embrace Act Cong. 1803, c. 62, § 2, prescrib- | der the general term 'revenue measures,' and ing the penalty of $500 for not depositing the ship's register with the consul on arrival in a foreign port. Parsons v. Hunter (U. S.) 18 Fed. Cas. 1259, 1261. these measures include all the laws by which the government provides means for meeting its expenditures. 12 Stat. 294, imposing direct taxes upon the states, is a revenue act, and therefore cases arising under the act are provision of 4 Stat. 632, authorizing such relaws of the United States." Peyton v. Bliss moval in cases of suits involving the revenue (U. S.) 19 Fed. Cas. 407, 408. A "bill for raising revenue," as we understand it from the debates on the federal Con-removable to the federal courts under the stitution, authorities, and text writers, embraces all appropriations of money for the public treasury, where the bill either provides for the levy of duties or taxes, capitation or ad valorem, upon the people, or is a part of a system of laws or another bill which does so provide. Commonwealth v. Bailey, 81 Ky. 395, 399, 400. Within the meaning of United States statutes providing that any person guilty of any crime arising under the revenue laws of the United States, or incurring any fine or forfeiture by breach of said laws, may be prosecuted at any time within five years, an action to recover a penalty under the embargo law of 1808 is not an action for a penalty under the revenue laws. The true meaning of "revenue laws" in this clause is such laws as are made for the direct and avowed purpose of creating and securing revenue or public funds for the use of the government. No laws whose collateral and indirect operation might possibly conduce to the public wealth are within the scope of the provision. United States v. Mayo (U. S.) 26 Fed. Cas. 1230, 1231. Delegation of power to tax. An act incorporating a town is not an act for raising revenue, within the meaning of Const. art. 1, § 16, providing that all bills for raising revenue or appropriating moneys shall originate in the House of Representatives, although the act may, among the many powers it confers upon the town, confer the power to tax. In such a case taxing is not the end; it is a mere incident. Besides, the delegation of the power to tax and the laying of a tax are two things. The constitutional provision applies to an act laying a tax. Harper v. Town of Elberton Com'rs, 23 Ga. 566, 570. Imposition of direct tax. As excluding internal revenue law. The general term "revenue laws of the United States," as used in Act March 2, 1833, providing for removal of causes, standing alone, might include all revenue laws of every description, but, used as it is in an act entitled "An act further to provide for the collection of duties on imports," must be considered as not intended to include laws for the collection of internal revenue. Postal law. Stevens Revenue laws are not necessarily laws for raising "revenue," within the constitutional rule that a bill for raising revenue must originate in the House of Representatives, and hence an act increasing the rate of postage on certain mail matter is not unconstitutional although it originated in the Senate, and was not an amendment to a bill for raising revenue in the House of Representatives. Const. art. 1, § 7, subd. 1, providing that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House. United States v. James (U. S.) 26 Fed. Cas. 577, 578. The post-office laws of the United States are "revenue laws" within the meaning of section 3 of the act of Congress of March 2, 1833 (4 Stat. 633), providing for the removal into a Circuit Court of the United States from a state court of a suit brought against a person for an act done under the revenue laws of the United States, or under color thereof. Warner v. Fowler (U. S.) 29 Fed. Cas. 255. The term "revenue laws," within the meaning of 4 Stat. 633, providing for the removal into the Circuit Court of a suit brought against a person for an act done under the "Any law which provides for the assess- revenue laws of the United States or under ment and collection of a tax to defray the color thereof, includes the post-office laws expenses of the government is a revenue law. of the United States. "Laws relating to the Such legislation is commonly referred to un-revenue or revenue laws are such laws as are enacted in reference to such collection; such as give rules as to the mode of its collection, and as to the manner in which the officers employed in such collection shall collect duties. Our taxes are no more the revenue of the state than are the duties or taxes collected under the post-office laws of the United States for the carriage of letters in the public mails." Warner v. Fowler (U. S.) 29 Fed. Cas. 255. Tariff act. Act Cong. March 2, 1799, c. 22, 1 Stat. p. 627, regulating the collection of duties on imports, is a revenue law, within the meaning of Act Cong. April 18, 1818, c. 70, providing for the mode of suing for and recovering penalties and forfeitures for violations of the revenue laws of the United States. The Abigail (U. S.) 1 Fed. Cas. 36. REVENUE LAWS OF A STATE. The ordinances of municipal corporations laying taxes cannot be regarded as the "revenue laws of a state" from which they derive their power of laying taxes, within the meaning of the act of June 30, 1870, making it the duty of the court to give to causes wherein the execution of the revenue laws of any state are enjoined, etc., preferences or priority over all other civil causes. Davenport City v. Dows, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 390, 392, 21 L. Ed. 96. REVENUE OFFICER. "Revenue," as used in Rev. St. § 989 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 708], providing that judgments recovered against an "officer of the revenue" shall be paid out of the United States treasury if there was probable cause for the commission of the act for which the judgment was rendered, does not include a postmaster. Campbell v. James (U. S.) 3 Fed. 513, 516. REVERSE. To reverse is to overthrow, set aside, make void, annul, repeal, or revoke, as to reverse a judgment, sentence, or decree, or to change to the contrary, or to a former condition. The distinction between the reversal of a judgment and an affirmance with a modification is said by the court to be too marked and radical to justify them in disregarding it, and it is held that the reversal of a judg ment nullifies the same and entirely vacates it. Cowdery v. London & San Francisco Bank, 73 Pac. 196, 197, 139 Cal. 208, 96 Am. St. Rep. 115. REVERSAL. Unanimous reversal, see "Unanimous." The reversal of a judgment annuls it, but does not necessarily set aside the foun dation on which it rests. This foundation may be sufficient to support a judgment of a different kind, and may be such as to require it. A reversal, therefore, is never, standing alone and ex vi termini, the ground of a new trial. Coughlin v. McElroy, 44 Atl. 743, 744, 72 Conn. 444. The terms "affirmance" or "reversal," used in section 84 of the small cause act (Revision, p. 554), providing that courts of common pleas shall have cognizance of appeals in a summary way, and give judgment, with costs, and award execution thereon, either on the affirmance or reversal of the judgment so appealed, are employed to indicate the successful or unsuccessful party on the appeal; and costs on appeal will only be given to a successful party, who has judg ment in his favor on the appeal. Housel v. Higgins, 47 N. J. Law (18 Vroom) 72, 73. REVERSED. The term "reversed." as used in opinions, judgments, and mandates, has received by long usage in the courts a settled construction, and means setting aside, annulling, or vacating. Laithe v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 254, 268. "The word 'reversed' in its technical sense applies to the ultimate decision annulling expressly what had been done before." King v. Sloan (Pa.) 1 Serg. & R. 77, 79. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Where the order of a court on appeal is remanded"-the effect of the reversal is only as follows: "Judgment reversed and cause to set aside the judgment, unless it is apparent from the opinion of the court that the adjudication was intended to be a final disposition of the cause. Ryan v. Tomlinson, 39 Cal. 639, 646. It is a settled rule, unless there is something in the opinion of the court or the order words "reversed and remanded," they have made by it restricting the operation of the the ordinary meaning, and it is error, on the entry of such order, for the court below not to award a new trial. Myers v. McDonald, 8 Pac. 809, 811, 68 Cal. 162. REVERSED CURRENT. An electric current, which is periodically reversed by a cummutator, which thus breaks the current between the changes in direction and takes off the current in sections, is known as a reversed or alternated current. This distinction between an alternating and an alternated or reversed current should be carefully noted. An alternating current continues to act in opposite directions as originally generated. An alternated current has been so reversed that the whole flows in one direction, and is then known as a continuous current. Every mechanically generated current is naturally and originally an alternating current. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. New England Granite Co. (U. S.) 103 Fed. 951, 952. REVERSIBLE ERROR. A reversible error is such an error as warrants the appellate court in reversing the judgment. New Mexican R. Co. v. Hendricks, 30 Pac. 901, 902, 6 N. M. 611. REVERSION. The term "reversion" signifies a return to a pre-existence or tormer state or place. Clute v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 24 N. E. 317, 318, 120 N. Y. 267. Sir Edward Coke describes a reversion to be the returning of land to the grantor or his heirs after the grant is over. Barber v. Brundage, 50 App. Div. 123, 125, 63 N. Y. Supp. 347; Alexander v. De Kermel, 81 Ky. 345, 350. In Co. Litt. c. 2, § 19, it is said: "A reversion is when the residue of the estate always doth continue in him that made the particular estate, or where the particular estate is derived out of his estate." De Kermel v. Alexander, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 142, 147. A reversion is a vested interest or estate, inasmuch as the person entitled to it has a vested right of future enjoyment. Payn v. Beal (N. Y.) 4 Denio, 405, 411. The term "reversionary interest" implies that there is a preceding particular estate or interest, and is so used in Acts 1869-70, c. 1, § 21, providing that it shall not be lawful to sell on execution the reversionary interest in any lands included in a homestead until after the termination of the homestead interest therein. Joyner v. Sugg, 44 S. E. 122, 124, 132 N. C. 580. 4 Bl. Comm. p. 175, says "an estate in reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor, to commence in possession after the determination of some particular estate granted out by him." Barber v. Brundage, 63 N. Y. Supp. 347, 348, 50 App. Div. 123; People v. Lawrence (N. Y.) 54 Barb. 589, 619; Todd v. Jackson, 26 N. J. Law (2 Dutch.) 525, 540. And Lord Coke describes it as the return of land to the grantor or his heirs after the grant is over. Powell v. Dayton, S. & G. R. Co., 16 Pac. 863, 866, 16 Or. 33, 8 Am. St. Rep. 251; Alexander v. De Kermel, 81 Ky. 345, 350; Todd v. Jackson, 26 N. J. Law (2 Dutch.) 525, 540. It seems to have two significations. The one is an estate left, which continues during a particular estate in being; and the other is the returning of the land after the particular es tate is ended. Powell v. Dayton, S. & G. R. Co., 16 Or. 33, 38, 16 Pac. 863, 866, 8 Am. St. Rep. 251 (citing Abb. Law Dict.). Blackstone attributes the doctrine of reversion to the feudal constitution; but Kent differs from him, and says that reversion, in the general sense, must be familiar to the laws of all nations which admit of private property in lands. Alexander v. De Kermel, 81 Ky. 345, 350. A "reversion" is the return of an estate to the grantor and his heirs after the grant is over. A gratuitous permission by the owner to a third person to use a chattel for a specified time is a loan, and does not create a reversionary right in the lender. Booth v. Terrell, 16 Ga. 20, 25. An "estate in reversion" is the residue of an estate left in the grantor, to commence in possession after the determination of some particular estate granted out by him. Sir Edward Coke describes a reversion to be the returning of land to the grantor or his heirs after the grant is over; as, if there be a gift in tail, the reversion of the fee is, without any special reservation, vested in the donor by act of law. So, also, the reversion after an estate for life, for years, or at will, continues in the lessor; for the fee simple of all lands must abide somewhere, and if he who was before possessed of the whole carves out of it any small estate, and grants it away, whatever is not so granted remains in him. Barber v. Brundage, 63 N. Y. Supp. 347, 348, 50 App. Div. 123 (quoting 4 Bl. Comm. p. 175). A "reversion" is a present vested interest, to be enjoyed at some future time on the happening of some particular event. A reversion is an estate vested in præsenti, though to take effect and profit in futuro, and may be aliened and charged as an estate in possession. It can only exist where the grantor has conveyed less than his whole interest or estate. Wingate v. James, 121 Ind. 69, 72, 22 N. E. 735. The word "reversion," in the rule that "where property is given to a person expressly for life, and there is annexed to such gift a power of disposition of the reversion, the first taker takes but an estate for life, with the power annexed," is a word of the very greatest importance in its connections in its influence upon rules of construction. It implies that the devising clause has left something to revert to the testator after the estate given to the devisee. Byrne v. Weller, 61 Ark. 366, 373, 375, 33 S. W. 421, 423. The term "reversion" is often used in such a sense as to be descriptive only of an interest in land. 4 Kent, Comm. 354. It is also used in speaking of the right to a return of such personal property as does not perish with a short term of using, the possession of which property the general owner has parted with. Frankenthal v. Meyer, 55 Ill. App. 405, 414 (citing Gordon v. Harper, 7 Term Rep. 9). An estate in reversion is the residue of an estate, usually the fee, left in the grantor and his heirs after the determination of a particular estate which he has granted out of it. Civ. Code Ga. 1895, § 3098. A "reversion" is the residue of an estate left by operation of law in the grantor or his successors, or in the successors of the testator, commencing in possession on the determination of a particular estate granted or devised. Civ. Code Cal. 1903, § 768; Civ. Code Mont. 1895, § 1217; Rev. Codes N. D. 1899, § 3332; Civ. Code S. D. 1903, § 248; Gen. St. Minn. 1894, § 4373; Rev. St. Okl. 1903, § 4033; Comp. Laws Mich. 1897, 8794; Rev. St. Wis. 1898, § 2036; Nicoll v. New York & E R. Co., 12 N. Y. (2 Kern.) 121, 132; Rev. St. N. Y. p. 723, § 12. It necessarily assumes that the grantor has not parted with his entire estate. Wood v. Taylor. 30 N. Y. Supp. 433, 436, 9 Misc. Rep. 640 (citing 4 Kent, Comm. 353). As an estate or fee. See, also, "Estate." ། but who parted with the possession or title to it by creating an estate in another." Pearce v. Lott, 29 S. E. 276, 278, 101 Ga. 395 (quoting And. Law Dict.). As used in a provision of a will providing that any portion of a certain sum authorized to be appropriated to the relief of the testator's needy nephews and nieces therein referred to which should not be so appropriated should revert to the use of a hospital fund, the term ""revert" means that it should go back to the hospital fund, from which it had been withdrawn. Ingraham v. Ingraham, 48 N. E. 561, 569, 169 Ill. 432. "Revert," as used in a will giving a daughter of the testator a certain sum, and providing that, should she die leaving no issue, the legacy should revert to testator's estate, does not indicate that the testator contemplated the death of the daughter after she had come into possession of the legacy. McDowell v. Stiger, 42 Atl. 575, 576, 58 N. J. Eq. 125. "Revert," as used in Code, 2015, providing that if a railway is not used or operated for eight years, or if, its construction having been commenced, work has ceased and has not been in good faith resumed for eight years, the right of way, including the roadbed, shall revert to the owners of the land from which it was taken, is a technical word, and should be accorded its meaning as such. It is the return to the owner of the fee of the easement formerly operated, or, perhaps more accurately speaking, the removal of the burden cast upon the fee. The "A reversion has been said to be the residue of the fee after a less estate has been carved out of it, both these interests being but one estate. Jac. Law Dict.; 1 Coke, c. 12, § 215. A fee simple of the land is the largest possible estate. Id. c. 1, § 11. Although there may be a remainder or a rever-instant the right of way reverts to the owner, sion in fee, it is not the entire property, or, in popular language, the land itself, that is held in fee in such case, but only the reversion or the remainder. A reversion or a remainder is described as such; the quality, value, and sometimes. the validity, being dependent upon the precedent estate." Therefore a remainder or a reversion is not properly described in the certificate of appraisers in execution, reciting that the debtor holds certain real estate in fee simple.-Stinson v. Rouse, 52 Me. 261, 266. the easement, with all its incidents, is extinguished, and the owner of the tract from which it was taken is restored to complete dominion over the entire property. Remey v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co., 89 N. W. 218, 220, 116 Iowa, 133. As go to. The term "revert," as used in a clause of a will declaring that, if the legatee should die before attaining her majority, the legacy should revert back to the testator's lawful heirs, should be construed to mean "go to." Beatty v. Trustees of Cory Universalist Soc., 39 N. J. Eq. (12 Stew.) 452, 463. Where a holographic will bequeathed testator's residuary estate to his only surviving sister of the whole blood, and provided that, in case of the death of any of the legatees before distribution, the portion bequeathed to such legatee should "revert to the children of the family of which such legatee is a member," and it appeared that the only members of the testator's family surviving at the date of the will were a halfbrother and half-sister living in different states, the phrase "revert to" should not be construed technically, but as meaning "go Snell's Ex'rs v. Snell, 38 N. J. Eq. (11 Stew.) 119, 124. to," so that, on the death of the sister before time. Testator devised his property to his own daughter in trust, she to have the income, and, should she die without issue, the property was to revert back to the heirs of testator and his deceased wife, but, should she die with issue, such issue was to inherit the estate. Held, that the words "shall revert back" should be read as "shall go to," as it would be impossible for the estate to "revert" to persons who had never had any interest therein. Johnson v. Askey, 60 N. E. .76, 77, 190 Ill. 58. As terminating estate. Where a deed conveyed land to a grantor's wife for the life of the grantor, providing that at the grantor's death the land should revert and reinvest in fee simple to his heirs at law or devisees, the provision that the land should "revert and reinvest" at the termination of grantor's life was equivalent to a grant of a life estate only. Whayne v. Davis (Ky.) 66 S. W. 827, 829. "Revert to the United States," as used in Act Cong. July 25, 1886, granting lands to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Central Pacific Railroad, in California, to Portland, Or.-section 8 providing that, in case the company should not complete the same as provided in section 6, this act shall be null and void, and all lands not conveyed by patent to said company or companies, as the case may be, at the date of any such failure, shall revert to the United States-is equivalent to a declaration that the act granting such lands shall cease to be operative if the company fails to complete its road within the specified time. "It is no more than a provision that the grant shall be void if a condition subse& C. R. Co., 11 Sup. Ct. 641, 643, 139 U. S. quent be not performed." Bybee v. Oregon 663, 35 L. Ed. 305. REVERTER. A devise of land was to be used by the vendee for a certain purpose forever, and whenever the vendee should cease to use the land for such purpose the same was to revert to testator's heirs at law. Held, that testator had reserved to his heirs at law an interest not exactly a reversion, but what is rather the possibility of a reversion, and termed a "reverter." Lougheed v. Dykeman Baptist Church and Society, 40 N. Y. Supp. 586. REVEST. A holographic will devised all the testator's land to his widow during widowhood, and at her death the land was directed to be sold, and the moneys arising therefrom to be equally divided among testator's four children or their heirs. In case of the widow's remarriage, the land was directed to be sold, and one-half of the money was to be used for her benefit and support, to revert back to the children at her death, and the other half to be equally divided The word "revest," in law, simply means among them. Held, that the phrase "revert back" clearly indicated the testator's inten- the return or the falling back into the pos tion to vest the fee in the children, subject session of the donor or of the former proto the widow's life estate. prietor. McPheeters v. Wright, 24 N. E. 734, The court says: "We think that a fair and reasonable inter- 739, 124 Ind. 560, 9 L. R. A. 176. pretation of the words 'revert back' indicates that the testator assumed and believed that by the preceding language he had already vested his real estate in his children in equal shares, subject to the use thereof of his widow during her life or widowhood." Therefore a conveyance by one of the children of his interest during the widow's life time was valid and binding. Miller v. Gilbert, 22 N. Y. Supp. 355, 357, 3 Misc. Rep. 43. The word "revert," as used in a will whereby the testator gave a life interest in certain lands to his wife, and whereby he directed that after her death the property should revert to the executors and be disposed of by them in the same manner as the rest of his estate thereinafter mentioned, showed that testator intended to give to the executors the remainder in fee. Therefore the executors could, with the widow's consent, sell the lands in question in her life REVIEW. See "Bill of Review"; "Writ of Review." As new trial. In Comp. St. 1715, § 131, giving the prisoner, if a verdict of guilty were returned in the county court, an absolute right of review, a new trial is meant. State v. Main, 37 Atl. 80, 82, 69 Conn. 123, 36 L. R. A. 623, 61 Am. St. Rep. 30. As review on appeal. The word "review," as used in Code Civ. Proc. § 779, providing that where costs of a motion are awarded or proceedings in the action on the part of the party required to pay the same, except "to review or vacate the order," are stayed until the payment |