happily living, I entertain a most sincere conviction that Mr. Pitt would this night have concurred. Mr. Stuart Wortley (amidst the general cry of Question, question.)-Sir, I rise only for one moment, to ask a question of the right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Ponsonby), whether at the time he made his communication to the Catholics of Ireland, he was himself lord chancellor of Ireland, and the duke of Bedford lord lieutenant. Mr. Ponsonby. I was at the time lord chancellor of Ireland, and the noble duke lord lieutenant. Mr. Stuart Wortley. Then, Sir, I can only say, that under those circumstances, such a communication was, in my opinion, to say the best of it, a piece of high indiscretion. But, however, convinced as I am of the necessity of going into the proposed enquiry without delay, I shall give my vote for the motion. Mr. Grattan waved his right of replying, observing, that the right hon. gentleman who had lately sat down, (Mr. Canning) had so ably, and so eloquently answered every argument against the motion, that he should hurt the cause, was he to add another word to his eloquent oration. The Question being loudly called for, the House divided, when there appeared, Ayes 215; Noes 300. Majority against going into a committee on the Catholic Claims, 85.-Adjourned at half-past six, Saturday morning. Coke, E. Knight, Robt. Lambton, R. Langton, col. Leach, J. Lemon, C. Lemon, J. Latouche, J. Latouche, R. Lamb, hon. W. Lester, B. L. Lloyd, sir E. Lloyd, J. M. Longman, G. Colbourne, N. W. R. Knox, hon. T. Lyttleton, hon. W. Grattan, rt. hon. H. Mills, Wm. Martin, H. Martin, R. Mahon, hon. S. Marryat, Jos. Matthew, hon. M. Meade, hon. J. Maule, hon. W. Mildmay, sir H. Milton, visc. Montgomery, sir H. Moore, P. Morpeth, visc. Mosley, sir O. Mostyn, sir Thos. Myers, T. Nugent, lord Newport, rt. hon. sir HOUSE OF LORDS. Monday, April 27. French merchant, was it to be supposed that he would not still continue the system? Earl Bathurst observed, that the right hon. Vice President of the Board of Trade had publicly contradicted the use of the expression which had been attributed to him, and which had been mentioned by the noble lord. The Earl of Lauderdale contended, that the public contradiction of the right hon. gentleman, amounted only to this, that he had been hardly dealt with, with respect to the expression attributed to him, but not to a denial of the expression itself. INFORMATIONS EX-OFFICIO.] Lord Holland adverted to the motion he formerly made relative to Informations Ex Officio, and stated his object now to be, to present a Bill or Bills to the House relative to this extraordinary and anomalous mode of proceeding. He was not, however, fully prepared, and he therefore merely now mentioned the subject, that he might not be thought to be acting unfairly if he introduced his intended measure at a very short notice. VOTE OF THANKS TO THE EARL OF WELORDERS IN COUNCIL.] The Earl of LINGTON, &c. FOR THE CAPTURE OF BADADerby presented a Petition from the mer- Joz.] The Earl of Liverpool rose, pursuant chants, traders, &c. of Liverpool, against to notice, to move the Thanks of the the Orders in Council. His lordship stated, House to the Earl of Wellington, and those that 6,000 signatures were attached to the divisions of the army which were concernPetition, and observed, that he was au- ed in the capture of Badajoz. In calling thorised by the deputation from whom he their lordships' attention to this gallant exreceived the Petition, to state, that they did ploit, it was hardly necessary for him to not conceive that the Declaration recently observe, that the operation combined in issued by his Majesty's government would itself the two circumstances which had alhave the effect of at all relieving the dis-ways been considered as constituting the tresses which the petitioners suffered in consequence of the operation of the Orders in Council. The Petition was ordered to lie on the table. The Earl of Lauderdale adverting to the object of the Petition, observed, that the right hon. gentleman who was the Vice President of the Board of Trade, (Mr. Rose,) had in a conference with a deputa. tion of manufacturers upon the subject stated, that England and France were like two persons with their heads in two pails of water, and the trial must be which could stand drowning the longer. The Declaration issued by ministers made the continuance of this system depend upon the pleasure of Buonaparté, and if he thought he saw the English merchant was more in danger of drowning than the (VOL. XXII.) best title to the honour of their lordships thanks,-first, the importance of the object, and next the magnitude of the effort, and the obstinacy of the resistance encountered. If they looked at the military history of Badajoz in this as well as in former wars in the peninsula, they would find, that situated on the southwest frontier of Spain, this fortress had always been regarded as an object of primary importance. In former wars it had stood many severe sieges; and it was somewhat singu lar, that the efforts then made to reduce it had never been successful. In the year 1658, when the struggle for Portuguese independence took place, this fortress was deemed an important object for the Portuguese, and it was accordingly attacked with vigour. The Portuguese were more than four months in prosecuting the siege (3 X) could not have been carried on without great loss. -they lost half their army,-and, after I all, the attempt proved unavailing, and the enterprise was abandoned. In the war of 1705, generally known by the name of the Succession War, Badajoz was besieged by the English, Dutch, and Portuguese troops, under the command of an ancestor of a noble lord whom he had in his eye. A most gallant effort was made on that occasion; and had it not been for particular circumstances, it would in all probability have been successful: but in 14 days from the opening of the trenches, the attempt was unavoidably given up as hopeless. In the course of the present war in the peninsula, also, Badajoz had been considered as an object of the greatest military importance: Their lordships might remember, that in the early part of the last year, the place was attacked by the French under the command of marshal Soult. They broke ground on the 3d of Feb. and met with a most gallant resistance on the part of the governor, and the troops under his command. The resistance would, in all probability, have been effectual, or the capture of the place would have at least been so long delayed, as to have contributed essentially to ultimate success in the contest, had not the governor most unfortunately died early in the month of March; and whether from the misconduct of his successor, or from some more serious cause, on the 11th of March the fortress capitulated. But even here it was to be observed, that the French under the able experienced leader whom he had mentioned, had not made themselves masters of the place till after a siege of 36 days. At a subsequent period, their lordships knew Badajoz had been attacked by lord Wellington when the French collected their troops from all quarters of the peninsula. Their northern army, which they called the army of Portugal, the southern army, the troops employed in the eastern parts of the peninsula, and detachments from the garrison of Madrid, all assembled to force the allied army to raise the siege, or risk a general battle for the protection of its operations. With such a force advancing against him, lord Wellington did not feel it prudent to continue the siege and give battle to the enemy at the same time; and therefore with the greatest judgment and propriety resolved to abandon the place. The siege could not then have been renewed till the month of June, a season of the year when, from the unhealthiness of that part of the country, the operations In the present year, after the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, lord Wellington determined with the first opportunity to direct his efforts against Badajoz. It was fairly to be contemplated, that the French would do every thing in their power to obstruct these sieges; and, therefore, it was an object of the utmost importance to get possession of the fortresses, in as short a time as possible from the commencement of the operations. Their lordships had already had an opportunity of expressing their opinion upon the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. That place had been taken with a rapidity altogether unparalleled, and utterly astonishing even to the enemy, whose commander had calculated that he would have been in time enough for its relief, if he arrived there at a period, which turned out to be nine or ten days subsequent to the date of its capture. The exertions made in the siege of Badajoz were not less extraordinary than those which distinguished the attacks upon Ciudad Rodrigo. Their lordships had seen the proofs of the strenuous resistance made on that occasion,-of the difficulties encountered in the course of the siege; but, notwithstanding every opposition, in 12 days from the opening of the trenches, the place was in the possession of the British army. In looking at the circumstances attending this noble effort, it was impossible for any heart not to feel a glow of admiration at the skill and decision of the commander, and the gallantry of the officers and troops. The conduct of general Picton had inspired a confidence in the army, and exhibited an example of science and bravery which had been surpassed by no other officer. His exertions in the attack on the 6th could not fail to excite the most lively feelings of admiration. It appeared that three practicable breaches had been made, that the enemy had expected the attack to be made by these breaches, and had employed every imaginable means for effectual resistance. That resistance, (he had this from an eyewitness,) was one of the most formidable efforts that had perhaps ever been made in any war. Their lordships, indeed, might judge of the nature of that effort, when they considered its effect upon troops certainly not liable to be deterred by difficulties in the execution of any hazardous enterprize, whatever might be the obstacles to be surmounted. On the one know this gallant officer, and was proud that he had had an opportunity of so highly distinguishing himself. But he mentioned it, chiefly with another and more important view,-that of calling their lordships' attention to the race of hand general Picton, and on the other general Walker, however, had succeeded by escalade, at the extremities of the place. It was impossible to contemplate without admiration, the conduct of the latter attack, which was only designed as a feint at first, to be turned into a real attack after-young officers, that were rising under the wards, if circumstances should allow. That division had got into the fortress by escalade, where there was no breach, and in the face of a strong bastion. It was impossible to contemplate this occurrence without feeling it due to general Walker to say,-and a higher praise could not well be bestowed that his conduct had sustained the reputation which he had acquired on former occasions. He hoped he would live to give his country the be nefit of those farther services which he had proved himself so capable of rendering. This was the officer who had distinguished himself so highly at the battle of Vimiera, where he commanded the 50th regiment, and manœuvred it in such a manner as to defeat the efforts of a body of the enemy five times the number of his own troops. So conspicuous had been his merit on that occasion, that the French general who was then taken, without knowing who general Walker was, earnestly desired to be introduced to him, stating that he had done what he had never seen done before in any battle. He thought it due to general Walker to advert to this circumstance, and he had only farther to say, that the vigour, promptitude, and spirit, which this excellent officer had displayed at Vimiera, were at least equalled by his conduct in the attack of Badajoz. It would be in vain to attempt to particularize the conduct of other officers where all had so eminently distinguished themselves. The public dispatches must have apprised their lordships of the gallant conduct of generals Colville, Kempt, Bowes, and the other officers concerned in this gallant enterprize. There was one circumstance, however, which he must not omit to mention, as it was worthy of particular observation. It happened, that, owing to the indisposition of some other officers, the command of a most important division of the troops, the light division, fell upon a young officer, not above the rank of lieutenant-colonel. This was colonel Barnard, whose conduct had been spoken of with the admiration which it deserved. He was induced by several considerations, to advert to this circumstance. He mentioned it because he had the honour to auspices and command of the distinguished leader of the combined armies. Here was a body of officers forming under lord Wellington, which would constitute a shield of strength, such as had, perhaps, never before existed in any other country, or, indeed, in this, on any former occasion. Having said thus much of the gallant exploit for which he called for their lordships' thanks, and of the merits of those concerned in it, he felt it impossible not to touch on the loss which our army had sustained. On that subject, there could be but one feeling in the House, and in the country at large. But he hoped the friends and relatives of those who so gloriously fell, would derive consolation from the fame of the illustrious dead; from the reflection that they had performed the most eminent service to their country, and that if they had fallen, they fell not in vain. They had died in a glorious cause, under a commander, who was regarded by the army with the most enthusiastic admiration, and in the discharge of a duty the most essential for promoting the farther success of the war. In looking at this part of the subject as a parliament and a nation, they must have observed, that there was no point of lord Wellington's conduct more remarkable than his anxiety on all occasions to spare the lives of the men under his command as much as possible. He had had an opportunity of knowing more fully than most others, that it was the ruling principle of his conduct, never to endeavour to gain by a battle that which he could gain without it. This was a proper principle on all occasions, and under all circumstances; but more particularly with regard to this country. Their lordships had seen how perseveringly lord Wellington had acted on this principle in the operations at Torres Vedras. His language, then, was this-" [ have an opportunity of attacking the enemy with a full confidence of success; but I think I can accomplish my purpose without it, and therefore I shall not expose the lives of my men to unnecessary hazard." On other occasions lord Wellington had acted on the same principle. The attainment of the present object had been, ance these places were capable of making and had made against other forces; and it was known, also, that before the British army under lord Wellington, Ciudad Rodrigo had fallen in eleven days, and Badajoz in twenty. All this must afford peculiar satisfaction to those who looked upon the course of the war in the peninsula as affording the best hopes of ultimate success in the contest. They must feel the high importance of this operation: and even to those who doubted or thought differently, if any now did so, it must appear a great advantage. They could not but see what strength it afforded for the defence of the country, if the battle were to be fought on our own ground, in the discipline and skill which must be acquired in the course of these operations, by such a British army, under such a leader. He concluded by moving the Thanks of the House to the general, the officers, and troops, in the usual manner. indeed, attended with great loss to the British army; but it ought to be recollected, that nothing was more to be avoided than a protracted operation; and even with a view to the preservation of the lives of the soldiers, as well as to the ultimate success of the war, the attack upon Badajoz ought to be considered as a most judicious enterprize. The loss ought to be compared with the magnitude of the object; and in this view it would be found to be less in the present instance, than in many operations at the most distinguished period of our military history. If their lordships would look at the operations under the duke of Marlborough, they would find that at the siege of Lisle, the allied armies had lost 12,000 men; at the siege of Douay, 8,000; at the siege of Aire, 7,000; and at the siege of Toulon, where they failed, 13,000 men. The loss in an attack such as that on Badajoz, might indeed be severe; but, however much to be regretted, Lord Holland observed, that he bad alit must be regarded as in all pro- ways acknowledged the great talents and bability less than that of a protracted siege. services of lord Wellington; and on the There was one other point to which he present occasion, he could not help dewas desirous of calling their lordships' at- claring his concurrence with the noble Setention before he concluded. Their lord-cretary in his praises of that distinguished ships must have observed with peculiar satisfaction, that the military operations of this country had, within these few years, assumed, an entirely new character. This he said, without by any means undervaluing its efforts in former wars; but such was now the state of the world, that in addition to strength and resources, a nation, in order to be secure, must combine with that strength all the advantages of art and science. The operation now under consideration could not fail to suggest the remarks which he had just made. On all occasions, indeed, British troops had shewn the most distinguished and preeminent valour in the field, but in the course of the last century, they had been but little accustomed to the science of attack upon fortified places. If they had still been defective in that species of warfare therefore, we ought not to have been disheartened,-we ought to have known that our soldiers would from experience acquire this art if essentially necessary; but we had the satisfaction to find from the attacks upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, that if our troops were the best in Europe in the field, which he supposed none would dispute with us, they were also not less formidable in attacks upon fortified places. It was well known what resist military character, to whose high merits he was happy to bear his warmest testi. mony. He was one of those who had considered all the hope we had of ultimately succeeding in driving the enemy from the peninsula, as resting upon the skill and activity of lord Wellington; and that hope was certainly much increased by the operation for which their lordships were called upon to vote their thanks. In no operation of the war, in his opinion, had the skill, judgment, and decision of lord Wellington been more marked, both as to mode and time of action, than in this. He felt, and all must feel the afflicting loss with which it had been attended; but though the loss in actions of this kind was more apparent, it was not usually greater than the losses suffered in protracted sieges. When they looked at the moral effects of the attainment of this great object, they would probably counterbalance the loss, severe as it had been. He took it for granted that it was necessary either to storm the place, to abandon it, or risk an action with Soult. The time, then, was exactly that in which it was most desirable for the British that the place should be attacked. With regard to the hopes of ultimate success, it had always been his principle not to mix political speculation of |