rushing on against the great disturber? No.he turned off for Norway. He succeeded in forcing the consent of Denmark; and when was this? Did we forget the months of January, February, and March? Did we remember the doubtfulness of the contest, its fierceness, the rivers of blood that flowed, the anxiety, the imminent hazard; and where was the crown-prince? On the 16th of January he concluded the treaty with Denmark: on the 29th of March he was at Liege. A curious article had appeared in the Liege Gazette of that time. It was worth notice. The crown-prince, a man bred up in the school of Napoleon, was possibly not the most ardent admirer of the liberty of the press. At all events it was not improbable that articles, judging of his conduct, could scarcely find their way into that gazette, without his supervision. It looked perfectly like a demi-official article. Its substance was, that many people were surprised to see the crown-prince, while the allies were plunging into the heart of France, remaining at Liege, and attending balls and public amusements. The surprise might, however, cease when it was known that the prince had expected and expressed his expectation of being called on to send a plenipotentiary to Chatillon, which plenipotentiary was never required; and next, that the Hanseatic legion, which had been raised and disciplined partly by the exertions of the prince, had been withdrawn from his command, and placed under Bulow; that to all his remonstrances no sufficient answer had been given; and that, in consequence, he had determined to take no active part till it was given. Here, said Lord Grey, was a full and fair acknowledgment that he had not done his duty as stipulated to this country. All was settled at length in some way or other; the Swedes were put in motion, and the prince went to Paris. When? On the 16th of April, sixteen days after the battle on the heights of Montmartre, sixteen days after the possession of that city, sixteen days after there was any thing of danger or use to be done; and yet for this he comes to claim the stipulations of Britain for real services? Take the question in another way. Try it round. Look from right to policy. Who could doubt that policy was against the cession of Norway to Sweden? Noble lords had said that Norway must be united with either Sweden or Denmark, and that an union with the former would be better for us than with the latter: but how could this be maintained? Who ever doubted that Sweden naturally looked to France to balance her against Russia; and that the Russian was of all others the most natural, noble, and useful alliance for England. In France the dynasty was changed, and there was undoubtedly the happiest hope of a long and lasting peace with France; but he must be a sanguine politician who did not look to

a possible future difference of prospect. If all BOOK XIII. that he had heard of that country were true, there was still much to be corrected there. He touched CHAP. II. on the topic reluctantly; but if the British 1814. ministers had influence there, they would do well to employ it in recommending a system of mildness, gentleness, and calm and forgiving wisdom. wisdom. He merely touched on this subject: he would now return. Was there no alternative for Norway but to be a dependency of Sweden or Denmark? Was there not independence? Might she not thus be incomparably more beneficial to this kingdom from her commerce, from her naval supplies, from the advantages of her situation, and all exalted by the grand and mighty energy of a people acted on by the spring and impulse of a new-found liberty. We ought, we assuredly ought, to withdraw our active hostility against such a people; we ought to withdraw our blockade. There were some other considerations which he (Lord Grey) had hitherto kept separate. It was said that Norway did not resist, but that Denmark had not observed her stipulations; and that the resistance was that of a faction, nurtured by Denmark. But who would assert that there was a single Danish soldier in all Norway? He was prepared to deny it. In all Norway there was no force but native Norwegians. The garrisons, the posts, the frontiers, all held by Norwegians, who had withdrawn from their allegiance to Denmark, and sworn to die for their country's independence. But there was a Danish faction, or there was not. If only a faction, was it worth while to add the force of England to that of Russia and Sweden, to beat down a faction? If a Danish faction, why not attack Denmark, and force her to abjure it? If a people, was it wise to tell a whole nation that we knew what was good for them better than they did themselves? But the Prince of Norway was presumptive heir of Denmark. Was there no possible arrangement for obviating this? Might not Norway, as the alternative of a choice, be taken as the better half? Equal in population, superior in territorial extent, and from its barrier of mountains and sea infinitely more secure; he (Lord Grey) if the choice were offered to him, would have no hesitation in selecting Norway. The declaration of Sweden was called munificent. Its conduct was like that of the French in Corsica. Its first demand was for the military possession of the country. The Danish government was called despotic; but on the testimony of all travellers the Norwegians seemed to enjoy perfect freedom. But we should be calm, and recollect the great cause of our national pride. We were at this moment exulting in our efforts for the deliverance of Spain. Ferdinand VII. had ceded his rights to Bonaparte. If the Danish king had a right to cede the Norwegians, Ferdinand had a right to give up his

1814.

BOOK XIII. Spaniards. But Ferdinand ceded on compulsion. Did the Danish king yield by his own conCHAP. II. sent? Something had been said of negociation. If such had commenced on any reasonable grounds, his motion would not have come before their lordships, but it was negociation in all the principles of the original injustice-the language of peace with the violence of war." Lord Grey, after enumerating a variety of miscellaneous arguments, concluded by moving an address, entreating that the blockade of Norway by a British force should be raised.

The Earl of Harrowby said, that "the noble lord had certainly exerted those powers of argument and eloquence which he always displayed upon such occasions as he thought fitting, and had taken advantage of a laborious research into every thing that could favor his view of this question. He hoped, however, that he had not so far succeeded with their lordships, but that by a plain practical appeal to their reason and common sense, they might be induced to resist so unusual an interference as was then proposed. The noble lord's distribution of the subject he should follow; though it was not exactly that which he approved. The object of the treaty of Sweden, the wisdom of which treaty was not then the subject of discussion, was to unite the power of Sweden with the common cause of the allies, and to insure to Sweden the acquisition of Norway by cession from Denmark. It was useless to refer minutely to other parts of the treaty. The Emperor of Russia might, if he pleased, engage for the union of Norway to Sweden; his Britannic majesty then agreed, not only to oppose, but to assist Sweden in that object by good offices, or, if necessary, by naval means in concert: but these were to depend on the conduct of Denmark. This was binding, or the treaty null and void. The terms were plain and clear; but the noble lord said, Russia guaranteed and we did not. True, for a simple reason; Russia might do as she pleased, and guarantee perpetually; but it had been the wise policy of this country to avoid that description of guarantee. That difference respecting guaranteeship made little or no difference in the question. The present, the noble lord observed, were not times in which we should sweep away great authorities on the laws of nations. He admitted, that they were useful land-marks and guides, though certainly not to be taken as quite decisive authorities: they were of great advantage in recalling public men to the principles of reason and probity. He could not consent to allow them to be attributed to the pope, unless it were in the same way that moderate and reasonable Roman Catholics allowed it; namely, when he acted with the consent of the universal church. It was like fighting a shadow, to take up the case of Norway as different from that of all other coun

tries; nor could he see any thing decisive in the distinction drawn between patrimonial and other dominions. When actual necessity pressed, the patrimonial sovereign might alienate his dominion; and in other cases, under a similar necessity, might not a sovereign alienate a part of his es tates for the security of the remainder? It was contended, that though a prince might cede parts of his estates, yet the people would have a right to resist such cession. Looking into the books quoted from, he found it stated, that a prince taking a province ceded by treaty, acquired the same rights as his predecessor. He acquired it as it stood, yet on certain grounds he might deprive them of some of their rights and privileges, such as their taking up arms against him. We should find, however, that though we borrowed light from authors on these subjects, general prac tice was our surest guide. Let us look, for instance, to the treaty of Westphalia, and see what great transfers were thereby made. Let us look also to the treaty of Utrecht, where similar circumstances occurred. Were there not provisions of the same kind in the famous partition treaties, and to a much greater extent? A noble lord had been impeached for his share in a partition treaty for injustice, not for the disposing of the Spanish succession, but for having concluded a treaty inconsistent with the provisions of an antecedent

one.

That treaty was much more liable to all the objections now made than the present one was. None of the great men of those days thought simple transfers of dominions so objec tionable. They had been constantly made. Under circumstances of necessity, they had occurred to Naples, to the Italian states, to the Low Countries, and to almost every part of Europe, except the great states. The point was, such a transfer was made in a case that justified it. It had been said in Lord Chatham's time, that America was to be conquered in Germany; so now Norway was gained in Holstein. Had not a sovereign a right in an extreme case to cede part of his dominions for his own safety and general good? According to the doctrines stated, nothing would be sufficient but the complete conquest of a state; this would militate against any peaceable possession of a ceded province: it would prevent the cession of any place most convenient, and fit to be taken.

The calamities of war would thus be extended. There could be no distinction drawn between towns and provinces. He should rather lay down the doctrine, the consequence of which had been shewn by its shortening wars, and preventing unnecessary evils to mankind, that every part was bound to consider the general state of the community, and was under the necessity of yielding to a power, so far successful in war as to require something for its own future safety. He thought this case of states in general just as ne

cessary as the sacrifices of individual liberties were to the general freedom and security of the societies of which they formed a part. There was a total dissimilarity of mind between him and the noble lord, respecting the comparison of the cases of Norway and Spain. Was there any likeness between the Swedish treaty and the conduct of France towards Spain? Compulsion in both it was said: but in all cessions of territory there was compulsion. It was a different matter when a sovereign had no will of his own, but was in a state of confinement. The decided will of the united Spanish people was declared against the fraudulent transfer of the nation to a tyrannical foreign power. Could the case of Spain be compared with a cession made at the end of a war by Denmark, to save herself from destruction? He next noticed what had fallen respecting the number of Swedish troops employed, which were to be 30,000. We had received no constant accounts of their employment from a British officer on the spot; but that was not provided for in the treaty (whether wisely or not was not the question), though it had been so in our other subsidy treaties with continental powers. If, from circumstances, the numbers were not always exactly kept up, there were very good reasons against a disposition to cavil. Had we entered into agreements with foreign powers in such a spirit, those great events might not yet have been accomplished, in which we had borne so large and so glorious a share. As to the services of Sweden, it was sufficient for him to know their utility in the north of Germany, and the spirit excited there by the conduct of the princeroyal. But for this advantage, and the certainty that the allies had a strong force to the north of the enemy's armies, circumstances might have occurred which would put us now in the situation of considering how to maintain our existence as a nation. The Swedish movements after the battle of Leipsic were with the concurrence of Russia. In a view of policy, it was wise to keep as many powers as possible independent of France. See ing that the alliance with Sweden was just, wise, and that the general concert had succeeded beyond hope, this was not a time to step out of the straight forward course of national honor. The people of Norway, during the war, never came to us to ask our assistance to preserve their neutrality; but they co-operated with Deumark, which had now given them up. According to certain doctrines, a sovereign might cede a province which he could not keep; and then that province might start up into a state. A country might be cut up into twenty pieces, and each part start up with a head and a tail as an independent body. The presumptive heir to the crown had gone to Norway, and endeavoured to set up a state after the king had ceded it. The Danish civil officers

CHAP. 11.

1814.

had been ordered to return. There was reason BOOK XIII. to think that the liberal terms of Sweden had been studiously concealed from the Norwegians. As to the condition of the Norwegians by the transfer, was there no difference in a transfer from a free to a despotic, and from a despotic to a free constitution? It was a satisfaction that instead of imposing hardships on Norway, the contrary was the fact. The King of Sweden offered Norway freedom. He lamented, under all the pleasing and glorious circumstances of the time, that there should be even this single voice of complaint to disturb the general joy, and that, too, upon the transfer of Norway from an absolute, though mildly-administered government, to a free and representative constitution.

Lord Grenville had heard with great pleasure, on a former night, that dissussions were carrying on between his majesty's ministers and the allied powers upon this most important subject. He had hoped that the object and result of those discussions would have been, to accomplish what he believed was the general wish of this country. He had hoped that his majesty's ministers would have dissuaded other powers from the horrible injustice of submitting the virtuous and unoffending people of Norway to the domination of a power not only hostile at the present moment, but to a power which, in all periods of the history of Europe, had been the unremitting enemy of Norway. The hostile disposition that had prevailed between some other nations of Europe, such as between Spain and Portugal, or between this country and France, was nothing equal to the spirit of hostility which had subsisted for many ages between Sweden and Norway. Having hoped that the ministers of this country would have been able to prevent this cruelty and injustice, he was miserably disappointed this night on hearing some things which had fallen from his noble friend (Lord Harrowby), and at the silence, still more eloquent and expressive which he preserved, as to some most important questions put to him by his noble friend (Earl Grey). He found now, that the point at which the exertions of this country was directed, was to compel the submission of Norway by a blockade, that would occasion famine. Was this the first use which we made of our successes, and of our newly-established influence in Europe? Were we now to adopt the new-fangled doctrine, that considerations of utility were to supersede all moral rights and the established law of nations? If the noble lord bad wished to sanction and screen all the injustice which has been committed by France for the last twenty-five years, he could not take a more effectual course than by adopting that new-fangled principle, that all questions of moral right could be considered by the pretence of utility, to be judged of only by the power

ther Sweden had fulfilled her engagements to the satisfaction of this country? If she had not, she had no right to claim our interference. Norway must either be considered as a part of the kingdoms of Denmark or Sweden, or else as an independent nation. If it was considered a part of Denmark, we were at peace with that power: if an independent nation, she had given us no cause of offence; and if she was to be considered as a part of Sweden, it was a strange employment of the navy of this country to be sent to chastise the rebels of Sweden. In fact, the argument lay upon the construction of a treaty in a case not at all contemplated by those who made the treaty. The resistance of Norway was not a case at all contemplated; it was only on the part of Denmark that the resistance was apprehended. Denmark, however, had fulfilled all the terms of the treaty. Although he never could admit that the question of mere policy should be set up against a clear moral right, yet he would contend, that even in policy it was the interest of this country rather to protect Norway. It had been always conceived of great importance, especially in a maritime point of view, that there should be a balance of power in the north of Europe: and it would be dangerous to that interest, if the whole of the supply of the materials for our navy was to be derived from one nation, and that, too, a nation that must be supposed to have a natural bias to France. Sweden had always rather a leaning to France for support against Russia; and it might well be supposed that, in future times, the same bias would return. He believed that the wickedness that this country was called upon to assist in, would be prejudicial to its interests; and, therefore, be heartily concurred in the motion of his noble friend, which would give time to his majesty's ministers to consider, whether it was not possible still, by amicable discussions, to avert the injustice and the miseries with which Norway was now threatened.

The Earl of Liverpool said, that the question in the first place was how far the cession of Norway was justified by the law of the nations; and, in the second place, how far we were bound to enforce it, as the ally of Sweden. If all the principles of the noble earl (Grey) were true in themselves, still he should contend that in the present case they did not apply; and that the house would not be justified in voting the address. The facts attending the cession were as follow: A part of the troops commanded by the Prince of Sweden had taken possession of Holstein, and threatened Jutland; and, in order to recover Holstein and to save Jutland, Denmark consented to give up Norway. But though Denmark recovered Holstein, still Sweden did not enter into possession of Norway, and was not to receive possession of it till the conclusion of a peace. These facts it was

Great Britain was a party. Sweden made a sa- BOOK XIII. crifice de facto to obtain Norway. The noble earl had stated, that though a government might cede CHAP. H. a part of its dominions, yet it was optional in the part so ceded to receive its new master. But 1814. every treaty of peace that had ever been concluded was made in the belief that a country might cede a part of its territories to save the rest; though he admitted that such a proposition was not to be universally adopted, and that a case might occur in which a country had a right to refuse a new master. No sovereign could concede rights which he did not possess himself, uor without an adequate necessity. The history of all negotiations consisted in determining what degree of cession was to be made by a weak, and of restitution by a strong, power. The King of Denmark had ceded no rights which he did not possess himself, as he was the most absolute inonarch in Europe, in consequence of the voluntary act of the nation. No doubt could exist as to the power and right of the King of Deumark to make the cession, nor that an adequate necessity existed; as, with the exception of Zealand and Norway, the whole of the dominions of Denmark was in the power of the enemy. The cession was also honorable to the country ceded, as every boon was proffered by its new sovereign. Instead of an absolute, a limited form of government was to be introduced, and the exclusion of the nation from places of trust and profit to be done away. If the principle of cession were to be at all maintained, no case of less grievance could arise from the exercise of it. But it was alleged that the Norwegians were averse to any incorporation with Sweden, and that they should not be compelled to form an union to which they were rootedly averse. To the general principle he assented; but it should be recollected that for eight years Norway had done us all the mischief in her power; that her harbours had afforded refuge to the ships of the enemy, by which our trade had been grievously harassed. During the whole of the war, Norway had made a common cause with Denmark against us, and now had no right toconvert herself into an independent state to disappoint our designs and those of our allies. It was necessary for the argument of the noble earl (Grey) to prove, that the indisposition on the part of the Norwegians was the free and spontaneous will of the nation, and not created by foreign influence. The King of Denmark had lately sent over, as regent to Norway, the heir of his crown, and had afterwards ceded Norway to Sweden on certain conditions, which conditions had been punctually fulfilled. The heir of the crown of Denmark had proclaimed the independence of Norway, styling himself Prince of Denmark and Regent of Norway, and proposing to treat with foreign powers. Was Denmark a