32D CONG..... 1ST SESS. Fortification of Key West and the Tortugas-Mr. Cabell, of Florida. commanding influence which it was supposed British councils had obtained, by the late adjustment of the affairs of Europe." The Marquis asked, "How did it happen that Ministers had been unable to prevent this cession?" He again speaks of it as "an occurrence, the prevention of which was so important to our inter ests. Earl Bathurst and Earl Liverpool replied to this speech at length, but did not controvert the facts asserted or opinions avowed as to the importance and effect of the cession, On the same subject (ibid., p. 902) June 3, 1819, in a debate in the House of Commons, on the "foreign enlistment bill," Mr. Macdonald said: "As to Ferdinand, in whose behalf we were now called on to interfere, this monarch, who was leagued to us in the strictest amity, had the other day made over a most important colony to OUR GREAT WESTERN RIVAL without consulting our interests or our wishes. The cession of Florida to the United Stutes could never have taken place if the spirit of the treaty of Utrecht had prevailed in the negotiations of those statesmen to whom the settlement of Bavaria, Baden, or any other German province, had seemed of so much consequence. But independently of positive treaties, there could be no question that we should have been justified in interfering in such a case, as self-preservation, which formed a part of the law of nature, was necessarily a part of the law of nations," And in the same debate (ibid., p. 893) Mr. Maryatt, referring to the Spanish revolted colonies in South America, said they had— "Another ally in both the interest and feelings of the people of the United States, whose territories, by the purchase of Louisiana, now come into contact with the borders of Mexico. The great and avowed object of their ambition is, that the whole of the vast continent which they inhabit should become independent like themselves, and the New World one day rival the Old. Although a sop has for the present been given to Cerberus by the cession of the Floridas to the United States, the policy of the Government will not long be able to restrain the wishes of the people, but be compelled to join in this popular and patriotic cause,' "&c. * * * The "late cession of the Floridas to the United States has certainly furnished that Government with great additional means of annoyance to our West India colonies in case of war ;" and, "the want of regard she [Spain] has shown in both these cases to the security of our colonial possessions certainly releases us from all obligation to interest ourselves about hers," &c. The celebrated Sir Robert Wilson, in same debate, (ibid., p. 871,) said: "North America had sent commissioners [to South America,] not to negotiate South American independence, but to give a character to their governments. Seeing all that had been done, Spain interposed and purchased the forbearance of America by the cession of Florida. It was dangerous to be a prophet in political events at all times, but more particularly of late, when reason and facts were so opposed. But he would hazard the assertion, that after Florida had been occupied by her population, and her new position was secured to menace in the event of war the trade through the Gulf, America would next demand Cuba, AND THAT SHE WOULD OBTAIN. By intrigue and intimidation she would ultimately extend her views of aggrandizement to Mexico, push her frontier from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean, and in the end laugh at Great Britain as the dupe of her artifice." And in the House of Lords, June 28, 1819, in a debate on the same bill, (ibid., p. 1413,) the Earl of Carnarvan asked: "Had no events recently taken place, which were calculated to affect the interests of Great Britain? Had not Spain ceded to America that very colony, [Florida,] which of all her other colonies, was most important to the welfare of our transatlantic possessions? * "Would not each of her colonies, one after another, fall a victim to the avarice and ambition of another great Power? Would not the fate of Florida soon become the fate of Mexico? When we looked at the weakness, the imbecility, and the absurd policy of Spain, it was proper that we should also consider what the fate of South America would be were the House to withdraw the British troops from it." Similar opinions were advanced by other speakers in both Houses of Parliament, in the debate on that bill, and in other debates the same session. On repeated occasions since, like views have been expressed by British statesmen. Mr. Huskisson, an English Minister, it is said (see Senate Doc. No. 318, p. 33, 1st sess. 32d Cong.) once proposed the seizure and fortification of the Tortugas by the British Government, because it was the key to the Gulf and West India trade. Lord George Bentinck's speeches, since made, show that both ministerial and opposition statesmen in England, have had their vigilant attention directed to that region, and to these points as controlling them. They appreciate their importance, if some American statesmen do not. On the 3d of February, 1848, in a debate in the House of Commons respecting the slave trade and slavery, Lord George Bentinck, as reported in the London Times, said: "He would, therefore, say at once, let them [the British Government] take possession of Cuba, and settle the question altogether. Let them distrain upon it for the just debt due, and too long asked in vain from the Spanish Government. They would put an end to the slave-trade if they could emancipate the slaves of Cuba. If the people of this country thought it right to spend £150,000,000 in putting down slavery and ruining our colonies besides, would it not be cheap policy to put an end to slavery forever by seizing Cuba?" Lord George further said, "The case of Cuba stood upon its own merits, and upon the debt of £45,000,000 due to British subjects from the Spanish Government. Then, depend upon it, when Great Britain possessed Havana, as once she did in 1762, when she held it for about a year, and then exchanged it for the Floridas, and when she could cut the trade of America in two, no more boasts could be heard of what the United States would do, such as that which was not long ago uttered by one of her military officers, who declared that they never would be satisfied until Uncle Sam had set his right foot upon British Canada, and his left upon California, embrace the whole of the eastern sea-board, and throw his leg, like a freeman, over the whole continent of South America to Cape Horn, with Cuba for a cabbage garden.'" 6 The speeches just referred to are exemplifica- the case. They are now disposed to acquiesce Ho. OF REPS. tageously; the present deplorable condition of Jamaica would soon become the fate of Cuba. It would be better for her for the United States to own it. She is sincere in her expressed desire to put an end to the African slave trade. This will be stopped if we possess Cuba. Even the shallow-brained fanatics who would excite trouble on the subject of negro servitude, are beginning to see that such would be the result. Whatever Lord Palmerston or such misguided and mischievous men as the late Lord Bentinck, may say or be willing to do ex→ hibiting hostility to the United States, they are not now sustained by the British people, or their judicious and most intelligent statesmen. But though it is not probable that we shall have any serious difficulty with Great Britain, he must be a careless observer of passing events who does not perceive the "clouds gathering in the political horizon" of Europe. Great Britain sees it. She is preparing for it. She is vastly augmenting her naval force at Jamaica and elsewhere. An European war may take place within the next year, which will be fought in American seas; nay, near our own coasts. We may be involved in it. It will be difficult to avoid it. I repeat, though once our enemy, Great Britain is now bound to us by ties of interest and friendship; there is little probability of collision between the "stars and stripes" and the "cross of Saint George." Her preparations are to meet the coming storm in Europe. In this, great as she is, she may encounter fearful odds, and be induced to invoke our aid against the combined despotisms of the Continent, and which aid. a distinguished Democratic statesman, the ablest of President Polk's Cabinet, recently assured the people of England would be promptly and freely given. Profiting by her past dear-bought experience, Great Britain, however, may wisely adopt the policy of the United States, and resolve to keep aloof from the wars of continental despotisms, which have been so profitless to her, and have entailed upon her people a public debt of eight hundred millions of pounds sterling. This policy of "armed neutrality" will enable her to maintain such attitude, and will coerce the respect of all belligerent Powers. Our relations with Spain may lead to trouble. The odious and insulting system of secret spies she has adopted towards our Government and people, and their unfounded and mischievous reports; the unnecessary severity and cruelty her functionaries have pursued towards misguided Americans in their power; the strange conduct of her Cuban officers, displaying jealousy and hatred towards our people; its misgovernment of Cuba and Cuban affairs, arising from fear, selfishness and avarice; her exactions upon our trade and commerce, and the illegal exclusion of our vessels, and citizens from her harbors, in violation of the spirit of treaty stipulations, and her exhibitions of hostile feelings, are combined provocations to dispute. But it is to be hoped wiser and better counsels may prevail at Madrid, and at the Havana, which may result in the preservation of peace and harmony between the two nations. The difficulty that we should endeavor to be fully prepared for, if any occurs in which we shall become involved, is, it is most likely, with the French Emperor. The character and abilities of Napoleon the Third are greatly misunderstood in this country. He is one of the most observing and able men of the age, and has exhibited energy and executive talent scarcely surpassed by the great founder of his family. He is eminently a practical man-a man of few words, but of prompt and decisive action. I have good reason to say that the incessant attacks of a portion of the newspaper press of this country upon his conduct and motives, have excited ill feelings against us. Like the first Napoleon, he is exceedingly sensitive to such attacks; and the coarseness with which he has been assailed here has incensed him against the Government and people of the United States. It can be readily supposed that his assuming an unfriendly or belligerent attitude towards the only formidable republican government now existing, would gratify some of the other crowned heads of the continent, and would in some degree reconcile them to the restoration of the Napoleonic dynasty in France. The reported recent acts of the French Government with respect to the port of Samana, 32D CONG.....1ST SESS. Fortification of Key West and the Tortugas-Mr. Cabell, of Florida. in Hayti, are in harmony with the known sentiments of Louis Napoleon when in this country some years ago. It is a well-known fact, that Napoleon the First never recognized the independence of Hayti, and contemplated its resubjugation as a French colony. Louis Napoleon understands American affairs as well as any man in Europe. He is well acquainted with important matters of which many American citizens are ignorant. In 1846 he wrote and published an able work respecting the interoceanic route proposed at Nicaragua, as valuable as any written on the subject. It is hardly to be doubted that he intends or desires to reannex Hayti; and that he wishes to acquire a foothold in the Sandwich Islands, in Mexico, and elsewhere on this continent, and in South America, is equally certain. The restless genius of France loves not quiet. The French people, intoxicated by the memory of the glories of the Empire, anxiously await expected demonstrations by him to effect the unfulfilled purposes of Napoleon the First. is necessary for his own security that he should not disappoint them. He must divert and employ the turbulent spirits whom he has been elected to govern. His choice is a continental war-a war with the victors of Waterloo,-or a war distant from France, and in which he will have the sympathy of the ancient foes of the Empire. He cannot avoid one or the other. If he preserves peace in Europe, it will be by a war in the western hemisphere. mated cost of construction and repairs $1,200,000; expended $395,000; amount necessary to complete $805,000; cannon 185; cost of armament $160,725. Fort Jefferson, Garden Key, Tortugas: Peace garrison, one company; war fifteen hundred men; commenced in 1846; estimated cost, &c., $1,200,000; expended $210,133; necessary to complete $989,862; cannon 298; cost of armament $273,594. If it is the intention of our Government to complete these fortifications at any time; if it is not intended to abandon them, though partly finished, it seems to me there is an obvious propriety in the proposition I now submit, to make at once, the appropriation necessary to complete them as soon as practicable. As the appropriations are now made, it will require from fifteen to twenty years to complete the works at Tortugas! If appropriations be made in the manner recommended, they may be completed forthwith. To show the importance of completing works which have been commenced or determined upon, I ask special atIttention to the celebrated report of General Cass, then Secretary of War, of April 8, 1836, one of the ablest, and perhaps the best report ever made on the subject of fortifications. On pages 22 and 23, (Ex. Doc., vol. 6, No. 243, 1st sess. 24th Cong.,) he says: "I would suggest that the works which are determined on be pushed with all reasonable vigor, that our whole coast may be placed beyond the reach of injury or insult, as soon as a just regard to circumstances will permit. No objections can arise to this procedure on the ground of expense, because whatever system may be approved by the Legislature, nothing will be gained by delaying its completion beyond the time necessary to the proper execution of the work. In fact the cost will be greater the longer we are em eral superintendence and other contingencies, but because accidents are liable to happen to unfinished works, and the business upon them is deranged during the winter, when they must be properly secured; and the season for resum ing labor always finds some preparations necessary, which would not have been required had no interruption hap pened." There are some who believe that he designs an attack upon Great Britain, and that there is danger of the invasion of that Island. In my judg-ployed in it, not only for obvious reasons arising out of genment this is an idle surmise. The English papers, and especially the ministerial papers, nevertheless encourage it. I have observed that whenever the English rulers discover any trouble likely to arise at home from Chartists, Liberals, Irish patriots, op pressed working classes, or the like, they generally conjure up some such bugbear as "French invasion," and make cogent appeals to the loyalty of all British subjects to stand together for the "defense of their altars and firesides." The appeal rarely fails in its desired effect. Domestic and internal dissension is stifled by the aroused feelings of patriotic loyalty distinguishing the English people. Napoleon the Third has no intention of invading England. He may, however, unavoidably become involved with Great Britain; or he will engage in war with the continental Powers who hate and fear France, and will therefore combine against her, or, defying the American principle maintained by Mr. Madison with respect to Florida, in 1811, repeated by Mr. Monroe in 1823, and reiterated since, he may attempt to establish French monarchical colonies in America. He will be prepared for resistance to his measures; and he will be prepared, in retaliation for opposition to him, to intervene to prevent the acquisition by the United States, even by peaceful cession, of Cuba or any other new territory. And there is but one sentiment in this country, that such intervention will necessarily lead to war. Sir, I have some ground for speaking thus. One of the ablest and best of the Bonaparte family was long a near neighbor of mine, and an intimate friend. He was a sound republican, a large slaveholder, and an excellent citizen. I have heard much from that intelligent gentleman of his relative, the present Emperor of the sentiments, feelings, and views of the family; and I tell you, sir, Napoleon the Third cannot if he would, and would not if he could, remain at peace during the year 1853. We are as likely as any other people to become embroiled with him, and such result will be accelerated, if it can be, by the intrigues and incitement of every Power of the Old World hostile to liberal government. "But the political considerations which urge forward this great object are entitled to much more weight. When once completed, we should feel secure. There is probably not a man in the country who did not look with some solicitude during the past season at our comparatively defense less condition, when the issue of our discussions with France was uncertain; and who did not regret that our preparations, during the long interval of peace we had enjoyed, had not kept pace with our growth and importance. We have now this lesson to add to our other experience. Adequate security is not only due from the Government to the country, and the * * * * * conviction of it is not only satisfactory, but the knowlege of its existence cannot fail to produce an influence upon other nations, as well in the advent of war itself as in the mode of conducting it. If we are prepared to attack and resist, the chances of being compelled to embark in hostilities will be diminished much in proportion to our preparation. An unprotected commerce, a defenseless coast, and a military marine wholly inadequate to the wants of our service, would indeed hold out strong inducements to other nations to convert trifling pretexts into serious causes of quarrel." "I think that when the plan of a work has been ap proved by Congress, and its construction authorized, the whole appropriation should be made at once, to be drawn from the Treasury in annual installments to be fixed by the law. This mode of appropriation would remedy much of the inconvenience which has been felt for years in this branch of the public service. The uncertainty respecting the appropriations annually deranges the business, and the delay which biennially takes place in the passage of the necessary law reduces the alternate season of operations to a comparatively short period. An exact inquiry into the effect which the present system of making the appropriations has had upon the expense of the works would probably exhibit an amount far greater than is generally anticipated." The suspension of labor on works further north during the winter, mentioned by General Cass, is not the case as to these works. This should be considered in providing the means for their completion. That adequate means ought to be afforded to finish and arm these fortifications as soon as possible, so as to be ready forthwith for any emergency that may come upon us, is not only dictated by true economy, but in these instances the arguments urged by that distinguished states IN SUCH A CONTEST FORTS TAYLOR AND JEF-man, in the first paragraphs above quoted, apply with peculiar force. Before those works are probably completed in the ordinary progress in times of peace, allowed by annual or semi-annual appropriations of limited sums, they may be needed for defense or attack. More than five years have elapsed since they were begun, and not a third of the amount officially estimated as necessary for their completion, has as yet been appropriated. If a necessity should arise within the next five years for their use, and if they are then unfinished, the force to complete them may be wanted elsewhere; it may be more difficult to procure it, and the neces Ho. OF REPS. sary materials than at present, and the expense would probably be greatly increased. If the recollection of the solicitude" felt by so distinguished a statesman as General Cass, one of the most watchful guardians of his country's honor and interests, pending "our discussions with France," in 1835, should have caused him so strongly to urge the adoption of the measure I now recommend, with how much greater force do similar" political considerations" now appeal to us! They demand the serious attention of every statesman. Even delay in their consideration may be greatly injurious. No time can be more propitious for the execution of this proposition than the present. Our Treasury is overflowing. Our surplus revenue has become a subject of complaint. It is a positive grievance, and there is difficulty, real difficulty, in the way of the proper disposition of this excess of revenue over the present wants of Government. The public debt is not yet due, and the Government bonds cannot be bought except at a premium so high as to make their purchase at this time impolitic. This premium would necessarily be increased, so soon as it became known that the Government was in the market, a bidder for its own bonds. Why, then, may we not apply a portion of the fund lying idle in the hands of subtreasurers to this purpose? It cannot be more usefully employed, and will be but an anticipation of appropriations which must hereafter be made, when, perhaps, the expenditure of the money will be less convenient to us than now. The completion of these works is also a judicious measure, because it will destroy one argument strenuously urged by some in favor of the immediate annexation of Cuba, founded on the assertion that the Moro Castle now commands our Gulf commerce; and therefore that it is necessary we should possess it. As I have before shown, the fact assumed is not true. The Moro Castle, or any other point in Cuba, does not command the Gulf trade even now, if a respectable naval force is placed to protect it at Key West and Tortugas. On the contrary, Forts Jefferson and Taylor will, when fortified, with a small naval force, not only command that trade, but the Havana and Matanzas, and the entire northern and eastern side of Cuba, more effectually than the Moro Castle now does, even if the latter has a superior naval force to aid it. They will command that Castle itself. Yet the logic just alluded to, so artfully addressed to our pockets as well as our patriotic pride, is so potential that it has misled many good citizens and otherwise prudent statesmen into a willingness to withhold their pointed condemnation of highly reprehensible conduct by others, professedly to attain an object falsely assumed to be indispensable for the protection of our interests. It was my purpose to speak of the much-talkedof acquisition by the United States of Cuba, as closely connected with this subject. It is by far the most important question pending in this country. I desire and am prepared to discuss it; and, representing a State perhaps more deeply interested in what may precede, and in what must follow the consummation of such a measure, I intend to avail myself of the first opportunity that presents itself to express my views frankly and fully. At present I will content myself with saying, first, that if the works commenced at Key West and Tortugas are finished, it is not requísite for the protection of our vast and constantlyaugmenting commerce passing through "the Straits of Florida" that we should possess Cuba, or the Havana, or the Moro Castle, or any point in Cuba. Secondly, that if any attempt is to be made to conquer Cuba by naval and military force, the fortifications at Key West and Tortugas should be finished and garrisoned before it is made; being important to ensure success in that undertaking, with the least hazard, difficulty, and expense. Thirdly, after such conquest of Cuba, these fortifications are essential to ensure the continued possession of Cuba, even during the war for its acquisition, and at all times to prevent its blockade by a naval enemy. Fourthly, without these fortifications, in a war that will ensue from an attempt by us to conquer Cuba, or from our resistance of the attempts of any other Power to obtain that Island, or to interfere with it, or a war that may arise in any other way with any re 32D CONG....1st Sess. spectable naval power, our Gulf commerce, and all else that passes through the " Florida Straits," will be greatly exposed, and may be seriously injured. Fifthly, that these fortifications are necessary, even if we acquire Cuba by purchase and peaceful cession, and not only for the protection of the vast commercial and navigating interests I have mentioned, but for the protection, defense, and security of Cuba at all times hereafter. And, sixthly, if Cuba remains in possession of Spain, these fortifications are essential to us, insomuch as besides protecting our commerce and navigation, they will at all times" command the Havana, and "give us the control of the Island of Cuba." So far as Cuba is concerned, therefore, I claim for this measure the support of all divisions in this House and elsewhere of those who oppose the acquisition of that Island, of those who favor its acquisition by purchase and peaceful cession, and of those who would seize and hold it per fas aut nefas. 66 The Tariff-Mr. Woodward. refusing to consume the time of the House in de- HO. OF REPS. rights on the one side, and class obligations on the other. Well, sir, if revenue be the object of an impost system, and all of us agree that it is, at least one of the objects, and an indispensable one, it becomes us to know what constitutes the capacity, or rather the specific condition of the capacity of a country, to raise revenue by means of impost duties. That condition is, the absence of wealth in particular forms. It is because you can buy abroad what you do not make at home, or can buy cheaper abroad than you can at home, that foreign merchandise can bear an impost tax, and yet come into our markets. It is the difference in the cost of foreign and domestic production, in reference to any given article, that enables you to impose a duty on it, and without this difference you could impose no available duty whatever. Now, I was in favor of the resolution first introduced by the gentleman from New York [Mr. BROOKS] the day before yesterday. It was, in express terms, a proposition to reduce the revenue by reducing the duties; and are not we on this side of the House in favor of reduction? True, the proposition was to raise a special committee for this purpose, instead of referring the matter to the regular committee; but besides that the regular committee would have had no time to prepare such an exposition as would be useful and satisfactory Such being the case, the question of the practito the public; where was the danger in the appoint- cability of a fixed system of imposts, a permanent ment of a special committee? Would not the rate of duties, which, in the language of the distinIn conclusion, I repeat, sir, that no appropria- Speaker of the House have been bound-I do not guished gentleman from New York, [Mr. BROOKS,] tion can be made, no work constructed, in which say bound simply as a party man and a free trade should be adapted to prices abroad, and be high so many and such varied and important interests man-as a Democrat, representing the majority on enough when prices are low abroad, and low are involved. The ship builders and the ship this floor, but bound as the Presiding Officer of the enough when prices are high abroad, will depend owners of the East, and the commercial men of House, by parliamentary rule, to constitute the upon the inquiry, whether the difference in the cost the North generally, the planters of the South, committee favorably to the proposition to reduce? of foreign and domestic production, in relation to and the farmers of the West, all have a direct per- Though he had been a Whig, and a high tariff || the several articles of commerce, be fixed and personal interest in this measure. The General Gov- man, he would have been bound thus to compose manent; and this inquiry will be brought to a saternment is interested in the fortification of these the committee; for reduction was the only sub-isfactory conclusion, by a single restropective points. It is due to itself, and to the people of the stantive proposition. Very true, likewise, the glance at the brief period of twenty or twenty-five United States. Without them, our Navy may be committee was empowered by the resolution to years last past. I now assert, that a large proporcrippled in its strength, and rendered comparatively send for persons and papers; but if, as has been tion of foreign merchandise, which, at the begininefficient; and our commercial marine may, in the suspected, the gentleman from New York [Mr. ning of that period, would have borne a duty of language of Lord Bentinck, "be cut in two" by a BROOKS] intended-I do not, myself, impute any one hundred per cent. or upwards, is at the present maritime enemy. May I not, then, confidently such intention to him, but others have, and his in- time incapable of any duty whatever. And if appeal to all sides of this House, and to the patriot-dividual intentions appeared to be regarded by this be true, your capacity for levying imposts, ism of every American, to sustain the proposition them as constituting a part of his resolution-1 in relation to the descriptions of merchandise inI have made? say though he may have intended that the com- dicated, has diminished at the average rate of from míttee should send for persons and papers only on three to five, and in some instances, ten per cent. one side of the question, yet it must be remem- per annum. I beg gentlemen on both sides of the bered that his individual purpose would not have House to think of this; and especially would 1 controlled the committee. There was no obliga- solicit the serious meditations of that portion of tion imposed on the committee to send for per- the Democratic party, if there be, as I trust there sons or papers at all-it was only empowered to is no longer any such, who have aimed to stand do so; and even if it had been bound, it would upon the tariff of '46 as a finality, and who would have had its own discretion as to the manner of fraudulently erase from the Democratic creed the discharging the obligation. Had I been made a article of free trade and substitute therefor the member of such a committee, I am sure I should tariff of '46. have objected to receiving any ex parte budget without giving full time for the preparation of a budget on the opposite side of the question. I am indifferent, Mr. Chairman, about the adoption of this resolution, at this time. My object was to direct public attention, and particularly that of members of Congress, to this subject. That has been accomplished. Hereafter, when we come to consider the appropriation bills, I will again bring the matter before the House. In the mean time, I shall print these remarks, and the facts, statistics, and authorities to which I have referred, for the use of members, who I trust will give the subject some attention, and I most earnestly and respectfully solicit the members of the Committee on Military Affairs, and on Ways and Means, to give that consideration to the subject which its importance demands. THE TARIFF. SPEECH OF MR. WOODWARD, IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, The proposition of Mr. BROOKs to raise a Select Committee on the Tariff, being under consideration Mr. WOODWARD said: Mr. CHAIRMAN: This subject has come unexpectedly to me before the committee this morning, and I shall not detain them by entering at length into a discussion of the special merits of the tariff law of 1846, but shall limit my remarks chiefly to the question of what, in future, should be the commercial and fiscal policy of the country. Standing ready, at all times, to vote a reduction of the duties on imports, I am yet aware that Congress need not, at this short session, attempt any general or fundamental action on the subject. But it is because this is true, and because still more is true, it is because your longest session will not be long enough for mature action, that I am in favor of bringing up the question now. I desire that the discussion that may be had at this time shall go before the country, in order that the popular mind may be brought to bear upon the next session of Congress in relation to the matter. You have, time and again, seen propositions of radical reform run out at the end of your longest sessions. Why, sir, do not gentlemen remember, does not my friend from Virginia [Mr. BAYLY] remember, that the tariff of 1846 was saved from running out at the end of the session by its friends Now, the gentleman from New York seems to be in favor of a permanent fixed rate of duties, adapted to prices abroad, and which shall be high enough when prices are low abroad, and low enough when prices are high abroad. Mr. Chairman, I take the position thata permanent system is impossible, if the object be not to destroy foreign commerce, but to raise revenue by imposts. I take the position, that a permanent system is utterly inconsistent with the only lawful object of the system, which is the raising of revenue. In providing a tariff system, we do not act under the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations," but under a wholly different power, found in a different part of the Constitution; the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, the declared and only object of which is to raise money. That this is purely a money power has been declared by your ablest jurists-Judge Marshall among the rest, high Federalist as he was. I mean to say that a permanent tariff is impracticable, not in the nature of things, but consistently with the trust reposed in us, which makes it our imperious duty to see and be sure that we raise revenue by the imposition of duties and imposts, instead of fruitlessly and unjustly imposing a burden on trade; as though the Constitution had made it our duty to fetter commerce, instead of raising revenue for public uses. To impose duties with any other view, is to defraud the Treasury of which we are the guardians; to oppress commerce, which we are only authorized to tax for the sake of the Treasury; and all for the benefit of a class, which class is not once mentioned in the Constitution. Many public men reason and act as though the Constitution were a compact not between States, but between classes, and as though we met here to execute and enforce the covenants between classes as such, looking directly to class Why, sir, go back to the year 1816. At that time a huge proportion of foreign merchandise could have been imported under a duty of from one hundred to five hundred per cent. In 1816, you could have imported a hat, such as the one before me, under a duty of one hundred and fifty, probably two hundred percent. At the present time, a duty of fifteen or twenty would be prohibitory. Indeed, the existing duty is, I believe, prohibitory; for I have it from good authority that the article has quite ceased to be imported. And why is this? It is because the growth of the wealth of the country in home-made hats has reduced or destroyed the difference between the cost-value of the domestic and foreign article. It is the absence of wealth in particular forms, that enables any country to maintain an impost system. I could refer to a thousand important articles to prove the immense decline, and the large ratio of a still progressive decline, in your ability to levy high duties. I might refer to cotton cloths and cotton goods of every description; to leather, and every description of article made of leather, as very prominent articles for illustrating the proposition. In 1816, or even in 1828, most of the suggested articles would have borne a duty of one hundred per cent. Now many of them are incapable of any duty. Cottons, which twenty-five years ago would have borne that duty, are now exported into the very country against which they then had to be protected in the home market. Every single article of manufacture has become capable of less and less duty successively and continually. Not a year, not a month revolves, but some article of foreign commerce ceases to be dutiable. Take the article of sugar, once a prominent article in the protective system. Twenty years ago sugar would have borne a duty of one hundred and fifty, and probably two hundred per cent. I will stand corrected if I am in error. It did in fact bear a heavy duty. How is it now? What would be called a revenue duty in the view of a high tariff man, would now be a prohibition upon sugar, and 32D CONG.....2D Sess. it is not difficult to foresee that in ten years from this hour-and ten years is but an hour in the lifetime of a nation-sugar will be exported from the United States. And if the high tariff interest should make any proposition relative to it, ten years hence, it is most likely they will insist upon a repeal of all duties in order that the raw material may come in cheap to the manufacturer; for they teach us that whatever they want to buy is made cheaper by a low duty, and whatever they want to sell is made cheaper by a high duty. I must be understood as arguing the question before the committee more as a question of revenue, than one of free trade; assuming that the Government is to look to its impost system as its only present resource; and that direct taxes are to be resorted to only when, and in proportion as, an impost system shall prove inadequate. And I insist that the country ought to determine, at once, whether, in future, it is to look for its revenue to imposts, or in part to direct taxes. The Tariff-Mr. Woodward. revenue, when the proposition is submitted to them. But, sir, to return to the drift of my remarks, which was to show in what degree our foreign commerce is continually less and less capable of bearing high duties; and if I speak immethodically, and without a natural order of propositions, the committee will, of course, indulge me under the circumstances. The tariff of 1846 has already become, to a very considerable extent, and is rapidly becoming to a much greater extent, a prohibitory tariff. American skill is onward, American machinery is amplifying and approximating the perfection of that of Europe; in some instances surpassing it. American profits are lowering, and American economy is improving. There are very few things we could not make almost as cheap as they are made abroad. But just in proportion as our capacity to manufacture cheaply advances, so must duties fall progressively. The principle of low duties must be as progressive as American skill and American machinery, or else your tariff will become prohibitory. Now, sir, I lay it down as an undeniable proposition-and I am willing, in the course of this discussion, which I hope will go on, to be met upon the proposition-that the tariff of 1846 is at this time more prohibitory than the tariff of 1842 was at that time; and I maintain that if the tariff of 1842 were now the tariff of the country, your revenue would be less than $35,000,000; and if the tariff of 1828 were now the tariff of the United States, your revenue would not exceed $25,000,000; because, with the advancing skill of American artizans, foreign competition could not pay the duties imposed at that time, and come into competition with us. But the specific object proposed by the gentleman from New York, is to get rid of an existing surplus in the Treasury. There are two modes by which this can be done: You may diminish the revenue by reducing duties to moderate rates; or else, by means of prohibitory duties, you may reduce the amount of foreign commerce, which is the basis of duties, and in this way diminish revenue. In other words, you may diminish revenue by reducing or abolishing duties, or by reducing or abolishing foreign commerce. Either will answer the purpose. And regarded in a financial, and not a commercial point of view, it will make but little difference which method you adopt, if the object be simply to get rid of an existing surplus. But if the object be what it ought to be, to provide against future probable deficiencies as well as surpluses, then it is of great importance, both I do not pretend to deny that there is a much as a commercial and a financial question, whether heavier importation at this time, than what took you adopt this method or that. But the gentle-place at either of those periods: what I mean to man from New York proposed, in express terms, a reduction of duties as the means of reducing the revenue. Why should we, how can we, decline to meet him on that general proposition? The surplus in the Treasury has forced the question upon us. We, Democrats, cannot consistently evade it; we dare not; for the country sees that there ought to be a reduction of the tariff. Our situation is not what it was in 1846. The free trade party is in much better case now than then. At that time there was a deficient Treasury, and the fear was that reducing duties would increase the deficiency. The tariff men declared that it would, and treated the opposite proposition as an absurdity; and a portion of our friends were well nigh driven from the support of that tariff, from a serious apprehension that the Government might be bankrupted by it. It was not that they were averse to low duties-not that they were in favor of protection, that they gave in reluctantly, but because they were afraid of impoverishing the Gov ernment. That argument or ground of apprehension is now gone. There is a surplus in the Treasury of from seven to fourteen millions of dollars, and the question is whether you will continue that surplus, and if not, how you are to get rid of it. If it is determined that the surplus shall not be rendered permanent, then you are to decide whether you will reduce the revenue by reducing the duties, or by enacting prohibitory duties-and I maintain that this question could not go before the country in a form more favorable to free trade, or at a time more propitious than the present. In 1846 there was a deficient revenue, and the friends of a moderate tariff found it difficult to persuade the community that high duties made low revenue. The proposition was a little complex. But, sir, now that there is a surplus, the gentlemen who may propose to reduce the revenue by high duties must themselves evolve and expound that complex proposition. It does not rest upon our shoulders to do it. They themselves propose to reduce the revenue now, and they must show the country that raising duties will reduce the revenue, or else unite with us in giving effect to the opposite ideathey must maintain our former proposition. Having $14,000,000 surplus, the naked question is how to get rid of it; and, my word for it, the people of the United States will demand a reduction of duties as the means of reducing the say is, that the proportion of merchandise excluded by the present tariff, which would otherwise come into the country, is greater than the proportion excluded by either of those tariffs which would otherwise, then, have come in. As to agricultural articles, look at the extent of this country. We are the producers of almost everything, or capable of being so. What that is produced in any other country is not produced, or capable of being produced, in the United States? Tell me what articles of manufacture abroad, or what of the agricultural products of foreign climes, are not also produced in the United States, or likely soon to be? Coffee, tea, and some few tropical fruits, are not yet, I believe, found in the United States, but almost every other production is. There is, in the United States, this side of the stony mountain range, an amount of territory equal to the three States of Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana, of prodigious fertility and remarkable salubrity, which lies south of the southern extremity of Europe. It extends even. further south than the Barbary States of Africa; and though not of the same temperature, yet it is known that the inequality is not so great as to vary in any considerable degree its agricultural capabilities. The United States are a great ZollVerein, extending from the highest northern to the lowest southern latitude. Should Cuba become a portion of them, there will be almost nothing produced throughout the world that will not have its representative or analogue in the United States. I am told that in the deserts of California they actually find the gum acasia, a commodity thought indigenous only in the sand seas of Africa. In our day, almost everything is manufactured by means of machinery. A railroad locomotive, of five-horse power, inferior in quality and uncertain in its operation, and requiring to be tinkered every trip of fifty or one hundred miles, fifteen years ago, to my knowledge, cost $10,000. You now get an engine of six times that power, three times the speed, and as reliable for its operation as the rising of the sun and moon, for $6,000 or $7,000. Who will pretend that permanent duties are appropriate for that article? If a strict estimate be made, it will be found that railroad locomotives have been cheapened ninety per cent., and that is the reason why railroad stock, which was sold a few years back for thirty cents the dollar, is now Ho. OF REPS. one hundred and twenty-five and one hundred and thirty. I state this to illustrate the fact that American skill is progressing. It is hard on the heels of European skill, and so long as the difference between the two diminishes, which difference is the only thing which makes revenue by impost possible, your duties must be reduced progressively. A permanent system is an absurdity, if revenue be the object. Can any gentleman say what articles are not subject to the laws I have laid down? Take breadstuffs: What reason have we to imagine any description of breadstuffs will long remain cheaper elsewhere than in the United States? This great country has the greatest amount of waste land, and the most genial climates on the face of the earth. Are we to become dependent on foreign countries for breadstuffs? Never! Are we to become dependent on them for anything having relation to live-stock, or for animal products? It is only because the people of the United States getting virgin lands for nothing, can live on half labor, and the whole people can live by the labor of one half, that we do not drive Europe out of every market. When the population of the United States becomes a little more compact we will want to sell everything; for, taking in the northern region of Maine, the northwest division of our territory, this and the other side of the Rocky Mountains, and Texas, with the countries which can hardly fail to come under the operation of our institutions before many years, we will have (so to speak) an analogue to every country in the universe. A nation limited to a particular region, like England, having only a few descriptions of minerals, and producing only a limited number of vegetable commodities and raising a limited number of cattle, will be thus dependent, and the greater the number of articles she cannot produce, and the more pressing her need of them, the greater will be her power of levying imposts. And so of all the other European States. Their power of taxing the commerce of one another is immense; and, by reason of the impossibility of home production, the people of neither can evade the tax. But to think of this great Zoll-Verein-this great free-trade alliance of States, covering every clime of the world, resting their revenue system upon no broader a basis than their deficient capacity for home production, is absurd. Suppose the States of Europe, like the States of America, were united on the principle of a ZollVerein, (and to complete the comparison you should include with Europe the northern States of Africa,) with free-trade among them as there is by the Constitution among these States, and without any other reliance for revenue than on trade external to the whole of them, what would be the consequence? Royalty and nobility, armies and navies, would starve on any possible revenue under the case supposed. That is not yet our condition, but we are coming rapidly to it. It is a mistake to suppose that we have to grow as old as Europe to rival in her manufacturing. The newness or a country affords advantages for manufacturing in some respects. Many descriptions of raw material can be had cheaper, and the operative can, for the most part, purchase his provisions cheaper. I will mention materials of wood for illustration: Wood is cheaper in the United States than in England, and why cannot we make wooden fabrics cheaper? A laborer buys his meal for fifty cents a bushel here, and there for $1 50; and why cannot the laborer here, working ten hours a day, live better than the laborer there working fourteen hours a day? The half of a dollar is four times as much to a man in Ohio, Indiana, or Illinois, as to a man in Manchester, because he can get four times as much to eat with it. If he can live so much cheaper, and if the materials for manufacture, mineral or vegetable, are also cheaper, why cannot he manufacture cheaper? He can do it. He does not do it, because he can live comfortably without hard labor; while in Europe the operative must use diligent and hard labor or perish. There is a necessity to do it. Were our operatives to undergo the same labor, a man in Ohio would break down his competitor in England, because he obtains his raw material as cheap, and in some respects, a vast deal cheaper, and his bread and meal at less than half price. But this is not to continue always. The population of the United States is becoming dense. 32D CONG....1ST SESS. I The northern and middle States will not always have the alternative of high wages at home or public land in the West. The alternative of fleeing to the West to cultivate the soil instead of working for wages below certain rates, disables manufacturing in the older States; but that disability is continually being reduced. The new country is settling up, land is increasing in value, and every day your manufacturer acquires a new facility of bringing his laborer to cheap wages. am not speaking according to any sentiment of my mind, but according to the laws of political economy. They will rule. Wages will be regulated by supply and demand, and you may as well try to repeal the laws of chemistry as to repeal that law. They are all the laws of God. And I shall never hope, by progressive political science, to substitute a better law for it. Indeed, had a better law been possible, in the nature of things, God would have ordained that better law. But this is the age of engines-one machine makes another, or, rather, each one is made by all the rest. Everything is done by engines, and human beings are but their body servants. Why, sir, you have a machine for setting card-teeth, that has cut off one half of the revenue on that article. A machine can work as cheap in the United States as in England. It does not matter whether it be run among a crowded or sparse population. A pinmaking machine will work as rapidly in a wilderness as in a dense population. Take your machine for making percussion caps, and your machine for moulding bullets, (and I speak of these as curiosities familiar to every one.) will they make fewer caps or fewer bullets in the United States because we have a sparse population? They are constructed mathematically to run so fast, and in that proportion is their product. Indeed, it seems to be the destiny of machinery to engross the whole business of manufacturing, and to supersede, to a great extent, the employment of human labor in the mechanic arts. It would seem that the cultivation of the soil alone is to be left to human hands, and even that not altogether. It is therefore a great mistake to suppose that cheap manufacturing must await the old age of the country, and a dense population. These conditions are favorable as to most kinds of manufacturing, but not indispensable to any. And they are favorable only to the extent that human labor mixes with the operations of machinery. But while machinery thus tends to bring manufacturing to its highest perfection, even in a wilderness, when once introduced, it has the effect, also, of producing a precocious development of the agricultural and mineral resources of a new country; for, engrossing, to a great extent, the business of manufacturing, it drives thousand to the cultivation of the soil. The competition thus produced in agriculture leads, naturally, to the development of the science, and the improvement of the practice of agriculture. The consequence of which is, that agricultural products become greatly multiplied, and that, too, while the home market is contracted; for an engine neither eats bread or meat, or cheese, or vegetables, or wears clothes of wool, or flax, or cotton. For these disadvantages, however, the tiller of the soil has innumerable compensations in the institution of machinery. And I do not regret that things are as they are. One, however, cannot help regretting that this Government should have selected for the subject of its burdens those employments which are committed to human hands, and for the object of its bounties, those that are committed to hands of iron. But, in referring to compensations to the farmer, I do not admit that the increased wealth and consumptive capacity of the manufacturer is worthy to be mentioned, so far as breadstuffs, provisions, and the more substantial eatables are concerned. It is conceded that wealth is capable of increasing indefinitely one's importance as a consumer, with reference to manufactured commodities. Take, for instance, fabrics of wood or iron, or of any other metal. Such articles are applicable to ten thousand purposes of use or taste, or ostentation and folly; and the richer a man is, the more of them is he able and likely to consume. Each manufacturer, therefore, is apt to become a very important consumer to all the rest. But the human stomach is the spherometer of the chief market of the farmer; and that stomach is only in a minute degree The Tariff-Mr. Woodward. progressive; its capacity for consumption depends very little on wealth. Mr. Chairman, I am obliged to suspect that many do not realize the situation in which the country stands in regard to its commercial and financial interests. There seems to be a delusion on the subject, and I will endeavor to explain my conception of the cause. The duty on iron is thirty per cent. That duty we know is not prohibitory. But how much does it lack of being so? Is the prohibitory point five per cent. above the existing duty; or ten, or twenty? Who will undertake to say? The man who has made himself acquainted with the laws that govern in such matters, and has ascertained the principal conditions under which these laws are now operating, who has studied to know the number and force of existing activé causes, may be able to form a rational judgment; but he who has not done this is as incapable of an opinion as a dead man. He cannot know whether the point of prohibition be fifty, or only five per cent. above the actual duty. He cannot see that point, and will realize it only when it is present. It is to him as invisible as death, and like death it will most likely come upon him unawares. That the prohibitory point is near in our neighborhood, is proven by the fact that the reduced duties of the tariff of 1846 increased the revenue; for there was an increase of revenue before the gold crop came in. I think that no one will deny what I have already stated, that from the year 1824 to the present time, the dutiable capacity of a very large proportion of foreign merchandise has diminished at an average rate of from four to five per cent. per annum. The causes that have produced this diminution, I have endeavored briefly to explain. Now, suppose that for the next four years this reduction should go on at the same rate; what would be the action of the tariff of '46, at the end of the period, upon foreign merchandise that could not, to-day, bear a heavier duty than thirty per cent., or twenty-five, or twenty per cent.? Who can deny that this tariff is fast becoming a prohibitory tariff; and, indeed, is already so to a considerable extent? But it may be asked whether I would, by reducing the duties, incur the risk of increasing the existing surplus, instead of getting rid of it. I answer that I would most certainly, not doubting that the public would demand still further reductions, until surpluses should cease. The discovery of gold in California is the only thing that throws doubt upon the financial and commercial prospects of the country. We cannot reason safely from that fact, because we cannot know its future importance. But we can safely say that it will not repeal the laws of political economy. It has introduced no new principle, but has only made the country richer than it was before. Speculation, buying on credit, and overbanking, will not, however, be prevented by increased wealth, though their consequences may be postponed by a rapid progressive increase of wealth. The tariff of '46 would not now yield sufficient revenue to sustain your current expenditures, but for the gold crop from California. The discovery of those mines, besides throwing a large amount of specie into circulation, duplicating your currency, paper and metallic, has added vastly to your foreign trade. I may be charged with boldness when I say that the gold crop of the country in its double character of merchandise and circulating medium, has added to your exports eighty millions of dollars. In its character as merchandise it is admitted to have added some forty millions. In its character of money, it is conceded to have increased the circulating medium in metallic form, twenty millions. And when it is considered that the portion which went abroad as merchandise, in its transition, percolated the country and served as money for the time, twenty millions may be supposed too low a figure. But by increasing the metallic medium, it has also bolstered up and kept in a flush state, the paper medium, and in this way has enlarged the general circulation. Now, consider what is the just proportion between the whole amount of circulating medium and the whole valuation of property in a country. Set down money as one twentieth part of property, and it follows that if you add thirty millions to currency, you add six hundred mil HO. OF REPS. lions to the valuation of property. But an increase of valuation, brought about so suddenly, would not, at first, extend equally to all descriptions of property. It would first affect property actually in the market, and which from its nature belongs to trade, and is destined for annual consumption. Cotton, tobacco, &c., manufactures, &c., would first be affected. Real estate, fixed investments of capital, would experience the effects more gradually. But where the influence first acted it would tend to expend its whole energy, and cotton, with the other items mentioned, would go up to a valuation far above the due proportion between currency and property. Thus it will be seen that while gold as merchandise has added forty millions to our exports, as currency it has probably added forty millions more, by enhancing the valuation of exported property. And here I must beg you to recollect that the increase of our exports is not so much in the specific quantity of the articles exported as in their valuation. The specific quantity of cotton exported the last year does not much exceed that of previous years, but its valuation is fifty millions greater. And this valuation has been caused in the way I have described. I have said that forty millions goes abroad as merchandise; but it goes to Europe to become currency, and, added to the influx from Australia, it produces commercial and financial effects there, similar to those produced here by what remains in the country. The relations of the two countries will not therefore be changed. Both have acquired new wealth, and that is about all. The capacity of foreign imports to bear impost duties will go on diminishing hereafter as heretofore. If next year there should be found a surplus in the Treasury, it will be the result of increased wealth in this country and in Europe, and will only show that the prohibitory tendency of your tariff is not sufficient wholly to obviate the effects of that increase of wealth. We should pursue the same financial policy as if the mines of California had no existence. The discovery of these mines, by-the-by, and their yield, has saved this country from a commercial revulsion. We are now in the midst of the period when that revulsion would have occurred, but for the finding of these mines. Mr. BAYLY, of Virginia. If there be a commercial revulsion in prospect, would it not be better, since we have a surplus, to provide for our debt, which will not embarrass us when the revulsion comes? Mr. WOODWARD. That was a part of the argument which I overlooked. I have shown that duties are progressively advancing towards the prohibitory point. There are articles now imported into the United States under the tariff of 1846, which under that same tariff, will not be capable of importation hereafter, and by reducing the duty you will greatly increase revenue. I do not, Mr. Chairman, believe in a horizontal tariff in any sense, and I am not going to sustain a maxim because the Democratic party is the author of that maxim. There is a great variety of articles that will not bear more than five per cent. If you put twenty per cent. upon them they are prohibited. There are other commodities that will bear a duty of twenty per cent., and would raise the highest possible revenue at that duty. Would I have the same duty upon each of these articles out of respect to the horizontal principle? We ought to measure the capacity for duty of each article, and adjust the duty accordingly. I was about to conclude by saying, that if twelve months be permitted to elapse, and this discussion is deferred to the commencement of the next Congress, we will not get a bill through even at the long session of Congress. We have failed too often, and always would have failed, but for expedients by the prominent friends of free trade in the session of 1846. But the gentleman from New York has referred to the estimates of the tariff of 1846, showing how we were then disappointed. Now I happened not to be disappointed. I had been for several years on the Committee on Manufactures, and I felt it my duty to look into that matter. I did not know but that the question of revenue would come before that committee. I recollect perfectly well that my estimates, at the time most carefully |