Ethic. ii.

suche maner of erogation nat to be worthy the name of liberalitic. For Aristotle defineth a liberal man to be he whiche doth erogate accordinge to the rate of his substance and as oportunitie hapneth. He saieth also in the same place, that liberalitie is nat in the multitude or A liberall quantite of that whiche is gyuen, but in the habite or man. facion of the gyuer, for he gyueth accordinge to his habilitie. Neyther Tulli approueth it to be liberalitie, wherin is any mixture of auarice or rapyne; for it is nat properly liberalitie to exacte iniustly, or by violence or craft to take goodes from particuler persones, and distribute them in a multitude; or to Combined in its essence are breach of trust, peculation, depredation, oppression, and corruption. Exercised to a good end, and at a man's own expense, liberality is a virtue: exercised at the expense of others, and without their consent, it is a vice.' Works, vol. ix. p. 267, ed. 1843.

This word and the verb, to erogate, in the following sentence are simply adaptations of the strictly classical words erogatio, erogare signifying ‘to spend, or distribute lavishly.' Thus Cicero says, 'Herréλorov movere ista videntur, in primis erogatio pecuniæ.'-Ep. ad Att. lib. xv. 2. And again, Et quoniam pecunias aliorum despicis, de tuis divitiis intolerantissimè gloriaris, volo uti mihi respondeas, fecerisne foedera tribunus plebis cum civitatibus, cum regibus, cum tetrarchis? erogarisne pecunias ex ærario tuis legibus?'-Orat. in Vatin. cap. 12. Another writer of the 16th century uses the word in the same sense: 'But yet wold I wish that what so is superfluous or ouermuch, either in the one or in the other, shuld be distributed and erogate, to the help and subuention of the poore members of the body of Christ Jesus.'-Stubbe's Anatomie of Abuses, p. 11, ed. 1595. Patrick, Bishop of Ely, who wrote in 1692 'an Answer to a book intituled The Touchstone of the Reformed Gospel,' in replying to the proposition which affirmed 'that no man can do works of supererogation,' says, 'How should he? when no man can supererogate till he have first erogated. In plainer terms, no man can have anything to spare to bestow upon others (for this they mean by supererogating) till he hath done all that he is bound to do for himself.'-P. 119.

* Καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἔπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. — Ethic. Nicom. lib. iv. cap. 1 (2).

• Κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ ̓ ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἕξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. - Ibid. $ 19. Qui aliis nocent, ut in alios liberales sint, in eâdem sunt injustitiâ, ut si in suam rem alienam convertant. Sunt autem multi, et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriæ, qui eripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur: hique arbitrantur se beneficos in suos amicos visum iri, si locupletent eos quâcumque ratione. Id autem tantum abest officio, ut nihil magis officio possit esse contrarium. Videndum est igitur,

take from many iniustly, and enriche therwith one persone or fewe. For as the same autour saieth, the last precept concerning benefites or rewardes is, to take good hede that he contende nat agayne equitie, ne that he upholde none iniurie.a

Nowe will I procede seriously and in a due forme to speke more particulerly of these thre vertues. Nat withstandinge there is suche affinite bitwene beneficence and liberalitie, beinge always a vertue, that they tende to one conclusion or purpose, that is to saye, with a free and glad wyll to gyue to a nother that thinge which he before lacked."

CHAPTER IX.

Of what excellence beneuolence is.

WHAN I remembre what incomparable goodnes hath euer proceded of this vertue beneuolence, mercifull god, what swete flauour fele I persing my spirites, wherof bothe my soule and body to my thinkinge do conceyue suche recreacion, that it semeth me to be in a paradise, or other semblable place of incomparable delites and pleasures. Firste I beholde the dig

ut eâ liberalitate utamur, quæ prosit amicis, noceat nemini.'-Cic. de Off. lib. i. cap. 14.

'Extremum autem præceptum, in beneficiis operâque dandâ, est ne quid contra æquitatem contendas, ne quid pro injuriâ.’—De Off. lib. ii. cap. 20.

b 'But,' as Dr. Brown says, 'pecuniary aid is only one of many forms of being useful. To correct some error, moral or intellectual-to counsel those who are in doubt, and who in such circumstances require instruction, as the indigent require alms-even though nothing more were in our power to show an interest in the welfare of the happy, and a sincere commiseration of those who are in sorrow; in these, and in innumerable other ways, the benevolent, however scanty may be their means of conferring what alone the world calls benefactions, are not benevolent only, but beneficent; as truly beneficent, or far more so, as those who squander in loose prodigalities to the deserving and the undeserving, the sufferers from their own thoughtless dissipation, or the sufferers from the injustice or dissipation of others, almost as much as they loosely squander on a few hours of their own sensual appetites.'-Lectures on Ethics, p. 263, ed. 1846.

nitie of that vertue, consideringe that god is therby chiefly knowen and honoured both of aungell and man. As contrarie wise the deuill is hated and reproued bothe of god and man for his malice, whiche vice is contrarious and repugnaunt to beneuolence. Wherefore without beneuolence may be no god. For god is all goodnes, all charite, all loue, whiche holy be comprehended in the saide worde beneuolence.c

• Dr. Whewell says, 'We conceive not only Will and Purpose, as residing in God, but also Affections. His creation abounds in Contrivances, which have for their objects, the health, comfort, and enjoyment of his creatures; and nowhere exhibits Contrivances which have, for their object, pain or disease. Hence we conceive God as benevolent towards his creatures.'-El. of Mo. p. 255. Modern philosophers of the school of Kant derive the notion of the supreme benevolence of the Deity from our own moral faculty. Even if we could discover a predominance of benevolence in the creation,' says Mr. Lecky, we should still regard the mingled attributes of nature as a reflex of the mingled attributes of its Contriver. Our knowledge of the Supreme Excellence, our best evidence even of the existence of the Creator, is derived not from the material universe but from our own moral nature.'-Hist. of Europ. Morals, vol. i. p. 57, ed. 1869. And Bentham says, 'It is not from the attributes of the Deity, that an idea is to be had of any qualities in men on the contrary, it is from what we see of the qualities of men, that we obtain the feeble idea we can frame to ourselves, of the attributes of the Deity.' Works, vol. i. p. 273, ed. 1843.

The Patristic notion, however, was that this malice (malitia) was itself the creation of the supreme Being. 'Nonnulli eum (sc. diabolum) non in hanc malitiam libero voluntatis arbitrio esse deflexum, sed in hâc omnino creatum putant, quamvis à Domino Deo summo, et vero naturarum omnium creatore.'-S. Augus tin, tom. iii. col. 439, Migne ed. And Lactantius says, 'Deinde fecit Deus alterum (spiritum) in quo indoles divinæ stirpis non permansit. Itaque suapte invidiâ tamquam veneno infectus est, et ex bono ad malum transcendit.'-Lib. ii. cap. 9. Tertullian ascribes to the Devil, 'et infirmitas et malitia.'-De Oratione, cap. 8. Bishop Butler says, 'Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of Nature to be that of simple absolute benevolence. This, considered as a principle of action and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest possible happiness, without regard to a person's behaviour, otherwise than as such regard would produce higher degrees of it. And supposing this to be the only character of God, veracity and justice in him would be nothing but benevolence conducted by wisdom.' But he goes on to prove that though there may possibly be in the creation beings, to whom the Author of Nature manifests himself under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite absolute benevolence, for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice; yet he manifests himself to us under the character of a righteous governor.'-Anal. of Rel. p. 110, ed. 1852, Bohn's Stand. Lib.

Nowe let us see where any other vertue may be equall in dignitie with this vertue beneuolence, or if any vertue remayneth, where this is excluded. For what commeth of prudence where lacketh beneuolence, but disceite, rauine, auarice and tyranny?b What of fortitude, but bestely crueltie, oppression, and effusion of bloode? What iustice may there be without beneuo

Sir Thomas Elyot anticipates in this passage the opinion held in the eighteenth century by Hutcheson, who is the very founder in modern times of the doctrine of "a moral sense," and who resolved all virtue into benevolence or the pursuit of the happiness of others.'-Lecky's Hist. Eur. Mor. vol. i. p. 4. Dr. Brown says, 'The doctrine of virtue, as consisting in benevolence, false as it is when maintained as universal and exclusive, is yet, when considered as having the sanction of so many enlightened men, a proof at least of the very extensive diffusion of benevolence in the modes of conduct which are denominated virtuous.'-Lectures on Ethics, p. 253.

This is exactly in accordance with the view taken by Bentham three centuries later. 'As to Ethics in general, a man's happiness will depend, in the first place, upon such parts of his behaviour as none but himself are interested in ; in the next place, upon such parts of it as may affect the happiness of those about him. In as far as his happiness depends upon the first mentioned part of his behaviour, it is said to depend upon his duty to himself. Ethics, then, in as far as it is the art of directing a man's actions in this respect, may be termed the art of discharging one's duty to oneself : and the quality which a man manifests by the discharge of this branch of duty (if duty it is to be called), is that of prudence. In as far as his happiness, and that of any other person or persons whose interests are considered, depends upon such parts of his behaviour as may affect the interests of those about him, it may be said to depend upon his duty to others; or to use a phrase now somewhat antiquated, his duty to his neighbour. Ethics, then, in as far as it is the art of directing a man's actions in this respect, may be termed the art of discharging one's duty to one's neighbour. Now the happiness of one's neighbour may be consulted in two ways: I. In a negative way, by forbearing to diminish it. 2. In a positive way by studying to increase it. A man's duty to his neighbour is accordingly partly negative and partly positive; to discharge the negative branch of it is probity, to discharge the positive branch, beneficence.' — Works, vol. i. p. 143.

• A modern philosopher, however, attributes still greater force to the influence of the imagination. Mr. Lecky says, 'There are certain virtues that are the natural product of a cultivated society. Independently of all local and special circumstances, the transition of men from a barbarous or semi-civilised to a highly organised state necessarily brings with it the destruction or abridgment of the legitimate sphere of revenge, by the transfer of the office of punishment from the wronged person to a passionless tribunal appointed by society; a growing substitution of pacific for warlike occupations, the introduction of refined and intellectual tastes, which gradually displace amusements that derive their zest from their bar

lence? Sens the first or chiefe porcion of iustice (as Tulli saieth) is to indomage no man, onelas thou be wrongfully vexed." And what is the cause hereof but equall and entier loue; whiche beinge remoued, or cessing, who endeuoreth nat him selfe to take from a nother al thyng that he coueteth, or for euery thinge that discontenteth him wolde nat forthwith be auenged? Wherby he confoundeth the vertue called temperance, whiche is the moderatrice as well of all motions of the minde, called affectes, as of all actis procedyng of man. Here it sufficiently appereth (as I suppose) of what estimation beneuolence is.

Nowe wyll I, accordynge to myne accustomed maner, endeuore me to recreate the spirites of the diligent reder with some delectable histories, wherin is any noble remembrance of this vertue beneuolence, that the worthinesse therof maye barity, the rapid multiplication of ties of connection between all classes and nations, and above all the strengthening of the imagination by intellectual culture. Hence in a great degree, the tact with which a refined mind learns to discriminate and adapt itself to the most delicate shades of feeling, and hence, too, the sensitive humanity with which, in proportion to their civilisation, men realise and recoil from cruelty.'-Hist. of Europ. Morals, vol. i. pp. 137–139.

This is in accordance with the views of the utilitarian school of philosophy. Thus, Bentham says, 'Justice, in the only sense in which it has a meaning, is an imaginary personage, feigned for the convenience of discourse, whose dictates are the dictates of utility, applied to certain particular cases. Justice, then, is nothing more than an imaginary instrument, employed to forward, on certain occasions and by certain means, the purposes of benevolence. The dictates of justice are nothing more than a part of the dictates of benevolence, which, on certain occasions, are applied to certain subjects; to wit, to certain actions.'—Works, vol. i. p. 58, note, ed. 1843.

Justitiæ primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus injuriâ.'— De Off. lib. i. cap. 7.

Dr. Whewell says, 'The special kinds of benevolent Affection, Gratitude, Compassion, Reverence for Superiors, Filial Affection, Parental Affection, Conjugal Affection, Fraternal Affection, are all Duties. They are Affections in which all men sympathize. They are Natural Affections. Those who have them not, are universally condemned as without natural affection. Such men have not found admission into the Moral School of the Heart. They have not made the first steps towards that Universal Benevolence, which is a Fundamental Moral Principle. Such men must be destitute of that warmth of right affections which the Principle of Earnestness requires. Such men cannot give to the obligations of their station that moral significance which Morality requires. -El. of Morality, p. 101.