admits the trust, the court will enforce it. If a conveyance has been made upon a valuable consideration, there can be no resulting trust to the grantor, as the payment of a valuable consideration imports an intention to benefit the grantee in case the trusts declared fail, or are imperfectly declared, or do not take effect for any other reason.2

§ 152. Thus, if upon a conveyance, devise, or bequest, a trust is declared of a part of the estate only, or the purposes of the trust do not exhaust the whole beneficial interest, the trust in the remaining part or interest will result to the settlor or his heirs; for the reason that a declaration of trust as to part is considered sufficient evidence that the settlor did not intend the donee to take the beneficial interest in the whole, and that the creation of the trust was the sole object of the transaction. But a distinction must be observed between a devise to a person for a particular purpose, with no intention of conferring upon him any beneficial interest, and a devise with a view of conferring the beneficial interest, but subject to a particular charge, wish, or desire. Thus, if a gift be made to one and his heirs, charged with the payment of debts, it is a gift for a particular purpose, but not for that purpose only; and if it is the intention to confer upon the donee of the legal estate a beneficial interest after the partic

1 Ibid.

2 Kerlin v. Campbell, 15 Pa. St. 500; Gibson v. Armstrong, 7 B. Mon. 481; Brown v. Jones, 1 Atk. 158; Ridout v. Dowding, 1 Atk. 419.

* Northen v. Carnegie, 4 Drew. 587; Lloyd v. Spillett, 2 Atk. 150; Barn. 388; Cottington v. Fletcher, 2 Atk. 155; Culpepper v. Aston, 2 Ch. Ca. 115; Cook v. Gwavas, cited Roper v. Radcliffe, 9 Mod. 187; Sherrard v. Harborough, Amb. 165; Hobart v. Suffolk, 2 Vern. 644; Halliday v. Hudson, 3 Ves. 210 a; Killett v. Killett, 3 Dowl. P. C. 248; Davidson v. Foley, 2 Bro. Ch. 203; Levet v. Needham, 2 Vern. 138; Kiricke v. Bransbey, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 508; Robinson v. Taylor, 2 Bro. Ch. 589; Mapp v. Elcock, 2 Phill. 793; 3 H. L. Ca. 492; Read v. Stedman, 26 Beav. 495; Dawson v. Clarke, 18 Ves. 254; Wych v. Packington, 3 Bro. Ch. 44; Bristol v. Hungerford, 2 Vern. 645; Hill v. Cook, 1 V. & B. 173; Mullen v. Bowman, 1 Coll. N. C. 197; Loring v. Elliott, 16 Gray, 568.

ular purpose is satisfied without exhausting the whole estate, the surplus goes to the donee and does not result. But if the gift is upon a trust to pay debts, that is a gift for a particular purpose and nothing more. If the whole estate is given for that one purpose, and that purpose does not exhaust the whole estate, the remainder results to the donor or his heirs.2 Or as Vice-Chancellor Wood stated the rule: (1) where there is a gift to one to enable him to do something, where he has a choice whether he will do it or not, then the gift is for his own benefit, the motive why it is given to him being stated; (2) where you find the gift is for the general purposes of the will, then the person who takes the estate cannot take the surplus after satisfying a trust for his own benefit; (3) where a charge is created by the will, the devisee takes the surplus for his own benefit, and no trust is implied.3

§ 153. If from the whole instrument there can be gathered an intention to benefit the donee, no trust in the remainder

1 Hill v. London, 1 Atk. 619; King v. Dennison, 1 V. & B. 260; Southouse v. Bate, 2 V. & B. 396; Mullen v. Bowman, 1 Coll. C. C. 197; Dawson v. Clarke, 18 Ves. 247; Walton v. Walton, 14 Ves. 318; Wood v. Cox, 1 Keen, 317; 2 M. & Cr. 684; Downer v. Church, 44 N. Y. 647; Clarke v. Hilton, L. R. 2 Eq. 810; Irvine v. Sullivan, L. R. 8 Eq. 673.

2 King v. Dennison, 1 V. & B. 272; McElroy v. McElroy, 113 Mass. 509. 8 Barrs v. Fewke, 2 Hem. & M. 60; 11 Jur. (N. s.) 669; Sanderson's Trust, 3 K. & J. 497; Saltmarsh v. Barrett, 29 Beav. 474; 3 De G., F. & J. 279; Pollard's Trusts, 32 L. J. Ch. 657; Henderson v. Cross, 17 Jur. (N. s.) 177; Hale v. Horne, 21 Gratt. 112. In Cooke v. Stationers' Co. 3 My. & K. 262, Sir John Leach said: "If the devise to a particular, or for a particular, purpose, be intended by the testator to be an exception from the gift to the residuary devisee, the heir takes the benefit of the failure; but if it be intended to be a charge only upon the estate devised, and not an exception from the gift, the devisee will be entitled to the benefit of the failure." Thus if lands be devised to A. charged with a legacy to B. if he attain the age of twenty-one, the devise will become absolute in A. if B. dies before he becomes twenty-one. And the will is to read as if B. was not named in it. Tregonwell v. Sydenham, 3 Dow, 210; Sprigg v. Sprigg, 2 Vern. 394; Cruse v. Barley, 3 P. Wms. 20; Att'y-Gen. v. Milner, 3 Atk. 112; Croft v. Slee, 4 Ves. 60; Sutcliffe v. Cole, 3 Drew. 185; Jackson v. Hurlack, 2 Eden, 263; Tucker v. Kayess, 4 K. & J. 339.

will result, as where a man made his dearly beloved wife his sole heiress and executrix to pay his debts and legacies, and there was a residue after paying debts and legacies, there was no resulting trust, for the expressions in the will indicated an intention to benefit the donee. So any other expressions, that indicate an intention that the donee shall be benefited after the particular purposes are satisfied, will prevent a trust from resulting. So expressions of affection or relationship will be evidence upon the question, whether a trust was intended to result after the particular trusts are satisfied. If the donee is an infant incapable of executing a trust, or a married woman, it will be evidence upon the same question.4 But if from the whole will it is apparent that the donee shall not take a beneficial interest, all such circumstances go for nothing.5

§ 154. If the donee, to whom an estate is given upon a trust declared as to part, is also the heir, or other person to whom the trust for the remainder would result, or if he is one of a class, such gift to him will not prevent him from taking by the resulting trust the part that may come to him. So a legacy or other beneficial gift to him will not exclude him from the resulting interest, even if the interest given him is to arise out of the declared trust.8

1 Rogers v. Rogers, 3 P. Wms. 193; Cook v. Hutchinson, 1 Keen, 42. 2 Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. 555; Wood v. Cox, 2 M. & Cr. 692; Cook v. Hutchinson, 1 Keen, 42.

Rogers v. Rogers, 3 P. Wms. 193; Coningham v. Mellish, Pr. Ch. 31; King v. Dennison, 1 V. & B. 274; Hobart v. Suffolk, 2 Vern. 644. 4 Williams v. Jones, 10 Ves. 77; Blinkhorn v. Feast, 2 Ves. Sr. 27.

5 King v. Mitchell, 8 Pet. 349; King v. Dennison, 1 V. & B. 275.

• Hennershotz's Estate, 16 Pa. St. 435.

7 Farrington v. Knightly, 1 P. Wms. 545; Rutland v. Rutland, 2 P. Wms. 213; Andrews v. Clark, 2 Ves. Sr. 162; North v. Pardon, 2 Ves. Sr. 495.

8 Starkey v. Brooks, 1 P. Wms. 390; Randal v. Bookey, 2 Vern. 425; Pr. Ch. 162; Killett v. Killett, 1 B. & B. 543; 3 Dowl. P. C. 248.

§ 155. The doctrine of resulting trusts, where a trust is declared as to part only, was formerly much discussed in cases of gifts to executors for the payment of debts and legacies. In such cases at common law the appointment of the executor entitled him, both at law and equity, to all the remainder of the personal property after the payment of debts and legacies, unless it was specially disposed of by the testator in the will. Courts were always astute to find circumstances to repel the beneficial interest in the executor, and to raise a resulting trust for the next of kin, or heir-at-law, and it was finally enacted, 1 Will. IV., c. 40, that such executors should be trustees of any residue, unless it plainly appeared by the will that they were intended to take the residue beneficially. In the United States the rule never prevailed, but executors always took as trustees for those entitled to the distribution of the personal estate, unless it was expressly disposed of to some other persons, or unless it was expressly given to the executor beneficially.2

§ 156. In this connection an important exception to the general doctrine of resulting trusts should be stated. If property is given to trustees by grant or devise for charitable uses generally, and the particular purpose is not declared at all, or, if declared, does not exhaust the whole estate, there will be no resulting trust for the donor, his heirs, or next of kin, in either case; nor will the donees take any beneficial interest, but the court will direct the trustees to administer the whole estate under some scheme for charitable purposes.3

1 See 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1208, and the elaborate note cited from Fon. Eq. B. 2, c. 5, § 3, note (k).

2 Hill on Trustees, 1234 (Am. ed.); 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1208, 1209; as the doctrine has never prevailed in America, it is not worth while to state all the learning and nice distinctions of the courts. found in Hill, Story, and Fonblanque as above cited.

They will be

8 Cook v. Dunkenfield, 2 Atk. 567; Metford School, 8 Co. 130; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 73; Att'y-Gen. v. Bristol, 2 J. & W. 308;

§ 157. If a gift is made by deed or will upon trust, and no trust is declared,1 or a bequest is made to one named, as executor, "to enable him to carry into effect the trusts of the will," and none are declared,2 or a gift is made upon trusts thereafter to be declared, and no declaration is ever made,3 the legal title only will pass to the grantee or devisee, while a trust in the equitable interest will result to the settlor, his. heirs, or legal representatives, according to the nature of the property, whether real or personal; for it appears upon the instrument itself that the legal title alone was intended for the first taker, and that the equitable interest was intended to go to some other person, and as such other person cannot take the equitable interest for want of a declaration of the trust, it results to the settlor or his heirs.1 So if a testator says that he gives the residue, and stops there, or if he cancels a residuary bequest by drawing a line through it. But Mills v. Farmer, 1 Mer. 55; Att'y-Gen. v. Haberdashers' Co. 4 Bro. Ch. 103; see post, chapter upon Charitable Trusts, where this matter is stated at large.

1 Att'y-Gen. v. Windsor, 8 H. L. Ca. 369; 24 Beav. 679; Gloucester v. Wood, 1 H. L. Ca. 272; 3 Hare, 131; Dawson v. Clark, 18 Ves. 254; Dunnage v. White, 1 J. & W. 583; Morice v. Durham, 10 Ves. 537; Woollett v. Harris, 5 Madd. 452; Southouse v. Bate, 2 Ves. & B. 396; Goodere v. Lloyd, 3 Sim. 538; Pratt v. Sladden, 14 Ves. 198; Anon. 1 Com. 345; Penfold v. Bouch, 4 Hare, 271; Brown v. Jones, 1 Atk. 101; Sidney v. Shelley, 19 Ves. 359; Emblyn v. Freeman, Pr. Ch. 542; Coard v. Holderness, 20 Beav. 147; Longley v. Longley, L. R. 13 Eq. 137.

Barrs v. Fewke, 2 Hem. & M. 60.

3 London v. Garway, 2 Vern. 571; Collins v. Wakeman, 2 Ves. Jr. 683; Emblyn v. Freeman, Pr. Ch. 541; Fitch v. Weber, 6 Hare, 145; Brookman v. Hales, 2 V. & B. 45; Brown v. Jones, 1 Atk. 188; Sidney v. Shelley, 19 Ves. 352; Taylor v. Haygarth, 14 Sim. 8; Flint v. Warren, 16 Sim. 124; Onslow v. Wallis, 1 H. & Tw. 513; 1 McN. & G. 506; Jones v. Goodchild, 3 P. Wms. 33; Sturtevant v. Jaques, 14 Allen, 526; Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 388.

Aston v. Wood, L. R. 6 Eq. 419; Jones v. Bradley, L. R. 3 Eq. 635. Cloyne v. Young, 2 Ves. Sr. 91; Langham v. Sandford, 17 Ves. 435; Mapp v. Elcock, 2 Phill. 793.

Mence v. Mence, 18 Ves. 348; Skrymsher v. Northcote, 1 Swans.