The Thirde Boke. CHAPTER I. Of the noble and moste excellent Vertue named Justyce: HE moste excellent and incomparable vertue called iustice is so necessary and expedient for the gouernour of a publike wcale, that without it none other vertue may be commendable, ne witte or any maner of doctrine profitable. Tulli saith, that at the beginninge whan the multitude of people were Offic. ii. oppressed by them that abounded in possessions and substaunce, they espienge some one whiche excelled in vertue and strength, to hym they repayred; who ministringe equitie, From whan he had defended the poore men from iniurie, whens the finally he retayned to gether and gouerned the kyng firste greatter persones with the lasse, in an equall and inproceded. different ordre.a Wherfore they called that man a king, whiche is as moche to saye as a ruler. And as Aristotell sayeth, iustice is nat onely a portion or spice of vertue, but it is intierly the same vertue." And therof onely (sayeth Tulli) name of a 'Mihi quidem, non apud Medos solum, ut ait Herodotus, sed etiam apud majores nostros, justitiæ fruendæ causâ videntur olim bene morati reges constituti. Nam cum premeretur inops multitudo ab iis qui majores opes habebant, ad unum aliquem confugiebant, virtute præstantem; qui cum prohiberet injuriâ tenuiores, æquitate constituendâ summos cum infimis pari jure retinebat.'—De Off. lib. ii. cap. 12. * Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετή ἐστιν. Elk. Nic. lib. v. cap. 1 (3). men be called good men," as who saieth that without iustyce all other qualities and vertues can nat make a man good. The auncient Ciuilians do saye iustyce is a wille perpetuall and constaunt, whiche gyueth to euery man his right." In that it is named constaunt, it importeth fortitude; in discernynge what is ryght or wronge, prudence is required; and to proporcion the sentence or iugement in an equalitie, it belongeth to temperaunce. All these to gether conglutinate and effectually executed maketh a perfecte definicion of iustyce.c Justice all though it be but one entier vertue, yet is it described in two kyndes or spices. The one is named iustyce. distributiue, which is in distribution of honour, money, benefite, or other thinge semblable; the other is called commutatiue or by exchaunge, and of Aristotell it is named in Diorthotica. Greeke Diorthotice, whiche is in englysshe correctiue. a * ‘Justitia, ex quâ unâ virtute viri boni appellantur.'—De Off. lib. ii. cap. 11. 'Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi.'—Instit. lib. i. tit. i. This definition was apparently borrowed from that attributed to Cicero, which is as follows, Justitia est æquitas, jus unicuique tribuens, pro dignitate cujusque.'-Ad Herenn. lib. iii. cap. 2. • The author has evidently borrowed this idea from Plato, according to whose theory the perfect state was composed of four elements, viz., Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice, of which the three former being discovered, that which remains afterwards will be Justice. Οἶμαι ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς γε ᾤκισται, τελέως ἀγαθὴν εἶναι. Ανάγκη, ἔφη. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι σοφή τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρων καὶ δικαία. Δῆλον. Οὐκοῦν ὅτι ἂν αὐτῶν εὕρωμεν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὐχ εὑρημένον ; Τί μήν; Ωσπερ τοίνυν ἄλλων τινῶν τεττάρων, εἰ ἕν τι ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτῶν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν, ὁπότε πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο ἔγνωμεν, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν ἡμῖν, εἰ δὲ τὰ τρία πρότερον ἐγνωρίσαμεν, αὐτῷ ἂν τούτῳ ἐγνώριστο το ζητούμενον· δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο ἔτι ἦν, ἢ τὸ ὑπολειφθέν. ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. . . . Εἶεν, ἦν δ ̓ ἐγώ· τὰ μὲν τρία ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει κατῶπται, ὥς γε ούτωσὶ δόξαι· τὸ δὲ δὴ λοιπὸν εἶδος, δι' ὁ ἂν ἔτι ἀρετῆς μετέχοι πόλις, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη; δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη. Δῆλον . . Ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς ἀρετὴν πόλεως τῇ τε σοφίᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ τοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν δικαιοσύνην τό γε τούτοις ἐνάμιλλον ἂν εἰς ἀρετὴν πόλεως θείης ; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.— Plato, De Rep. lib. iv. cap. 6-10. .... 4 Τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ ̓ αὐτὴν δικαίου ἕν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας. Arist. Ethic. Nic. lib. v. cap. 2 (5). • Εν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν.-Ibid. lib. v. cap. 2 (5) The And that parte of iustyce is contayned in intremedlynge, and somtyme is voluntary, somtyme involuntary intermedlynge." Voluntary is bienge and sellynge, loue, suertie, lettynge, and takynge, and all other thynge wherin is mutuall consent at the beginnyng; and therfore is it called voluntary. Intermedlynge involuntary somtyme is priuely done, as stelynge, auoutry, poisonyng, falschede, disceyte, secrete murdre, false wytnes, and periurye; somtyme it is violent, as batry, open murdre and manslaughter, robry, open reproche and other lyke. Justice word which expresses justice in the Greek language has several different meanings; and as the correspondent word in all other languages, so far as I know, has the same, there must be some natural affinity among those various significations. In one sense we are said to do justice to our neighbour when we abstain from doing him any positive harm, and do not directly hurt him, either in his person, or in his estate, or in his reputation. This is that justice, the observance of which may be extorted by force, and the violation of which exposes to punishment. In another sense we are said not to do justice to our neighbour unless we conceive for him all that love, respect, and esteem which his character, his situation, and his connection with ourselves, render suitable and proper for us to feel, and unless we act accordingly. It is in this sense that we are said to do injustice to a man of merit who is connected with us, though we abstain from hurting him in every respect, if we do not exert ourselves to serve him, and to place him in that situation in which the impartial spectator would be pleased to see him. The first sense of the word coincides with what Aristotle and the schoolmen call commutative justice, and with what Grotius calls the justitia expletrix, which consists in abstaining from what is another's, and in doing voluntarily whatever we can with propriety be forced to do. The second sense of the word coincides with what some have called distributive justice, and with the justitia attributrix of Grotius, which consists in proper beneficence, in the becoming use of what is our own, and in the applying it to those purposes, either of charity or generosity, to which it is most suitable in our situation that it should be applied. In this sense justice comprehends all the social virtues.' Dr. Smith adds: 'The distributive justice of Aristotle is somewhat different. It consists in the proper distribution of rewards from the public stock of a community.'-Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 397. · Τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσιά ἐστι τὰ δ ̓ àkovoia.-Arist. Eth. Nic. lib. v. cap. 2 (5). • Εκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις, ὠνή, δανεισμός, ἐγγύη, χρῆσις, παρακατα θήκη, μίσθωσις· ἑκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούows.-Arist. ubi supra. The reader will observe that the author's inclusion of 'love' amongst the obligations enumerated is not due to the original authority. • Τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπή, μοιχεία, φαρμακεία, προαγωγεία, distributiue hathe regarde to the persone; iustyce commutatiue hathe no regarde to the persone, but onely considerynge the inequalitie wherby the one thynge excedeth the other, indeuoureth to brynge them bothe to an equalitie. Nowe wyll I retourne agayne to speke firste of Justice distributiue, leauinge Justice commutatiue to an other volume, whiche I purpose shall succede this warke, god giuynge me tyme and quietnes of mynde to perfourme it." CHAPTER II. The firste parte of Justyce distributiue. IT is nat to be doughted but that the firste and princypall parte of Justyce distributyue is, and euer was, to do to god that honour whiche is due to his diuine maiestic; whiche honour (as I before said in the firste boke, where I wrate of the motion called honour in daunsinge) consisteth in loue, feare, and reuerence. For sens all men graunte that iustyce is to gyue to δουλαπατία, δολοφονία, ψευδομαρτυρία· τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία, δεσμός, θάνατος, ἁρπαγή, πήρωσις, κακηγορία, προπηλακισμός. — Arist. ubi supra. Bacon, in his Advancement of Learning, says, 'Is there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion?'-Works, vol. iii. p. 348, ed. 1857. And it was probably the recollection of the above passage which caused Dr. South to say, 'Although, according to the common division of justice into commutative and distributive, that which is called commutative be employed only about the strict value of things according to an arithmetical proportion (as the schools speak) which admits of no degrees, and the other species of justice, called distributive (as consisting in the distribution of rewards and pnnishments), admits of some latitude and degrees in the dispensation of it; yet, in truth, even this distribution itself must so far follow the rules of commutation, that the good to be dispensed by way of reward ought in justice to be equivalent to the work or action which it is designed as a compensation of; so as by no means to sink below it, or fall short of the full value of it.' -Sermons, vol. ii. p. 233, ed. 1823. The author's intention, however, appears unfortunately not to have been carried out. See Vol. I. p. 242. euery manne his owne, moche more to rendre one good dede for a nother, mooste of all to loue god, of whome we haue all thinge, and without hym we were nothing, and beinge perysshed we were eftsones recouered, howe ought we (to whome is gyuen the very light of true fayth) to embrace this parte of iustyce more, or at the leste no lesse, than the gentilles; whiche wandring in the darkenes of ignoraunce knewe nat god as he is, but deuidynge his maiestie in to sondry portions imagined Idols of diuers fourmes and names, assigned to them particuler autorites, offices and dignities. Nat withstandynge, in the honourynge of those goddes, suche as they were, they supposed all way to be the chiefe parte of iustice. The honour that the gentels bare to Romulus (the firste kynge of Romanes) for his fortune and benefites, whiche he ascribed to his goddes, made to the honoure of them great and noble Temples, their goddes ordaynynge to them images, sacrifices, and other ceremonyes." And more ouer (whiche is moche to be Plutarchus meruayled at) he also prohibited that any thing in vita ro- shulde be radde or spoken reprocheable or blasphemous to god. And therfore he excluded all fables made. muli. Dionisius Halicarn. lib. ii. of the aduoutryes and other enormityes that the Greekes had fayned their goddes to haue commytted; inducinge his people to speke and also to coniecte nothinge of god but onely that whiche was in nature moste excellent, whiche after was also commaunded by Plato in the firste boke of his publike weale.b • Ων πολλὴν ἔσχε πρόνοιαν, τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενος ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα καὶ δαιμόνια σεβασμῶν· ἱερὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τεμένη καὶ βωμοὺς καὶ ξοάνων ἱδρύσεις μορφάς τε αὐτῶν καὶ σύμβολα καὶ δυνάμεις, καὶ δωρεὰς, αἷς τὸ γένος ἡμῶν εὐηργέτησαν, ἑορτάς τε ὁποίας τινὰς ἑκάστῳ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων ἄγεσθαι προσήκει καὶ θυσίας, αἷς χαίρουσι γεραιρόμενοι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων, ἐκεχειρίας τε αὖ καὶ πανηγύρεις καὶ πόνων ἀναπαύλας καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως κατεστήσατο τοῖς κρατίστοις τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι νομίμων. Τοὺς δὲ παραδεδομένους περὶ αὐτῶν μύθους, ἐν οἷς βλασφημίαι τινὲς ἔνεισι κατ' αὐτῶν ἢ κατηγορίαι, πονηροὺς καὶ ἀνωφελεῖς καὶ ἀσχήμονας ὑπολαβὼν εἶναι, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι θεῶν ἀλλ ̓ οὐδ ̓ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν ἀξίους, ἅπαντας ἐξέλαβε καὶ παρεσκεύασε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κρατίστα περὶ θεῶν λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν μηδὲν αὐτοῖς προσάπτοντας ἀνάξιον ἐπιτήδευμα τῆς Makaplas púσews.-Dion. Hal. Antiq. Rom. lib. ii. cap. 18. The author is mistaken; the passage referred to occurs not in the first but in |