on the Continent is a proof both of his ambition and the little respect he pays to the rights of nations. By breaking the spirit of resistance, and forcing them to crouch under the banners of France, he has made them, instead of independent states, the abject slaves of his will; the miserable subjects of his rapacity and extortion, the wretched victims of his perfidy and ambition. I will not shew him in that accommodating garb in which he wished to become all things to all men. I will not raise the abhorrence of my countrymen, whom I know to be religious, against the most sacrilegious conduct the world ever witnessed. I will not hold up to view the speckled features of his religious transformations, from the adoration of the naked Goddess of Liber y, and the soothing idea of an eternal sleep, to the joys of a Mahometan Paradise, and the blessed society of the faithful. Such a daring outrage to all religious opinions would have cailed down the vengeance of Greece or Rome upon the impious wretch; but which, by a Frenchman, will be considered as a mark of greatness of mind, and a happy stroke of political sagacity. Let us pardon his past failings, for he is now a good Christian, and desires his pious bishops to offer up prayers to the Almighty, that he may prosper in his injustice and villainy. Here too we trace the features of his character, for it is in every respect singular and consistent. From the Palace of St. Cloud he issues mandates that astonish Europe, as well by their novelty as their injustice. Amidst the representatives of Sovereigns, his rage breaks out with all the acrimony and inso lence of a leader of banditti, traversed in his schemes of rapine and plunder. Before the eyes of Europe he acts the political madman, and the boldness and singularity of his gestures and actions are really astonishing. His paroxysms would be highly amusing were he deprived of the means of -rendering them dangerous. To the voice and sentiments of mankind he pays no regard. To the authority of religion he is too great and too unprincipled to submit. Few despots are proof against the keen at tacks of public censure. They endeavour to colour over their injustice with some plausible pretence; and it is not until they are dead to all shame, and regardless of the opinion either of contemporaries or of posterity that they venture upon actions which transmit their names with infamy to all eternity. They may disregard the sullen curses of the miserable wretches subject to their authory; but they ought to be considered as hardened indeed in villainy if they do not feel sore at the generous indignation of a free and independent people. But the Chief Consul, if he be a despot, is a hero also; and heroes must not be confined, like ordinary men, within the bounds of old prescriptions, and the beaten track of dull uniformity. They must astonish by their actions. They must force their way over the neck of laws, and rights, and opinions, and justice, and every thing which other mea hold sacred. How else should they be known to be heroes? And who does not know that the greatest heroes are the greatest madmen? Satan in his Palace of Pandemonium would scarcely have been distinguished from his infernal counsellors, had he not had the daring to issue out at hell gates to explore and ruin the world. "As when a Fulture on Imaus bred, Of Ganges or lydasper, Indian streams. Of Sericana," We The conduct of the First Consul towards this country, if it has not been equally vio lent as towards other nations, did not proceed from any regard to justice, but from a well grounded fear of openly enraging a high spirited and formidable people. He knew our strength; he had felt our power; he shrunk from our vengeance. Like a fugitive and deserter he fled from his brave army in Egypt to usurp the ancient throne of the Bourbons. From that time till the present moment, power has been his object. and he has but too well succeeded. alone had the courage to oppose him, and to oppose him with vigour. Our success in the late war, notwithstanding the defection of our allies, was such as to warrant us to prescribe terms instead of receiving them. We had taken from France the best part of her West-India possessions, and all that she held in the East. We had almost annihilated her navy. The remnant of her ships were either rotting in her harbours, or taken successively by our cruizers. All her attempts upon us baffled by the vigilance of our ministers and the skill and bravery of our sailors and soldiers. What then did France gain from us? Not an inch of territory: not the shadow of an advantage. We indeed felt sorely the perfidy and distresses of our allies; and it was for them we made so many sacrifices. For ourselves, we did not despair. We stood firm as a rock; growing every day more formidable as dangers thickened around us. The JULY 9, 1803. 5] Chief Consul, aware of all these advantages on our side, made some concessions, which, it is plain, he never meant to ratify. He probably thought, that, could he once make us drop our arms, we would not suddenly resume them, though he should continue to wound us through the subjugation of Switzerland, the oppression of Holland, and He thought, Sebastiani's famous mission. no doubt, that, since we were almost entirely excluded from the Continent, we would not have the boldness to encounter He certainly valued him single-handed. himself much upon his dextrous policy in forcing the continental powers to withdraw from our alliance; and not without reason. It appears to have been the intention of France, for more than a century, to loos n our connexion with those nations on the Continent, who, apprehending danger from her growing power, had joined in a strict Our statesmen were, alliance with us. towever, better acquainted with the interests of this country; and those nations knew too well the value of our alliance, to suffer France to obtain this important end. Louis XIV. entertained the same ambitious views as Buonaparté; but Europe was preserved from slavery, chiefly by the exertions of this country, conducted by the abilities of a man who, to the talents of a great general, united those of a consummate statesman and politician. France was driven within her ancient limits; and only saved by the dissensions which broke out among the confederates. The issue of last war has not been so favourable to Europe. During the course of it we lost our allies one after another. The King of Prussia basely betrayed us. The Dutch, most fatally for their own interest and independence, threw themselves into the arms of France. Spain, after a few feeble efforts, joined the conqueror. The intrigues of the Italian powers Some of anished before French ferocity. the smaller states have been blotted out of existence, and others have risen upon their ruins. Russia, after making a considerable impression upon France, withdrew from the co.amon alliance, and was only prevented, by the premature death of her Sovereign, from turning her arms against us. the Emperor of Germany, our only valuable and best tried ally, forced, by a train of defeats, to conclude a treaty in which we were not comprehended. Thus, after a series of events which have no parallel, partly occasioned by ill-judged policy, perfidy, and weakness, on the one hand and by a spirit of enthusiasm, ambition, irresistible power, and astonishing success, on And the other, we found ourselves deserted by our allies, and left to maintain the combat alone. Thus, that balance of power, which cost our ancestors so much blood and trea sure, and which cost us little less to maintain, has, for the present, by unforeseen events, been in a great measure overturned. We are now to consider France as the mot dangerous enemy to the liberties of Europe, and as avowedly aiming at universal empire. Viewing her in this light, what are we to do? Ought we to sit quietly dowr, and give up the cause as hopeless? Ought we to look quietly on and see her hem us in on every side by her conquests? We ought surely more than ever to make the ba lance of power the object of our thoughts, and direct all our measures for restoring it to its proper level. The language of Buonaparté upon this head is equally unjust to this country, and insulting to the other nations of Europe. Rightly interpreted, it runs thus: "The powers upon the Continent are all under the dominion and protection of France. Not one of them dares move without her permission. They have it not in their power to conclude, or break off alliances. You alone are our rivals, But On the you are our rivals only by sea. Continent you have no ally, no force, no interest." Such language, the weakness alone of Germany ought to prevent her from chastising. But we ought, from the first, to have remonstrated with spirit, and if remonstrances were of no avail, to have followed them up by action. From our insular situation we never can endanger the liberties of any nation upon the Continent, nor acquire any permanent authority among them, farther than mutual interest may promote. We have long since abandoned the idea of continental conquests. All the efforts we have made in that quarter were either intended to divide the power of France, or, more frequently, to protect our allies. But the situation and views of herself both able and inclined to wrest from France are very different. She has shewn them their independence, laws, and possessions. She maintained herself, during the greatest part of the late war, at their expense. And, had it not been for the defeats she received from us, defeats which checked her pride and taught her to stop in le career of conquest, all Europe, and, pu.. haps, most of Asia, would, ere now, have been subject to her power. There cannot be a doubt, that, should France ever have the good fortune to ruin our navy (which God forbid!) the balance of power in Europe would be entirely lost; and she may then go on conquering and to conquer, acquiring an increase of strength from every new accussion of vterritory. Nor is this altogether improbable while she commands such an extensive line of coast.. From the mouth of the Elbe,* it takes a wide sweep along the German and Atlantic Ocean up the shores of the Mediterranean. It bounds the most fertile and populous countries in Europe. I know that other means are necessary to create a great and respectable navy fit to cope with ours. But these means, I affirm, France has been labouring to ob. tain: first, by excluding us from the Continent; next, by preventing all British ma nufactures from entering France and the The French have taken possession of Hanoor, and also, it is said, of Hamburgh and other free maritime towns in Germany. These are acquisitions which ought to alarm every State upon the Continent, but more particularly the Germans themselves. The avowed design of the First Consul is to exclude our manufactures and commerce from the whole of the Continent. This measure involves in it a train of evils which will not fall so heavily upon this country as upon Germany and France herself. The commerce of France and her maritime allies, it is to be hoped, will be soon entirely ruined by the superiority of our fleets. Germany has no foreign possessions, nor foreign trade. The Northern nations possess nearly as little, and cannot furnish her with those commodities which she has been accustomed to receive from us. She will find it almost impossible to want them. And France herself will sustain a heavy loss by the interruption of that contraband trade of British manufactures, which, in spite of the jealousy and vigilance of his Consular Majesty, was poured in upon her through the medium of Germany. What will be the consequence? France will either be obliged to give up the free towns or incense every state upon the Continent so much against her, that she will be attacked by enemies on every side. Even the pohtic and avaricious Pussian will find his interest severely wounded by destroying the liberty of the fice towns. Perhaps it would be better for this country, while her navy blocks up the French fleets and armies in their ports, that the Germans sub.mitted patiently to this act of injustice and robbery. The First Consul must keep up numerous armies, but how shall he pay them when he has no provinces to plunder, no commerce to tax? Let the continental powers think of this. If we keep him at bay, as I hope in God we shall, whenever he is straitened, he will seek a pretence to countries subject to her then, from a treacherous design to seize upon our colonies and obtain Malta; and, lastly, to invade this country and subject it under her domi nion. This has been the avowed design of the Chief Consul both before and since the signing of the treaty of Amiens. This is an important consideration. It interests us most nearly. It ought to be guarded against with the most scrupulous care. But it cannot be indifferent even to the independent nations of Europe. Should France succeed in conquering this country, what other power is there that could make head against her? In our fall would be involved that of Europe. The existence, the success of the continental powers depend upon our exist ence and success. We deprive France, by our navy, of the sinews of war. Put her in possession of these; put her in possession of our immense wealth, of our navy, of our colonies, and what other power ever was or will be more formidable? Do you suppose that the northern nations would then be able to cope with her? No: they are at too great a distance to stop her in her career and lie out of the direct line of conquest. She will not attack them until she has asunder the feeble Ottoman Empire. One over-run all Germany and Italy, and broken might naturally suppose that a sense of their own danger and the liberty of Europe should rouse them before it be too late. At pre sent they may do much either as arbitrators or parties; and effectually assist us in raising the Emperor of Germany to his former influence and authority, and in reducing France within her ancient limits, where alone she will cease to be formidable. The policy of France in supporting Prussia against the Emperor has tended much to their mutual aggrandisement. But it nust have fatal effects. It has weakened the only power upon the Continent capable of resisting the French. It has raised Prussia, the natural rival of Austria, from a subordinate rank in which she could never be dangerous, to a pitch of power equal, if not superior to her rival; and given her the means of preventing the immense power of the Germanic body from being turned invade Italy or Germany, and gather the glean-against France. Something similar to this ings of his former rapacity. We are threatened with burdens and dangers, but they are threatened with the loss of every thing; and, what is worse, they seem so overawed by France, or so jealous of us, that they never make the least remonstrance. Their supineness is astonishing. They are not aware that the most temporising among them will only be the last victim of Consular ambition. Implacable hatred to this country is the pretence, lawless ambition the object of the politics of St. Cloud. was the conduct of the Elector of Bavaria in the time of Louis XIV. He too was the rival of the then Emperor. But he fell, and his fall ought to be an instructive lesson to his more powerful imitator. The King of Prussia, if he be possessed of any political sagacity, ought to consider, that France has employed him merely as the tool of her ambition to humble the power the States of Greece during the Peloponnesian war; and afterwards most accurately understood and diligently inculcated upon the Athenians, on occasions very similar to the present, by Demosthenes, the greatest orator, and, perhaps, the greatest politician the world ever saw. He knew took well what it was to trust to the protection of an ambitious, faithless monarch. Those intimate connexions, says he, which republics form with tyrants are generally fatal to them.* Any person, who will take the trouble to Consider the present humbled state of most of the nations upon the Continent, and the formidable power and ambition of France, will easily perceive that the contest, on the side of France, is for universal empire; on our side, for self defence and the maintenance of the balance of power We are not accessories; we are principais in the present war. It is the interest of the other nations of Europe to look up to us for protection. It is their interest to coalesce with us in bumbling France. Had the Dutch, instead of that mean jealousy of our power, which induced them, about the commencement of the last war, to open their gates to the French and receive the fraternal hug which, 1 believe, has squeezed them pretty well, imitated the conduct of their ancestors, and joined cordially in the league against France, affairs might have taken a different turn. Their defection and the dissensions which arose among the allies ruined the cause. Divided counsels and separate views weaken and destroy the general interest It is unfortunate that there was not at that time at the bead of the confederates a man of superior rank and talents who could unite so many jarring interests in one. Such a Mariborough is not always to be found. But without the abilities of a Marlborough a confederation is feeble and divided. The same mean jealousy, which formerly proved fatal to them, ought not How to subsist among the continental powfreedom, but we now fight for our own in We then fought in defence of their canianction with theirs, without the smallthink of this; if they prove enemies, we est news of aggrandisensent. Let them can ruin their commerce, but we cannot injare their independence. We can prove a better ally, but not such a formidable mad as enemy as France. In the present crisis it would, perhaps, be dangerous for those states that are contiguous to France, and have suffered most from her power, to enter at once into an al liance against her. While we confine her within her shores, she would direct all her rage against them. Every blow we give her marine or commerce she would revenge upon them. She would pour in her im mense armies and overwhelm them in an instant. No single, contiguous power is able to oppose her. A general combination is, perhaps, at present impossible. would restrain some, weakness, others. Germany is distracted and torn with mutual jealousies. Russia is the only power that can co-operate with us in such a manner as may most injure and humble France; and, at the same time, sustain little or no injury herself. The Emperor of Russia's" dominions are extensive; his power formidable: his marine respectable; his distance from France so great, and the points of attack so few, that she never can make any impression upon him while awed and confined by our fleets. Two such powerful and formidable enemies as Great Britain and Russia, acting together with unanimity and effect, might not only obtain favourable and secure terms for themselves, but likewise emancipate the oppressed powers upon the Continent. Or, should France have the hardihood to oppose them both, she would soon have her commerce entirely ruined, her colonies wrested from her, and her territories threatened on all quarters. Should the Emperor of Russia pour in an army through Germany to attack her upon her frontiers, It ought to be the policy of the small ates upon the Continent to attach themrespectable power, from which they can have nothing to fear, but Then will be the time for the states of Ger at the first reverse of fortune she would find herself deserted and threatened on all points. selves to which is some capable of protecting or assisting many to rise and attack her in the moment them against a formidable and ambitious of dismay. Then will be the time for Hol. neighbour. Such was the system of policy land to assert her independence, and repursued by the Italian States in the fifteenth or sateenth centuries. They carried it, however, too far, and refined themselves at length out of their independence. Sutch also was the system of policy practised by venge herself for all her oppressions. Then * Ου γαρ ασφαλεις ταις πολιτείαις οι προς THE TUGANOUS άuras av dias. Philip. Sept will be the time for Switzerland to resume the bow and arrows of Tell, and steep their points in the blood of their tyrants. The more distant nations will catch the same spirit. That enthusiasm, which inipelled Frenchmen upon the swords of their enemies, and rendered them intrepid and fearless, is gone. They have not even the mistaken but fascinating name of liberty to fight for. That enthusiasm, and that name will animate their enemies. They will begin to inquire for what purpose, and for whom they are again to be dragged from their homes, and driven in the face of their en mies. They will not raise against them -the arms and vengeance of all Europe for the sake of a tyrant's ambition, who, should he succeed in baffling the designs of his enemies, will become only the more formi dable and dangerous to his own people. After having endeavoured to point out the necessity of maintaining the balance of power abroad, it follows next that we take a view of our own situation, and the circumstances which have forced us into the present war. The Treaty of Amiens, notwithstanding the encomiums bestowed upon it by the advocates of his Majesty's ministers, was certainly an unfortunate one for this country; unfortunate, because it left us stripped of many valuable possessions, for which we received no equivalent. It appears to have been made, if we may judge by the event, rather to gain a short breathing time, than as the foundation of a lasting and secure peace. The terms were not sufficiently explicit; the interest of this country and Europe not sufficiently attended to. If Buonaparte's conduct, since the signing of that treaty, has been villainous, that of our ministers has not been dignified and firm. They seemed always to think they were in the wrong. Their blundering, politics needed perpetual corrections. Their views were always too limited; their language too tame; their policy too shallow and confined. And what has been the consequence? After repeated aggressions on. the part of France, of patient submission and concession on our part; after orders were sent to give up the Cape; counter-orders to retain it; orders again to surrender it; and counter-orders, I suppose, would again have been sent to retain it, could they have - reached it soon enough; it was not, until the most flagrant proofs of the ambitious views and hostile designs of the First Consul Aappeared that his Majesty's ministers began to speak to hit in Me language which initusters of this country ought ever to use whed it is insulted Bonaparté certainly, The concluded from our patient endurance that we were afraid to involve ourselves in a quarrel with him. Robbery after robbery, and insult after insult, suffered to pass unnoticed or geatly remonstrated against, would confirm the supposition. Our conduct smelled strongly of quietism. When struck on the one check we turned the other also. But the moment of aggression was the time to remonstrate. To oppose the designs of Buonaparté by secret negotiation and under hand management, was merely to protract, the distresses of this country and disgrace us in the eyes of Europe, without answering any purpose of policy, or prudence From beginning, to end it has been a series of complaints and negotiations, vainly endeavouring to patch up a faithles treaty by offers on the one hand as base as they were disgraceful, and by an extraordi nary mixture of weakness and resolution, of concession and tenacity in the other. Courier after courier departed and returned. Messenger after messenger was burried away or came post with some new project. For many a day was the sea vexed with their fruitless voyages. The people, in the meantime, left to gaze in idle wonder, and busy themselves in endless conjectures. clouds at last began to gather and the storm to burst. But the causes for a rupture with France had existed ever since the signing of the Treaty of Amiens; nay, the First Cousul was violating every article of it at the moment he signed the treaty. This requires a serious investigation. It deeply af fects not only the honour of this country, but the conduct of his Majesty's ministers also. Let us examine it with candour and impartiality. I have already mentioned, that, at the conclusion of the last war we had acquired many advantages, while France had not made the least impression upon us. By the Treaty of Amiens we surren dered several West-India Islands to France and the Dutch, and made some sacrifices to Spain. In the East, the Cape was to be delivered up to Holland, and Pondicherry to the French, What then did France or her allies surrender to us as equivalents for the many valuable possessions we restored to them by the Treaty of Amiens? Nothing but the declaration of the independence of these our formerly well tried and most faithful allies! This indeed, had some appearance, of attending to the balance of power upon the Continent. But how far was our influence to extend? To Holland, and Naples, only. We were to rescue them from the pangs of French-tyranny by so many and so great sacrifices, |