dence in regard to real estate, that the law of tenures is necessarily interpreted in America by the precedents established under the statute; and in this branch of the law, as in all others, it is impossible to obtain a clear perception of its present state, without a full knowledge of the successive steps by which the latest development has been reached. The application of the statute has been very much modified in many of the States, but the general idea is still acted upon.2 Mr. Washburn remarks, that it is not a fair inference 14 Kent, Com. 299-301.

2 In Maine, a person may convey land by deed acknowledged and recorded. Rev. Stat. 1857, c. 73, § 1. And a deed may be any species of conveyance, not plainly repugnant in terms, and necessary to give effect to the intention of the parties. Emery v. Chase, 5 Me. 235. And the statute of uses is in force. Shapleigh v. Pilsbury, 1 Me. 271; Emery v. Chase, 5 Me. 232; Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 496; Morden v. Chase, 32 Me. 329.

In New Hampshire, the form in which lands may be conveyed is fixed by statute. Rev. Stat. But this does not exclude other known forms of conveyance at common law, and the statute of uses is in full force. Exeter v. Odiorne, 1 N. H. 232; Chamberlain v. Crane, ib. 64; French v. French, 3 N. H. 234; Upham v. Varney, 15 N. H. 462; Hayes v. Tabor, 41 N. H. 526; Bell v. Scammon, 15 N. H. 394; Pritchard v. Brown, 4 N. H. 397; Dennett v. Dennett, 40 N. H. 498; Hutchins v. Heywood, 50 N. H. 496.

In Vermont, there is similar legislation as to the form of conveyances; but Chief Justice Redfield held that the English statute of uses was not in force, for the reason that their court of equity could carry out the intention of parties without the help of the statute. Gorham v. Daniels, 23 Vt. 600; Sherman v. Dodge, 28 Vt. 26. Mr. Justice Thompson, of the United States court for the district, held the contrary. Soc. &c. v. Hartland, 2 Paine, C. C. 536.

In Massachusetts, a deed acknowledged and recorded conveys land without any other ceremony. Gen. Stat. 1860, c. 89, § 1. The form of deed in general use gives, grants, bargains, sells, and conveys, upon a consideration, limiting the estate to the grantee and his heirs to their use. These words prevent a resulting use in the grantor; and it is a conveyance at common law, since the grantee and the cestui que use is the same person. But if, for any reason, it is necessary, in order to give effect to the conveyance, to construe it as operating under the statute of uses, the court will do So. Cox v. Edwards, 14 Mass. 492; Marshall v. Fish, 6 Mass. 24; Hunt v. Hunt, 14 Pick. 374; Wallis v. Wallis, 4 Mass. 135; Pray v. Pierce, 7 Mass. 381; Russell v. Coffin, 8 Pick. 143; Blood v. Blood, ib. 80; Parker v. Nichols, 7 Pick. 111; Gale v. Coburn, 18 Pick. 397; Brewer v. Hardy, 22 Pick. 376; Thatcher v. Omans, 3 Pick. 522; Norton v. Leonard,

that the doctrine of uses would be inapplicable in any State where they are not declared not to exist, either because no case has arisen in the courts of the State to test the question,

12 Pick. 157; Newhall v. Wheeler, 7 Mass. 189; Chapin v. Univer. Soc. 8 Gray, 580; Baptist Soc. v. Hazen, 100 Mass. 322; Durant v. Ritchie, 4 Mason, 45; Northampton Bank v. Whiting, 12 Mass. 104; Johnson v. Johnson, 7 Allen, 197.

In Rhode Island, deeds of bargain and sale, lease and release, and covenants to stand seized, are recognized by statute. Rev. Stat. (1857) p. 335. And the statute of uses would seem to be in partial force. 1 Lomax, Dig. 188; Nightingale v. Hidden, 7 R. I. 132.

In Connecticut, the act of acknowledging and recording a deed is held equivalent to livery of seizin. Barrett v. French, 1 Conn. 354. But the statute of uses is held to be part of its common law. Bacon v. Taylor, Kirb. 368; Barrett v. French, 1 Conn. 354; Bryan v. Bradley, 16 Conn. 474.

In New York, previous to 1827, the English statute of uses was in full force. Jackson v. Myers, 3 Johns. 388; Jackson v. Fish, 10 Johns. 456; Jackson v. Root, 18 Johns. 79; Jackson v. Cary, 16 Johns. 302; Jackson v. Dunsbagh, 1 Johns. Ca. 91; Jackson v. Cadwell, 1 Cow. 622. After that year, the rules of the common law were repealed; all uses and trusts were abolished, except such as were expressly authorized. Every interest in land is declared to be a legal right, and cognizable in a court of law except where it is otherwise provided. A conveyance by grant, assignment, or devise is substituted for a conveyance to uses, and future interests in lands may be conveyed by grant. 3 Rev. Stat. 15 (5th ed.), 4 Kent, 300. It has, however, been determined that if land is granted to one in fee in trust for another, the cestui que trust takes the estate absolutely, but subject, however, to such incumbrances as the trustee made upon the estate at the time of the conveyance, as if the trustee should give back a mortgage for the purchase-money, it would be held to be one transaction. Rawson v. Lampman, 1 Seld. 456. Nor have these statutes any application to securities by mortgage. King v. Merchants' Exchange Co. 1 Seld. 547.

In New Jersey, the statute of uses is substantially re-enacted. Den v. Crawford, 3 Halst. 107; Prince v. Sisson, 13 N. J. 168.

In Pennsylvania, a statute declares all deeds in a prescribed form equivalent to a feoffment with livery of seizin at common law, and the statute of uses is also in full force. Opinion of the Judges, 3 Binn. 599; Ashhurst v. Given, 5 Wat. & Ser. 323; Welt v. Franklin, 1 Binn. 502; Sprague v. Woods, 4 Wat. & Ser. 192; O'Kinson v. Patterson, 1 Wat. & Ser. 395; Hurst v. McNeil, 1 Wash. C. C. 70; Franciscus v. Reigart, 4 Watts, 118. Indeed, at one time, the Pennsylvania courts carried the application of the statute to an unusual extent, and held that equitable were converted into

or because a form of deed not known under the statute of uses may have been declared by the statute of a State sufficient to convey lands. It is true that Lord Hardwicke is legal estates in all cases except active trusts, and even then if the purposes of the trust did not furnish a legitimate reason for not executing the trust in the beneficiary. Kuhn v. Newman, 26 Pa. St. 227; Whichcote v. Lyle, 28 Pa. St. 73; Bush's App. 33 Pa. St. 85; Kay v. Scates, 37 Pa. St. 31. But these cases were overruled, and the law restored to its former condition, in Barnett's App. 46 Pa. St. 392; Shankland's App. 47 Pa. St. 113; Earp's App. 75 Pa. St. 119; Deibert's App. 78 Pa. St. 296.

In Delaware, the statute provides that lands may be transferred by deed without livery, and that the legal estate shall accompany the use, and pass with it. Rev. Code (1852), p. 266.

In Maryland, the English statute of uses is the foundation of their conveyances, and their rules of construction of it are nearly similar to the English rules. Lewis v. Beall, 4 Harr. & McH. 488; Mason v. Smallwood, ib. 484; Matthews v. Ward, 10 Gill & J. 443; Cheney v. Watkins, 1 Harr. & J. 527; West v. Biscoe, 6 Harr. & J. 465; Calvert v. Eden, 2 Harr. & McH. 331.

In Virginia, the statute of uses was a part of the colonial law; but it was repealed in 1792. Afterwards, in 1819, and in Rev. Code (1849), p. 502, a partial substitute was adopted, by which the possession was transferred to the use only in cases of deeds of bargain and sale, lease and release, and deeds operating by way of covenant to stand seized to uses. If uses or trusts are raised by any other form of conveyance, as by devise, they remain, as before the statute of Henry VIII., mere equitable estates, not cognizable by courts of law. Bass v. Scott, 2 Leigh, 359, 1 Lomax, Dig. 188, 2 Mat. Dig. 34; Rowletts v. Daniel, 4 Munf. 473; Tabb v. Baird, 3 Call, 475; Duvall v. Bibb, ib. 362.

In North Carolina, the statute is similar to the statute of Virginia, and the statute of uses has nearly the same application. Rev. Code (1854), p. 270; Den v. Hanks, 5 Ired. 30; Smith v. Lockabill, 76 N. C. 465.

In South Carolina, the statute of uses was re-enacted in terms. 2 Stat. at Large, p. 467; Ramsay v. Marsh, 2 McCord, 252; Redfern v. Middleton, Rice, 464; Kinsler v. Clark, 1 Rich. 170; Chancellor v. Windham, ib. 161; Laurens v. Jenney, 1 Spears, 356; McNish v. Guerard, 4 Strob. 74.

In Georgia, the form of deed in general use is that of bargain and sale, which operates under the statute of uses. Adams v. Guerard, 29 Ga. 676.

In Florida, there is a statute similar to the statute of Virginia, and

1 2 Washburn on Real Property, 154.

reported to have said, that the statute of uses had no other effect than to add at most three words to a conveyance;1

the statute of uses is in partial force. Thompson's Dig. p. 178, § 4; 1 Lomax, Dig. 188.

In Alabama, the statute of uses is part of the law of the State. Horton v. Sledge, 29 Ala. 478; You v. Flinn, 34 Ala. 411.

In Mississippi, there is a statute similar to the statute of Virginia. How. & Hutch. Dig. p. 349.

In Louisiana, conveyances originated under the civil law, or the code of France.

In Texas, a statute recognizes deeds of bargain and sale, which operate under the statute of uses.

In Arkansas, the mode of conveyance is by deeds of bargain and sale, and of course the statute of uses must be a part of their law.

In Tennessee, the statute of uses is not in force, though deeds good at common law or under the statute of uses are valid to convey estates; but if uses are raised, they remain as before the statute of Henry VIII.

The statute of Kentucky is in nearly the same words as the statute of Virginia, and the statute of uses has the same application. Rev. Stat. p. 279 (ed. 1860).

In Ohio, the statute of uses was never in force, and if trusts or uses are raised by the form of conveyance they remain unexecuted, and mere equitable estates, cognizable only in courts of equity. Williams v. Presbyterian Church, 1 Ohio St. 497; Helfensteine v. Garrard, 7 Ham. 276; Foster v. Dennison, 9 Ohio, 124; Walker, Am. Law, 124; Thompson v. Gibson, 2 Ohio, 439.

In Indiana, the statute of uses is enacted in substance. Rev. Stat. (1843) p. 447; Linville v. Golding, 11 Ind. 374; Nelson v. Davis, 35 Ind. 474. In Illinois, the statute is very similar to the statute of Virginia. 2 Stat. (1858) p. 959; Witham v. Brooner, 63 Ill. 344.

In Michigan, the laws are similar to the statutes of New York, by which all uses and trusts are abolished. 2 Compt. Laws (1857), p. 824; Ready v. Kearsley, 14 Mich. 228.

In Missouri, the statute of uses is re-enacted in substance. Rev. Stat. (1845) p. 218; Guest v. Farley, 19 Miss. 147.

In Iowa, uses are recognized, and deeds may operate under the statute of uses. Pierson v. Armstrong, 1 Iowa, 282.

In Wisconsin, the statute is very similar to the statute of New York, and all uses and trusts are abolished except those specially provided for. Rev. Stat. (1858) p. 529.

In Minnesota, deeds may be in form of bargain and sale, which operate under the statute.

In California, conveyances originated under the old Spanish law, and

1 Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 591.

Mr. Kent thinks this rather too strongly expressed, and says that the doctrine of the statute has insinuated itself deeply and thoroughly into every branch of the jurisprudence of real property. It seems to have been the intention of the statutes of the various States to supply the want of livery of seizin, and to make all deeds, or other writings executed with certain formalities, equivalent to the old feoffinents; therefore, any old and well-established rule of conveyancing ought not to be considered as abolished, in the absence of express provisions to that effect.

§ 300. The statute of uses at the time when it was passed had an immense effect upon the tenures of the realm. Many interests in land which had been merely equitable, and cognizable only according to the rules of equity, became at once legal interests, cognizable in courts of common law. Many persons who were seized of estates to uses, and who only could sue or be sued at law in relation to the same, ceased at once to have any title either at law or equity. Although it is probable that it was the intent of the statute to convert all uses or trusts into legal estates,2 yet the convenience to the subject of being able to keep the legal title to an estate in one person, while the beneficial interest should be in another, was too great to be given up altogether, and courts of equity were astute in finding reasons to withdraw a conveyance from the operation of the statute. Three principal

probably the statute of uses has little or no influence upon the law of the State.

In Kansas, a conveyance to A. to the use of B. vests the estate at once in B., by force of the statute. Bayer v. Cockerill, 3 Kan. 292. 14 Kent, Com. 301.

2 1 Green. Cruise, tit. 12, c. 1, § 1.

8 Mr. Cruise thought that the strict construction put upon the statute by the judges in a great measure defeated its effect. Ib. Mr. Blackstone is of a similar opinion. 2 Black. Com. 336. And Lord Mansfield, in Goodright v. Wells, 2 Doug. 771, said that it was not the liberality of courts of equity, but the absurd narrowness of courts of law, resting on