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sent, I shall confine myself to a remark or two on the conduct of the Irish administration, at the time of the rebellion, which first gave rise to the measure of martial law, and on that part of their conduct in particular, which relates to the late Commander in Chief of the forces.--The public will recollect, that, I some time ago stated, that, on the morning of the 23d of July, the very day that the rebellion broke out in Dublin, a general order was issued, by the Commander in Chief, General Fox, directing that ten men of each company should be permitted to go on furlough, for the purpose of assisting to get in the harvest. To have issued such an order, after having been duly informed of the threatened rebellion, would have been an act very little short of treason, as it would have been to disband, for the time, one sixth part of the effective force, at least. On a former occasion (p. 288), I said one fourth part; but I was not then aware of the augmentation, which has, of late years, been made in the strength of the companies. In p. 414, it was observed, that, from the information then received, it appeared, that General Fox was not duly apprized of the state of the country: "Some sacrifice, however," it was then said, " is wanted; somebody must "be to blame, and, it appears General Fox "is to be the Jonas. How he will sustain "that character remains to be seen; but, "the world will certainly be very much surprised, if he should tamely suffer his reputation, either as a loyal subject or as a military man, to be tarnished for the "sake of any douceur that the Addingtons "and Hawkesburies have to bestow *.". It is with some satisfaction that I now turn back to this passage. The conjecture was correct in all its parts: Gen. Fox has, as far as the ministry could effect their purpose, been made the Jonas; the douceur has been tendered to him; but he has not, for the sake thereof, suffered his reputation to be tarnished; a parliamentary inquiry into his conduct, as well as that of the Irish administration, is to be moved for, immediately after the recess; and, if that inquiry should be resisted by ministers, the nation will not be at a loss where to fix the guilt.Fox, in speaking on this subject in parliament, on the 9th instant, referred to and quoted, a paragraph, published in a Dublin paper, just after the event of the 23d of July, in the following words: "Our Com"mander in Chief is a brother to Mr. Fox "of the House of Commons, and first cou

"

-Mr.

*See Register, Vol. IV. p. 414. Sep. 17, 1893.

"sin to the Duke of Leinster, and the late "Lord Edward Fitzgerald.” The insinua

tion, and the inference to be drawn from it, are too evident to be pointed out; and, a more base or infamous attempt to destroy the reputation of any man, never was known, or heard of, in the world. Far Le it from me to say, or to think, that such a paragraph as this was inserted by, or with the connivance of, any persons high in of. fice in Ireland. That, I hope, and sincere. ly believe, is an act, of which none of those persons are capable; but, in a city, where the press, the whole of the political periodical press, is at the absolute command of the government, it is not going too far to say, that those, who did insert, or cause to be inserted, this paragraph, were fully persuaded, that it would not be read with displeasure at the Castle; and, when, joined to this circumstance, it is acknowledged, as it now is, that the Lord Lieutenant wished for General Fox to be recalled, it is impossible that the latter can rest satisfied with any thing short of a full examination into the conduct of both.The partisans of ministry are, in the mean time, using their utmost endeavours to prepossess the public mind against General Fox, whom, not being able to make any specific charge, they represent, in general terms, as being a slothful, negligent person; and, accordingly, leave their hearers to conclude, that the rebellion, together with all its consequences, would have been prevented by a Commander in Chief of a different character. Nothing is so foul as this mode of attack, and in it no men or set of men were ever so successful as the present ministry. They deal largely enough in the press; they care not who they employ in that way, nor how they prostitute the offices, either in Church or State, as rewards for the services that are rendered them. But, the pres they dare not, in all cases, have recourse to; then they avail themselves of verbal slander; and, it is really astonishing how swift and how wide the effects of this political back-biting are extended. This is the way, in which their partizans are now attacking General Fox. They are sinking the facts of the rebellion, and are endeavouring to give the whole event an appearance of having arisen out of his general habits of slothfulness and neglect. Seeing that such is their object, I shall, I trust, be excused, for stating what I myself have heard, and what I have known, of the charatter and conduct of General Fox, as a milita y man. I can only say, on this subject, what is well known to the British ariny;

but in foreign courts and countries, where this dispute will not fail to excite considerable interest, my statement may be of some use.I was once under the command of General Fox, he being commanding officer of the garrison, where the 38th regiment, of which he was then Lieutenant Colonel, at that time, lay. I have, before and since that time, been with more than forty of our regiments of foot; and, except in the single instance of his Royal Highness the Duke of Kent, I never saw so active and vigilant a field officer as General Fox. Since the epoch, to which I here allude, I have passed several years of my life amongst men, who had served immediately under General Fox, during the greater part of the war in America, where he had a conspicuous command in the flying army, and to which army he would never have been appointed, had he not been distinguished for qualities exactly the contrary of those, which are now, most falsely, I am persuaded, attributed to him. All those whom I have known, who served under him at that time; all the military men I ever heard speak of him, have uniformly given him the character of extraordinary activity, vigilance, punctuality, and zeal for the service; and this account perfectly corresponded with what I myself have seen of him. This knowledge of the character of General Fox emboldened me, the moment I heard any blame imputed to him, to state, that "he

had always been considered a very zea"lous and vigilant officer, and that, in the "present instance, there was every reason "to believe, no part of the blame would "be found to attach to him;" a statement, which, it now appears, was perfectly correct.- But, indeed, the best and most complete reply to this ministerial backbiting is to be found in the commands, with which these ministers themselves have entrusted General Fox. If he had been, at the time of his appointment to Ireland, or if he were now, the man which they wish the world to regard him; if he had been an indolent, slothful, negligent man, where are we to look for a justification for their conduct in having appointed him, at such a time, to the chief command of the forces in Ireland? And, if his conduct in Ireland has discovered to them the qualities they now impute to him; if, in short, he has misbehaved

Ireland; if, owing to his misbehaviour, or his inability, the city of Dublin has been surprised, is it wise, is it proper, is it decent, to commit to his generalship the immensely greater metropolis of England, including the palace, the family, and the sa

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THE VOLUNTEER-SYSTEM.

Since the meeting of Parliament, this system, which was before falling into disrepute, has experienced a considerable depreciation, notwithstanding the support, which it has received from that able financier, Mr. Pitt. He wished to render it more efficient; but, the very proposition which he made for that purpose, proved that his wish was impracticable; because the efficiency was not to be obtained without such means as could not be had, or could not be employed. His proposition, however, amounted to a full acknowledgment of the present inefficiency of the system. Thus far, he has proved the advesaries of the system to be right; and, it surely is not too much to ask of him, to be, in future, less pertinacious, upon this topie in particular, than he has heretofore been. He tells us, that, if we will adopt certain regulations, the system will be good; but, having before told us, that it would be good without those regulations, how can he expect that we now should place in his assurances an implicit belief.--How griev ously has this gentleman disappointed his friends! How has he disappointed the nation ! Instead of going into those grand subjects, the military and naval means and resources of the country, and the conduct of ministers relative thereto, he shuts his eyes to the past, and to the future also, except as far as relates to some trifling mat ters of detail, and that detail, too, of a sort that could, one would think, have seriously occupied no mind but that of some grocer or cheesemonger, puffed up with the vanity of being a colonel of volunteers. Was this the line of conduct which the nation expected to see pursued by Mr. Pitt? --Mr. Fox's speech, on this occasion, contained some most excellent remarks. He truly described the vaunted system of volunteer-corps; he set at nought that mean, that worthless, that shop-keeping popu larity, which Mr. Pitt still seemed to cling to; and, in short, his whole speech, even leaving the magnanimity of it out of the question, was well worthy of the applause, with which it was received. It was

hoped, that Mr. Pitt's disposition, also, to bory all party animosities, and to form, in this critical juncture, an union of all the great character and talents in the country, would have appeared, from his conduct, st the opening of the Parliament; and, though

this hope does seem to have been disappoint- I parté's threats of invasion? Why was not

ed, it ought not to be entirely relinquished, till we have seen the part which the right honourable gentleman will take on the important questions relative to Ireland.Unanimity to see a cordial unanimity amongst the great men of the day must be the wish of every one, who loves his king and country; for, such an unanimity is the only means of producing those great and wise measures, by which alone we can hope to recover our lost reputation, and to preserve ourselves from slavery. We are daily and hourly fading in the eyes of the world: foreign nations speculate upon our fall: the probable fall of England is a subject that is become familiar in their mercantile transactions. A striking and most woeful instance of this is now exhibited in our commercial concerns with the United States of America, where the merchants refuse to draw bills of exchange on England and to guarantee payment in case an invasion of the country shall bave taken place! I speak of a fact here, which I call upon the partisans of ministers to deny, if they can ; and, in order to render the denial more specific, I will refer to both time and place. I say, then, that at Philadelphia and New York, on the 5th of November last, no bill of exchange on England was to be bought, without the insertion of a condition, that, in case England should be invaded, when the bill arrived, the drawer of the said bill should not be liable to damages. The consequence of which was, few people would purchase bills, and the consequence of that was, remittances were delayed, unless dollars could be collected and transmitted, at the loss of freight and insurance; and such was the demand for dollars, from this cause, that, at the time referred to, the bank at Philadelphia put a stop to, or, at least, limited, its issues in specie. Such, as to America, are the consequences, and the natural consequences of a want of confidence in the stability of Our government; for it is nothing short of that: and, that this want of confidence has, in great part, arisen from the contemptuous opinion, which the Americans, in common with all other foreigners, entertain of our ministry, no one will, I imagine, attempt to deny, especially if he has read the public prints of the United States, from one end to the other of which, those ministers are spoken of in terms, which no Englishman, though the opponent of ministers, can possibly hear without sorrow and shame, nor even without some degree of resentment.-Are we to be told, that this distrust, on the part of the Americans is merely the effect of Buona

this effect produced last war, when an invasion of Ireland actually took place? Lord Hawkesbury said, no longer ago than the 10th of August last, that the dangers of the country were greater in 1798 than in the time when he was speaking; but, did the Americans refuse to guarantee bills in 1798 ? No such thing ever entered into their minds. During the whole of 1798 bills on England were regarded as good as at any former period; and, in short, doring the whole of last war there was no merchant in America, who did not look upon England as the securest place in the whole world, his own country not excepted. To what, then, are we to attribute that want of confidence, which exists with respect to our country? To what but an universal' contempt of the ministers, by whom that country is governed?-From this long and rambling digression, I should now return to the subject of Volunteer Corps, and offer a few observations on their exemptions and com mittees; but, want of room will compel me to postpone these topics to my next; in the mean time, however, I think it necessary to state, that I shall most amply prove the falsehood of an assertion which has been made, that the committee mentioned by Mr. Windham is a solitary instance, six-seventhis, at least, of the infantry corps being under the guidance of such committees, though the important and alarming fact was, it seems, utterly unknown to Mr. Pitt, the generalissimo of the shop-keeping army. I will once more, and for the last time, observe, on the baseness of accusing me, and those who think with me, on this subject, of despising the volunteers. It is the system, and not the men. To despise or hate the volunteers would, agreeably to a sentiment very happily expressed by a writer in the Morning Chronicle, be to despise or hate my country. And, is this my character? Have I ever despised, have I ever hated, have I ever turned my back upon, my county or my countrymen? And have I ever refused to face their enemies? But, of these base arts of my opponents, I will take no more notice; for, of those who are so ignorant as to be misled by them, the good opinion is not worth possessing.-In referring to the attacks on the volunteer system, I should na

turally enquire, wirat prevented Mr. Sheridan from stepping forward in its defence; Mr. Sheridan, who moved the vote of thanks, and who is said to have been rewarded by a colonelcy; but this enquiry also must be delayed till my next.

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ARMY ESTIMATES.] Mr. Addington"

said, some time ago, that, “ even certain success in reducing the power of France "would not have been worth forty millions

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of money." What may be the object, which that great man has, at present, in view, is, as far as I know, a profound secret. From what has been let out, one would believe, the object to be nothing more than an attempt, and a very humble attempt too, to eke out the existence of Britain, as an independent nation. If reducing the power of France was not worth forty millions, the object here supposed to be in view, cannot, surely, be worth nearly so much; yet, I think, it will be very wonderful indeed, if it does not cost the full sum, during the very first year of the war, the expenses of which Mr. Addington estimates at twenty-six millions, but which will not fall short of fortytwo or forty-three millions. It is, indeed, impossible, as yet, to make out a statement worthy of any other name than that of a guess; but, it is my opinion, that the expenses of the army, ordnance, and navy, for the first whole year of war, will be, for GreatBritain alone, nearly as follows::Ordinaries of the army as stated by the Secretary at War, exclusive of Barracks..

£. 8,346,860 1,500,000 5,500,000

Barracks

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1,600,000

Expenses of 397,000 Volunteers, at 7 l. per man, loss of labour not included,

2,779,000

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War portion of Miscellanies

Total

THE REVENUE.

4,000,000 17,303,371

41,039,231 1,500,000

42.539,231

In the speech from the throne, the minister thought proper to tell the House of Commons, that there was a 66 progressive improvement of the revenue," which could not fail to encourage them to persevere in the present system of finance; and, the House of Commons, in their response to this part of the speech, assure his Majesty, that they are fully sensible of the advantages of this system.

From assurances like these,

who would not believe, that the revenue has been more productive this year than it was last year? Most assuredly this is the notion intended to be conveyed to the public; yet, it will be no difficult matter to show, that the contrary is the fact, notwithstanding the comparative account of the produce of the permanent taxes, which has lately been laid before parliament, and which has been made

the ground of exultation amongst the partizans of the ministry.--The paper, here referred to, purports to be an account of the net produce of all the permanent taxes in the years and quarters ending the 10th day of October 1802 and 1803, respectively; and, its object is to show, that the year ending the 10th of October, 1803, has been more productive than the year ending 10th Oct. 1802. The war taxes, that is to say, the taxes imposed and collected during this present year, are left out of course; but the produce of the addition made to the customs, under the pretext of consolidation, is included in the receipt of the present year. The totals of this comparative account stand thus.

Year ending 10th Oct. 1803... £30,192,335 Year ending 10th Oct. 1802... 25,199,093

Difference £4,993,242

Now, who would not imagine, that this sum of difference exhibited the degree of that" improvement of the revenue," alluded to in the King's speech, and so much talked of out of doors? Who would imagine, that, as to the improvement of the revenue, as to the proof of national prosperity, contained in this account, the decision is against the present year, instead of being in favour of it? Strange as these suppositions may be, such, nevertheless, is the fact.In the year 1802, there were new taxes imposed to the annual estimated amount of 4,785,123. As these taxes were not enacted till the month of May, they yielded, in the year ending 10th October, 1802, only £980,570; and, of course, there has been, from these new taxes, the sum of £3,798,553 received in the year ending 10th October, 1803, more than there was received from that source in the year ending 10th October, 1802.—Again: last winter, an act was passed to consolidate the custom duties, and, by means of this act of consolidation as it is called, an addition was made to those duties, which addition has, in the year ending 10th October, 1803. produced £62,500. A third cause of difference is to be found in the account of corn bounties, that is to say, sums paid by way of bounty for the importation of corn and rice, which sums being paid at the Custom-house, where they are first deducted from the gross receipt at that House, are, of course, never brought into the Exchequer, and are not included in the accounts of the net produce of the taxes, laid before the House of Commons. During the year ending 10th October, 1802, there was, on this account, deducted from the net produce of

the permanent taxes £1,633,587; but, in
the year ending 10th October, 1803, there
was, on the same account, not one farthing
deducted from the net produce of those taxes.
The three sums here specified, must, then, in
a comparative view of the two years, be de-
ducted from the produce of the year ending
10th October, 1803; and, when this is done,
it will be found, that the "improvement of
"the revenue," which has been so much
boasted of by the partizans of the minister,
turns out to be a decline in its produce.

Net produce of permanent taxes in £..
year ending 10th Oct. 1803...... 30,192,335
New taxes not received in

1803, more than in 1802. 3,798,353 Arising from addition made

to Customs in 1803......

62,500

Con bounties paid out of

taxes in 1802, none being paid in 1803...

1,633,587

5,494,640 £.24,697,695

Net produce of permanent taxes in
the year ending 1oth Oct. 1802.... 25,199,093
Net produce of permanent tax 10th
Oct. 1803, deducting for new taxes
and corn bounties, as above..
Difference, being a falling off in the re-
venue during the year ending 10th
Oct. 1803.

....

24,697,695

But there is another consideration, with which people seem to trouble themselves but very little, but which is of vast impor tance in every estimate of national receipt or expenditure, particularly in compara tive estimates; and that is the gradual depreciation of money. If the national receipt amounts to the same sum this year as it amounted to last year, people generally suppose, that it will purchase as much service for the state; and, if there were no paper currency, and, of course, very little depreciation of money, this supposition would never be very distant from the truth; but far different is the state in which we are, and in which we see the value of money lessen even during the short space that it remains in our hands. Upon a computation leaning rather in favour of the value of money, it appears, that since the year 1797, that is, since the restriction, as it is called, was enacted as to the issues of specie at the bank, the average annual depreciation of money has been at the rate of four-pence in the pound; and, therefore, unless we suppose the depreciation to have been, this year, less than usual, the sum of 30,000,000l. of money collected in taxes up to the 10th of October last, is not worth more, and, in £ 501,398 fact, is not more, than that of 29,500,000l. collected last year; so that, adding this half million to the half million of real deficit in the receipts, it appears, that the "improvement in the revenue" consists of a defalcation of a million. Let us now see how the surplus of the consolidated fund is likely to stand at the end of the present year; first adverting to the promises held out by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the 10th of December, 1802, when he estimated the surplus of the consolidated fund, for the present year, at 7,845,000 1.; but though he saw no reason to apprehend a diminution of any part of the revenue, "he would not reckon upon a sum so large as might have been inferred from the experience of the three last quarters, and "he had, therefore, limited his expecta"tiens to 0 500,000l." These words are quoted from his speech as published by himscif, in the shape of a pamphlet; but the whole speech will be found, very correctly given, in the Register, Vol. II. p 910 et seq.it will be remembered, that this estimate was, at the time of its being made, declared to be fallacious. On every point of his financial statements Mr. Addington was contradicted; but, as to the surplus of the consolidated fund in particular, he was brought to issue with his opponents. The

Here is a defalcation of half a million instead of a "progressive improvement;" for, certainly, no one will pretend that the having made an addition to the receipt, by the means of new taxes, is a mark of "improve"ment?" If it be, there is no denying, that we are under a course of improvement, such as no nation upon earth ever before experienced. If this be improvement, the more numerous and the heavier are the burdens of the people, the more they ought to rejoice, for the greater, in that case, would be the means, and, of course, the credit of the nation! But, this is not the way to make a comparison between the produce of two years of taxes; this is not

the

way to make out a case of improvement. Such comparison, to be of any use for such a purpose, must be confined to taxes which were in existence, and in full operation at, or before, the commencement of the first of the two years, the produce of which is compared, for, whatever sum may have been collected from new taxes, if there is a falling off upon those which have existed during both the years, twat falling off must, according to its magrude, be regarded as a mark of decline is the pecuniary prosperity of the nation.

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