Waterman v. Sprague Manufacturing Co. of substance neither works hurt to the plaintiff nor brings help to the defendant. It cannot be made the occasion for driving the former out of court, in reality he is appropriating the property of his debtor to the satisfaction of a judgment at law based upon a debt, the validity and justice of which both defendants admit. The law of this state is, that as against the plaintiff both of those deeds were fraudulent and void and conveyed no title to the real estate here. Knowledge of the law of his state of residence is to be imputed to him, but not knowledge of the law of a foreign state. Upon the record, after the promulgation of the law of this state by this court he speedily instituted proceedings for the appropriation of the real estate in this state, not effectually conveyed to Chafee, trustee. There was no laches on his part after knowledge of his rights, and no laches in obtaining such knowledge. He had the right to presume that the law of this is as the law of his own state. He was under no obligation to assume the burden of a suit for the purpose of learning whether it is so or not. The plaintiff was not compelled to ask the aid of the equitable powers of the court. Upon the record he had a judgment at law, upon which he was entitled to an execution, in satisfaction of which the real estate attached in the suit might have been set out to him. He had also means of satisfaction by lien and foreclosure on the equitable side of the court, assuming the judgment to be of such a character as to come within the statute as to judgment liens, as to which no question is made in the case. With this right at the time to apply the property to his debt by proceedings at law, his delay in instituting those proceedings is not laches. Laches is not to be imputed to a suitor in a court of law. who has not brought himself within the statute of limitations. If there had been no laches up to that point, and he had then the right to resort to a judgment lien and a foreclosure, he is not affected by any imputed laches in a court of equity. Daly v. Dimock. The Superior Court is advised to render judgment for the plaintiff. In this opinion PARK, C. J., and BEARDSLEY, J., concurred; CARPENTER and LOOMIS, JS., dissented. THOMAS D. DALY vs. EDWIN O. DIMOCK. Hartford Dist., Oct. T., 1887. PARK, C. J., CARPENTER, PARDEE, LOOMIS and BEARDSLEY, Js. The statute (Revision of 1888, sec. 2011) provides that every coroner shall reduce to writing and return to the clerk of the Superior Court in the county, the testimony of all witnesses examined in any inquest, with the finding, and all certificates sent him by the medical examiner in the case. Held that these documents in the hands of the clerk are open to the inspection of all persons interested. And that the inspection of them could not be refused to a person indicted for a homicide, as to which an inquest had been held. Under the statute there is no discretion in the matter on the part of the coroner, the clerk or the court. While a court will in many cases exercise its discretion as to granting the writ of mandamus, yet it will not refuse it where the applicant has a clear legal right, a substantial matter is involved, and there is no other adequate legal remedy. [Argued October 5th-decided December 5th, 1887.] APPLICATION for a writ of mandamus; brought to the Superior Court in Tolland County. The application stated that the plaintiff had been indicted in that court for murder in the second degree in killing one Thomas Murphy, and that the indictment was now pending. in the court; that an inquest had been held upon the body of Murphy by the coroner of the county, who had caused an examination of the body to be made by the medical examiner of the county, assisted by sundry others; that the coroner had, under the provision of the statute prescribing his duties, within ten days after the inquest returned the testimony taken at the inquest, with his report as coroner, 55 579 65 362 55 579 74 197 | 55 579 76 178 Daly v. Dimock. to Edwin O. Dimock, Esq., the clerk of the Superior Court for the county, which documents were held by the clerk; that access to the testimony given at the inquest was essential to the preparation of the plaintiff's defense; that he was legally entitled to an inspection of the documents mentioned, and had made demand upon the clerk for permission to inspect them, and that the clerk had refused and still refused to allow him to inspect the same. The plaintiff therefore moved the court to issue a writ of mandamus requiring the said Dimock, as such clerk, to allow him and his attorneys to inspect and read the testimony in question, or show cause to the contrary. The defendant filed the following demurrer to the application:-The defendant demurs-because the testimony of the several witnesses taken by the coroner upon the inquest is not a public record; because the public interests then required and still require that such testimony should not be inspected or read by said Daly or his attorneys; and because upon the facts averred the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought. The case was reserved, upon the demurrer, for the advice. of this court. B. H. Bill, with whom was C. Phelps, in support of the demurrer. 1. The writ of mandamus is not demandable as a matter of right, but is awarded in the discretion of the court. Rex v. Bristol Dock Co., 12 East, 429; Am. Asylum v. Phœnix Bank, 4 Conn., 172; Ayres v. State Auditors, 42 Mich., 422; Page v. Clopton, 30 Gratt., 415; People v. Hatch, 33 Ill., 9; Woodman v. Com'rs of Somerset, 24 Maine, 151; State v. Graves, 19 Md., 351. To entitle the party to this remedy there must be a clear legal right, not merely to the decision in respect to the thing, but to the thing itself. People v. Booth, 49 Barb., 31; Peck v. Booth, 42 Conn., 274; State v. N. Haven & Northampton Co., 45 id., 332, 343. "And the court will not grant a mandamus where it appears that the object sought could have been secured with Daly v. Dimock. out serious difficulty without the aid of a court." Harrison v. Simonds, 44 Conn., 318. 2. The act concerning coroners provides that whenever any person shall come to a violent death or shall be found dead, the medical examiner shall make immediate inquiry, and if he shall be satisfied that the death was not caused by the criminal act of another, he shall so certify to the coroner, but if he shall see reason to suspect that it was so caused he shall so inform the coroner, and the coroner shall at once proceed to make all proper inquiry by himself or by a jury respecting the cause and manner of death. He may cause an examination of the body to be made, and take the testimony of such medical examiner or of any person or persons. He may order any inquest or any part thereof to be held in private. If the finding charges any person with having caused the death, the coroner is required without delay to communicate the import of the finding to a grand juror or a prosecuting attorney of the town or city. He is required to reduce to writing, and within ten days after any inquest to return the testimony of all witnesses examined to the clerk of the Superior Court of the county, with all certificates sent him by the medical examiner and all certificates by him made. He is required to keep a record book into which he shall copy all such certificates and in which he shall keep a record of all views, inquiries and inquests by him made or held, stating the time and place, the names and residences of the witnesses, the cause and manner of the death as found, the disposition and place of burial of the dead body, and a careful description of all dead bodies not identified before burial. He is required to take the dying declarations of persons dangerously wounded or injured by any criminal act of another. During an examination of witnesses he may cause them to be kept separate so that they cannot communicate with one another. And he is empowered to cause the immediate arrest and detention of any persons whom he has good reason to suspect guilty of causing the death of the one on whose body the inquest is held. From these provisions it is manifest that the purpose of Daly v. Dimock. the statute is investigation, with a view to the discovery of crime and the apprehension of the criminal. It is a proceeding in the interest of the public against wrongdoers. It is an inquest, a mere investigation, and in no sense a tribunal. Its findings are not admissible in evidence, and have no force as judgments. The investigation need not be public. The coroner is required to return the testimony, the finding, and all certificates returned to or made by him, to the clerk of the Superior Court; but the clerk is not required to record them. They are only left in his custody for safe keeping. It does not follow that they are public records. To hold them to be such would oftentimes defeat the object of the statute, and make them serviceable to the criminal rather than helps to the prosecuting authorities. In the course of investigation facts might be developed very important to be withheld, beyond the limit of the ten days, from the public and especially from the suspected parties. The coroner is a public officer, and is required to keep a record book in which all certificates shall be copied, and in which all views, inquiries and inquests shall be recorded. It is a significant fact that the testimony of the witnesses is not included among the matters for record. All that is important for public knowledge is specially mentioned. This book is doubtless a public record, accessible to all parties who may be interested, and furnishes all the information intended for the public. 3. It is the indicted criminal who is asking for the testimony as a matter of right, claiming it to be essential for his defense. The according it is discretionary with the court. Would it be the exercise of a reasonable discretion to grant the request? The testimony is not even essential to a defense. It cannot be used as evidence. It can only be a benefit to the accused by informing him of what certain witnesses have testified on a former occasion. If the same witnesses should be offered in the trial, and they should testify differently, their former contradictory statements might be used against them. The application is virtually asking the court to com |