Tagus with the greatest part of his fleet, then all in good order for service, leaving Rear Admiral Sir John Orde, with S sail of the line and 3 or 4 frigates and smailer vessels, to continue the blockade, which he did until the month of April following-Let us suppose however, notwithstanding the miserable state of the Spanish fleet in Cadiz, (and more wretched it need not be made appear, than a part, and the élite of it proved itself when afterwards engaged with Sir James Saumarez in the Gut of Gibraltar,) that it might have been most adviseable for his Lordship only to have detached, at an earlier period, the same number of ships from his fleet, that he sent at last off Toulon when too late, (viz. 6 sail of the line, one ship of fifty guns with several smaller,) instead of keeping them employed, as he usually did, in cruizing on remote stations for prizes, or in carrying passengers and bullocks, to the degradation and injury of the naval service; what might not have been effected by such a force under a skilful leader in delaying the sailing of the French fleet from Toulon, dependent as it was on other parts for its transports and supplies of every kind?-Retarding the departure of the expedition even for a week, would have been every thing; for, as it was, Lord Nelson with the reinforcement from England reached Malta three or four days only after the French left it. And who will pretend to say, had this force been sent off Toulon one month before Lord Nelson went there, that it might not have been the means of delaying the sailing of the French fleet more than that time. What professional man will assert that with such a force, joined by the Portuguese ships already mentioned, as being at Lord St. Vincent's disposal, (and which were stationed soon after off Malta), Ruonaparté might not have been arrested in his course, had he been encountered by it at sea, before our reinforcement arrived, with his numerous and ill appointed Armada !→ Had he been so, what a difference would it have made to this country! Malta and Egypt would not have been possessed by the French; quantities of British blood and treasure would have been saved; and the war now commencing, might eventually have been prevented! With such instances before us of successful enterprise on the part of the French during the last war, under circumstances the most desperate, as this now spoken of; that from Brest to Bantry Bay; and from the former port up the Mediterranean and back again; how can we reasonably expect to be safe from invasion at present should the same unforeseen ne

glect prevail now among our naval rulers as did then? yet what hope can we entertain of better management from the same people, should we withhold our censure on their last conduct when so loudly called for?-Let us remember that Bantry Bay is more than 100 leagues distant from Brest; Toulon from Brest about 600; and Egypt from Toulon upwards of 500! yet that all these distances were passed and repassed by hostile armaments, except the last, without the smallest interruption from our fleets, then in the zenith of their power and greatness; whilst those of our enemies were at their lowest ebb. The expedition to Bantry Bay consisting of ships of war and transports, was some time at anchor in that port, and weeks at sea; and but for providential. interference in our favour, must have been completely successful. That from Brest to. the Mediterranean consisted altogether of ships of war, and was ten or twelve weeks on its tour before it returned with a part of the Spanish fleet from Cadiz.--That to Egypt was composed of all sorts of vessels, the worst provided, amounting to near 400, with 40 or 50,000 troops on board; yet, so confident did its commander appear of his security from being intercepted, that he stopt and took Malta, that impregnable. fortress, in his way, before proceeding to his final destination. On these several occasions, we had only one port to watch and guard at a time, viz. Brest in two instances, and Toulon in one; and we had full and timely information of the designs carrying on in each. Comparing those bold attempts of distant invasion with these we are now menaced, how wide the difference, how much more easy to have been counteracted! An extent of near 200 leagues of enemies coast faces our own, in some parts not above eight or ten leagues distant from us,. at most not exceeding thirty; full of harbours, from which expeditions for crossing the channel may be fitted out, and many of them difficult to be effectually watched. A few hours, a single night might land our enemies on our shores from different points, in small vessels, or even in open boats. Let us reflect on all this, and afterwards decide whether more skill and vigilance than was manifested by Lord St. Vincent in opposing Buonaparté, are not requisite at present to save us from serious mischief?-In palliation, for I never heard an attempt at justification of Lord St. Vincent's conduct on this occasion, I have heard some friends of his say, it would have been imprudent to have sent the force I have spoken of in March or April off Toulon, as we had no port in the

Mediterranean where to repair in case of damage, or where to procure supplies. What would Lord St. Vincent say to this pretended friend for his defence? or to any officer who should make such a difficulty, if directed by his lord-hip on service similar to that alluded to off Toulon? Let the officers of the navy answer this question!-But to reply to it effectually; Lord St. Vincent did send such a force off Toulon --He sent a smaller. He sent a larger when we had no port in the Mediterranean; when Malta had become a French port; and, when by the French preparations at Toulon, all the neutral states bordering the Mediterranean, were more than usually apprehensive of offending them.--Lord Nelson, when there with only three sail of the line, one fifty gun ship, and some frigates, had his own ship dismasted; and his lordship repaired to Sardinia without molestation.His lordship afterwards, and before the glorious battle of Aboukir, watered and victualled his squadron in Sicily. But, if none of these supplies could have been had on the spot, might they not have been sent from Gibraltar? Have our ships on much less important occasions, never been at sea three or four months without going into port? Some others have said, we had evacuated the Mediterranean, and Lord St. Vincent had nothing to do with it!-Strange indeed would it be, if his lordship with a commission of commander in chief in the Mediterranean in his pocket, should have nothing to do with it; when Egypt and Malta, the keys to our Indian possessions, were threatened by the French, and he had ships to spare to defend them! If such an argument is worth any thing, it should have been used against our sending a squadron there at last, when too late fully to counteract Buonaparté, and not against our sending it earlier when it might have defeated his views altogether. We had, it is true, evacuated the Mediterranean for some time, and the most fatal measure it was that we adopted during the whole war; had we, instead of employing our troops to parade uselessly with Lord St. Vincent in Portugal, whilst he lived upon our poor Consul at Lisbon, sent them together with some of our mercenaries engaged on disgraceful expeditions on the Consent, to take possession of Minorca, we might as easily have had the Is and twelve months before it was attacked by Sir Charles Stuart, as we got it then; and, having that port, with such a fleet in the Mediterranean, as by proper exertions we might have had at the end of 1797, no Egyptian expedition would ever have been thought of by the French. The Austrians would have been successful

Observations on the Conduct of Admiral Sir John Jervis, K.B. now Earl St. Vincent, from the 6th of April, 1796.

Admiral Sir John Jervis left St. Fiorenza Bay in the Island of Corsica, the 6th of April 1795, with the squadron under his command, and proceeded to Toulon, to block up the French squadron. la the month of October tollowing, Rear Admiral Man in the Windsor Castle of 98 guns arrived of Toulon, making the fleet under Sir John Jervis to consist of 22 sail of the line, including two sail of the line detached under Commodore Nelson off Genoa. Hostilities with Spain, were known to be commenced, notwithstanding which, Sir John Jervis ordered Rear Admiral Man to return to Gibraltar. -On Admiral Man's passage to that fortress, his squadron of seven sail of the line, tell in with the Spenish fleet consisting of 36 sail of the line, and the Windsor Castle narrowly escaped being brought to action, and which might have enJangered his whole squadron.-From Gibraltar Admirai Man sailed without delay for England; he was sensible Gibraltar was not a fit anchorage in time of war, for a squadrou in the winter season, as the ships could not remain there for anynumber of days, because, the first hard Levanter (strong east wind) would have driven some of the ships over the Bay, and others into the Gut of Gibraltar, at the risk of being lost.-The latter part of October, Admiral Sir John Jervis returned to St. Fiorenza Bay in Corsica, to assist in evacuating that Island.-During the stay of the squa dron in St. Fiorenz Bay, intelligence was receive ed of the Spanish fleet of thirty-six sail of the line being off the Island of Corsica.-If Rear Admiral Man had not been detached with his squadron, Admiral Sir John fervis would have had twentytwo sail of the line to have fought the Spaniards, and might have captured and destroyed twenty or thirty sail of the enemy, for the Spauish fleet during the three days they were off the Island of Co sica, sailed in a straggling manner, and their ships were much separated from each other. What a glorious opportunity at one biow, was here lost, of destroying, or capturing, the naval force of Spain. -Had this event fortunately happened, Buonaparté never could have sailed for Egypt.-A disposeable naval force might in that case have been spared to have continued the blockade of Toulon. -What plea can Earl St. Vincent frame for reducing his torce by detaching Admiral Man, who had at that time no service to perform: although, prior to his arrival off Toulon, he had with seven sail of the line bee. many months blocking up, in the most officer-like manner, Admiral Richery with eight sail of French ships of the line in Cadiz harbour?-On the appearanse of hostilities wich the Spaniards, the Marquis of Bute (the British Ambassador and Plenip itentiary in Spain,) recommended to Admiral Man without delay to reinforce with his squadron Ad nital Sir John Jervis of Toulon, and which Rear Admiral Man H.It may be presumed Sir J. Jervis directed Admiral Man to return to Gibraltar, because, a British Ambassador with the best intentions and priority of intelligence, should not directly or indirectly dictate discretionally to any part of his squadron, although, by advice only. The above is perfectly

true, and which no one can deny.-When the Spanish fleet was off Corsica, the Island of Elba was in possession of the British and Corsica was not at that time evacuated by the British troops, who had possession of Calvi, Bastia, and St. Fiorenza, -The probable reason for evacuating Corsica, was the knowledge that a war with Spain was not ar distant. Had the Spanish fleet been captured or destroyed off that Island, other directions might have been sent from England relative to it. After the evacuation of Corsica in the month of November, 1796, the squadron under Sir John Jervis sailed for Gibraltar, to procure a supply of provisions and coals. They arrived there after a passage of three weeks.-The tanks being out of order, no water could be procured though sheets of water fell.-Gibraltar is well known to be a dangerous anchorage in the winter, especially for a large squadron.-Was not Sir John Jervis acquainted with this circumstance, and also, that he was going to Lisbon? Could not the victuallers have met the squadron at Lisbon? Or, if already at Giraltar, could they not have sailed with the squadron to the Westward, and as frequently happens, been cleared of their cargoes at sea?The squadron did not leave Gibraltar until the Courageux of 74 guns was shipwrecked, and only 30 persons out of a crew of 650 men, saved.-The Zealous of 74 guns, and Gibraltar of 80 guns, were damaged by striking on rocks under water, and bath were near being lost.-The Zealous was afterwards hove down at Lisbon, and as the Gibraltar's damages could only be repaired in a dock, she was sent to England.In the middle of December the squadron sailed for Lisbon, and on its arrival off the Tagus, the signal was made by Sir John Jervis, for the commanding officers of divisions, to lead their divisions into port.-The channel into Lisbon is one of the most awfully dangerous, perhaps, in the world, because the surf beats high, and with uncommon violence on the North and South Catchops, the two great shoals at the entrance of the Tagus, and between which the squadron had to sail The Britannia of 100 guns (the flag ship of Vice Admiral Thompson) sailed so badly that she retarded part of the squadron, and many ships were in consequence obliged to anchor. A store ship (44 guns) was, owing to this, near being lost but was saved by the assistance of boats, and she again in the evening anchored (to the Eastward of the Bougee Fort) near the South Catchop. The Bombay Castle of 74 guns, (that separated a few days before in chase) was coming in from sea, and about six o'clock in the evening, in an endeavour to avoid the store ship by passing to the southward of her, the Bombay Castle broached to and went on the South Catchop, where she was finally lost.Had Sir John Jervis allowed the ships to put into port as most convenient, all the squadron (without heading the Victory, his flag ship) would have been safely anchored in the Tagus before dark, and the channel would then have been left clear for the Bombay Castle.-Let any one attempt to refute this assertion.-The latter part of January 1797, Admiral Sir John Jervis waited for his dispatches at Lisbon, and at half ebb made the signal for the squadron to weigh. The consequence of doing this, and not taking a proper time of tide to sail out of the Tagus before the flad tide made, was the St. George of 98 guns, (Capt. Peard) meeting the flood tide and wind to the northward betwixt the Catchops, and the tide of flood setting to the south-east, carried her on the South Catchop, where she beat off her rudder

and was near being totally lost, but was saved by the great exertions of her captain, who, with the St. George returned to Lisbon -Could not Admi ral Sir John Jervis have taken a proper time of tide to sail with the squadron, and left a frigate to follow him with his dispatches? When Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson, K. B. sailed to attack Teneriffe, his orders were positive so to do. Neither Sir Horatio Nelson nor any officer in his squadron knew where to land, or the state of the fortifications; a description of those at Santa Cruz may not be unacceptable to the Public.The militia of the Island of Teneriffe amounts to seven or eight thousand men, and the garrison generally consisted in time of peace of twelve hundred soldiers, besides artillery men. There are four circular forts on an extensive esplanade behind the line wall. These forts are not to the northward of the landing place in the centre of the curtain of the line wall.-The fire of these forts crosses each other, and commands the espla nade. The Governor's house is about two hundred yards from the northernmost fort.-The guns of the forts are 24 pounders, and are under arches, and the parapet is above the guns. Each fort has a ditch and draw bridge, nor are the forts commanded by any hill near, except one in the town, and which is built upon and covered with houses. The line wall reaches north and south, beyond where the anchorage extends, and is mounted with heavy cannon.-There are two demi-bastions with flanks, and a straight curtain. -The two faces of the demi-bastions, the two flanks and the curtain have twenty-six pieces of heavy cannon mounted upon them to defend the wharf, and which is the only one.-The wharf projects from the centre of the curtain some distance into the sea.-The centre of the curtain is open about eight feet, and there is a large chevaux-de-frize seven feet high, and which closes the centre of the curtain every night.-About the middle of the wharf is a draw bridge, and from thence on each side of the wharf, there is an half chevaux-de-frize (the points outwards) all the way to the wall of the curtain; so that, at night, when the draw bridge of the wharf is hauled up, it is impossible to pass to the curtain. It is by no means difficult to land four thousand soldiers with field pieces, without any accident to be ap prehended from the surf; but this landing cannot be made at the town of Santa Cruz.-How many brave men were here sacrificed? The fault was not Sir Horatio Nelson's.-Where does blame then attach itself? What motive could induce Earl St. Vincent to send so small a force to Teneriffe to capture the Spanish treasure? Was it that the late Hon. General Sir Charles Stuart and the British troops under his command at Lisbon might not have a share? Hoping to reserve all the plunder for the navy alone. For plunder the treasure on shore must certainly have been, and not prize money: and, therefore, the treasure (had it been captured,) must have been divided according to the directions of the King, and in such proportions as his Majesty thought proper. -The fact is, the Spanish treasure was not at Teneriffe, but was afterwards supposed to have been landed at one of the Western Islands, and brought from thence in Portuguese men of war to Lisbon, and by American merchant ships to Cadiz. When the British fleet under Earl St. Vin cent were cruizing off Cadiz, two Spanish frigates laden with treasure to a great amount, hailed Earl St. Vincent's flag ship, at twelve o'clock at night; and no notice being then taken of them, they

made their escape in shore, and immediately landed their treasures in safety. Whose fault was this? What would have been the consequence, if an inferior admiral or captain had acted in a similar manner? As Vice-Admiral Sir John Orde could not obtain a court-martial on Earl St. Vincent for his conduct towards him, Earl St. Vincent may, perhaps, consider himself as placed beyond the reach of all law; but his lordship must at the same time be aware that he cannot soar above the opinions of mankind, whose judgment will be formed from actions alone.

B. N.

CONDUCT OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sia, I am a plain man, not spending my time in contest, but a lover of truth; and having read in the Times, an answer, as it is termed, to your assertion, that "by the mode which the Admiralty has adopted in distributing apprentices to the shipwrights, in a few years the modellers and draftsmen will be extinct." I request that you will be pleased to insert my rejoinder to it, as i have the opportunity of being somewhat conver sant with the subject in question. The writer says, "It was not this Board of Admiralty, but their predecessors, who procured an order in council, &c. &c." I cannot exactly say, who it was precured it; but this every dock-yard man does know, that no such mode was ever put in practice relative to apprentices until the present Board of Admiralty presided: and most unfortunately, like all the new regulations, this hath given general discontent. I am greatly apprehensive that this cannot be benefitting the nation; but with the present Admiralty every thing must be chang et; every thing must be novel; for former regulations, by whomsoever planned, however they have stood the test of time and experience, will not do now. Unluckily the impossibility of complying with some of the new orders obliged the Board to cancel them, and have recourse to those again which they had superseded. Men would net, could not submit to them. Whether the present introduced mode is more eligible than the former, remains to be determined; but the boys now picked up are chiefly of the lowest order of the people.-Shipwrights not thinking it worth their while to bring their children up to a trade, where the extra is taken away, which formerly was universally allowed for a servant; and which the desering were always in the hope of receiving in their turn with their apprentices.—Whereas, now however many extra hours the master works with the apprentice by his side; he neither receives any extra advantage from the extra labour of the apprentice, nor does the apprentice (though forced to work such extra) receive any more for the performance of his duty, either now or in expectation hereafter. At this very instant, three days for one are paid to the shipwright, if he works the hours, which have by the trade been stipulated to go for such; all able working men Bow receive at least two days, or what is termed double days pay; while the apprentice, who works all that time, only receives a single day's Pay. When this informant set forth, that "*.formerly the master was paid three days for one, in the first year, nay, in the first week of his apprentices time," if he came within the line of truth; it was nevertheless, a misrepresentation. For what was the fact? Government had settled what should be a day's work, what should be considered as two and three days. If the apprentice worked

such time (and not otherwise) the master certainly was paid for him; it was meant he should be. But what was he paid? Only the first year at the small rate allowed by government for the appreatice of 1s. and 2d. per diem; increasing ad every year, and to the last year and day of his apprenticeship, his pay was still inferior to the workmen. This is the true statement, and surely it was fait. So when they worked on board of ships, skeping hard, and from their homes, they were allowed by establishment additional pay; likewise at their dinner time when deprived of it, as some compen sation for such deprivation. This was the regu lation of those who had well considered the business, and which had stood the test of time. it would have been wise, if those who have made the changes had duly reflected on a trite adage: "Let well alone." The giving one-third of the pay to the apprentice (mind if he behaves well), does not induce parents to place their children; for they were accustomed to give them their board during their apprenticeship, in short, to find them in every thing. This expense ceased the day they were out of their time; when in their turn, they could, if necessary, assist their parents with the pleasing prospect of obtaining, probably, in the course of time an apprentice themselves, and of reaping the same advantages, which they had before been the means of giving to their masters. This is now no longer an object of pleasing expectation. Formerly people of some property placed their sons at school with the intention of apprenticing them, after gaining a proper education, to the master shipwright or his assistants, or to the master mast maker, master boat-builder, &c. in the fair hope of their succeeding, if fortu nate, to those employments themselves; they gave with them from 20 to 80 pounds. When dee serving, the masters, as they rose, made a point of bringing them forward. It was the fair condition of the obligation.—It was right individually, and in a national view.-The writer again says, "the doceur to the master shipwright is the indispensable and only key to the mould loft." There is no reason for supposing that the masters of the shipwrights are worse than other men, (although they have been shamefully stigmatized;) but, I would ask, in whose hands can the key be so properly kept? The fallacy of the above representation will plainly be seen, when it is known, that master shipwrights, and even surveyors of the navy have risen to those posts, having served their appreaticeship to persons in the yard very inferior to the master shipwright. This violent correspondent has either very superficial knowledge of the subject, or he lets out only just as much as will an swer his purpose, using the shadow of truth, whi'e he hides the substance. But what will he say when I make it public, (for I will not call it informing him,) that by the new and wise regula tions, every shipwright apprentice now indented is positively bound to the master shipwright; so his indenture runs; and the man, who receives the trifling advantage from him is called his instruc tor; he has no other right in, or authority over him; and consequently, has no stimulus to a care of him. It would be unreasonable to suppose the master shipwrights immaculate, however the great Board may be so.-A certain number of these ap prentices must successively go to the mould loft: and any further comment is unnecessary. The writer next says, "Mr. Cobbet pretends (and I asset) that the Admiralty have been obliged to resort to the assistance of warranted carpenters of ships (i.e. the master carpenters) to do the com

mon duty of working shipwrights, &c." And he adds, "that when the caulkers and shipwrights in the merchants' yards refused to work, the carpen ters of ships offered their service."-1 must own, I never heard this before; but I well know, how reluctant these officers are to be classed with working men in the King's yard at this time. He is very right in saying some caulkers were discharged; for these, although they were only common men, refused to go; and would to a man, but from their having families, so they were afraid to reluse. Not one of them would have been again entered, had it not been from the impossibility of finding others to supply their places; old men and boys being the only caulkers left in any of the dockyards, so very general was the refusal. He again says, "that if there is not three years consumption of timber on hand, every clerk at the Admiralty knows, that one of the Board's standing orders has been neglected." That the Navy Board have been cramped in all their proceedings, from the commencement of the present Admiralty to this day, is well known to every clerk at the Admiralty, and to every other public office; and that the harshness and rigidity of the Admiraky have been such, that merchants are positively averse to contract, is fully experienced. No conversant person, of the many thousands who are masters of the subject will attach the least blame to the Navy Board; but admire their patience and unabated zeal in the performance of their duty. Knowing the value of room in your paper, I will not obtrude at present myself farther, only requesting you will be pleased to give this an early place, as my remarks would have been forwarded to you sooner had the answer, which I have now replied to, come in my way.Sir, &c. &c.

I am,

S. T.

LETTERS TO A FRIEND IN THE COUNTRY. LETTER I.

London, June 26, 1803. My dear, Sir,I received yours of the 24th yesterday. -Your inquiries about news, and about the measures, which are taken by government in the present emergency of the country, are certainly most seasonable. I wish I could send you word, that there was apparent any where that spirit, which the moment requires. Eur, neither in the Country at large, nor in the Parliament, nor above all, in the members et administration, can 1 perceive any appearance of vigour or exertion, adequate to the occasion --- -It is therefore, with rather a heavy heart, that I sit down to answer your queries. will not, however, delay doing so, and, as you have the good nature to set some valuc on my opinion, I will detail at some length to you my sentiments on the present situation of alfairs, contess to you, that I view that situation with the greate tanxiety and apprehcusi n. Our friends here frequently rally me on the dejcetion and lowness of spirits, which such a view has produced on me. Put I confess, neither their jokes nor their disagreement as to the causes of it have been able to make me shake it off-indeed, it is in a great degree produced by that very disagreement of sentiment; by tha. want of sense of the magnitude of the darges, which i perecive in them, and in the nation in general.-I know that myself, and those who dunk like me, are called desponding persous.-1 do not deny it. I do despend. But why? Not because we are at war; not because Trince is powerful; not because Buonaparte is implacable; not because we are threatened with invasion, and because invasion

by a French army, led on by French enthusiasm, and supported with French courage and perseverance is a most tremendous danger; but because, people will not believe that this danger exists; because people are so persuaded of the difficulties and dangers of such an attempt, that they think that the enemy will not dare to meet these dangers and difficulties, or meeting them must yield to them; because people reckon up all the difficulties of the passage; and talk of the difficulties of embarkation and disembarkation, with as much pride and satisfaction, as if they were securities of our own erceting; and enumerate with great pomp, all the chances of their being met by cur cruisers, and all the havock that a single frigate could make in such a rencoun et-In short, because people trust to the "Little Ditch," (to use a common expression,) that surrounds us; to our Wooden Walls," to the chances against invaders, and in short, to any thing but their own exertions and efforts.- -Now this feeling, or rather this want of feeling, I must attubute to a want of spirit or to a proper sense of the danger to which we are exposed.- -That the feeling exists, is I think undeniable. It is proved, I think, by what we daily hear of and see now in town. Balls and routs, and parties of pleasure, buying and selling, horse dealings at Tatiersall's; auctions at Christie's, &c. now all going on just as if we were in a state of perfect safety, or to use the soporific phrase of the Doctor, in " profound "peace."-All this is very pretty; but, I confces it alarms me. They ate, they drank, they mal“ried, they were given in marriage, till the flood 66 came and swept them all away."--But if the thing wanted further proof, I should say that we had it, in the present acquiesence of the county under the total inertness of government, and their slowness in bringing forward any measure for resisting or preventing the danger.-—A plan has, indeed, lately been brought forward in the House of Commons by Mr. Yorke.Bv the fa vour of our fiend,....I was in the gallery and heard that gentleman's opinion of the business; and I have just received from the same friend the printed copy of the bill, as completed and per cct. ed by them in the Committee; and I confess, bo h the speech and the bill have filled my gloomy mind with increased gloom; so inadequate, so miserably short of the emergency, and of my expectation have they both of them fallen.-Of that measure I shall have occasion to say something presently.—As to want of spirit in the country, I do not assert that there is no spirit; but I do as sert, notwithstanding, that I have been teid that that assertion has been flatly contradicted by high authority, that none is apparcut. I know not what that high authority may say in the House of Commons; but this I know, that out of doors I do not meet a single person, who does not com plain of it. It may be that the spitit exists, but has not been drawn forth. I admit nothing has been done to draw it forth, by those whose busines it was to do so; and I think that is no small charge amongst the many grievous charges that ought to be brought against the ministers, but I say, that events which have happened, and things we have witnessed within these few weeks ought to have called forth that spirit; and, it it existed, I think would have culed forth that spiri, notwithstanding all the doctor's seporifics, and notwith standing all the impediments, which his weak, slow, and ineffi icat a muistration, throws in the way of all manly and spuited exertion. 1, there fore, for one, think this spirit does not caist, this