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this further intelligence, with all the eagerness and sensibility of a loyal man exposed to the pikes of assassins. His warning voice was again disregarded, and his intelligence again spurned with contempt, by the sagacious and magnanimous guardian of the Insh nation. Mr Clarke, returning home at a late hour in the evening, was way-laid and shot, as it is believed, by some of his own workmen. You now, with demonstration of the act before you, can scarcely believe that no one measure of precaution, of any kind, was taken for the safety of the Castle and City of Dublin, though there was ample time for this purpose after the information was given --The Castle was left to its ordinary guard. about 100 men, with the usual quantity of ammunition to each man. No supply of ball cartridges

was in readiness. The yeomanry were totally unapprized of their danger, and left without any supply whatever of ball-cartridges. When the lawyer's corps, between ten and eleven at night, rushed to the Castle, alarmed by the cries of murder and rebellion in the streets, the stores were opened, and no cartridges were to be found, except a few made up for carbines and pistols, and which were entirely unfit for musquets. In the Castle, all was terror, confusion, and may. The garrison in the barrack were in a smilar state, without inforination, without preparation, and without orders. The principal officers, who, in the full security of peace, had been that day amusing themselves at a grand cricket match in the Park, afterwards dined at a Tavern in Earl Street, remote from their quarters, and remained there until a late hour of the night, having narrowly escaped assassination. Other officers walking through the streets on their dif

ferent

had

engagements, were told by some who escaped, that the rebels were actually, at that instant, armed and in great force in Thomas Street, committing the most cruel outrages. They did not believe the intelligence, thinking it impossible that government should be so destitute of information, far less, that they should have received and neglected it. General Dunn, amidst this carnage and confusion, at length made his way from the barrack to the head-quarters at Kilmainham, through streets beset by armed rebels; and narrowly escaped assassination. There he received the first orders, which were issued to the military for the suppression of the rebels. They were promptly and gallantly executed. In short, so complete was the surprize, that the rebels advanced without opposition within two short streets of the castle, and nothing but

their brutal ferocity, in attacking Lord Kilwarden, prevented them from taking it. Here let me pause, and ask how it was possible that a conspiracy, of this extent, so long in agitation, so diffused in its operation, could so long have been concealed from the irish government? The people will ask, why no measures were taken for the apprehending Russell and Emmett, who were seen by many, and were long and pretty openly employed in maturing the conspiracy? The people will ask, why no proclamation has been issued, offering suitable rewards for apprehending these desperate miscreants, and the other leaders who are known, while rewards have been offered by a puny proclamation for bringing to pu nishment the deluded rabble who were but the instruments of their atrocity? The peo ple well know the leaders are few, but their followers are numerous, and spring up ke the soldiers of Cadmus. The punishment of these persons would cut up the conspiracy by the roots, the cutting off thousands of the latter would scarcely diminish the danger. Another measure appears to the people a little extraordinary. Many copies of the rebel proclamation have been taken while the rebels were in the very act of printing it, but are attempted to be most carefully suppressed by the Irish government. A printer of known loyalty applied at the Castle, for liberty to print and publish the Dublin proclamation from the provisionary government, with notes explanatory of its mischievous tendency, but was strictly enjoined on no account to attempt it. This reminds me of the school-boy who turns his face to the wall and thinks that nobody can see him. It is obvious that these proclamations cannot be kept concealed from rebels or enemies, why then keep them se cret from the loyal part of the community, who, to a man, are mercilessly proscribed by them? For my part, so little do I think, that secrecy, as to any thing that has passed here for the last six months, can contribute to the public safety, that I am determined, by a deliberate sense of imperious duty, to make known, as far as I possibly can, to the Irish and British Public, the whole of what has been done and left undone during that period. My only object is the public safety, and my only means a strict adherence to truth. If a single position in this detail can be controverted, I am ready to expunge it.

But I cannot compromise the safety of all for the paltry purpose of rescuing the guilty from public execration and the arms of justice. It is an aw'ul question to be put by the people to those who have

"Haud tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis tempus eget."

I hope; from the bottom of my soul I hope, that I may not be ominous, but I cannot help reflecting; it presses, it forces itself on my mind, that in every country, over. whelmed, during the latter period of French continental hostilities, you, Sir, were the British harbinger of their dismal overthrow and subjugation-witness Switzerland, Tuscany, and Austria. May God! that God, who has recently rescued us from the deadly lethargy of ministerial pride, ignorance, and presumption, avert the omen! Regular troops, tried veteran troops can alone adequately defend us, powerfully reinforced by a numerous, gallant, and loyal yeomanry. Such troops alone can repel the first attacks of the French. In this country, reverses at the out-set may be fatal, as they would be the means of bringing, instantaneously, myriads of armed rebels into the field. And yet, the present plan is to oppose French veteran troops with a raw, unofficered, incomplete Irish militia. Great Britain is fortifying her capital-read this letter, and say, what have the Irish ministers been doing?

had the guidance of public measures: who sacrificed: paltry, wretched, witless, infaare responsible for the murder of Lord Kil- tuated men? warden, the much lamented head of Irish jurisprudence? The blood of this unfortu nate nobleman, of the hapless Colonel Brown, and the other ill-fated victims of rebellion, who were exposed to the pikes of merciless savages, by criminal supineness and the most obdurate obstinacy, cries aloud for vengeance. Small will be the atonement to their manes, that those who exposed them to the most ferocious of mankind should meet with the punishment they have richly merited. Had the measure of their crimes been completed, there would not, at this day, have been a loyal hand left in Ireland to hold a pen to detail to you, Sir, who were absent in a foreign realm, the dismal catastrophe of the annihilation of Ireland. As far as their guilt is concerned, they are answerable to the fullest extent for the destruction of the very name, character, and stamp of loyalty in this wretched and most neglected country. Ministers did no one act; they took no one measure to discover, prevent, resist, or suppress the mischief. If they did, let them name it, and so far diminish the load of their guilt. You may, Sir, readily conceive the feelings under which I write this horrid and detestable history of treason, audacious, active, and highexerted treason; opposed to supercilious folly and wavering imbecility.Let me advert, for a moment, to our present forlorn condition. In common with the rest of my countrymen, who feel and think, not a morning do I rise from my bed, but I expect to hear of a landing of the enemy in force on some part of the coasts of this kingdom. Mention to Mr. Marsden this general sentiment of the nation; nay, if one should come from the dead to announce it, be will receive it with the same supercilious grimace as he did the intelligence of Mr. Aylmer, Mr. Clarke, Mr. Going, Mr. Finlay, and many others, on the fatal 23d of July. The only measure I have heard of taken for our defence, is, that redoubtable act of policy, the reembodying the Irish militia, a measure reprobated and deprecated by every thinking man in the nation. Ask Lord Hutchinson, whether the Irish militia can be relied on against French veteran troops. In short, the folly and temerity of this measure is next to madness, when their service is confined by law to the country where they have been already tried, and have been found fit only to fill the enemy's ranks. But, militia regiments were agreeable douceurs to the meritorious body of Irish gentry resorting to St. James's-and to that we are to be

Your indignant observer,

AN IRISHMAN.

ON INVASION.

SIR, Since you published in your Register of the 16th ult. that part of my letter which relates to St. Domingo, accounts have reached this country, both from France and America, respecting the state of affairs in that island. The French, as might be supposed, speak most favourably of the situation of their troops there, and describe them as enjoying a certain degree of tranquillity; and, indeed, so it may be, if being shut up in the sea-port towns and receiving only such supplies of produce from the interior of the country as the blacks might think fit to give them, in return for the articles of necessity of which they themselves may stand in need, can be so considered. The Americans, however, represent things in a much worse light; yet, no doubt, in a more correct point of view. They say, that the French are not only shut up in the seaport towns, but that they have failed in an attack which they made upon Tortue, and that a considerable number of French troops have deserted to the negro army. case, however, appears to be simply this

The

*

ried by our brave troops in the most gallant manner; it is, however, an evident proof of the decided superiority which our heroic countrymen have hitherto maintained, for ages, over the troops of our inveterate enemy, and shews what will be the fate of those who may have the temerity to invade our native land. But this success ought not to lead us to prosecute farther military operations against the colonies of France, for no good whatever is likely to result ultimately from such a system. Our ships should closely blockade all the ports of their islands, but our military operations should be confined entirely to Europe. In a former letter I detailed pretty fully my ideas upon this subject, and before I conclude this letter I shall make a few more remarks thereon. We have now a sufficient military force in the West-Indies to hold St. Lucia and Tobago, and to secure all our own islands against any attack whatever. And by proper arrangement, there might be found a disposable force sufficient, also, to garrison the Dutch colonies in South America until peace shall be restored. For if we do not possess ourselves of them, the French at Cayenne will, in all probability, take them under their protection; and when once France is in possession of them there is not the least probability of their being restored.The Cape of Good Hope having been so much the subject of conversation since the peace of Amiens, I cannot help expressing my apprehensions that it may be again an object of conquest in the contemplation of government. Should this be the case, not a man should be sent from Europe against it, but the whole military force for that particular service should be drawn from India.--I shall now revert to the observations I communicated to you upon the subject of invasion, which have not yet appeared in print; I shall, therefore, here repeat them in the expectation that you will give them a place in the ensuing Register.I have, in a former letter, shewn the state of that part of the navy allotted for the defence of the country, for the protection of our coasting trade and na

if our government do but take immediate and proper steps to open a communication with the black chieftains, in the manner, and under the stipulations I have before pointed out, and declare all the ports of St. Domingo, now in the possession of French troops, in a state of blockade, the whole of the military force of France, in that island, would be under the necessity of surrendering to the blockading squadrons, or to the black armies. The supplies of flour and salt provisions which the French obtain from America (and which are the only supplies they have hitherto obtained) would be immediately cut off, and, as it is fair to presume that they have but very little in store, necessity would, before the expiration of six months, oblige them to submit. By the arrival of the five ships at Ferrol, the French naval force at St. Domingo is reduced to about three ships of the line and a few frigates, but these have also very probably left the island for Europe, otherwise there is little doubt that they must soon fall into our hands. The Consul being aware of the danger to which his fleet was exposed in that part of the world, not only from our squadrons, but from the critical state of St. Domingo, has very prudently withdrawn the greater part of it, and the remainder will undoubtedly very shortly be withdrawn, if they are not destined to make a trip to America, for provisions for the troops, before they ultimately depart for Europe, and abandon the soldiers to their fate.The five French ships, which have lately arrived at Ferrol, are well situated to escort and protect any armaments that may be preparing, for the invasion of Ireland, in the Loire, the Charente, or the Garsone; and as Ireland is our vulnerable point, a strict and close blockade of Ferrol, Bordeaux, Rochfort, Rochelle, and Nantes is an object that claims our immediate and most particular attention; as any armaments that may be equipped for Ireland from those ports will unquestionably run 150 or 200 leagues to the westward before they attempt to steer a course for their real destination, as well with the view of avoiding our cruizers in the Bay of Biscay, as for the purpose of join-vigation, and for the annoyance of that of ing their ships, now at Ferrol, in a certain latitude, if they can put to sea and elude the vigilance of the squadron blockading that port. The conquest of St. Lucia appears to have made no greater impression upon the minds of the people in this country than the capture of a single merchant vessel, although the strong post of Morne Fortunée was car

* See Register, p. 33, et seq.

France and Holland, and the blockade of their ports at the signing of the preliminary treaty; the force I have there enumerated, you are, of course aware, did not include the ships in the Mediterranean and on the coast of Spain, these amounted to 42 sail of the line (including troup-ships) 4 fifties, 62 frigates, and 39 sloops, in all, with the

See Register, p. 40,

ships armed en flute, 147 vessels of war. The naval force upon the more distant stations, I need not here mention, as that force cannot be considered at all connected with the set of invasion, though the fleet in the Mediterranean and on the coast of Spain may fairly be brought into view, in the discussion of this topic.--A few months before the preliminary treaty of London was signed, Mr. Dundas (Lord Melville) in his speech on the 25th of March, 1801, in answer to Mr. Grey on the subject of the military force then in Great Britain and Ireland, said, "There is at present of regular

"

force in England, an establishment of "21,500 cavalry, and of 84,900 infantry : " and in Ireland a regular cavalry of 4,400 66 men, and 48,600 infantry. This is exclu"sive of the artillery, exclusive of marines to "the amount of about 10,000, serving on "board ships of war on the bome station; "exclusive of sea-fencibles amounting to near "7,000 men; and exclusive of the volunteer force in both Islands I am not possessed of an accurate statement of the volunteer force "in Ireland, but I am generally informed that "it amounts to about 40,000. In England, "according to an examination very recently "made of their effective strength, it amounts "to 20,685 cavalry, and 107,353 infantry." By this statement of Mr. Dundas's it appears, that there was a total of regular and volunteer cavalry of 42,185, and of infantry 199,253, (exclusive of the 10,000 marines, which certainly ought to be omitted while serving afloat) making a general total, for the defence of Great Britain, of 241,438 men. The cavalry in Ireland, except the regular force, cannot be distinguished, but the general total including infantry and cavalry amounted to 93,000. So that the whole force in the United Kingdom was no less than 334,438 men in arms!! All of whom would, upon the landing of the French, and upon proclaiming a artial law, have been liable to be marched from one extreme of the Kingdom to the other; yet, notwithstanding all this immense force, and the complete protection afforded thereby, the Consul's threats of invasion were reechoed in the people's ears, instead of assaulting and destroying his towns upon the coast, and thereby rendering his government and his hostility to this country odious to his own people, who would then have soon been convinced that all his boasted threats against this country were vain, and that he was even incapable of securing them against our just revenge. My motive for going back to the period of which I have been speaking is, because every thing seems

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to shew that the same sentiments now per vade the government and the parliament, although we have a much more considerable armed force in the United Kingdom, than we had even at the period to which I have referred. May I therefore not be justified in saying, that there is not, I am confident, a professional man of experience and distinction, either in the navy or army, who would not join with me, in urging the immediate embarkation of 10,000* men, or as many more as possible, for offensive optrations, as the season in which embarkations and debarkations can be effected with ease and safety, will soon be past.-The embarkation of such a force as I have here described, would of itself, agitate the whole of the sea-port towns of France, and would be the means of turning the troops which the Consul may have destined for the invasion of this country, to the defence of the French coast.--It was by such a system of proceeding in the years 1758 and 1759, as this I have here pointed out, that, that immortal statesman Mr. Pitt (Lord Chatham) raised this country to that pinnacle of glory and fame at which she arrived through his wisdom, assisted by the kill and conduct of our admirals and generals, and supported by the valour of our seamen and soldiers. At the period above-mentioned, the French held out threats similar to those of the present day, and preparations, upon the most extensive scale, were making in all the ports within the Channel to convey their troops our shores. Shipping, flat-bottomed boats, and craft of all descriptions were collected for the purpose, and the whole of their men of war were ordered to assemble at Brest to protect and support the invading army, which amounted to near 70,000 men, who were put under the command of the Prince of Condé, aided by 40 other generals. This grand expedition was, however, entirely frustrated by the bombardment of some of the enemy's towns within the Channel, by the destruction of the shipping in their ports, and by attacking various points of their coast, by the defeat of the Toulon squadron by Admiral Boscawen on its way to Brest, for the purpose of strengthening the fleet there, and by the decisive victory obtained over M. Conflans by Sir Edward Hawke near Belleisle. These were amongst the glorious results of Mr. Pitt's profoundly wise and energetic administration. Yet when that great statesman resolved upon these vigorous measures, the whole mili rary establishment of this country was

* Vide Register, Vol. IV. p. 41.

to

about 70,000 regulars and 30,000 militia, making a total of 100,000 men in arms. Now, by the vote of Parliament, the regular force is about 140,000, the militia of the United Kingdom 130.000, the army of reserve 50,000, and 280,000 volunteers are actually enrolled, making the whole 600,000 men in arms, exclusive of a considerable body of sea-fencibles. To these are yet to be added the levy en masse. Nevertheless, are we sunk into, and kept upon a defensive system. How must this nation naturally feel then, upon comparing the decisive conduct pursued by Mr. Pit, with the language now held in Parliament, where the threatened invasion is talked of as almost inevitable, and as a matter of course. What would the illustrious Chatbam say, were it possible for him to hear the leading men in our legislature speak of the possibility of the enemy throwing 60,000 men into this country without a fleet, or even a squadron to protect them against the attack of a few frigates It is true, that our naval armaments are not so numerous as could be wished, yet they are fully sufficient, at the present time, to blockade every port, at which the enemy may be making preparations to embark his troops: a perfect knowledge of which, may be obtained by the observations of our naval commanders, as well as by those channels through which intelligence may always be procured, when liberal rewards are held out for it--Between the Elbe and Bayonne we have now 31 ships of three and two decks, 42 frigates, and 72 sloops (including inferiot armed vessels) actually employed in the blockade of the ports of France and Holland (or of those in possession of French troops) and in the protection of our own coasts, making a total of 145 vessels of wart. In addition to these, there are near 90 others of different classes fitting and preparing for sea, many of which are nearly ready to proceed against the enemy; yet we seem to be daily alarmed by fishing boats, schuyts, and flat bottomed boats, which are now held up as objects of terror, and in which, we are told, that, in spite of our ships of war, the threatening host are to be conveyed to our shores; but how such vessels as these are to escape the vigilance of our squadrons, I am at a loss to conceive; and if they should not escape their vigi

*The yeomanry and volunteers in Ireland have not been stated, though it is imagined, their numbers now exceed considerably what Mr. Dundas supposed them to be (40,000) when he made his speech in March, 1801.

There are in the Mediterranean also near 50 ships of war of different rates.

lance, inevitable destruction must attend them. The fishing boats and schuyts it is well known (particularly the latter) could make little or no progress without wind, and, with wind, they could not possibly move without being discovered, and then only with a fair breeze could they proceed in the crowded and lumbered state in which they must be, supposing each vessel to contain 100 men, which seems to be the number allotted to them; but which I venture to assert is, upon the average, more by onethird than such vessels could receive. Supposing, however, that each vessel could convey across the Channel 100 men, it would require no less than six hundred of these vessels to transport 60,000 men; but if my estimate be right, it would of course require more than nine hundred. Now I would ask any naval officer of experience, whether it be possible for an hundred of these vessels, nay, even for twenty of them, much less nine hundred, or even six hundred, as above stated, to leave the ports of France, Flanders, and Holland, without being discovered, and consequently destroyed. It is right here to observe, that in speaking of the comparatively small number of twenty vessels, I allude to those ports at which it is understood preparations are making for embarkations, and before which our blockading squadrons are stationed: I would not on any account, for a moment, entertain such an idea of the want of vigilance, of zeal, of activity, and of ability in such officers as Admiral Thornbrough, Sir James Saumarez, and Sir Sydney Smith, as to imagine that, any one of these gallant and distinguished men, would suffer even so small a number as twenty of the yessels before described to escape, having been apprized, that, in the port before which his squadron was placed, such a flotilla was preparing for the invasion of his country. How then can any man, at all conversant with the movements of flotillas, and the transport of troops, be so absurd as to think that one, two, three, six, or nine bundred vessels, lumbered with men, could not only put to sea without being discovered, but absolutely reach the British shores in defiance of our naval commanders, and of our brave and gallant seamen. No;-This I declare to be impossible! and I have no doubt, that this declaration would be readily confirmed upon an appeal to the distinguished men I have alluded to, as well as by all others in the service, animated with the like zeal and spirit of enterprize. For, our blockading squadrons, at this season of the year, are perpetually, either collectively or separately, at the mouths of the enemy's

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