of Holland, in order to join the troops now collecting there for the invasion of England. -The Batavian troops are assembling in North Holland and Zealand, and a considerable force has been sent to the Island of Walcheren.——Accounts from Ceylon on the 9th of February, state that a corps of Militia had been formed there, for the protection of the town and district. Gen. Macdowal's army was at Kattaderria, upon the Candian frontiers, and were in daily expectation of crossing the Kaymelle.

NAVAL.--Letters from Cape François dated the 14th of July, state that the blockade is strictly kept up by the British cruisers, and that a great number of ships have been taken and sent into Jamaica. Several

French vessels were, a short time ago, cut out of the harbour of Jeremie, notwithstanding that a very heavy fire was kept up from the batteries on shore. Two French 74's and 4 frigates were preparing to sail for Europe, and men were pressed from all the merchant ships at the Cape, to complete their crews.The entrance of Port Royal in Martinique, is closely blockaded by one of our small squadrons, and the inhabitants of the island are in perpetual dread of an attack from our troops. --British ships are constantly cruising off Guadaloupe, and se veral prizes have been made, and sent in.On the 14th of June, Capt. Mowbray, in the Maidstone, captured the French brig L'Arab, of 8 guns and 58 men, returning from Athens to L'Orient.--Advices have been received from the Mediterranean stating that Lord Nelson had been joined by Sir Richard Bickerton's squadron.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS. PRINCE OF WALES. The censures which have been passed upon the ministers, on account of their conduct with respect to their rejection of the offer of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, have been attributed to factious motives; to enmity against the ministers, and not to friendship for the Prince. To inculcate this opinion, and, at the same time, to prevent the effect of the general desire, which the Prince must perceive to prevail, as to the publi cation of the correspondence, which pass ed between him and the ministers, seems to have been the object of a very insidious article, which appeared in a daily paper of the 27th ultimo, and which, it is credibly asserted, was published at the express request of Mr. Sheridan. The writer sets out with condemning the rejection of the Prince's offer, especially as the measure appears to have been the effect of narrow policy. He

then praises the conduct of the Prince, says that his being invested with a military command must have produced the best possible consequences, that "the objections urged "against it are frivolous, unworthy of a "serious answer, and that the only reason "which does, or can exist, is a mean and "mischievous spirit of jealousy in some low mind." But, having thus disapproved of the refusal to give his Royal Highness a command, this candid gentleman disapproves still more. of the spirit of faction, which it is at"tempted to raise in consequence of it." He thinks that the Prince, having done all that there was any occasion for him to do, having "acquitted himself to the people, "having already derived from the offer all "the honour of actual service," he should "display magnanimity, as well as ardour, "in the cause of his country, and thereby "endear himself to it still more by giving

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an example of submission."-It is impossible to proceed further without asking,submission to what, and to whom? Because, if it be a submission to any thing but the paternal authority, or the laws of the realm; if it be a submission to the interested views of a minister, then his Royal Highness would set a most dangerous example to the country. Besides, if he has already "derived from the offer all the honour "of actual service," where is the room for this grand display of his magnanimity? But, how shamefully fallacious is it, to pretend, that the making of an offer, which has been rejected, does, of itself, reflect on his Royal Highness all the honour of actual service! When a person has offered to fight, and has been prevented, by the refusal of his adversary, or by some other insurmountable obstacle, such person is, indeed, justly entitled to all the praise due to the action which he was desirous of performing. Very different is the case of the Prince: he is not prevented from fighting by the refusal of the enemy, but by that of the minister: not by the refusal of him, against whom he wished to fight; but by that of him for whom he wished to fight, and who, to use a somewhat vulgar phrase, seems to have considered his room as preferable to his company. So weak, indeed, is this argument, that the writer himself appears to despair of it; and, as is not uncommonly the case, attempts to prop it up by another, by which it is completely destroyed. So partial and so unwise, he says, have been the military appointments, that, it is difficult to decide whether ac. ceptance or rejection be a proof of talent; and, he assures the Prince of Wales, " that

"the rejection of his services rather raises "than lowers him in the esteem of the public! This statement, so comforting to the people and so flattering to the ministry, contains, nevertheless, very little to satisfy the Prince: for, if it be a very questionable point, whether it be an honour or a dishonour to serve, in the present state of military arrangements, what becomes of all the honour of actual service," which the Prince is said to have already "derived from his offer," and with which honour he is conjured to rest satisfied?But, be his injuries what they may, he is, it seems, to bury them in oblivion, lest the expression of his discontent should operate as an example to the "thousands

of volunteers, whose services are at this "moment, rejected, and who will be rendered refractory, if they see the Prince "of Wales raising an opposition to go"vernment." Raising an opposition to government! This is precisely the doctrine, which Mr. Sheridan preached at the breaking up of the parliament, but which doctrine he very properly reprobated on the 16th of February, 1801. What opposition is the Prince of Wales raising to the government? Is it raising an opposition to government to be discontented at the i-treatment he has received? Το complain of usage such as no Prince in England ever before endured; of being stigmatized in the eyes of the people, and of the whole world, as a person either incapable, or otherwise unworthy, of military command, after having been twenty years in the military service, and after having attended its duties with great regularity; is it being factious to resent treatment like this? The volunteer corps, indeed! So, his Royal Highness is to overlook the contumelious behaviour of ministers towards himself, because their follies have excited discontents in other quarters! But, after all, in what way is the Prince raising an opposition to government? What has he done or said, to oppose measures of ministers? Most people are disposed to think, that he might, with no impropriety, have employed his influence to oppose the ministry; but, that he has done it, there is not the shadow of a proof. His cause has, indeed, been espoused by others; and, he is told, that if he looks round him, "he "will see many, who give him support, on the present question, who are far "from being friendly to him on other oc"casions. He will see, that his cause is "taken up, as any other cause would be, "simply with a view of attacking the mi"nistry, or weakening and embarrassing

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"them," the object of all which, doubtless, is to turn them out of their places. Allowing, for a moment, that the object be what is here described, it will then remain for this moderate gentleman to shew the harm that is likely to arise from the ousting of a ministry, who proceed upon narrow policy;" who, in rejecting the offer of the heir apparent, have acted under the influence of " a mean "and mischievous spirit of jealousy in some low "mind;" who have so distributed the commands in the army, as to render it "doubt“ful, whether rejection or acceptance be a proof "of talent;" and, who, at a moment when the existence of the State depends upon deeds of arms, have so degraded the mili tary profession, that for an officer to have his offer of service rejected, “ rather raises “than lowers him in the esteem of the public." What harm there can be in effecting the political dissolution of a ministry like this, it will be very difficult for any one to point out, unless he believes what the ministers themselves tell the world, that, if the nation will not suffer them to remain in power, there can be no ministry at all. -Where this gentleman has discovered those persons, who have taken up the cause of the Prince, simply with a view of attacking the ministry, he does not tell us; and, it does appear a little uncharitable, that a motive so unworthy of a defender of the Prince should have been sought for by a person, who himself describes the conduct of the ministers towards the Prince as comprizing every thing that is unjust, mischievous and base. Speaking with refe rence to this work, of which it is evident the writer in question did not entirely lose sight, it can be safely asserted, that, in none of its pages, nor in those of any work ever conducted by the same editor, can there be found one expression, which is, either directly or indirectly, "friendly" to the Prince of Wales. As to friendship, indeed, it is a sentiment, which it would be presumption in a person in common life to affect to entertain towards one so far exalted above him. The proper sentiment is loyalty. Not that sort of loyalty, which flows so flippantly from the tongue of drunkenness, or that issues, in noisy shouts, from the lungs of the rabble; much less that loyalty which, in praying for the King, has in view the preservation of the funds. No; but that sort of loyalty, which includes attachment, fidelity, and zeal, arising, not from reflection and calculation, but from an ever-operative principle implanted in the heart; a principle quite suf

upon the subject. But, while all agree as to the expedience of offensive operations, there is great difference of opinion as to the scale, the manner, the time, the place, the object, and, strange to tell, men are not quite unanimous as to the abstract nature of those operations; for, the partizans of the ministry either believe themselves, or wish to deceive others into a belief, that the nation is at this moment carrying on a most vigorous and fortunate offensive war. To propagate this notion has been, of late, a leading object with the ministerial writers; and, indeed, the dissertation, which is here more particularly alluded to, bears every mark of official dictation. Viewing it in this light, the sentiments it contains are of importance.

- The writer states, in substance,' that the blame which was, in parliament, thrown upon the ministers, on account of the loss of Hanover, was without foundation; because, not being able to rouze the North• ern Powers, it would have been madness to attempt the defence of the Electorate by the means of British troops: that small expeditions to the coast of France may possibly be of use; but that considerable expeditions, to any part of the Continent, 'would, at present, be useless, and would only terminate in new battles of Marengo, and in making a great addition to the fame and influence of the Consul of France: that Holland is the only weak point of the • Continent; but, as Buonaparté is well aware of this, he is so strengthening himself on that side, that another attack on it would, in all probability, terminate in another Dutch expedition: that, though ⚫ we cannot make, or excite, war against France upon the Continent, we must not, for that reason, conclude, that we are unable to wage offensive war against her; for, that, an offensive war may be carried on against her marine, her commerce, and her colonies; and that this is, too, the safest and most effectual species of offensive war: that this sort of war-fare will, if no other is carried on, become of vast importance in the eyes of the world; it will be the object of universal attention; and, as it is a scene where British valour is sure to dazzle, the more powerful France ⚫ is by land, the more she will be exposed to the derision and contempt of mankind, and the more swiftly the fame of Buonaparté will decline: and, finally, that, if we place our finances, our army, and our navy, on such a footing as to be able to say to France, here we will stand for ever unless

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merce and her colonies, and even all her ' commercial and colonial hopes.'--The absurdity of these sentiments would render them totally unworthy of attention, did not the source whence they come give them a fearful importance. As to Hanover, how it at all found its way into remarks of this sort appears quite unaccountable; and, if the writer was, for some reason or other unknown to all the world but himself, resolved to introduce that Electorate, he might, surely, have confined himself to those censures that were passed on ministers, relative to it, and not have put others into the mouths of their adversaries. No one, either in parliament or out of parliament, ever censured the ministers for not attempting to defend Hanover by the means of British troops; no man in his sound senses ever thought of such a thing. The charge, now that all the circumstances are known, is, their not having saved Hanover by influence with Prussia; and the charge in the House of Commons, was, their not having sent transports in time to fetch away the troops, when it appeared, that they had intended to send them: instead of being charged with not sending out a British army to Hanover, they were charged with having neglected to bring a Hanoverian army to Britain, when it was in their power so to do, when they designed to do it, and when they failed in effecting their design only because they were weak and indecisive. - -With respect to the scheme of war, which is here described, it may possibly be the only one that is left us to act upon; but, if it be in itself, so excellent, it must always have been a most desirable thing, that France should have been mistress of Europe, and in proportion, therefore, that she should have been mistress of the several parts. Formerly the notion was different we thought, that every acquisition of France was an evil; but, now we find it was a great good, as contributing to, and making part of, the grand consummation, when she is to be mistress of the whole, and we are to be in possession of all the mighty means of distressing and disgracing her! But, to give a somewhat more rational turn to the argument, adinit, that our warfare against the commerce and colonies of France is, in every instance, crowned with success. Will this success put an end to the war? Will it induce France to yield to terms of peace that will give us security? If the answer be in the affirmative, the next question is, why were such terms not obtained from her at Amiens, when her com merce was destroyed as far as it ever can be, and when she had almost forgotten that she