dence, that puts the transaction clearly beyond all doubt or question, it will be set aside or he will be converted into a trustee. This disability of an attorney continues as long as the relation of attorney and client continues, and as much longer as the influence of the relation can be supposed to extend. If the relation has ceased, but the influence of the relation continues to affect the minds of the parties, all contracts made under the influence will be avoided.2 But if the relation has entirely ceased, and there can be supposed to be no influence remaining, the rule will not apply. And so, if an attorney makes a purchase of a client of property entirely disconnected with the subject of the litigation, and the transaction is in all respects as if it had taken place between strangers, the rule will not apply. So the rule does not apply to a gift to an attorney in the will of a client, if the will is a good and valid instrument in the courts where it is presented for probate; and a voidable conveyance to an attorney may be confirmed in the will of the client. But the rule will not apply to an attorney incidentally consulted concerning some point of the litigation, but who is not employed or confided in, for the management of the case, nor will it apply to the attorney upon the other side. Nor will it apply after the relation has ceased and the attorney has

1 Ibid.; Smith v. Brotherline, 62 Pa. St. 461.

2 Henry v. Raiman, 25 Pa. St. 354; Leisenring v. Black, 5 Watts, 303; Hockenbury v. Carlisle, 5 Watts & S. 350.

8 Wood v. Downes, 18 Ves. 127.

Edwards v. Meyrick, 2 Hare, 60; Bellows v. Russell, 1 B. & B. 104; Montesquieu v. Sandys, 18 Ves. 302.

5 Hindson v. Wetherell, 5 De G., M. & G. 30, overruling same case, 1 Sm. & G. 604. But see 23 L. Rev. 442, and notes to 1 Sm. & G. 604.

Stump v. Gaby, 2 De G., M. & G. 623. But see Waters v. Thorn, 22 Beav. 447.

314.

Dobbins v. Stevens, 17 S. & R. 13; Devinney v. Norris, 8 Watts,

• Bank v. Foster, 8 Watts, 305.

assumed a hostile position in endeavoring to collect his fees.1 But it has been held that an attorney having a lien or an execution in favor of his client, could not buy in land of his client at a sale thereof on execution.2 If an attorney takes an absolute deed from a client in payment of his fees, the court may order it to stand as a mortgage security, and where there was a fair agreement that an attorney's fees should be charged upon the estate, if recovered, the court allowed it to stand in the absence of undue influence, and so the court will not interfere after a great lapse of time where the sale was for full value.5

§ 203. All the dealings between attorney and client will be carefully examined by courts, and no purchase of a client's property will be allowed to stand. Thus a bond obtained from a poor and distressed client, the consideration not appearing with sufficient clearness, was set aside, and so a bond was not allowed to stand except for the amount of fees actually due, and a judgment was inquired into after a considerable lapse of time. And even where a barrister married a lady client, and undertook to draw the marriage settlement, according to the stipulations between them, it was held to be open to investigation by the court.10 The same rules are 1 Johnson v. Fesemeyer, 3 De G. & J. 13; Smith v. Brotherline, 62 Pa. St. 461.

236.

2 Stockton v. Ford, 11 How. 232.

Pearson v. Benson, 28 Beav. 598; Morgan v. Higgins, 5 Jur. (N. s.)

• Moss v. Bainbridge, 6 De G., M. & G. 292; Blagrave v. Routh, 2 K. & J. 509.

Clanricarde v. Henning, 30 Beav. 175.

• Moore v. Brackin, 27 Ill. 23; Smith v. Brotherline, 62 Pa. St. 461. Proof v. Hines, Cas. t. Talb. 111; Walmesley v. Booth, 2 Atk. 28.

8 Newman v. Payne, 4 Bro. Ch. 350; 2 Ves. Jr. 200; Langstaffe v. Taylor, 14 Ves. 262; Pitcher v. Rigby, 9 Price, 79; Jones v. Roberts, 9 Beav. 419.

• Drapers' Company v. Davis, 2 Atk. 295. 10 Corley v. Stafford, 1 De G. & J. 258.

applied to all persons standing in the relation of attorneys or confidential advisers, although they are not attorneys in fact; thus clerks in an attorney's office, who do business for the client and obtain a knowledge of his affairs and his confidence, cannot avail themselves of their position to make favorable bargains or purchases, and so one who acts as a confidential adviser in a matter before a magistrate, where attorneys are not employed, is under the same obligations and disabilities. Of course, if there is actual fraud committed by an attorney in a purchase of a client, the transaction will be summarily dealt with.3

§ 204. The same principles apply to transactions between all persons standing in confidential and influential relations to each other. The person thus possessing the confidence of another, and having an influence by reason of such confidence, cannot use his influence to obtain contracts, conveyances, or property. Quasi guardians, husband and wife, confidential advisers, stewards, keepers of asylums in which the quasi ward may have been treated, or confidential medical advisers, all come within the rule. But the mere fact that the donee is an attending physician, there being no confidential relation, will not avoid a deed. But the adminis

1 Hobday v. Peters, 28 Beav. 349; 6 Jur. (N. s.) 794; Cowdry v. Day, 5 Jur. (N. s.) 1199; Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327; Poillon v. Martin, 1 Sandf. Ch. 569.

2 Buffalow v. Buffalow, 5 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 241.

3 Webster v. King, 33 Cal. 348.

4 Trevelyan v. Charter, 9 Beav. 140; 11 Cl. & Fin. 714; Revett v. Harvey, 1 S. & S. 502; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273; Gray v. Mansfield, 1 Ves. 379; Wright v. Proud, 13 Ves. 136; Ahearne v. Hogan, 1 Dr. 310; Billing v. Southee, 9 Hare, 534; 16 Jur. 188; Crispell v. Dubois, 4 Barb. 393; Blackie v. Clarke, 22 L. J. Ch. 377; Whitehorn v. Hines, 1 Munf. 559; Shallcross v. Oldham, 2 John. & H. 609; Dent v. Bennett, 4 M. & Cr. 269; Gibson v. Russell, 2 Y. & C. N. R. 104; Pratt v. Barker, 1 Sim. 1; Swissholm's App. 56 Pa. St. 475; Falk v. Turner, 101 Mass. 494; Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 252.

5 Doggett v. Lane, 12 Mo. 215.

trator of a deceased partner may buy the partnership property, although he may be a surviving partner.1

§ 205. Upon the same principles, administrators and executors cannot purchase the estate under their charge to administer. They cannot purchase directly of themselves, nor from the heirs, legatees, devisees, or other persons interested in the estate, nor can they purchase indirectly by procuring a third person to purchase in the first instance, and by receiving a conveyance from such third person. This rule is so strict, that they cannot purchase any of the assets of the estate under their charge, although the assets are ordered by the court to be sold at public auction; and even where a cred

4

1 Savage v. Williams, 15 La. An. 250; Carter v. McManus, ib. 641; Dugas v. Gilbeau, ib. 581.

2 Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252; Van Epps v. Van Epps, 9 Paige, 237; Ward v. Smith, 3 Sandf. Ch. 592; Ames v. Browning, 1 Bradf. 321; Rogers v. Rogers, 3 Wend. 503; Bostwick v. Atkins, 1 Comst. 53; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 504; Drysdale's App. 14 Pa. St. 531; Moody v. Vandyke, 4 Binn. 31; Beeson v. Beeson, 9 Barr, 279; Winter v. Geroe, 1 Halst. Ch. 319; Conway . Green, 1 H. & J. 151; Bailey v. Robinson, 1 Gratt. 4; Hudson v. Hudson, 5 Munf. 180; Baines v. McGee, 1 Sm. & M. 208; Baxter v. Costin, 1 Busb. Eq. 262; Breckenridge v. Holland, 2 Blackf. 377; Edmunds v. Crenshaw, 1 McCord, Ch. 252. But in South Carolina an executor may purchase the personal property. Stallings v. Foreman, 2 Hill, Eq. 401; and so in Alabama, Julian v. Reynolds, 8 Ala. 680; Peyton v. Enos, 16 La. An. 135; Van Weckle v. Malla, ib. 325; Huston v. Cassidy, 2 Beas. 228; Mulford v. Winch, 3 Stockt. 16; Culver v. Culver, ib. 215; Dugas v. Gilbeau, 15 La. An. 581.

8 Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252; Paul v. Squibb, 12 Pa. St. 296; Woodruff v. Cook, 2 Edw. Ch. 259; Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 717; Beaubien v. Poupard, Harr. Ch. 206; Buckles v. Lafferty, 2 Rob. 292; Hunt v. Bass, 2 Dev. Eq. 292; Forbes v. Halsey, 26 N. Y. 53; Miles v. Wheeler, 43 Ill. 123; Kruse ». Stephens, 47 Ill. 112; Smith v. Drake, 23 N. J. Eq. 302; Tiffany v. Clark, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Add. 9.

4 Wallington's Est. 1 Ashm. 307; Beeson v. Beeson, 9 Barr, 279; Rham v. North, 2 Yeates, 117; Jewett v. Miller, 10 N. Y. 402; Fox v. Mackreth, 1 Lead. Ca. Eq. 1; Colgate v. Colgate, 23 N. J. Eq. 372; Colburn v. Morton, 1 N. Y. Decis. 378; Farrar v. Farley, 3 S. C. 11.

itor seized a portion of the estate and exposed it to public sale, it was held that the executor or administrator could not purchase.1 So if an executor join with others in the purchase of the estate the sale may be avoided.2 If, however, the estate is sold in good faith to a stranger, with no collusion between him and the executor, there is nothing to prevent the executor from purchasing it afterwards like any other property.3 So an executor may purchase the interest of a third person in the estate. If fraud is superadded to a purchase by an executor, or any use of his situation is made to make a more favorable purchase, it will of course be avoided, or he will be ordered to account for the property and all the profits received. But generally a purchase of the assets of an estate by an executor is not void, but only voidable, and such sale may be confirmed by all the parties interested in the estate; and so a long acquiescence in a purchase made by an executor, by all the heirs, would be held to be a confirmation. If an administrator purchases the estate at his own sale, and afterwards conveys the estate to a third person, his vendee will be charged with notice of the defect of title, as it would be apparent upon the face of

1 Spindler v. Atkinson, 3 Md. 410; Fleming v. Teran, 12 Ga. 394; Wyncoop v. Wyncoop, 12 Ind. 206. But the contrary rule was held in Fisk v. Sarber, 6 Watts & S. 18; Prevost v. Gratz, 1 Pet. C. C. 364; Campbell v. Johnson, 1 Sandf. Ch. 148; Bank of Orleans v. Torrey, 7 Hill, 260. 2 Mitchum v. Mitchum, 3 Dana, 260; Paul v. Squibb, 12 Pa. St. 296. • Silverthorn v. McKinister, 12 Pa. St. 67.

4 Alexander v. Kennedy, 3 Gratt. 379.

5 Vanhorn v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 388; Hudson v. Hudson, 5 Munf. 180. • Harrington v. Brown, 5 Pick. 519; Bruch v. Lantz, 2 Rawle, 392; Pennock's App. 14 Pa. St. 446; Longworth v. Goforth, Wright, 192; Dunlap v. Mitchell, 10 Ohio, 117; Williams v. Marshall, 4 G. & J. 377; Moore v. Hilton, 12 Leigh, 2; Scott v. Freeland, 7 Sm. & M. 410; Lyon v. Lyon, 8 Ired. Eq. 201.

Jennison v. Hapgood, 7 Pick. 1; Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 719; Ward v. Smith, 3 Sandf. Ch. 592; Baker v. Read, 18 Beav. 398; Musselman v. Eshelman, 10 Barr, 394; Bell v. Webb, 2 Gill, 164; Todd v. Moore, 1 Leigh, 457.