CHAP. II.

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BOOK IV. state of the roads impeded the progress of the French troops under Marshal Soult, scarcely any portion of the Russian army could have escaped destruction. The loss in these actions, on the part of the French, was admitted by themselves to be little short of three thousand men; but that of the Russians was, on the same authority, stated to be twelve thousand killed, wounded, and taken; eighty pieces of cannon; and about twelve hundred baggage waggons. The retreat of the Russians was the signal for the French troops to enter into winter quarters, and the corps under Marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessieres, were almost immediately cantoned on the left bank of the river Orege, while Marshal Soult, with the brigades of light horse, were stationed on the right bank of that river for their protection.

The King of Prussia, while all these disastrous events were taking place, was experiencing a state of suspense and embarrassment, which, although arising from his own culpable policy, could not but excite sentiments of commiseration. His queen and family, with a long train of attendants and nobility, sought an asylum, first at Dantzic, and afterwards at Memel, where the death of one of the young princes was combined with other circumstances of public and domestic affliction. In this brief, but decisive campaign, the successes of the French are almost unprecedented in the records of history. It cannot appear surprising that these successes should have operated upon a people peculiarly susceptible of every thing calculated to excite exultation, and to gratify national vanity; nor that the "illustrious head of the great nation" should, at the coptemplation of that superiority which he obtained in these conflicts, adopt frequently a style of decided prophecy and dictation, approaching to the most consummate arrogance. The forces of an immense empire were under his uncontroulled direction, and he was able to avail himself of them to their fullest extent. There was no opposition to his projects, no collision with his interests. The decisions of his cabinet, or rather of his closet, instead of being obliged to await the forms of slow deliberation, and the fluctuation of remote caprice, sprang with all the bloom and vigour of youth into immediate action. In the coalitions which he had had hitherto to encounter, this simplicity in the midst of complication administered in a great measure to his uninterrupted success. In the case of Prussia, indeed, concert had not been formed till ruin was almost absolutely incurred, and her folly was only the more apparent from these defective arrangements, which had depended solely upon herself.

A suspension of hostile operations existed for some time after the battles of Pultusk and

Golymin, arising from the difficulty of procuring supplies, and the state of a northern region at this season of the year. Vigilance and preparations were on both sides connected with a state of comparative acquiescence; and no means were omitted by either army to qualify themselves for those approaching shocks, to which Europe now looked with painful suspense for the decision of its fate. A general armament was ordered by the Emperor of Russia to be raised, in a certain proportion to the existing population, according to which the force to be levied would amount to upwards of six hundred thousand men, who were, on any requisite emergency, to be ready to support the troops of the empire. Nor was the Emperor Napoleon by any means less attentive to the arrangements required by his situation. Levies were perpetually sent from the interior of France to the seat of war, and an anticipated conscription for the ensuing year was put in requisition, to be trained and disciplined, though not immediately to be marched to the theatre of war.

In the mean while Jerome Bonaparte was successfully conducting the operations of the army in Silesia. The proclamation of the King of Prussia to the brave inhabitants of this province, though by no means attended with those results that in the ardour of his mind he had expected, was not wholly inefficient. By the exertions of the Prince of Pless, who had been appointed to the government of the province, a considerable corps was collected from the troops stationed in the various fortresses, which appear to have derived some increase of force from the zeal and attachment of the people at large. The troops of the King of Wurtemberg and Bavaria were employed, under Prince Jerome, to reduce them, and about the beginning of the year, inflicted upon them a severe defeat. After this event, the best mode of disposing of the remainder of the army appeared to the Prince of Pless to be their rapid dispersion, by detachments into different fortresses; a plan which was immedi ately adopted, and in consequence of which he was obliged to abandon to the enemy some of his artillery, and a considerable portion of his baggage. On the 8th of January, the city of Breslau, which had been for some time regularly besieged, surrendered to the enemy, who had begun to batter in breach; the magazines of this fortress were considerable, and its garrison, consisting of five thousand five hundred men, defiled before Prince Jerome as his prisoners of war. The other fortresses in Silesia were in succession rapidly invested; Brieg capitulated in a short time, and Schwiednitz soon followed her example. The Prince of Pless, driven from the positions of Frankenstein and Neurohde by

General Lefebvre, took refuge in Glatz, and was soon after succeeded in the command by Baron Kleist. The activity and energy of the new commander kept all the troops under Jerome Bonaparte in sufficient employment; and an unsuccessful attempt was made under the baron to surprise and retake Breslaw. The siege of Niesse, before which the French Prince was encamped, occupied a considerable time; and although this and the other fortresses were at length forced to a capitulation, the bravery and perseverance of the troops and commanders employed in their defence, redounded to the credit of their firmness and loyalty. By the prolonged exertions in defence of these places, an object highly desirable was effected-the detention of a great body of forces from joining the French armies in Poland, and a striking contrast was exhibited to that precipitation and baseness with which, in other provinces of the unfortunate Prussian monarchy, fortresses, impregnable for their situation, and furnished with every means of protracted defence, had been surrendered almost upon the first summons.

While Silesia was thus in a state that must insure its ultimate reduction, unless the fortune of war should exhibit a most important reverse on the great theatre of hostility, the French armies were employed in prosecuting the sieges of Stralsund, Colberg, and Dantzic, the possession of the latter of which cities was justly deemed of extreme consequence. The idea of the restoration of the kingdom of Poland, if it had been ever seriously entertained, was now apparently abandoned. Whether it was, that, having been repeatedly deceived by sovereigns, their pledges were no longer received by the inhabitants of that country with any confidence: whether policy was speedily found to require the renunciation of a project by Bonaparte which he really had intended to accomplish; or whether the boasted constitution of Poland had no hold on the poor man's heart to nerve his arm for its recovery; it appears that few of the Poles contributed to swell the French armies; and that, for the restoration of Poland in its former integrity, was substituted a government of the Prussian districts of that country, accompanied with no specious pretensions to liberty and independence, though judiciously enough contrived as a provisional administration.

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The representations of Austria, whose military establishments had been placed by the Archduke Charles on a footing of high respect ability, could not, it may be presumed, be safely neglected. She had a formidable army in Gallicia, convertible to the emergency of circumstances, and capable of almost indefinite increase, from the existing regularity, economy,

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situation of Bonaparte, the interposition of this BOOK IV. force might be supposed capable, not merely of preventing the re-establishment of the monarchy CHAP. II. of Poland, but of cutting off his retreat to France, and thus subverting for ever the fabric of ambition which he had been so many years in raising. But the perils and labours, the achievements and glories, of so long a period, were not thus rashly to be ventured for an enterprise, which to him was of trifling importance. On the subject of Austria it may be further observed, that the exertions of the Archduke Charles, in his chief military superintendence of the empire, were incessant and invaluable. Those whose conclusions were generally directed by their wishes, and whose wishes were ardent for the subversion of the colossal power which now threatened to bestride the continent, eagerly inferred that these exertions on the part of Austria, were intended for something more than to cause her neutrality to be respected, and every rumour of a reverse sustained by Bonaparte was followed by another, circulated with equal confidence, that the Emperor Francis was coming forward to complete the triumph of the allies. What might have been the result of those reverses, had they actually taken place, and how far they might have induced the Austrian government to deviate from its neutrality, it is impossible to determine. The secrets of cabinets are explored with difficulty, and their mere professions of attachment are certainly little to be relied upon. Austria, however, had felt what it was to fall under the weight of the energies of France. She might, at the same time, not bear so strong a spirit of revenge and antipathy as was imagined, against an enemy, who, after over-running her provinces and capital, by no means inflicted the extremity of vengeance, and who, though he retained much of his conquest, also restored much which he could never have been compelled to abandon. In addition to all these considerations, the ancient disgusts between the Austrian and Prussian states and governments must have been still extremely operative; and to this feeling of almost inborn origin, was added, by Austria, that retrospect of events, in the course of which she had been sacrificed to the timid policy, or rather grovelling interest, of the King of Prussia. Bonaparte, whose knowledge of human nature appeared little inferior to his military skill, might feel himself tolerably easy, with respect to the designs of Austria, though providence required that her motions should be observed with that vigilance which is ever alive to contingencies; and in the course of this campaign, she adhered steadily to her system of neutrality, taking no measures that could reasonably excite offence or alarm.

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BOOK IV. increased vigour against the fortress of Dantzic. This place had been for some time invested, CHAP. II. but the siege was now urged with extreme pressure and perseverance. The garrison consisted of sixteen thousand men, under the command of the Prussian General Kalkreuth, an officer of tried loyalty and skill. The troops who surrounded the place consisted, in a great degree, of the auxiliaries of France, of different prejudices, habit, and languages, but whose efforts, under the direction of Marshal Lefebvre, were effectually combined by a happy union of encouragement and discipline, and who, in repelling the sorties of the besieged, and in advancing the progress of the works, displayed astonishing skill and alacrity. The exertions of the commander of the fortress were, on the other band, no less striking and meritorious; and his vigilance and energy in this situation of high responsibility were in incessant operation. Ön the 24th of April the bombardment begun. On the night of the 29th, Marshal Lefebvre, having conceived the garrison to be sufficiently weakened, and the fortifications so much impaired as to justify the attempt, ordered the storming of the fortress. The governor, however, was well prepared to resist the assailants, whose stratagems were unable to deceive him with regard to the real point of attack, and repelled the effort made by the enemy, with the most dreadful carnage. This overthrow was far from preventing a renewal of the enterprise, and no less than three separate attempts were made on this fatal night to get possession of the citadel. The skill of the commander, however, and the exertions of the garrison, completely defeated each after the loss of an immense number of lives the attempt was abandoned, and the assailants were obliged to take shelter under cover of their works. An armistice of four hours was soon after agreed upon between the hostile commanders, and the work of destruction was suspended by a solemn pause for the burial of the dead. The struggles of the garrison were not viewed with indifference by the commanders of the allied armies, and two attempts were made to throw succours into the fortress and to raise the siege, but both of them without success. The moment was now therefore rapidly approaching, in which all the valour and exertions of the garrison would be unavailing; nearly a thousand houses had been destroyed in the town, and the distress of the inhabitants was extreme. The troops, exhausted by a series of efforts, interrupted only by short periods of repose, were not only thinned in numbers, but scarcely able to support any longer those privations and difficulties which daily increased. The works of the enemy were, in the meantime, proceed

ing with rapidity; the covered way was now completed; the preparations for passing the fosse were finished, and on the 21st of May every thing was prepared for the assault-when General Kalkreuth intimated to the French commander that he was willing to capitulate, on the same conditions as he had himself formerly granted to the garrison of Mayence. This proposition was acceded to without hesitation; and on the 27th of May, the garrison, reduced from sixteen thousand to nine thousand men, with their general at their head, marched out of the fortifications with all the honours of war, and were permitted to go wherever their inclination and convenience dictated, engaging only not to serve against France for the ensuing twelve months. Dantzic, at the time of its surrender, possessed eight hundred pieces of artillery, and magazines and stores of every description. Its principal advantage, however, to the conqueror, lay in its constituting a place of the first order, for strength, on the left wing of the grand army, while the centre was supported by Thorne, and the right by Praga.

But it is time to advert to other incidents of the extended and destructive hostility in which Europe was now involved. The operations of the 8th corps of the grand French army in the north of Germany, under General Mortier, will be long remembered; their exactions and depredations on the devoted towns and territories of this country, left indelible horror on the minds of the unresisting inhabitants. After a system of violence and rapine had been sufficiently organized to proceed with little military impulse in Hamburgh, Lubeck, and the various other places, which, in their turn, became the victims of imperial plunder, the corps of Mortier was ordered to proceed against Swedish Pomerania, and to co-operate with Lefebvre in the siege of Dantzic. The attempts of Bonaparte to detach the King of Sweden from the confederacy had been such as would have seduced or terrified to his purpose men of less firmness and perseverance than were possessed by this young monarch, whose ardour however, it will be admitted, arose on some occasions to something not very different from frenzy, and who occasionally appeared as intemperate as he had been persevering. The failure of the overtures of the French government was, in January, followed by the seizure of Anclam. Grissewald was soon taken by the French troops, and Stralsund itself was invested. The Swedish army at Stralsund consisted of thirteen thousand Swedes, and four thousand Prussians; these the king was almost in daily expectation of seeing joined by a very considerable British force, which might qualify him to take the field for active operations against the enemy, instead of confining himself within