Among the circumstances preceding the above convention, it was stated, that the commandant of Frederickstadt gave up his fortress without firing a shot; that two generals behaved so ill, that they were cashiered; but that the commandant of Frederickstein, General Ohme, had declared, that he would defend himself to the last extremity; and that Colonel Kreds had assembled about 10,000 peasants near Kongswinger with the intention of falling upon the rear of the Swedish army. But this would have been a fruitless at tempt against such regular troops as the Swedes, and such a general as the crown-prince. It is probable, that if the war had been protracted by drawing it to the northern parts of the kingdom, the blockade of the ports would have involved those sterile regions in the miseries of famine. The people of Britain, who from their constitution, their habits, and feelings, are much disposed to sympathize with all attempts made by the people of any country to gain or retain their independence, and generally to express their sentiments fearlessly and openly, not only on their own affairs, but also on the affairs of all other nations, could not be silent on the subject of Norway, as soon as it was known that the allied powers were determined to support the claims of the crown-prince upon Norway, and the case which they made out was a strong one. It was contended that it was tyrannical, and in the very teeth of the professions of the allied sovereigns, to compel the Norwegians to submit to a power which they detested; that Bonaparte could have done nothing worse; and that it was particularly unworthy of Great Britain, and disgraceful to her, to co-operate in this attempt to force a sove. reign on the Norwegians, especially by blockading the ports, and thus starving them into submission. They asked what was the leading principle of the British constitution; on what account did we hold ourselves out as the envy and admration of the world? Was it not because, according to our constitution, the consent of the people is necessary to the legitimacy of any government? Had not our ancestors bled to defend this principle? Had not we taken up arms against Bonaparte, because he had enslaved Europe, by forcing it under his dominion? and would we now give the lie, not only to our ancestors, but also to our own recent conduct, by joining in the league against the people of Norway? In this case, there could be no doubt what was the wish of the Norwegians; they had expressed that wish unanimously from themselves: and what was the character of the people whom we joined in oppressing? Perhaps more like our own than any other nation in Europe: or rather like what our ances tors were, when they fought and bled in defence of those blessings which we now enjoyed? The Norwegians were simple, without guile, manly, determined and brave: and would we put a yoke upon such a people? Had Britain and the allied sovereigns so soon forgot that they had been fighting for the liberties of Europe? Had they so soon forgotten the charges which they brought against Bonaparte? Had Britain, in particular, forgotten the reasons which induced her to aid the Spaniards? Had not they, like the Norwe gians, been transferred by their sovereign to a foreigner, whose yoke they detested? Had we not applauded them for their resistance? Had we not assisted them in throwing it off? Did we not take credit to ourselves for our conduct on this occasion? Had then our conduct been wrong? Ought we rather to have joined in subduing the people of Spain to the yoke of Bonaparte? Or did we make a distinction between the same actions, when committed by Bonaparte, and when committed by any other person? Or was the charge against us true, that we assisted the Spaniards because it was our interest to assist them? The case of the Norwegians appeared so strong, and so worthy of sympathy, that even ministers in parliament seemed to lament the treaty by which the allies had bound themselves to secure Norway to Sweden. As this treaty, to which Britain was a party existed, it was necessary to see it carried into execution. On the ground of this treaty, therefore, and on the further ground of the peace between Denmark and Sweden, by which the former agreed to give up Norway to the latter, the attempt to subdue the Norwegians was justified. It must be admitted, that the allies derived great advantage from the services of the crownprince; and, indeed, there is reason to believe that if it had not have been for his powerful assistance in the battles of Gross-beeren, Dennewitz, and Leipsic, Bonaparte would have succeeded in overpowering the allies. But after the battle of Leipsic he did nothing but attend to his own interest. Even after he had forced Denmark to make a peace, he did not unite with the allies in their invasion of France; and though it was repeatedly reported that he was on his march to attack France on the side of the Netherlands, he never made his appearance. Still it may be alleged, if the allies were satisfied with his conduct, they were bound to reward him as they had promised and bound themselves to do. But had they a right to promise and bind themselves to reward him by giving him a country, the inhabitants of which were averse to his rule? Ought they not to have made this a condition of their promise, that it should bind them only if the Norwegians were not averse to the union of their country with Sweden? Great Britain was placed in a still more objectionable predicament. Her ministry confessed they were sorry that Norway had been pledged to Sweden. Why were they sorry? Because they thought it wrong to force a sovereign on a people against their will. But could the promise be binding if it were wrong? It may be very proper that, if an individual makes a promise, he should be bound to keep it, even though it turn out that by so doing he will injure himself in a manner he did not anticipate. The case, however, must be different where a third party is concerned; there can be no morality; but there must be the greatest injustice in performing a promise which will injure them. There was, indeed, in the case of Great Britain, a choice of paths, both of which led to what was wrong: if she refused to assist in placing Norway under the Swedes, she broke her obligation to Sweden; if she actually did assist, she was instrumental in doing the highest injustice to a nation which it can suffer, by destroying its independence, and forcing a government upon it to which it was a verse. There was also another consideration which applied peculiarly to the part which Britain was called upon to take in the contest against Norway, if she actually embarked in it. We have before observed, that Norway was assailable by famine, and that famine must unavoidably follow if her ports were blockaded. By a reference to the first chapter of this book, it will be seen, that previous to the commencement of hostilities by land, the ports of Norway were blockaded by a British fleet, and can any thing more aggravate the injustice of an unjust war, than such a mean and cruel way of carrying it on? We had the honor of co-operating in the subjection of Norway to Sweden, by starving its virtuous and nobleminded people! And this too we did, notwithstanding the Norwegians looked up to us, as bearing the character of a free people, and as the defenders and friends of liberty, for assistance, and, as we mentioned before, sent deputies to this country. But while the deputies of the ignorant and bigoted Spaniards, who, it is now evident, resisted Bonaparte, not so much from any real notion of liberty, but because he was a foreigner, and an enemy to their priests, were received and treated in the kindest manner; the deputies of enlightened and consistent lovers of liberty, were dismissed without notice. There is, however, another point of view in which this question ought to be considered. It was contended that, as the King of Denmark gave up Norway formally, by treaty, to Sweden, the Norwegians had no right to offer any resistance to the transfer of themselves; and that, if they had a right, no treaty of peace could ever be carried into execution since the inhabitants of the ceded territory might always avail themselves of this right, and oppose the cession. There is certainly much plausibility in this argument, as upon a general question; but it does not apply to the case of Norway. By the very words of the treaty of peace between Sweden and Denmark, Norway is declared to be an independent kingdom,-attached to Denmark certainly, but not subject to it; and, therefore, the King of Denmark could have no right, according to the usages of nations, to give it away to Sweden without consulting the inhabitants. Let us put a case in which Great Britain was concerned: and suppose that, in consequence of the success of an invading enemy, part of England was conquered, and that, as the price of peace, the king consented to give up Scotland to the enemy; would the people of Scotland consider that they could thus be transferred. Would they not declare that Scotland constituted an independent kingdom, united to England certainly, but not subject to her; and, therefore, that the people of Scotland alone could cede themselves to a foreign power? Would they not have still greater reason for complaint and indignation, that they, who had not been conquered, were sacrificed, in order to preserve part of England, which had been conquered.. And was not this exactly the case with respect to Norway. Part of Denmark had been overrun by the Swedes; Norway was untouched, and yet Norway was given up to save Denmark.. But it was said Norway supported the King of Denmark in his attachment to Bonaparte, and in his enmity to England. Let us consider the latter first: we do not mean here to canvass the justice of the expedition against Copenhagen in 1807; but can we as men, and as Britons, be surprised or angry at the Danes and Norwegians, if, after we had burnt their capital, and carried away their ships, in the time of peace, they felt towards us the bitterest of enemies? A regular war isfrequently carried on between two powers, without the mass of the people feeling much antipathy against each other. But it must be different where a country is invaded; where the people are witnesses of the ravages of the enemy; where they perhaps see their dearest relatives and friends killed under their eyes. Feelings of hatred, wishes for vengeance, must then fill their hearts; and of BOOK XIII CHAP. III. 1814. CHAP. III. 1814. BOOK XIII. takes place in time of peace! We must not therefore be surprised that the Danes and Norwegians did not look on the people or government of Britain as their friends, after the bombardment of Copenhagen. Their throwing themselves into the arms of Bonaparte, was almost a necessary and natural consequence; they hated Britain, and therefore they joined themselves with the man who also hated her. Their hatred for this country was so overwhelming, had such full and powerful possession of their minds, that it blinded them to the tyranny of Bonaparte; and they ran the very great risk of being subjected by him, in order to have the very small chance of seeing Britain injured. It may be said, that this was very foolish, and very wrong. It was so ; but who drove them into this conduct? Should not we therefore have been the last to have made them suffer for that attachment to Bonaparte, into which we had forced them? There is only one other point of view in which we wish to consider this subject: it was contended that the Norwegians were their own enemies in resisting the union of their country with Sweden; that their independence, rights, and privileges were all secured to them by that country, and guaranteed by the allies; that, therefore, in this respect they would be as well off as they had been under Denmark, while, lying contiguous to Sweden, they would enjoy many advantages of a commercial nature to which they were before strangers. All this might be very true; but the Norwegians did not think so: and it is certainly a first principle, and an essential element in the code of liberty, that the people themselves should be the judges of what government they wish to live under: they may make a bad choice, they may refuse a kind of government which would have increased their liberties and happiness. But liberty and happiness as soon as they are compulsory cease to be so; and if it were once admitted, that any other but the people themselves should judge of the government they wish to live under, under the pretext that their choice is a bad one for themselves, the door is opened for the worst of tyranny; and we might now invade Spain for the purpose of setting aside Ferdinand, with as much justice as we before assisted the Spaniards in delivering themselves from the yoke of Bona-. parte. In the case of Norway, the people ought to have been convinced of the benefit which would result to them from a union with Sweden, and not compelled to submit to that nation. We will acknowledge, indeed, that the Swedes, during the short time the war lasted, did every thing in their power to conciliate the Norwegians; they levied no contributions; and as the country was suffering grievously for want of corn, the inhabitants of those parts of the country which they had conquered, were liberally supplied with provisions. The prisoners also, which fell into their hands, were well fed, and afterwards sent back to their homes. The Norwegians having been unsuccessful in their efforts to maintain their independence, Prince Christian issued the following proclamation to them on the 16th of August : 66 Norwegians! When upon the dissolution of your union with Denmark, we took upon ourselves the direction of the affairs of Norway, it was to prevent your beloved country from being torn to pieces by civil war and faction. Your wishes called us to the throne of Norway. We obeyed the call. Your confidence and your good cause demanded our participation. We resolved to make every personal sacrifice in order to secure to you those benefits. "It is true we were aware of the dangers which threatened your hopes and our's in such an unequal contest, but we could not possibly conceive that the most powerful states of Europe would combine to oppose a noble and innocent people, whose reasonable wish was liberty, and whose only desire was independence. Meanwhile, Sweden's powerful allies informed us, by their envoys, that the union with Sweden was irrevocably determined on. It is known to you that we were willing to sacrifice our personal happy situation, if the great assembly of the nation should find it conducive to the happiness of the country; but you likewise know the conditions on which an armistice was at that time offered, were such that we could not accede to them, till the fortune of war had been tried, because they were contrary to the fundamental laws. We saw with regret that our sincere endeavours to avoid a war in the North were fruitless. "The extensive frontiers and sea-coast of Norway made it necessary to divide the troops. Sweden made great exertions to arm at different points, and in the uncertainty on what part of the kingdom the attack might be expected, from which we could cover the interior provinces of the kingdom, and at the same time hasten to the assistance of such points as were threatened or attacked, in all these respects Glommen seemed to present the most advantages. "On being informed of the enemy's invasion by Ide, Sletten, and Swinesund, we hastened to collect a corps at Rackstadt, in order, by an attack. from that side, to stop the further progress of the enemy; but the unexpected surrender of Frederickstadt obliged us to take a position on the Glommen, the enemy having obtained a secure passage, so that the road to Christiania might be forced. "The enemy being superior at sea, bad it in his power, by frequent landings, to turn our right flauk.-A long blockade by the English and Swedish naval force had hindered us from furnishing our magazines in a sufficient manner: they were nearly exhausted, and want of the first necessaries threatened to break that courage which the superior force of the enemy could not bend. The deputies from the diet were not received by the English ministry, and therefore returned without any hope of assistance or a relaxation of the inimical measures of that kingdom. Under these circumstances, Sweden proposed an armistice. Of the two fortresses, the occupation of which by Swedish troops had been refused by the negociations that were broken off, one was already in their hands, and the other cut off from all relief and bombarded. The fortune of war had declared against us, and the continuation of the contest would in such circumstances have led only to the total ruin of our country. To prevent this, and to give the nation an opportunity of learning the condition of the kingdom by a meeting of the diet, we repeated our offer of voluntarily retiring from that happy situation to which your confidence had called us. "The armistice and convention of the 14th instant were signed: and, in consequence thereof, we have, by our rescript of this day, directed to the chief magistrates, caused our extraordinary diet to be summoned to meet at Christiania, on Friday, the 7th of October, this year. "Beloved people of Norway, only imperious necessity-this you cannot doubt-could have induced us to take a step which your attachment to us renders doubly painful. Our desire was to deserve your love-our comfort is the conviction of your sentiments, and the consciousness that your welfare was the object of all our actions. "Given at Moss, Aug. 16, 1814, under our hand and the seal of the kingdom. (L. S.) "CHRISTIAN Frederick. VON HOLTEN." Although it was evident that the Danish prince had not given up the cause of Norwegian independence until its maintenance was placed beyond all human probability, there was still the remnant of a party which, in the disappointment of their eager hopes, regarded the termination of the contest as the result of perfidy. Some persons, who in the Swedish account are qualified as "professing the principles of jacobinism," excited, on the 19th, a popular tumult in Christiania, in which the house of General Haxthausen, the friend and confidant of Prince Christian, was attacked, and its windows and furniture destroyed. The general being at that time at his country-house, the mob pursued him thither, and his life was saved only by the speedy arrival of a body of Norwegian cavalry. The crown-prince, informed of this circumstance, intimated to the council of state at Christiania, BOOK XIII. that if they did not possess sufficient authority to preserve the public tranquillity, he should be CHAP. III. obliged to order his troops to pass the line of demarkation in order to protect the peaceable inhabitants of the capital. Haxthausen, it appears, was charged with having suffered the Norwegian army to be three days without provisions. The diet of Norway met at Christiania on the 8th of October, when Prince Christian, whose health and spirits had been affected by the mortifications he had undergone, sent in his resignation. On the next day, his royal highness set out for Lauwig, accompanied by General Haxthausen and several others of the late ruling members, who would not quit him. Although a British sloop of war was in waiting to convey him wherever he pleased, he refused the offer, and embarked in a Danish cutter. He declared that he would not go to Copenhagen, but would be landed at Sanderberg in the Belt; and thus terminated his short-lived royalty. On the 20th of October the diet, by a majority of seventy-four voices to five, came to the following resolution: «Norway shall, as an integral state, be united to Sweden under one king, with the preservation of its constitution, subject to such necessary alterations as the welfare of the country may require, having at the same time regard to the union with Sweden. These alterations, which his Swedish majesty has recognized in the convention of Moss, are to be considered and determined on by the diet as speedily as possible; and as soon as this has been done, the diet will solemnly elect and acknowledge the King of Sweden, his majesty Charles XIII, as the constitutional King of Norway." This resolution was made public in the following proclamation of the representatives of Norway to their countrymen:-- "The representatives of Norway assembled according to the royal proclamation, founded on the convention entered into at Moss. By this convention they were made acquainted with the principal object for the diet's consideration. That the situation of the country generally was precarious, and that its power of resistance was much weakened by the armistice which had been concluded, with this they were acquainted before they left their homes; but, as Norwegians, they did not doubt, that if an honorable peace could not be obtained, they would still find means to assert the honor and liberty of the country, under the guidance of a king who had been chosen by the Norwegian people, and to whom the oath of fidelity had been taken. "The illness of King Christian Frederick,which, for a length of time, had made the Norwegian nation uneasy, did partly continue. The king could not open the diet in person. From the 1814. CHAP. III. 1814. BOOK XII. speech which his majesty caused to be delivered by his privy-council, was perceived, not only the uncertain internal situation of the country, but the mournful certainty was obtained, that Norway could expect no assistance from the powerful states of Europe, and that these persevered in their alliance with Sweden. It also learnt, that our beloved king, with the same affection for the Norwegian nation which formerly determined his majesty to place himself at the head of the people, had now offered the sacrifice of consenting to abdicate the crown, as this was the only condition on which an armistice could be obtained, which had become necessary in order to save the army and a great part of the country. "The king issued the day following the act by which for himself and his heirs he abdicates the crown of Norway, without any reserve; after which his majesty departed the same evening. "The liberty, honor, and independence of Norway were the objects the diet had to labour for. If this end could be obtained by a renewed combat; if the means and resources of the country were adequate for conducting a war, perhaps a protracted one, against a superior enemy, who had already acquired considerable advantages; if there was a sufficient hope for the fortunate result of the contest to sanction the exposing a great part of the country to the calamities of war; if, after the greatest success, it could be expected that the frontier might still be defended, and peace on the ocean, so necessary to Norway, be obtained; or if the liberty and independence of the people could be secured through an honorable union with Sweden, protected by the maintenance of the constitution of Norway;-these were the important questions which the diet had to decide on. "The assembly followed the dictates of its duty by endeavouring to obtain better information of the real situation of the country, as well with regard to the departments of war and the commissariat, as to its finances. "Commissioners from his Swedish majesty made proposals of changes in the constitution, which they considered as necessary for the union with Sweden. That these proposals will be modified and fixed so as to make them compatible with the liberty and honor of Norway under the union, of this the convention of Moss is the guarantee. "The hour in which a resolution was to be taken had arrived. After the maturest deliberation, animated by an equal zeal for the honor of Norway, and for its peace, with a view to the spirit which the representatives of Norway in every district knew to prevail,-and not unmindful of the political and economical advantages which an union with Sweden may procure for Norway, the diet has yesterday taken the fol 66 Countrymen! the representatives of Norway, honored by your confidence with the high calling they are fulfilling, are assured your approbation will reward their exertions; that you, with a disposition which is natural to Norwegians, will receive their determinations; and that you partici pate with them in the hope, that an honorable union with a neighbouring country will contribute to the welfare of old Norway, which was ever free and independent. "Christiania, in Norway, extraordinary diet, the 21st of October, 1814. "In behalf of all the representatives, On the following day, the commissioners of the King of Sweden proceeded to the diet, to express on the part of his majesty their satisfaction at the result of its deliberations. "The ever-memorable day (said they) has at length arrived, which must terminate the ancient enmities of the North, and open a new era of tranquillity, of glory, and happiness. Norwegians and Swedes have thrown aside the arms which they lately directed against each other; and on those mountains which formed a hostile frontier, they are about to raise a trophy consecrated to concord, and to the new fraternal alliance of the two nations. There they will ab jure the errors of prejudice, the delicate recollections of the past; and will promise each other union in counsels, union in dangers, mutual at tachment, and unconquerable courage against oppression. From thence will they proclaim that they aspire to no other glory but that of living independent amidst their mountains, and that the pole and the sea are at once the boundaries of their territory and of their hopes. In the name of the king, then, and of his successor; in the name of our common country, we convey to you, gentlemen, the united expression of their satisfac tion. May providence, who watched over the North, while the destinies of calamity swept over the rest of Europe, bless the moment when two nations of the same origin, similar in character, and animated with equal love of liberty, seek, under the sway of the same king, a permanent guarantee of their respective rights. We have seen from your resolution how important you yourselves consider it, to discuss and promptly to decide upon the alterations which the king has projected in the constitution. We join you in the same wish to finish this great work with the least possible delay, that nothing may retard the |