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A purchaser, ex vi termini, is one who | in good faith without notice and for a reahas acquired the title, and the term cannot sonable consideration," mean without actual in legal propriety be applied to one who notice, or without a knowledge of such circlaims under an unexecuted contract to con- cumstances as may be deemed equivalent vey. Gilpin v. Davis, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 416, to notice. Zimmer v. Miller, 40 N. Y. Supp. 418, 5 Am. Dec. 632. 886, 890, 8 App. Div. 556.

A bona fide purchaser and a purchaser

PURCHASER FOR VALUABLE CON- without notice stand on the same footing of

SIDERATION.

The term "purchaser for a valuable consideration" is defined by the court in Fullenwider v. Roberts, 20 N. C. 420, as for "a fair and reasonable price according to the common mode of dealings between buyers and sellers"; or, as said by Pearson, C. J., in Worthy v. Caddell, 76 N. C. 82: "The party assuming to be a purchaser for valuable consideration must prove a fair consideration, not up to the full price, but a price paid which would not cause surprise, or cause any one to exclaim: 'He got the land for nothing.

There must have been some fraud about it.'"

Collins v. Davis, 43 S. E. 579, 581, 132 N. C.

106.

PURCHASER FOR VALUE.

A mortgage taken for a precedent debt does not constitute the mortgagee a purchaser for value as against a person acquiring an interest in the property prior to the giving of the mortgage and subsequent to the incurring of the indebtedness. Reeves v. Evans (N. J.) 34 Atl. 477, 478.

An indorsee of a negotiable instrument, who takes it before maturity in part payment of a pre-existing debt and credits it thereon, is a purchaser for value in the due course of business. Smith v. Thompson (Neb.) 93 N. W. 678, 679.

PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH.

See "Good Faith."

PURCHASER WITHOUT NOTICE.

The phrase "without notice," as used in Mill & V. Code Tenn. § 2890, providing that instruments not registered shall be void "as to existing or subsequent creditors or bona fide purchasers from the makers without notice," qualifies bona fide purchasers, and is not grammatically a qualification of the word preceding. Therefore a creditor of the grantor is not affected by an unregistered instrument, though he had notice of its existence. Southern Bank & Trust Co. v. Folsom (U. S.) 75 Fed. 929, 934, 21 C. C. A. 568.

The words "without notice," as used in Code Civ. Proc. § 2469, which provides that the receiver's title to personal property extends back by relation in certain cases, but not so as to "affect the title of a purchaser

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A pure charity is one which bears a portion of the burden that would otherwise fall on the public, and which gratuitously cares for persons who would otherwise be a public charge; and hence a charitable institution which requires a payment of an admission fee and the making of a will in its favor by the applicant is not a pure charity. In re Keech's Estate, 7 N. Y. Supp. 321, 322.

An act exempting institutions organized for pure charity from taxation applies to any association to improve the condition of the poor, which dispenses its benefits without any charge whatever, and keeps a place where money is disbursed to the needy. It is not necessary that it should have a house where the poor are lodged, but it is sufficient if it has a place or office where it transacts its business, consisting of the dispensation In re Lenof alms without discrimination. ox's Estate, 9 N. Y. Supp. 895, 896.

PURE PLEA.

A pure plea in equity must clearly and distinctly aver all the facts necessary to ren

der it a complete equitable defense to the case made by the bill, so far as the plea extends. It should be direct and positive, and not state matters by way of argument, inference, or conclusion. Where its allegations, being taken as true, did not, so far as the plea purports to extend, make out a full and complete defense, or where the necessary facts are to be gathered by inference alone, it will not be sustained. Da Costa v. Dibble, 24 South. 911, 912, 40 Fla. 418.

PURE SWEET WINE.

"Pure sweet wine" is fermented grape Juice only, and shall contain no other substance of any kind whatever, introduced before, at the time of, or after fermentation, and such sweet wine shall contain not less than four per centum of saccharine matter, which saccharine strength may be determined by testing with Balling's saccharometer or must scale, such sweet wine, after the evaporation of the spirit contained therein, and restoring the sample tested to original volume by additional water: provided, that the addition of pure boiled or condensed grape must, or pure crystallized cane or beet sugar to the pure grape juice aforesaid, or the fermented product of such grape juice prior to the fortification provided for for the sole purpose of perfecting sweet wines according to commercial standard, shall not be excluded by the definition of pure sweet wine as aforesaid: provided, further, that the cane or beet sugar so used shall not be in excess of ten per centum of the weight of wines to be fortified. U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2171.

PURE TAX.

A pure tax is a burden imposed by the sovereign power on all property and persons alike, and compensated for by the equal protection which all receive from such power. Dressman v. Farmers' & Traders' Nat. Bank, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 1013, 1014, 38 S. W. 1052, 1053, 100 Ky. 571, 36 L. R. A. 121.

PURE WINE.

As used in an act relating to the adulteration of wines, the words "pure wine" mean the fermented juice of the undried grapes, without the addition thereto of water, sugar, or any foreign substance whatever. Bates' Ann. St. Ohio 1904, § 4200–57.

PURELY.

In connection with the phrase "purely

public charity," and in its ordinary sense, the word "purely" means completely, entirely, unqualifiedly. White v. Smith, 42 Atl. 125, 126, 189 Pa. 222, 43 L. R. A. 498.

In the statute exempting from taxation Institutions devoted to merely pure public

charity, it is held that the word "purely" is equivalent to the word "wholly." Episcopal Academy v. Taylor, 25 Atl. 55, 56, 150 Pa. 565; Trustees Kentucky Female Orphan School v. City of Louisville, 36 S. W. 921, 923, 100 Ky. 470, 40 L. R. A. 119.

PURELY CHARITABLE INSTITUTION.

A "purely charitable institution," within the constitutional provision exempting certain classes of property from taxation, may be said to be an institution organized for the purpose of rendering aid, comfort, and assistance to the indigent and defective, open to the public generally, conducted without a view to profit, and supported and maintained by benevolent contributions. State v. Bishop Seabury Mission, 95 N. W. 882, 90 Minn. 92.

PURELY CHARITABLE PURPOSE.

A Masonic lodge building, the first two stories of which are rented, and the third used as a lodge hall, is not used for purposes purely charitable, within Const. art. 10, § 6, and Rev. St. 1889, § 7504, exempting buildings in cities and towns from taxation, when used exclusively for purposes purely charitable, notwithstanding the rents received or paid on the building went to pay a debt on the building. There is a very material difference between what is denominated a public charity and what is meant by the words "for purposes purely charitable." In Delaware County Institute of Science v. Delaware County, 94 Pa. 163, it is said: "No corporation or institution is a purely public charity which is not under control or supervision of the public authorities, or at least subject to public visitation, or is founded and endowed so as to give the general public under reasonable restriction an absolute right to receive its benefits, and, in case of failure of managers, to follow it and compel compliance therewith by application to the court. In the case of the dissolution of such a charity, its property must vest in the public authorities for charitable uses." An institution may be used for purposes purely charitable by distributing alms to the poor, needy, and afflicted of certain sects or nationalities, or the members of certain organizations, and their widows and children. Fitterer v. Crawford, 57 S. W. 532, 533, 157 Mo. 51, 50 L. R.

A. 191.

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ganized to carry on a general business of distilling liquors, and to deal in the same, and also to engage in dealing in cattle and other live stock, and in malting and dealing in malt. Distilling & Cattle-Feeding Co. v. People, 43 N. E. 779, 780, 161 Ill. 101.

PURELY PUBLIC CHARITY.

A public charity is defined as whatever is done or given gratuitously in relief of the public burdens or for the advancement of When the public is the the public good. beneficiary, the charity is public; and when no private or pecuniary return is reserved to the giver, or to any particular person, but all the benefit resulting from the gift or act goes to the public, it is a purely public charity. Kentucky Female Orphan School v. City of Louisville, 36 S. W. 921, 923, 100 Ky. 470, 40 L. R. A. 119 (citing Episcopal Academy v. City of Philadelphia, 150 Pa. 565, 25

Atl. 55).

Thus a religious denominational school, which does not limit the admission of children of members of its own denomination, though it gives a preference to such children, and is not maintained for pecuniary profit, is within the meaning of the term. Episcopal Academy v. City of Philadelphia, 25 Atl. 55, 56, 150 Pa. 565.

The Ohio act of 1864, exempting from taxation institutions of purely public charity, means buildings or property used exclusively for charitable objects. If an institution embraces other objects and uses, its buildings for other purposes, as, for instance, renting with a view to profit, it is not an institution of purely public charity. Cleveland Library Ass'n v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St. 253, 259.

Const. art. 9, § 1, exempting from taxation "institutions of purely public charity," cannot be construed to include an academy of learning whose chief source of mainteIt is not enough that

nance is tuition fees.

the institution be founded and endowed by
public or private charity, but it must be sub-
stantially maintained by public or private
charity. Appeal of City of Philadelphia (Pa.)
15 Atl. 683.

orphan children, open to the public, but to which the children of a certain religious faith were to be given a preference, and which asylum was to be under the religious auspices of such particular religious faith, is a "purely public charity," within the meaning of Const. art. 9, § 1, authorizing the exemption from taxation of institutions of purely public charity. Burd Orphan Asylum v. School Dist. of Upper Darby, 90 Pa. 21.

Under Const. art. 9, § 1, empowering the Legislature to exempt from taxation institutions of "purely public charity," an asylum for the maintenance and education of white female orphan children of not less than four have been baptized in the Protestant Episyears or more than eight, first, who shall copal Church in the city of Philadelphia; second, the same class of children baptized in said church in the state of Pennsylvania; third, all other white female orphan children between the said years, without respect to any other description or classification, except that at all times and in every case the orphan children of clergymen of the Protestant Episcopal Church shall have the preference-is a purely public charity. The word "purely," in this connection, is not to have its largest and broadest signification. It is not contended that a charity, to be purely public, must Without be open to the whole public, nor to any considerable portion of the public. doubt an asylum for the support of 50 blind men, or an equal number of paupers, would not be obnoxious to the objection that it was not purely public. A charity for the maintenance of disabled seamen, or of aged and infirm stonemasons, resident in the city of Philadelphia, would undoubtedly be a purely public charity; and so, also, would a charity for the maintenance of the children of such As said in Gerke v. Purcell, 25 persons. Ohio St. 229: "When a charity is public, the exclusion of all idea of private gain or profit is equivalent in effect to the force of purely' as applied to a public charity in the constitution." Burd Orphan Asylum v. School Dist. of Upper Darby, 90 Pa. 21, 28, 29, 30.

A Young Men's Christian Association, organized to endeavor to bring young men unAn institution of science, whose object der moral and religious influences, to aid them is the promotion and diffusion of general and in selecting suitable boarding places and sescientific knowledge among the community curing employment, and by other means to at large, and the establishment and mainte- surround them with Christian influences, and nance of a library and museum, but the ben- actually engaging in such work, and also furefits of which are restricted to members, ex-nishing instruction, keeping open libraries, cept upon conditions prescribed by a board gymnasiums, lists of boarding houses, etc., of managers, is not a "purely public charity" within the meaning of the Pennsylvania and membership in which is nontransferable, Constitution, exempting such institutions from taxation.

giving no property right, the membership fee being merely nominal, is an institution Delaware County Institute of "purely public charity," within Const. § 170, exempting property of such institutions

of Science v. Delaware County, 94 Pa. 163,

167.

An asylum established by will for the maintenance and education of white female

Commonwealth v. Young
from taxation.
Men's Christian Ass'n, 76 S. W. 522, 25 Ky.
Law Rep. 940.

Const. art. 9, § 1, providing that the | Methodists, would not be a public charity; General Assembly may exempt from taxation but then, to exclude every other idea of 'pub"institutions of purely public charity," means lic' as distinguished from 'private,' the word charities that are purely and entirely pub- 'purely' is prefixed by the Constitution. This lic. The phrase is intended to exclude those is to intensify the word 'public,' not 'charity.' charities which are private, or only quasi It must be purely public; that is, there must public, such as many religious aid societies be no admixture of any qualification for adare. A library held in trust as the property mission, heterogeneous, and not solely relatof a corporation for the advancement of ing to the public." City of Newport v. Maknowledge and literature in a city, not used sonic Temple Ass'n, 56 S. W. 405, 406, 108 in any way for the purpose of private profit, Ky. 333, 49 L. R. A. 252. no distinction being made between the parties and the general public, except member's privilege of commutation by annual payment for the hire of books, which payment is for the increase and preservation of the librathe corporation is an "institution of pure ly public charity," within the meaning of the Constitution. Philadelphia Library Co., v. Dohohugh (Pa.) 12 Phila. 284, 285.

ry,

Masonic lodge.

PURGATORY.

Purgatory is defined by an authoritative expositor of the church's creed to be "a state of suffering after this life, in which those souls are for a time detained who depart this life after their deadly sins have been remitted as to the stain and guilt, and as to the everlasting pain that was due to them, but who have, on account of those sins, still some debt of temporal punishment to pay, as also those souls which leave this world guilty only of venial sins. In purgatory these souls are purified and rendered fit to enter into Heaven, where nothing defiled enters." Harrison v. Brophy, 59 Kan. 1, 3, 4, 51 Pac. 883, 40 L. R. A. 721 (quoting Catholic Belief [Lambert's Am. Ed.] 196).

If a disseisor take from the disseisee a naked release of all his interest in the land,

no relation arises between them by which one is placed in subordination of the other, and the disseisin is not thereby purged. Fox v. Widgery, 4 Me. (4 Greenl.) 188.

PURGERY.

Const. § 170, providing that institutions of purely public charity shall be exempt from taxation, does not include a Masonic lodge, which provides for its members and their families, or the wives and orphans of those who are dead, for it is a private charity. The words "purely public" need no definition. They do not include any restricted or private charities. In Morning Star Lodge No. 26, I. O. O. F., v. Hayslip, 23 Ohio St. 144, the court said: "A charitable or benevo- PURGE. lent association, which extends relief only to its own sick and needy members, and to the widows and orphans of deceased members, is not ‘an institution of purely public charity." In City of Philadelphia v. Masonic Home of Pennsylvania, 160 Pa. 572, 28 Atl. 95, 23 L. R. A. 545, 40 Am. St. Rep. 736, the question was whether the property of the Masonic Home, open only to those who were Masons, was exempt; and the court said: "When the eligibility of those admitted is thus determined, it seems to us that the institution is withdrawn from public, and put in the class of private, charities. A charity may restrict its admissions to a class of humanity, and still be public. It may be for the blind, the mute, those suffering under special diseases, for the aged, for infants, for women, for men, or for different callings or trades by which humanity earns its bread; and as long as the classification is determined by some distinction which involuntarily affects or may affect any of the whole people, although only a small number may be directly benefited, it is public. But when the right to admission depends upon the fact of voluntary association with some particular society, then a distinction is made which concerns not the public at large. The public is interested in the relief of its members, because they are men, women, and children, not because they are Masons. A home without charge, exclusively for Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Catholics, or 7 WDS. & P.-2

A purgery is a room in which hogsheads full of sugar are placed in a standing or upright position for the purpose of being drained. Meyer v. Queen Ins. Co., 6 South. 899, 900, 41 La. Ann. 1000.

PURLOIN.

Purloin means to commit larceny, and hence, when used in a statute, it is synonymous with "steal." McCann v. United States, 2 Wyo. 291, 298.

PUROLINE.

Puroline and gasoline as sold and used for illuminating purposes, are both petroleum products, and both are gas generating fluids. From the testimony of chemists and other experts, and of dealers in such articles, it appears that the difference of danger between puroline and gasoline of 74° gravity, is so slight and insignificant that it is

hardly measurable, or even perceptible. It also appears that in the trade orders for puroline are frequently and almost usually filled by delivering 74° gasoline, and circulars issued and distributed all over the state by different dealers in these articles contained the statement that 74° gasoline is of the same gravity as puroline. In both, the danger is not from explosion while burning in lamps, but from handling in the proximity of a light, on account of the gas which they liberate and generate from packages which are not air-tight, and which gas is inflammable. Socola v. Chess Carley Co., 1 South. 824, 826,

39 La. Ann. 344.

PURPART.

As design.

The term "purport," as used in Code 1873, § 3917, defining the crime of forgery, "if any person, with intent to defraud, falsely make, alter, forge, or counterfeit any note, being or purporting to be the act of another, by which any pecuniary demand or obligation, or any right or interest in or to any property whatever, is, or purports to be created," etc., means the design or tendency, meaning or import. Under the wording of the statute, the instrument need not in fact create any liability. The design of the instrument merely is material, and, if it be intended to create a legal liability on its face, it may be the subject of forgery within the statute. State v. Sherwood, 58 N. W. 911, 912, 90 Iowa, 550, 48 Am. St. Rep. 461.

As indicating invalidity.

A purpart is that part of an estate which, having been held in common, is by partition allotted to any one of the parties to it. The The word "purporting," as used in an inuse of the word implies a common concur-struction in a will contest in which an instrurent holding, whether in possession or remainder. Seiders v. Giles, 21 Atl. 514, 516, 141 Pa. 93 (citing Bouv. Law Dict. 395).

PURPORT.

The word "purport," as used in speaking of the purport of an instrument, means the substance thereof as it appears on the face thereof to every eye that reads it. Dana v. State, 2 Ohio St. 91, 93 (citing Wharton).

Purport imports what appears on the face of the instrument. McClellan v. State, 32 Ark. 609, 611. It is usually intended to express the substance and effect as appears from the face of the instrument, in distinction from "tenor," which means a copy or State v. Callendine, 8 Iowa, 288,

exactness.

296.

A statute imposing a penalty for passing any false or forged instrument issued or purporting to have been issued by any corporation or company duly authorized for that purpose is designed to describe paper appearing on its face to be such as was calculated to defraud, and not to require proof of the actual legal existence and authority of the corporation whose name was used. Snow v. State, 14 Wis. 479, 483.

ment is spoken of as one "purporting" to be a codicil, cannot be construed to intimate that the instrument was not a codicil, or to cast discredit upon its validity. Smith v. Henline, 51 N. E. 227, 232, 174 Ill. 184.

As resembles.

An instrument purports to be a particular instrument which it more or less resembles, and this definition applies to a part, as well as the whole, of an instrument. Reg. v. Keith, 29 Eng. Law & Eq. 558, 560.

As substance.

The purport of an instrument means the substance of it, as it appears on the face of it, in the eyes of all who read it. Roberts v. State, 16 South. 233, 234, 72 Miss. 110; State v. Fenly, 18 Mo. 445, 454; Thomas v. State, 2 N. E. 808, 812, 103 Ind. 419; State v. Chinn, 44 S. W. 245, 246, 142 Mo. 507; Fogg v. State, 17 Tenn. (9 Yerg.) 392, 394.

The purport of an instrument means the substance of it, as it appears on its face to every person who might read it, and means the apparent, and not the legal, import. State v. Pullens, 81 Mo. 387, 392.

By setting forth an instrument accord"Purporting," in a statute making it a ing to its "purport and effect" in an indictfelony for any person to counterfeit the law-ment, only the import or substance of the ful issue of any bank or corporation, or notes instrument is indicated, and not an exact or bills purporting to be of any bank or cor- copy. State v. Bonney, 34 Me. 383, 384. poration, means appearing on the face of the instrument. Van Horne v. State, 5 Ark. 349, 353; State v. Harris, 27 N. C. 287, 294.

Purport means the design or tendency, the meaning or import when used in the expression, "An instrument purports," etc. State v. Burling, 102 Iowa, 681, 684, 72 N. W. 295, 296 (citing State v. Sherwood, 90 Iowa, 550, 58 N. W. 911, 48 Am. St. Rep. 461).

"Purport," as used in an indictment for libel, charging a person with an unlawful and malicious libel "according to the purport and effect, in substance, among other things, as follows," is not equivalent to "tenor," and does not necessarily import a strict recital of the words of the libel. The purport of a message or communication may be, and, indeed, generally is, stated without the use of

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