once had colonies? These our maritime and colonial successes will, we are told, cover her with disgrace, and render her an object of derision in the eyes of other nations. Is it likely that our maritime and colonial sucCesses will be greater during this war than they were during the last? And, is it true, that our successes of last war rendered France an object of derision in the eyes of any of those nations, whose opinions can have any influence with respect to her views? If the conclusion, here evidently aimed at, be attempted to be set aside by a denial of the analogy, on which the argument is founded; if it be, as, indeed, it is, asserted, that the discontinuance of active war will tend to lower the military fame of France, and that the laurels of Buonaparté will wither for want of new victories; if this be asserted, it behoves the asserter to say, why that military fame had not been lowered, why that laurel had not withered, during the two years which had elapsed between the treaty of Luneville and that of Amiens, even though to the European inactivity of that period were added the misfortunes of the Egyptian campaign? Besides, if inactivity be so certain a source of disgrace to France, is it not likely, that it will be somewhat disgraceful to us? And, if it be said, that we shall always, or for a long time, at least, be kept in a state of activity by our war on the commerce and the colonies of France, when are we to experience the promised advantages to be derived from the destruction of that commerce and the capture of those colonies? As long as there are French colonies to capture, and French commerce to destroy, France will enjoy part at least of her colonies and commerce; and, exactly in the same proportion that we diminish her commercial and colonial means, we must diminish the meaus by which we are to be kept in a state of activity, by which we are to dazzle mankind, to disgrace our enemy, and finally to reduce him to the necessity of sueing for peace. If the ministerial partizan should have the good fortune to extricate himself from this whimsical dilemma, his next task will be to reconcile his notions with those of the Lords Castlereagh and Hawkesbury, and their worthy colleague, Mr. Henry Addington; the latter of whom has put on record his solemn protest against the extension of our colonial possessions, while the two former have declared, that the surrendering to France all her colonies was the best, if not the only, means of recovering our influence on the Continent of Europe: and, as to Lord Castlereagh, he was of opi nion, that the security of England depended, in a great measure, on the revival and increase of the commerce of France. Yet, we are now told, that our salvation is to be wrought by the capture of French colonies, and the destruction of French commerce! The pursuit of these objects it is, which we are now told to regard as constituting that offensive war, which is to recover our lost reputation, humble the pride of our enemy, and give us a lasting and honourable peace! -War is offensive, or not, according to its final object. Because we were the beginners of this war, we are not, for that reason alone, to conclude, that the world will look upon us as being engaged in an offensive war, and our enemy as being engaged in a defensive war. If our object be to change the relative situation of the two countries, to add to our own dominions, or power, or to diminish the dominions or the power of France, the war is truly an offensive war, whatever be the nature of its naval and military operations; but, if mere security be our object, if we are still content to live upon the terms of the treaty of Amiens, if we have only taken up arms to save ourselves from subjugation, and if we are ready to lay them down, when, on that score, our apprehensions are removed, then, though we should be constantly attacking the enemy by land as well as by sea, we must still be regarded as engaged in a defensive war, and must move under all the great and numerous disadvantages attached to that situation. If such be our humble hopes, France will always be, what she now is, the assailant, even though she never attempt to invade us. Buonaparté does not, indeed, come across the Channel; but, there he stands threatening us; and we are fully occupied in preparing not to attack, but to resist him. Defence is the word of the day: all our talk is about defence: to defend ourselves seems to be the utmost stretch of our hopes; to remain free from the Gallic yoke, the pinnacle of our ambition. Can we, then, be said to be engaged in an offensive war? Will the world regard us as being so engaged? And, shall we not be exposed to all that contempt, which, as this writer truly observes, belongs to a state of defensive war?" If," says he, "we "place our finances, our army, our navy, on such a footing as to be able to say to "France, here we will stand for ever, un"less you yield, she must submit, she must "solicit peace, or she must lose her com"merce and her colonies, and even all her "commercial and colonial hopes." The alternative being prefered, the commerce and colonies, the commercial and colonial hopes, being willingly given up by France, as, indeed, they already have been, the ministerial scheme of compelling her to yield is, at once, rendered abortive. But, what, on the other hand, becomes of us, if we should fail in placing our finances, our navy, and our army in a situa ion which will en able us to 66 stand for ever" in a warlike attitude? If the conte t be reduced to a mere trial of patience and of pecuniary resources, it is by no means difficult to determine, on which side victory will finally remain. Buonaparté has not. in consequence of the present war, imposed one penay of additional taxes upon the people; he has had recourse to no new and extraordinary means for the purpose of augmenting his army; and, if the defensive plan of minis ters be pursued, there is every reason for believing, that he may remain for years in his present attitude, without making any addition whatever to the expenses of the nation. How different are the circu stances, in which we are placed! New taxes, to the amount of twelve millions annually, the Army of Reserve, an Irish Militia, three hundred thousand irregular troops: these are the first demands of the war. That the taxes must be nearly doubled, in the space of two or three years, no one can doubt, unless the system of loans be reverted to; and, will any man seriously say, that he thinks the people will patiently bear those taxes, together with the monstrous load of county and parochial rates imposed by the various laws relating to the defence of the country? Yes; they will bear all this and much more, if their prospect be enlivened with the hope of success; but, never will they bear it, unless a system of real offensive operations be resolved on and adher ed to. The ministers, with those selfish short-sighted views, by which all their measures are dictated, have swelled out the militia, are raising an additional army by ballot, and, finally, are calling on the mass of the people for volunteer service. All these expedients owe their birth to the desire which ministers have to spare the Exchequer; but, in the eyes of any man of reflection, where is the difference to the country, whether the money, to defray military expenses, be' raised by a general tax, or by county or parochial assessments? And, where is the difference, whether it be issued from the King's Exchequer, or from the several county treasuries or parochial vestries? The burthen to the nation is alike in both cases; but, in the latter, its weight falls more partially, and produces effects more injurious to individuals. In estimat ing, therefore, the ability and patience of the country to support a long, inglorious, defensive war, we must always take into consideration the effect not of the taxes alone, but also of the enormous, and, in some cases, absolutely unbearable burdens, which come in another shape, and which, while they must inevitably tend to werry the people, produce a great defalcation in the taxes; and, thereby, create the necessity of new ones. For a few months, or, perhaps, for a year or two, this mode of helping out the resources of war may succeed to a certain degree; bat, the time must soon ar rive, when it will be defeated by the feelings of the people. Hitherto men have thought of nothing but the danger which immediately threatens them; but, very shallow indeed must be that minister who expects to find, at the end of eighteen months of defensive war, the same degree of zeal that exists at this moment, more especially as the new taxes, none of which have yet begun to operate, will then have made people feel the effects of the war, and will have set them to inquire, what is its object and when it is to end; and, if no one can point out an adequate object, if no one can foretel the probable duration of the contest, is it likely, that the sacrifices, necessary to its continuation, will any longer be chearfully made? Nay, in such a state of things, after having contemplated the horrors of invasion till these horrors are become familiar, is it not to be feared, that men may make up their minds to submission, rather than bear expenses and anxiety which appear to be endless, because no visible means is made use of to put an end to, or diminish them? One of the grounds, on which the ministers justified the peace of Amiens was, that, all Continental aid being at an end, the war had no longer any object, because without such aid it was impossible for us to make any impression upon France. "The duty "of negotiation commenced," said Mr. Addington, "when all hopes of Continental "aid was at an end "*" To those." said he, who wished to continue the war for "the purpose of reducing the power of "France, I only wish to state, that another campaign could not have been made at a "less expense than forty millions and that even certain success W Could not have been "worth such a price" Upon ground like this was the peace justified by all the minis ters; but particularly by Mr. Addington * See Parl. Deb. Register, Vol. II. p. 1149. and the Lord Chancellor ; † and it was, over and over again, asserted, that the people were tired of the war, because it had no longer any object, because there was no longer any hope of effecting a diminution of the power of France. If, therefore, such were the reasons for making the peace of Amiens, why should not the same reasons operate again; and why should not the peo ple ask for an object in this war as well as in the last, unless the present war should prove less burthensome and less vexations? At present there is an object, the all-impor tant object of saving ourselves from slavery; bat, it is utterly incredible, that this object should, for any considerable length of time. continue to stimulate the people: it must soon grow taint in their sigh or it must entirely sub lue their spiri: acting upon a defensive system, no nation ever long pre served either its power or its independence. -Whar, then, ought to be the object of the war? The ultimate object ought to be, to produce such a change in the relative state of Great Britain and France, as shall Trader a peace between them not absolutely incompatible with the security of the former; and, as this object is not to be attain ed by a commercial and colonial war, as there re, at present, no hopes of aid from the Continental powers, as very little is to be done by mere assaults of the French coast, and as France would certainly beat us in a trial of patience and of pecuniary resources, the only rational object left for us to pursue, is, the restoration of the House of Bourbon. Here success would be of real and lasting use; the enterprize would be great; it would inspire enthusiasm ; it would make men cheartully bear the fatigues and the expenses of war, and, if it did not succeed quite to our wishes, it would produce great alarm in the breast of our enemy, and would, as the least possible good, effectually relieve us from the dread of invasion, and from all the tantalizing measures arising from that dread. Great was the clamour, which was raised against the Royalist part of the last war. Every geinea, expended on that account, was counted fifty times over, while millions upon millions were sunk in the commercial and colonial, that is, in the base, the selfish, and ineffectual, part of the war, without exciting the least murmur. Every thing bestowed on the Royalist war was looked upon as thrown away. It was impossible to make people perceive, that the Royalist tee Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 149 and TỊCH, war formed a diversion in favour of Great Britain, and that one guinea expended in La Vendée saved the expending of a hun dred for the defence of this island. But, it should never be forgotten; now more especially it should be remembered, that the dread of invasion began the moment the Vendean war was put an end to. Till then, the invasion of either England or ireland never was thought of by us, and never was talked of by the enemy; but, the moment that war was over, the moment our allies in La Vomée were subdued, and, in a great measure by the force which our tolly (to give it the mildest term), at Valenciennes had sent against them; that moment the spectre of invasion arose, that horrid spectre, which has haunted us ever since, and which will continue to baunt us, till the rebel government of France, or till the Britis' monar hy is destroyed; and, to destroy the rebel government there is no way but hat of restoring the Lourbons to their throne - How this restoration might be effected has been clearly pointed out by a genteman, who, under the name of Inquisitor, some time ago communicated his thoughts to the public through the pages of this work. cautions the public, and the caution is too good and too necessary not to merit repeating; he cautions hem against adopting the erroneous notion, that, in consequence of Buonaparté s failing in his attempts at invasion, he will become unpopular in France, and will, finally, be overset. "As if he " He were less popular on account of the en"tire failure, and of his desertion from, the "the expedition to Egypt; as if he were "less popular on account of the complete "failure (as we are told it is) of the migh It ty expedition to St. Domingo, or less able "to send thither more troops, because fifty thousand have already perished "there!" These are, indeed, striking iastances of the docility of the French people, who have, moreover. by no means verified those predictions of the I ondon new:writers, which related to the discontents that the war would excite in France. has excited no discontent; Buonaparté is as popular as he ever was; nor will any thing short of a war, avowedly for the restoration of the Bourbons, ever shat e his power. —— That large British armies ought to be employed for the accomplishment of this restoration is what no one can be prepared to say; nor, indeed, is it certain, that good policy would dictate the employing, in this enterprize, any British army at all. But, the soundness of the argument, which the partizans of ministers make use of against that sort of offensive war, must by no means be admitted. We are, according to these persons, not to invade France," lest we should give Buonaparté opportunities of gaining other battles of Marengo."—— To refuse to fight your enemy is, it must be confessed, a most effectual way of preventing him from beating you in the field; but, it should be remembered, that your refusal amounts to a solemn acknowledgment of his military superiority, while, to you, no defeat could possibly be more disgraceful. The same argument would apply to an invasion of Holland, and, indeed, to every plan, the execution of which included the probability of a battle where Buonaparté would command the armies of France. Farewell, then, if the ministerial notion be adopted; farewell even to the hope of ever producing a change in the relative situation of France and England; and farewell for ever to real peace, to tranquillity, and security; for, these never can be obtained without a change in this situation, and that change never can be effected without giving to Buonaparté a chance of adding to the laurels, which he acquired at Lodi and Marengo. Adopt this notion, and Continental co-operation becomes not only useless but injurious; for, what aid can we possibly receive from the powers of the Continent, other than that of armies employed against France? And, how can armies be employed against France, without furnishing Buonaparté with an opportunity of displaying his military talents, and of supporting, if not adding to, the fame he has acquired ?--It is, indeed, but too evident, from the tendency of the arguments advanced by the partizans of ministry, that a poor tame, drawling system of warfare has been resolved on. The ministers would willingly see the Bourbons restored; they are of opinion that no real peace will ever be obtained till that restoration takes place; they would expend, in secret, a few millions for the purpose; but, openly to declare their wishes and their opinions, manfully to commit themselves and to pledge their country in this great and glorious cause; this is what they have not the courage to do; and, without this, the present contest must, at no very distant period, end in a peace, still more ruinous and disgraceful than the last, or in the complete subjugation of this country." The people!" The people would object to the expending of the treasures of Britain for any other than "British ob jects." This was the opinion during the last war; this false and fatal opinion still prevails. One would think, that experience ought to have worn it away; but, such is our perverseness on this subject, that if the two hundred thousand men, who perished in the last commercial and colonial war, were to rise from the dead in order to reclaim us, we should turn a deaf ear to their admonitions. Mr. Dundas was pursuing British objects, objects," objects truly British," for that is the phrase; these objects he was pursuing at St. Domingo and Guadaloupe. Mr. Addington, too, was pursuing "objects truly "British" when he obtained Ceylon and Trinidad, at the expense of Portugal, Sardinia, and the Vendean Royalists. But, did the pursuit of those objects last war prevent Ireland from being invaded, and England from being threatened with invasion? And, have the British objects of Mr. Addington preserved us from those evils now? Have they spared us the shame of preparing to fortify London, and will they spare us the enormous expense of Barracks along the coast for lodging our troops during winter? Have any, or all, of these "truly British objects" preserved the character which we formerly maintained in the world; and will the further pursuit of them tend to relieve us from our present most embarrassing, dangerous, and tormenting situation? To restore the Bourbons is an object truly British; because, without that restoration, Britain never can enjoy one hour's secure and honourable peace. We are, to use the words of Mr. Addington, 66 now at war "because we cannot be at peace." This will be followed, as before, by a peace, "because the war is without an object." To that will succeed another war" because "we cannot be at peace;" and with that war will end the patience, the pecuniary means, the honour, the liberty, the independence, and the very name of Britain. People may affect to despise these predictions; they may, in the excess of their fear, assume the blustering tone of Mr. Sheridan; but, neither their affected contempt nor their affected anger will turn from its course the current of events, which, unless a vigorous system of warfare, avowedly in behalf of the Bourbons, be immediately resolved on, will most assuredly bring upon this country a fate far more hard and more disgraceful than that of Spain, Holland, or Switzerland. RUSSIA has finally given in her ultimate propositions, which have been rejected by the ministers. She was good enough to offer to take Malta into her keeping for ten years. The detail is not known, but this was the leading proposition; and, as far as men are to be commended for not having committed high treason, the miniscters deserve commendation for their resistfance.-This, then, is the result of the farfamed mediation of Russia, which was adopted by the ministers amidst the mutual congratulations of the House of Commons, and amidst almost the huzzas of the people. At the time when this mediation was first proposed, it was strongly protested against in the Register: "We are told that the Emperor Alexander is fitting out 66 a fleet, and are given to understand, that !" it is to act in our favour. But, how fool"ish, how ridiculously foolish will this na“tion look, in a few month's time, if it expects any thing from this mediation, except the further humiliation of England. Russia must be excellently disposed to mediate a peace advantageous for us, after the trick which the ministers have played, in order to prevent her from setting foot in Malta, a post, which, above "all others in the world, she was desirous 66 to occupy, and which the Consul art"fally proposed to give her possession of. "This mast most sweetly dispose her for acts of amity towards us! Yet, there are not wanting politicians to entertain very sanguine hopes from this mediation, "notwithstanding it is evidently the policy, as it is, indeed, the interest of Russia "(if gratifying her ambition be interest) "to side with France against England, "and to lower the maritime power and pride of the latter by every possible means, particularly while she holds Malta, "the very place, to obtain which in perpetuity, we are asking, begging, beseeching, this monstrous mediation! "Mr. Fox must have made the motion, "to which we have alluded, without any "hope of its being adopted. What, then, "must have been his surprize, to see his "notions, as well as his mischievous mo"tion, adopted by Mr. Pitt? We were "surprized to see Mr. Windham and Mr. Grenville silent on this occasion. Ap. prove of the motion they could not, we are certain; and, though it was not put "to the vote, though that was prevented "by the minister's promising to adopt the "measure which it recommended, still, 66 66 we think, that Mr. Windham should “have taken an opportunity of giving "to the whole proceeding some strong "mark of his disapprobation." * This was one of the passages, which was attributed to a desire to create despondency. Events have already prove!, • Register, Vol. III. p. 828. that the warning contained in it was very salutary. This asking for the mediation of Russia was a most unwise, and will, in the end, prove a most fatal measure. Had we wished to cut off for ever all hopes of obtaining the co-operation of Russia, and immoveably to fix that power in the arms of France, we could not have fallen upon a scheme so effectual, as that of asking for a mediation from her, in a dispute relative to Malta. The ministers must have been fully acquainted with the all-powerful motives, which she had for obtaining possession of that island, or, at any rate, for wresting it from the hands of Great Britain; and, for them, under such circumstances, to appeal to her as an umpire, was an act of imbecility unparalleled in the history even of their blundering administration. It is, however, no more than justice to them to state, that they themselves were averse from the measure, and that they complained most bitterly of the conduct of the House in forcing upon them, as it were by acclamation, the proposition of Mr. Fox. Resist they could not, without hazarding their majority and their places; and, thus, in another and most important concern, have the interest and honour of the country been sacrificed to their vanity and emolument. Having rejected the terms proposed by a mediator chosen by ourselves, our cause will become, all over the world, more unpopular than ever it is utterly incredible, that any of the powers of Europe should think of espousing it: we must fight the battle single-handed, and we may think ourselves extremely fortunate, if Mr. Addington's three hundred and eighty-one days of peace does not finally procure us two or three enemies, in addition to those whom we before had to encounter. VOLUNTEER CORPS.-These "semina"ries of indiscipline," as they were styled in a former sheet of this work, are giving very striking proofs of the progress, which their pupils have made in their studies. Accounts are given of a corps at the west end of the town, who held a debate of four hours on the question, whether they should or should not lay down their arms, unless the government would submit to their terms! A set of resolutions were finally adopted, including a censure on the colonel, who presided on the occasion! The result is not yet known; but, it is easy to foresee, that, if the government gives way, in this instance, all will become disobedience and mutiny.--Indeed, it is impossible for any reflecting man not to entertain very serious apprehensions as to the effects, which may |