D. C., December 22, 1917.
CHANGES IN METHODS OF ADMINISTRATION ADOPTED WITHIN THE PAST YEAR TO RELIEVE CONGESTION OF FREIGHT AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM.
The executive committee of the American Railway Association special committee on national defense was created on April 11, 1917, five days after the declaration of war by the United States on Germany. Following the declaration of war, Secretary of the Interior Lane introduced and had passed this resolution in the Council of National Defense:
Resolved, That Commissioner Willard be requested to call upon the railroads to so organize their business as to lead to the greatest expedition in the movement of freight.
In response to which the chief executives of most of our large railway systems met in Washington and-
Resolved, That the railroads of the United States, acting through their chief executive officers here and now assembled, and stirred by a high sense of their opportunity to be of the greatest service to their country in the present national crisis, do hereby pledge themselves, with the Government of the United States, and with the governments of the several States, and one with another, that during the present war they will coordinate their operations in a continental railway system, merging, during such period, all their merely individual competitive activities in the effort to produce a maximum of national transportation efficiency. To this end they hereby agree to create an organization which shall have general authority to formulate in detail and from time to time a policy of operation of all or any of the railways, which
policy, when and as announced by such temporary organization, shall be accepted and earnestly made effective by the several managements of the individual railroad companies here represented.
Following the adoption of this resolution, 631 railroads, comprising 262,000 miles of lines in the United States, immediately coordinated their activities, and for eight months have been operated as a unified continental system. In another resolution, contemporaneously adopted, the railroads agreed "to the direction of the executive committee in all matters to which its authority extends, as expressed in the resolution heretofore adopted." This executive committee, composed of five railroad executive officers, sits continuously in Washington and is commonly known as the railroads' war board. Quoting the chairman of our central department, "by this act, this great railway system with all its facilities was made to serve the Government in this crisis as completely as if it had owned them; and at the same time the Government was spared the expense of buying the roads and the responsibility and labor of managing them. "Perhaps the most significant feature of the matter was that this act on the part of the railways was purely voluntary. No law required it. Another of its very significant features was that the step was taken without any prospect of special consideration or compensation having been held out by the Government. In England the railways have been united for operating purposes during the war into a single system; but there this action was required by law, and cach railway was guaranteed the same net return that it had earned before the war began.
The individual companies composing our railway system, through the organization formed by themselves, placed their facilities at the service of the Government without any understanding or promise that if this resulted in loss to any individual line, this loss would ever be made good.
The additional expense of this organization to the carriers is $800,000 per year; the Government assumes no expense or obligation whatsoever.
A large part of the work of the committee has been to stimulate the American railroads to greater efficiency and to cut out unnecessary competitive practices. This has been done in various ways, very largely through the agencies of the commission on car service and its 33 subcommittees covering the entire United States, whereby the most cordial and cooperative relations have been established with the public.
SOME THINGS THE WAR BOARD HAS DONE.
1. Formulated probably the most satisfactory car-service rules which the railroads have ever had. Arranged at once to pool box cars so that they circulate as freely over the United States as bank notes, and thereafter arranged to pool coal-carrying cars to promote their equally free circulation and to transfer locomotives from one line to another to meet unusual traffic requirements.
2. Established the most cordial and cooperative relations with commercial bodies, individual shippers, State railroad commissions, manufacturers' associations, etc., through the organization of 6 departments coextensive with those of the Army and 33 subcommittees of the commission on car service covering the entire United States.