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when threatening here among us quiet old gentlemen to sweep the British from all the country north of 490, or to annex all Central America to the United States. We know, from the letter of Mr. Dickens, Acting Secretary of State, of the 10th of June, 1835, to this John Galindo, that the subject of the letter of Alvarez must have been made a Cabinet question; for the Secretary pledged himself in that letter that it should be brought to the consideration of the President. Picture to yourself, then, General Jackson and his Cabinet in session; the Senator from Michigan, then being Secretary of War, occupies the third seat at the cabinet table; John Forsyth produces the letter of Alvarez and reads it. I do not believe he soiled his fingers with the speech of Señor Annitia to his constituents in Central America, or with the letters of John Galindo, whom the committee have dignified with the name of the "Minister" Don Galindo. When Mr. Forsyth read the passage of the letter of Alvarez, declaring that "it had always been the policy of the United States to prevent and resist European settlements in America, and that the aggressions and encroachments at Balize were a dangerous and alarming violation of this principle," what do you suppose was the appearance and language of General Jackson, who came into power upon the adverse principle, supported by a party which violently denounced the Monroe doctrines, Clay's instructions to Poinsett, and the authors of the Panama mission especially, and all their works? The Senator from Michigan no doubt sustained the Monroe doctrine and the principles of the Panama mission. But how came it about that the "mission" of John Galindo, the speech of Señor Annitia, and the letter of Secretary Alvarez, were all treated with perfect contempt, or at least passed over in perfect silence? We know that General Jackson refused to take any notice of the subject, as he did of the application of the Government of San Salvador asking admission into our Union.

But this letter of Alvarez, when carefully examined, conclusively shows that the Central American Government at the time did not pretend that the boundaries of the British settlement, under the treaty of 1786, were within their limits. All they claimed was that "the boundaries should be according to the letter of the convention of 1786." They did not complain of the British settlement within those limits, but they did complain" of an encroachment beyond those limits by more than forty-five leagues." They expressly admitted the limits of Balize, which, they said, were "definitely fixed by the treaty of 1786;" and they admitted the Mexican title or "high domain" over the territory of Balize, by saying that "the original 'treaty limits had been ratified in 1826, by the 'treaty between Great Britain and the Republic of 'Mexico." They sent John Galindo to England to complain, not of the settlement within the limits of the treaty, but of the encroachments beyond them; and the passage cited by the committee from the letter of Alvarez to prove that the settlement of Balize, within the treaty limits, was upon the territory of Central America, proves directly the reverse, as it shows that only the aggressions and encroachments at Balize were upon that territory. As I consider this dispatch of M. Alvarez as conclusively admitting that British Honduras, within the treaty limits, was not in Central America on the 30th of December, 1834, I ask the reading of

that letter.

It was then read by the Clerk, as follows: DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ST. SALVADOR, December 30, 1834. SIR: A short time since the authorities of the State of Guatemala granted, for purposes of settlement, sundry lands situated in the neighborhood of the Bay of Honduras to a company, whose object was to form a national establishment upon them. As soon, however, as the authorities of Balize were informed of this grant, they declared that the lands in question were within their jurisdiction, were their property; and they positively refused to give the contractors possession of a right which now justly belongs to them.

This extravagant pretension is plainly contrary to the convention of 1786, based upon that of 1783, between their Britannic and Catholic Majesties, which definitively fixed the confines of Balize, within which the inhabitants were to keep themselves; which convention, having been ratified by the respective courts in 1814, and subsequently in 1826, by the treaty between Great Britain and the Republic of Mexico, it seems clear, without entering into questions of another description, that the boundaries should be according to the letter of that convention.

The inhabitants of Balize, who have exceeded the estab

Special Session-Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

lished limits by more than forty-five leagues, found their pretensions upon the circumstance of their having occupied the lands in controversy prior to the independence of Central America. But such a violation of existing treaties, persisted in despite the earnest and repeated remonstrances of the Spanish authorities, cannot give those of Balize a lawful right to consider that as their own which they have in fact usurped.

An affair of such magnitude has constrained the Government of Central America to accredit Colonel John Galindo to the British Cabinet; and the Vice President of this Republic does not doubt that, through your honorable conduct, the President of the United States may make the most pointed intimations to the court of his Majesty upon the subject, and that he will take a lively interest to the end that the rights of a nation, who is a sister and a friend of that of the North, may not be violated.

The mediation of the President will doubtless give greater weight to the representations which our Commissioner may make to the British Government; and this Republic would deem such a measure a most decided proof of friendship and of a concern for her rights. Suffer ine, upon this occasion, to remind you that it has always been an object of the policy of the United States that there should be no European settlements upon the American continent, and that the aggressions and encroachments at Balize upon the territory of Central America are a dangerous and an alarming violation of this principle. It belongs to your great and happy Republic to place herself in the vanguard of a policy so interesting to the new American States, and to uphold with her name our rights in the presence of England.

Meanwhile I have the honor to tender to your Excellency the most distinguished sentiments of the consideration with which I am your Excellency's very devoted and obedient servant, M. ALVAREZ.

The SECRETARY OF STATE,

of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of North America.

I will only add that even the letter of John Galindo admits that the British are entitled to occupy the town of Balize, though I do not consider his letter as compromitting any interest, for he disregarded all historical truth, and did not represent Central America or anything else. A letter of Mr. Murphy to the Secretary of State proves that he was an impostor, and was never accredited to England as a commissioner from Central America, but only from the little State of Guatemala.

I have now examined every authority cited by the committee, and by each of them I have proved that the report of the committee is erroneous. All these authorities prove the Balize to be in Yucatan, and nearly all contain the admissions of Guatemala herself, that the conclusion of the committee is utterly destitute of foundation.

6

Notwithstanding the committee state in one part of their report that "from the information before them, they entertain a decided opinion that the British settlements at Balize, as defined by the treaties with Spain, lie within the territory of the Republic of Guatemala, and so equally constitute a part of Central America," yet they evidently doubt whether "the information before them" was sufficient to establish that fact; for in the very next paragraph they add, that "in the event of its being ascertained hereafter that these British settle'ments on Honduras Bay lie in whole or in part 'north and west of the proper boundaries of Guate'mala, though they would not, in such case, form any part of Central America, and thus are not 'within the strict engagements of the treaty, yet 'that any colonies or other permanent establish'ments there by Great Britain or any other European Power, must necessarily excite the most anxious concern of this Government, and would, if persisted in, lead to consequences of most unpleasant character."

As the committee thus avow themselves doubtful of the "decided opinion" they expressed, I will proceed to strengthen their doubts, and to refute their opinion, by giving them the information which was not before them. Their report says that

by some of the European geographers, [not Spanish,] these British settlements are spoken of as in Yucatan." The first authority to which I shall refer them, as they have denied that Spanish geographers have so spoken, is the "Dictionario Geographico" of Don Antonio de Alcedo, published at Madrid, in 1786. I quote from the English edition, translated by Thompson, in five volumes quarto, London, 1812:

"BALIS, RIO DE, a river in the province and Government of Yucatan, which runs into the sea upon the same coast near the strand of Bacalar, and into the bay which is formed by that strand and Long Island."-Vol. 1, p. 129.

After mentioning the thirteen provinces of Guatemala, Alcedo expressly mentions Yucatan among the provinces of "Nueva-Espana," [Mexico.]Vol. 2, p. 64, and vol. 3, p. 106. The authority is the more conclusive, as the writer, who was a

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catan.

The next work to which I refer is that of the celebrated French geographer, (the greatest of the age,) Malte-Brun, printed at Paris in 1847, p. 725, from which I make the following extract:

"COLONIE ANGLAISE.-Sur le territoire de l'ancien état Mexicain d'Yucatan, les Anglais possèdent à l'embouchure de la Balize, rivière qui se jette dans la baie de Honduras, une colonie composée de 4,000 habitans. Elle porte le nom de colonie de Honduras. Son chef lieu est Balize, petite ville avec un port situé à l'endroit où la rivière de ce nom se jette dans le mer."

Having thus described the British settlement as a British colony in the ancient State of Yucatan, in Mexico, at the Balize, a river which empties into the Bay of Honduras, which British colony is called the colony of Honduras, M. Malte-Brun says, p. 740, that the ancient captaincy general of Guatemala, or confederation of Central America, is bounded on the Gulf of Honduras and the Bay of Mosquitos. In the 3d volume of the American edition of 1827, p. 301, Malte-Brun speaks of "the peninsula of Yucatan, or the intendency of Merida," and says:

"We have distinguished on our maps, under the name of ENGLISH YUCATAN, that part of the peninsula which lies to the south of the river Honda, [Hondo,] and of the Spanish military post of Salamanca.

Domingo Juanos, a Spaniard, in his "History of Guatemala," says that "the jurisdiction of the Royal Audiencia and Chancery of Guatemala 'extended along the Atlantic from the coast of Ba'lize, in the Bay of Honduras, to the Escudo de Veraguay."

In the third volume of the London Encyclopedia, page 419, we find that

"Balize is a river in the peninsula of Yucatan, South America, which falls into the Bay of Honduras, in latitude 14° 59 N. On its banks, and to the extent of two hundred miles up the stream, the English cut mahogany, and by the treaty of 1783 a right was guarantied to British subjects of cutting and carrying away logwood in the district between this river and the Rio Hondo. Beyond the scene of their operation the Balize is very imperfectly known."

Again:

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unite the two seas, on condition that the United States shall make a similar guaranty to New Granada of the neutrality of this portion of her territory, and her sovereignty over the

same.

"The reasons which caused the insertion of this important stipulation in the treaty will be fully made known to the Senate by the accompanying documents. From these it will appear that our chargé d'affaires acted, in this particular, upon his own responsibility, and without instructions. Under such circumstances, it became my duty to decide whether I would submit the treaty to the Senate; and, after mature consideration, I have determined to adopt this

course.

"The importance of the concession to the commercial and political interests of the United States cannot easily be overrated. The route by the Isthmus of Panama is the shortest between the two oceans; and, from the information herewith communicated, it would seem to be the most practicable for a railroad or canal.

"The vast advantages to our commerce which would result from such a communication, not only with the west coast of America, but with Asia and the islands of the Pacific, are too obvious to require any detail. Such a passage would relieve us from a long and dangerous navigation of more than nine thousand miles around Cape Horn, and render our communication with our own possessions on the northwest coast of America comparatively easy and speedy. "The communication across the isthmus has attracted the attention of the Government of the United States ever since the independence of the South American Republics. On the 3d of March, 1835, a resolution passed the Senate in the following words:

"Resolved, That the President of the United States be respectfully requested to consider the expediency of opening negotiations with the Governments of other nations, and particularly with the Governments of Central America and New Granada, for the purpose of effectually protecting, by suitable treaty stipulations with them, such individuals or companies as may undertake to open a communication between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, by the construction of a ship-canal across the isthmus which connects North and South America; and of securing forever, by such stipulations, the free and equal right of navigating such canal to all such nations, on the payment of such reasonable tolls as may be established, to compensate the capitalists who may engage in such undertaking and complete the work.'

"No person can be more deeply sensible than myself of the danger of entangling alliances with any foreign nation. That we should avoid such alliances has become a maxim of our policy, consecrated by the most venerated names which adorn our history, and sanctioned by the unanimous voice of the American people. Our own experience has taught us the wisdom of this maxim in the only instancethat of the guarantee to France of her American possessions-in which we have ever entered into such an alliance. If, therefore, the very peculiar circumstances of the present case do not greatly impair, if not altogether destroy, the force of this objection, then we ought not to enter into the stipulation, whatever may be its advantages. The general considerations which have induced me to transmit the treaty to the Senate, for their advice, may be summed up in the following particulars:

"1. The treaty does not propose to guaranty a territory to a foreign nation in which the United States will have no common interest with that nation. On the contrary, we are more deeply and directly interested in the subject of this guarantee than New Granada herself, or any other country.

2. The guarantee does not extend to the territories of New Granada generally, but is confined to the single province of the Isthmus of Panama, where we shall acquire by the treaty a common and coextensive right of passage with herself.

"3. It will constitute no alliance for any political object, but for a purely commercial purpose, in which all the navi gating nations of the world have a common interest.

4. In entering into the mutual guarantees proposed by the thirty-fifth article of the treaty, neither the Government of New Granada nor that of the United States has any narrow or exclusive views. The ultimate object, as presented by the Senate of the United States in their resolution, to which I have already referred, is to secure to all nations the free and equal right of passage over the isthmus. If the United States, as the chief of the American nations, should first become a party to this guarantee, it cannot be doubted-indeed, it is confidently expected by the Government of New Granada-that similar guarantees will be given to that Republic by Great Britain and France. Should the proposition thus tendered be rejected, we may deprive the United States of the just influence which its acceptance night secure to them, and confer the glory and benefits of being first among the nations in concluding such an arrangement upon the Government either of Great Britain or France. That either of these Governments would embrace the offer, cannot well be doubted; because there does not appear to be any other effectual means of securing to all nations the advantages of this important passage but the guarantee of great commercial Powers that the isthmus shall be neutral territory. The interests of the world at stake are so important that the security of this passage between the two oceans cannot be suffered to depend upon the wars and revolutions which may arise among different nations.

"Besides, such a guarantee is almost indispensable to the construction of a railroad or canal across the territory. Neither sovereign States nor individuals would expend their capital in the construction of the expensive works, without some such security for their investments.

"The guarantee of the sovereignty of New Granada over the isthmus is a natural consequence of the guarantee of its neutrality, and there does not seem to be any other practicable mode of securing the neutrality of this territory. New Granada would not consent to yield up this province in order that it might become a neutral State; and if she should, it is not sufficiently populous or wealthy to establish and maintain an independent sovereignty. But a civil Government must exist there, in order to protect the works

Special Session-Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

which shall be constructed. New Granada is a Power which will not excite the jealousy of any nation. If Great Britain, France, or the United States held the sovereignty over the isthmus, other nations might apprehend that, in case of war, the Government would close up the passage against the enemy: but no such fears can ever be entertained in regard to New Granada."

The vote on the treaty was as follows: "YEAS-Messrs. Atchison, Atherton, Badger, Bagby, Benton, Berrien, Borland, Bradbury, Bright, Butler, Calhoun, Davis of Mississippi, Dickinson, Dix, Downs, Foote, Hannegan, Houston, Hunter, Lewis, Moore, Niles, Rusk, Sebastian, Spruance, Turney, Underwood, Westcott, and Yulee-29.

"NAYS-Messrs. Baldwin, Clarke, Davis of Massachusetts, Dayton, Hale, Miller, and Upham-7."

It thus appears that every Democratic Senator of that day voted for the treaty. The Senator from Illinois, it would seem, is not of that school.

When I went into the office of Secretary of State under President Taylor, I found that a company of British capitalists contemplated the formation of a ship canal by the way of the river San Juan and Lake Nicaragua, and that they had employed Mr. Wheelright, an English gentleman, to make the necessary arrangements and obtain the requisite grant for that purpose from the Government of Nicaragua. At the same time a company of American capitalists, the chief of whom was Mr. Vanderbilt, of New York, was engaged in the prosecution of the same purpose, and had employed an agent to procure a grant from Nicaragua in their behalf. Supposing that Great Britain would throw her influence in favor of the English adventurers, the American capitalists naturally sought the aid of their own Government. The President appointed E. George Squier chargé d'affaires to Central America, in lieu of Elijah Hise, who had been appointed to the same place during the administration of President Polk. His instructions, dated the 1st of May, 1849, fully explain the object of the appointment of Mr. Squier, in aiding the American capitalists to obtain the grant of the right of way, and to carry out the principles of the resolution of the 3d of March, 1835. Those instructions, after denying the validity of the Mosquito title, and asserting that of the State of Nicaragua, arrive at the conclusion that the United States, being interested in a free passage to and from the Pacific ocean by the way of the river San Juan and Lake Nicaragua, cannot tamely allow that interest to be thwarted by the pretensions set up by Great Britain as the protector of the Mosquito coast. As it is necessary to explain the policy of this Government, and especially that of President Taylor, I trust I shall be pardoned for quoting the following passage from the instructions which I gave to the minister to Central America before he proceeded on his mission:

"Having now sufficiently apprised you of the views of this Department in regard to the title to the Mosquito coast, I desire you distinctly to understand how important it is deemed by the President so to conduct all our negotiations on the subject of the Nicaragua pass as not to involve this country in any entangling alliances or any unnecessary controversy. We desire no monopoly of the right of way for our commerce, and we cannot submit to it if claimed for that of any other nation. If we held and enjoyed such a monopoly, it would entail upon us more bloody and expensive wars than the struggle for Gibraltar has caused to England and Spain. The same calamities would infallibly be east upon any other nation claiming to exclude the commerce of the rest of the world. We only ask an equal right of passage for all nations on the same terms-a passage unencumbered by oppressive exactions either from the local government within whose sovereign limits it may be effected, or from the proprietors of the canal when accomplished. For this end we are willing to enter into a treaty stipulation with the Government of Nicaragua, that both Governments shall forever protect and defend the proprietors who may succeed in cutting the canal and opening the water communication between the two oceans for our commerce. Without such protection, it is not believed that this great enterprise would ever be successful. Nicaragua is a feeble State, and capitalists, proverbially a timid race, may apprehend from the rapacity of great maritime Powers the obstruction and even the seizure of the canal. Similar apprehensions on their part, from revolutions in the local government, from the oppression and exactions of

temporary chieftains, and from causes not necessary to be explained, may operate to retard a work in regard to which it may be safely predicted, that when successfully accomplished, its benefits to mankind will transcend those of any other similar work known in the history of the world. All these apprehensions may and will be removed by the solemn pledge of protection given by the United States, and especially when it is known that our object in giving it is not to acquire for ourselves any exclusive or partial advantage over other nations. Nicaragua will be at liberty to enter into the same treaty stipulations with any other nation that may claim to enjoy the same benefits, and will agree to be bound by the same guarantee. In desiring that our own countrymen may obtain the charter or grant of the

Ho. OF REPS.

right to make the canal, we do not mean to be misunderstood. Our purpose in aiding American citizens to obtain the grant is to encourage them in a laudable effort, relying, as their Government does, more on their skill and enterprise than that of others. If they themselves prefer to unite with their own the capital of foreigners who may desire to embark in the undertaking, this Government will not object to that. We should naturally be proud of such an achievement as an American work; but if European aid be necessary to accomplish it, why should we repudiate it, seeing that our object is as honest as it is openly avowed, to claim no peculiar privilege, no exclusive right, no monopoly of commercial intercourse, but to see that the work is dedicated to the benefit of mankind, to be used by all on the same terms with us, and consecrated to the enjoyment and diffusion of the unnumbered and inestimable blessings which must flow from it to all the civilized world?

"You will not want arguments to induce Nicaragua to enter into such a treaty with us. The canal will be productive of more benefit to her than any other country of the same limits. With the aid of the treaty it may (without such protection from some Power equal to our own, it cannot) be accomplished. Let your negotiation with her be frank, open, and unreserved, as to all our purposes. The same reasons for our interference must be avowed to the capitalists who may enlist in the work. Before you treat for their protection, look well to their contract with Nicaragua. See that it is not assignable to others, that no exclusive privileges are granted to any nation that will not agree to the same treaty stipulations with Nicaragua, that the tolls to be demanded by the owners are not unreasonable or oppressive, that no power be reserved to the proprietors of the canal or their successors to extort at any time hereafter, or unjustly obstruct or embarrass, the right of passage. This will require all your vigilance and skill. If they do not agree to grant us passage on reasonable and proper terms, refuse our protection and our countenance to procure the contract from Nicaragua. If a charter or grant of the right of way shall have been incautiously or inconsiderately made before your arrival in that country, seek to have it properly modified to answer the ends we have in view."

It will thus be seen that the policy of President Taylor was not only in accordance with the resolution of 1835, but with the principles adopted by both Houses of Congress, and with those of every President of the United States from the days of Presidents Adams and Jackson to this time, so far as we have the means of ascertaining them.

6

But, it will be asked, if the views of President Polk were really such as are here represented, why was it that he suffered Mr. Hise to violate the principle and abandon the whole policy of the Government by the negotiation of Mr. Hise's treaty with Nicaragua of the 21st of June, 1849, by which Nicaragua grants" to the United States, 'or to a company of the citizens thereof, the exclu'sive right and privilege to make, construct, and 'build, within the territories of the State of Nicar'agua, through and by the use and means of any of the streams, rivers, bays, harbors, lakes, or 'lands, under the jurisdiction or within the limits of said State, a canal or canals, or road or roads, 'either railways or turnpikes, or any other kind of 'roads, for the purpose of opening a convenient passage and communication between the Caribbean sea and the Pacific ocean?" The answer is, that Mr. Polk never assented to or authorized any such thing. Mr. Hise acted in making the treaty not only without instructions and beyond his powers, but in direct opposition to the instructions which Mr. Buchanan gave him in his letter of the 3d of June, 1848. He went with powers to conclude a common treaty of commerce with the Republics of Guatemala and San Salvador. But Mr. Buchanan expressly added, "it is not, however, 'deemed advisable to empower you to conclude a treaty with either Nicaragua, Honduras, or Costa Rica, until you shall have communicated to the Department more full and authentic statistic in'formation in regard to those States than that which 'it now possesses. Mr. Hise's treaty, granting to us the exclusive right of way, was not only hostile to all the views and opinions of Mr. Polk, but it was also adverse to the sentiments of Mr. Buchanan, the Secretary, as expressed by him to Mr. Crampton, the British Minister, on the 22d of May, 1848, at which time Mr. Buchanan requested Mr. Crampton to ascertain Lord Palmerston's opinion with regard to a plan he felt very anxious to give effect to for the establishment of a communication by a railroad, in the first instance, and afterwards, if practicable, by a ship canal, across the Isthmus of Panama, between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans.

The great obstacle which had prevented the execution of this important undertaking had been, in Mr. Buchanan's opinion, the want of security for property in the territory which embraces the isthmus, resulting from the continual revolutions and

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hostilities of the Republics of Central America; and for this state of things he proposed the remedy by the conclusion of a treaty between Great Britain and the United States, admitting as parties to it, should it be thought desirable, France or any other great commercial Power, by which treaty the perpetual neutrality of the province in which the Isthmus of Panama is situated should be guarantied. Mr. Buchanan proposed to afford the advantage of the communication at a moderate toll to all nations. In these views, General Herrau, the Minister of New Granada, concurred. The British Minister himself is my authority for the fact.

We know, therefore, that the views of Mr. Buchanan concurred with the principle established in 1835, and that he could not have yielded his approbation to Mr. Hise's treaty for a monopoly. But Mr. Hise's treaty, independently of the objection on the ground of the exclusive privileges it conferred, was liable to others.

By the third article

"It is agreed that if the Government of the United States shall decide not to undertake and construct the said works, then either the President or Congress thereof shall have the power and authority to frame, enact, and issue a charter or act of incorporation, containing such liberal provisions, and such grants of rights and privileges, (not inconsistent with the rights of the contracting parties herein secured,) as may be necessary, convenient, or proper to effect the great objects in view."

We see, then, that Mr. Hise's treaty proposed, first, that the Government of the United States should undertake and construct the canal in Nicaragua; and, secondly, if it should decide not to do so, then either the President or Congress should issue a charter or act of incorporation for the purpose. As to the first proposition, I have never yet met with any man of any party who supposed that our Government had power to make improvements outside the United States and their territories. Mr. Polk denied that it had power to make internal improvements, and Mr. Buchanan was of the same strict-construction school. As to the second proposition, to confer upon the President or Congress the power to issue a charter or act of incorporation for the purpose of cutting a canal in Nicaragua, I need not ask the question, Who believes that either of them could exercise such a power under the Constitution? No foreign Government could confer a greater power upon our President or our Congress than the Constitution delegates to them. The power of Congress to create a corporation within the limits of the United States was denied by Mr. Polk. But if there be any man (except the Senator from Illinois, Mr. DOUGLAS) who thinks that either the President (who has no legislative power) or Congress, or both combined, have power to issue a charter incorporating a company to make a canal in Nicaragua, or a railroad in China, I have not yet seen him.

By the twelfth article of Mr. Hise's treaty it is provided, in consideration of the monopoly granted and the other grants in the preceding articles,

that

Special Session-Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

not a treaty for a political alliance, which he admits would have been fatal to its confirmation. On the very principles laid down by Mr. Polk in that message it is impossible that he could have ever consented to the ratification of Mr. Hise's treaty.

I have quoted but a part of the twelfth article. The other provisions of that article are not only entangling, but entangled. If I understand the article at all, it provides that we shall not support Nicaragua in her wars of aggression outside of her just limits; yet the naval and military forces, and the entire means and resources of both the contracting parties shall be employed "to put down all wars and bloodshed arising therefrom," and to suppress all violations of the peace and interruptions of the neutrality of the State of Nicaragua; that is to say, if Nicaragua should go to war outside of her own limits, we are bound to fight till we put down the wars and bloodshed arising from them; and Nicaragua is to help us to do that, for not only our entire means and resources, (that is, all we have in the world, or can possibly get,) but all she has or can procure shall be employed for the common purpose. We are also bound to suppress all violations of the peace within her limits; to effect which we must have kept an army there. The twelfth article then proceeds to declare, "for further explanation, it is ' understood that if the State of Nicaragua should 'become involved in a [just] war with any for'eign Power or neighboring State within her own 'border, to defend the territories rightfully belonging to her, or to recover such territories 'wrongfully wrested from her, the United States engage to aid and defend Nicaragua in carrying 'on such war within her own rightful limits." Comment upon this provision of Mr. Hise's treaty would seem to be an inexcusable waste of time.

There are other articles in this treaty sufficiently absurd to condemn it. But if I have not already shown enough for that purpose, I feel that it would be useless to refer to any others. Is there a man in this Senate who will dare to stand up and say he would have voted for it? Not one! And if the whole Senate had voted for such a treaty, it could never have been ratified either by President Polk or by President Taylor. If the President had ratified it on our part, we know it never could have become a treaty, for the Government of Nicaragua, when this treaty was presented to it by Señor Selva, the commissioner who signed it with Mr. Hise, utterly disapproved it, and refused to ratify it. Of this fact all were fully apprised by the published letter of Mr. Carcache, the charge d'affaires accredited to our Government by that of Nicaragua, addressed to the Secretary of State on the 31st of December, 1849.

It was under these circumstances that the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS] made a charge against me on the floor of the Senate, on the 14th day of February last, that I had suppressed Mr. Hise's treaty. What right had he to say that I had suppressed the treaty? As a Senator he ought to have known, and if he attended to his duty, and read the correspondence transmitted to the Senate by the President, he did know that it was utterly untrue; for General Taylor himself informed the Senate that he had declined sending it to the Senate for ratification, for reasons which I have already given. If the Senator meant to say that I had concealed the treaty, then his statement was equally destitute of truth, for he knew well that I had sent that treaty to Congress on the 18th day of July, 1850, and that it was among the published documents when he made the state

ment.

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arraign me or President Taylor for declining to offer it to the Senate for ratification? When he indulged himself so freely at my expense, on the 14th day of February last, did he not know that neither Mr. Buchanan nor Mr. Polk had ever authorized Mr. Hise to make such a treaty ?-that although Mr. Hise stated in the treaty that he had full powers to negotiate it, yet he had no such powers? Did he not know that Mr. Hise made the treaty in utter disobedience to Mr. Buchanan's instructions? Did he not know that Mr. Hise made that treaty after his recall, and after the appointment of his successor? Did he not know that the treaty was utterly inadmissible on the principles publicly avowed and acted upon by Mr. Polk? Did he not know that the treaty violated plain principles of constitutional law, and overthrew the settled policy of this Government since its origin? Did he not know, while he was delivering his speech here in the Senate, that this was a treaty the like of which no man of any party could either ratify or approve?

In a report of the speech of the Senator from Illinois, now before me, he states his objections to the treaty made by Mr. Squier with the State of Nicaragua, and also to the Central American treaty concluded with Great Britain on the 19th of April, 1850. As both these treaties were negotiated on the principles of the resolution laid down in the Senate on the 3d of March, 1835, I will take this occasion of answering his objections, and correcting some of his misstatements. In that speech the Senator says that Great Britain could never have colonized any part of Central America. In another part of the same speech he says that Great Britain had colonized the Bay of Islands, which he says lie in Central America, and belong to the State of Honduras, in violation of the Monroe doctrine and the treaty negotiated by me with Mr. Bulwer. Both the statements cannot be correct-the one or the other must be untrue; and strange must have been that obliviousness which involved the Senator in such a flat contradiction of himself. Again: he says that I had instructed Mr. Squier to say to the Government of Nicaragua that Mr. Hise had no authority to act. This is another singular misstatement. There is not a word in my instructions to excuse the Senator for making it. I had no idea that Mr. Hise had disobeyed Mr. Buchanan's instructions when I wrote the instructions to Mr. Squier. He had been directed to make no treaty with Nicaragua. How could I imagine that Mr. Hise had acted upon powers which were never granted to him by my predecessor? The date of my instructions to Squier, as the Senator knew, was the 1st of May, 1849. He equally well knew, if he read the public documents, that Mr. Hise's treaty was not made till the 21st day of June thereafter. The Senator prefers Mr. Hise's treaty on account of the monopoly of the right of way; and his objection to that of Mr. Squier is, that it opened the right of way to all nations upon the same terms. Did the Senator object to the treaty negotiated in the time of Mr. Polk with New Granada? And is not that treaty liable to the very same objection which he now makes against that of Mr. Squier? It is Mr. Polk's boast in his message transmitting the New Granada treaty, that the Panama route would be " open to all nations on

the same terms.

The Senator, who has joined with a few others in denouncing the treaties with Nicaragua and Great Britain for making the "Nicaragua passage free to all nations on the same terms, was never known to open his mouth against the treaty which opened the Panama railroad to all nations. The treaty of the 19th of April, 1850, provides for the neutral

in regard to this treaty-has he any complaint to make now? Dare he now say that he would, under any possible circumstances, have voted for that treaty? Would he desire me to send such a treaty as that to the Senate for ratification? Would he ratify it? He cannot say that he would; and if he cannot, with what show of propriety did he

States, and for that reason the Senator condemns it. The treaty with New Granada, having in view the same object-the protection of an interoceanic communication through the Isthmus of Panama, and providing for the neutrality of the province of Panama-meets with his unqualified approbation. The Senator has taken up his song against the treaty which guaranties the neutrality of all the Central American Republics, and liberates them from the dominion of Great Britain. That Government had actually seized them and occupied them, and yet his harp hung upon the Willows from the day when the treaty establishing

32D CONG.....3D SESS.

Special Session-Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

mend to Congress such measures as he should deem expedient, he said, in his message to the two Houses: "We owe it to ourselves to declare," &c.; that is, he recommended to Congress (in virtue of the right to recommend given him by the Constitution) to make this declaration in some resolution or other proper form, and he was pledged by it to nothing more than this: that, if Congress shaped such a resolution, or made such a declaration, he would approve it. There was no pledge in it to any Power on earth but his own countrymen in Congress assembled. The American Government could be committed only by the vote of both Houses of Congress, approved by the President. The proposition recommended by Mr. Monroe was warmly opposed by the very Congress to which it was submitted. No such declaration was made or attempted to be made by Con

the neutrality of Panama went into operation till the present time, and during the whole succeeding period of five years not a murmur of disapprobation escaped his lips. He complains that, under the treaty negotiated by the Administration of General Taylor, we could not fortify in Central America, while the British can fortify at Jamaica; yet he has always been perfectly satisfied with the treaty of Mr. Polk, which deprives us of the power to fortify in any part of the province of Panama, while the British can fortify in British Guiana. He is shocked that we cannot annex the Central American Republics to the United States; yet he himself professes, almost in the same breath, to be opposed to the annexation. He cannot understand the reason why the Government of Nicaragua refused to ratify the treaty made by her Commissioner, Señor Selva, with Mr. Hise; yet he has seen that treaty which cedes away the juris-gress; but Mr. Clay, who was an ardent supporter diction of the State and her public domain to an enormous extent, and reduces her to a complete stage of vassalage; and, because he cannot understand this, he attributes her refusal to ratify that treaty to the influence of Mr. Squier and to my instructions. He amuses us with the assertion that the treaty of the 19th of April, 1850, is a negation of the Monroe doctrine in every particular; yet in the next breath he asserts that the treaty and the Monroe doctrine are so identical that a violation of one is a violation of both. And he urges us to make an issue with the British Government about the colony of the Bay Islands, which he says is a striking infraction of the treaty as well as the Monroe doctrine, and presents a very pretty quarrel as it stands. He is a great advocate of the Monroe doctrine, yet refuses to vote for that doctrine when asserted in a resolution presented by one of his own party.

As he declared that his reason for opposing the treaty of the 19th of April, 1850, was its " negation of the Monroe doctrine," I propose to examine the history of that doctrine, with a view to show not only that his assertion is unfounded, but that, while the policy indicated by the treaty has been the established policy of this Government for more than twenty years, the Monroe doctrine never has been established as a principle to regulate the action of this Government, and has been repudiated as often as an effort has been made in Congress to sustain it. In saying this, I do not mean to be understood that the Executive branch of the Government has not recommended it to Congress for effect or to attain a special object, nor do I mean to censure any President for doing so, but the President does not constitute the Government; and I mean to say that neither the President and Senate, by any treaty, nor Congress, by any vote or resolution, have ever sustained it.

Mr. Monroe's declaration was made in his seventh annual message to Congress, on the 2d of December, 1823:

"We owe it," said he, "to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and the European Powers, to DECLARE that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies and dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments which have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great considerations and just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition, for the purpose of oppressing them, or of controlling in any other manner their destiny, by a European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."

This celebrated declaration, which is often quoted as a pledge to go to war with any European nation which shall attempt to colonize any part of this hemisphere, is not a declaration by the President to a foreign country, but a mere recommendation to Congress, to declare, first, that we think any attempt to extend the European system, that is, to make a European colony in this hemisphere, would be dangerous to our peace and safety; and, secondly, that any European interposition to control the destiny of an established American Government would be viewed by us as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. Congress utterly refused to adopt the recommendation at the time, and has ever since refused to make any such declaration. Mr. Monroe made no declaration himself; but, in pursuance of the power given him by the Constitution to recom

of Mr. Monroe's administration, did, at the time, propose a resolution to the House of Representatives, which was intended to approach the declaration, but even that failed. His resolution was," that 'the people of these States would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible interposition by the 'allied Powers of Europe, in the behalf of Spain, to 'reduce to their former subjection those parts of the 'continent of America which have proclaimed and ' established for themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which have been solemnly ' recognized by the United States." Even had this passed, it was but a poor response to the recommendation. It did not adopt Mr. Monroe's language or its equivalent, and it restricted "the serious inquietude" we should feel to the case of a forcible interposition by the allied Powers to aid Spain! But Mr. Clay's resolution, even when thus diluted, backed by all the influence which he and Mr. Webster exerted on the occasion, never passed the House of Representatives. The Hon. James K. Polk, during the debate on the Panama mission, tells us the fate of Mr. Clay's resolution, and of Mr. Webster's kindred Greek resolution, which was defeated by a large majority at the same session. As Mr. Polk is often cited as an advocate of the opinion that Mr. Monroe's presidential message had pledged the nation to adopt the policy which Mr. Monroe merely recommended, I beg to quote the following passage from his speech on the Panama mission, in 1826, as not only showing that he did not consider such recommendations as he and Mr. Monroe gave to Congress as in any sense binding upon this Government, without the consent of Congress, but also to show the fate of Mr. Clay's resolution:

ITS OFFICE.

"Before he concluded, Mr. Polk said he would say a word in relation to the pledge which it was said the nation had given in relation to our South American policy. When the message of the late President (Monroe) of the United States was communicated to Congress, it was viewed, as it should have been, as the mere expression of opinion of the Executive, submitted to the consideration and deliberation of Congress; and designed, probably, to produce an effect upon the councils of the Holy Alliance, in relation to their supposed intention to interfere in the war between Spain and her former colonies. That effect it probably had an agency in producing; and, if so, IT HAD PERFORMED The President had no power to bind the nation by such a pledge. The sound and sober judgment of the people of the United States had not been brought up to the conclusion that we could, in any event, make common cause with the Republics of the South, or involve ourselves in the calamities of war in their behalf; all our sympathies, all our good feelings were with them; we wished them success; but self-preservation is the first law of nature and of nations; we were then, as he hoped we still were, unprepared to depart from our settled policy. As a strong evidence of what the opinion of this House then was, the present Secretary of State, (Mr. Clay,) then a member of the House, had submitted a resolution responding to the sentiments of the message of the President. The Greek resolution was submitted, too, at the same session, by the honorable member from Massachusetts; the fever was up; we seemed to be then, if we ever had been, prepared to go on a political crusade in behalf of others. The sober judg. ment of the House interposed; the Greek resolution shared its fate, and sleeps upon the table. Mr. Clay saw clearly that the same fate inevitably awaited his South American resolution, with only this difference, that it would probably have been negatived by a much more overwhelming majority. It was not called up. He, however, effected one object; he prevented any expression of opinion. By submitting his resolution, others were induced not to do so, with an expectation of having an opportunity of voting on his. And now it is said the national honor is pledged to act up to the declaration of that message. For himself, he did not so consider it; and for one, he never could agree to endanger the peace of the country by sending ministers to the consultative assembly at Panama."

In the same celebrated debate on the Panama mission, Mr. Buchanan opposed the mission on

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the same grounds: Speaking of the Monroe declaration, he said:

"It answered the purpose for which it was intended, and the danger which then threatened the Southern Republics has since passed away. This declaration contained no pledge to any foreign Government. It left us perfectly free, but it has since been converted into such a pledge by Mr. Adams's administration; and, although they have not framed formal alliances with the Southern Republics, yet they have committed the country in honor to an alarming extent." "Mr. Clay has gone to such extremities in the cause of these Republics, that in this particular prudent men would feel disposed to compliment his heart at the expense of his understanding."

Mr. Buchanan's complaint against Mr. Clay, which, he thought, went to show the weakness of Mr. Clay's head, was this: that he had instructed Mr. Poinsett to bring to the notice of the Mexican Government the message of Mr. Monroe, and that Mr. Poinsett had said to the Mexican Government that "the United States had pledged them'selves not to permit any other Power to interfere 'with the independence or form of government of 'the Spanish American Republics." I know it is claimed that in Mr. Buchanan's instructions to Mr. Hise, he asserted the Monroe doctrine; but on a careful examination of his language it will be found that he did not instruct Mr. Hise to make any such declaration, and only said that European interference with the domestic concerns of the American republics would "jeopard their independence and ruin their interests," and in the very next sentence he assigns a reason why the United States decline to resist such interference. In the same instructions he tells Mr. Hise that "it is our intention to maintain our established policy of non-intervention in the concerns of foreign nations."

Such are the words of Mr. Polk and Mr. Buchanan. Their acts or omissions to act were still more significant of their opinion of the binding force of the Monroe doctrine. The letters of Buitrago, the Secretary of State of Nicaragua, to Mr. Buchanan, of the 12th of November, 1847, and of Guerrero, the President or Supreme Director of that State, to President Polk, on the 15th of November, 1847, implore the enforcement of the Monroe doctrine. Not one word of reply-not any kind of notice was ever given by either of them to Nicaragua that such letters were received. The most impassioned eloquence, urging again and again that Nicaragua was about to fall a victim to British aggression, and entreating the United States to interfere on the very principles advanced by Mr. Polk himself, in his message at the first session of the Twenty-ninth Congress, and reiterated in his Yucatan message, was of no avail. The solicitations of Salinas and Castellon, and the warnings of Mr. Livingston, our consul at Leon, were equally ineffectual. There seemed to be no chord in the bosom of that Administration which vibrated to the touch of those who kneeled and begged for succor in this dark hour of their distress. The Monroe doctrine was laid aside; the President's own recommendation to Congress had, we must suppose, also, like Mr. Monroe's, "performed its office. The British, in their ships of war Alarm and Vixen, entered the San Juan river without even a remonstrance from our Government, on the 8th of January, 1848, and while Mr. Polk and Mr. Buchanan slumbered over all these forewarnings of the fate of Nicaragua, took the town of San Juan, and changed its name to "Greytown," stormed the fort of Serapaqui, and in the Island of Cuba, in the midst of the magnificent lake of Nicaragua, dictated their own terms as conquerors to the unhappy people who, relying upon our supposed promises of help contained in the President's previous public avowal of the Monroe doctrine, had dared to wage war and expend their blood in defense of their native land. The documents before Congress exhibit on the part of our Government the most cold and contemptuous silence-a perfect indifference to all the appeals of our weak sister Republic, and her letters were never answered until they were answered by Zachary Taylor, who has been so much abused for not carrying out the Monroe doctrine! His letter to the President and mine to the Secretary of the State of Nicaragua, are among the published documents before you; and how fully they refute the calumnies which for three years have filled a portion of the party press of this country and disgraced its character for veracity, all men are now