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CHAP. XI.

1815.

BOOK XII. never made: it not only contains the seeds of future war, but is altogether incompatible with the true interests of the mother-country and her dependencies. This country is by that event cajoled of the right and power to secure from invasion, provinces of incalculable value; the naturally strong situations of Canada is rendered of little avail; while, together with the Indian tribes on Lake Superior, she is left to the mercy of an inveterate enemy, who is growing stronger every day: and if Canada fall in a future contest, the British nation must attach the blame entirely to the blindness and negligence equally conspicuous in the conduct of the late war, and in yielding to the enemy's politics in concluding a treaty of peace. Our power and resources should have been fully exerted, until the enemy, unable to prolong the contest, consented to sue for peace, offering to deliver into the victor's hands, indemnity for the past, and pledges of security for the future. But the golden opportunity has been thrown away, of forcing our inveterate enemy to make those sacrifices and concessions, which would have taught her a severe but just lesson of humility.

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It is unfortunately too easy to analyze the causes that operated to produce this baneful treaty. It is evident that not only, the nation at large, but its rulers in particular, are void of perception, as to the real character of the Americans!: Principles of humanity and forbearance, arising from mistaken feelings of consanguinity, have repressed our military ardour throughout the late war. The same generous motives have also guided the councils of the nation in the conclusion of peace. America will, be so elated, as to assume in future a more lofty tone, and from a conviction of her imagined superiority, force a quarrel on the slightest grounds. The proposition stated by Mr. Madison in his declaration of war, that, nation jealous of its rights, and conscious of its strength, has no alternative but to exert the one in defence of the other," was at that time deserted from by the federalists, who much doubted this "conscious strength," and asserted that their seaports, and whole line of coast,. had no dependence but on British clemency and magnanimity. But in consequence of continued trains of brilliant exploits having in some measure concealed the national weakness, vanity will overcome their better judgment; they will conceive the idea of having compelled Britain to sign this peace, and hence a conviction of the power to declare war, combined with the desire of further esta blishing the national character, which has already gained so much, will make hostilities popular, even with the federal party. And after preparing means of defence and aggression, to which it will apply itself with the utmost promp. titude, the republic will rather court than decline

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a war: ambition being a most predominant feature in the American character, in no respect qualified by any principle of morality, or regard for the law of nations.

The dangerous and destructive principles of French policy are well understood, and suitable precautions are adopted. When Bonaparte's ambition was apparent, the allies declared they could not treat with. him, nor with any of his family. And if no peace with him could be regarded as permanent,. so, by parity of reason, must that just concluded with the United States be received in the same light.

Should the peace be defended on the ground of manufacturing and commercial advantage, let those who contemplated such a result consider the hostile measures of the American government, who, as soon as peace was proclaimed, imposed a new tariff of duties on foreign merchandize and manufactures, which doubles those previously existing,. and amounts almost to a total prohibition of importation..

With regard to commissioners, is it not sure prising that this country could not appoint men thoroughly acquainted with American affairs? No doubt Lord Gambier, and his worthy coadjutors, acted from the dictates of honor and benevolence; but were they competent to the task of negoci ating with such shrewd, not to say subtle men, as Bayard and Galatin? for, as in the treaty of 1783, so in the present instance, the British delegates have been foiled: by American sophistry.. It is much to be regretted, that some native of the provinces was not added. to the list of British negociators, as many gentlemen of superior talents might have been readily obtained. from either of the colonies. Our interests would then have been ascertained, and as certainly defended. Ignorance, and not conscious weakness, swayed our councils in the signature of the treaty. The spirit of that part of it, at least, which relates to the boundaries, is founded on the American claims, established by, the treaty of 1783. The arrangements made on the late occasion, relate to surveying this frontier, and ascertaining with precision its exact geographical limits, in order to prevent disputes in future. In ordinary cases this would be just and equitable on both sides; but it must be recollected, that although disputes had arisen on this subject, it was not even a collateral cause of the war on the contrary, the United States commenced hostilities for the real, though concealed, purpose of wresting Canada from Great Britain altogether.. It was this circumstance alone that produced the war-vate in Congress; and therefore sanctioned a departure from terms of reciprocity, and the enforcement of measures necessary to the security and repose of those provinces, against which the enemy's force was directed. The

ostensible motives assigned by the American government for the declaration of war, such as the establishment of sailors' rights and a free trade, &c. were rather political engines, employed to gain popularity, than real cause of hostility. Subjects calculated to inflame the public mind were forced into notice, and commented on with the utmost malignity and virulence; false statements, and even palpable absurdities, were assiduously propagated, both by newspapers and various other means and it is a fact, worthy the serious consideration of Britons, because it developes, in some measure, the deadly rancour of the ruling party, and the dangerous principles of American policy, that these injurious comments and assertions were intended to shake the loyalty of British seamen, whom they designedly hold up as being at present no better than degraded slaves.

Is it not then surprising, that the litigated questions have not been set at rest by an express article in the treaty, where not a word is said respecting the right of search and impressment, points which affect the vital interests of Britain, and that ought to have been made the basis of the whole; while some objects of comparatively insignificant importance are carefully inserted! It is understood, that a secret article of the treaty exists, by which the above questions are decided? If so, all may be well: but if the questions are waived, generally and verbally, by the respective plenipotentiaries, without a written document, what pledge can this country have from such vague proceedings, that they will not again disturb the repose of both nations?

It may be asked, was this a subject proper for the decision of a friendly power?-such a measure being contemplated by the Americans prior to the appointment of commissioners, with assurance of an issue favorable to the states, since it was well known there existed not one friendly power, who in this particular was not biassed against Great Britain. In this it appears American policy was foiled; but the adverse decision of an umpire would hardly have had a worse effect than the adopted mode of a tacit connivance, or mutual evasion. And notwithstanding what may have been pretended by the American plenipotentiaries, many are clearly of opinion, that the old ground will be again taken by the people of the states; and that by omitting to make the decision of the contested rights a prominent article in the treaty of Ghent, this c untry has given America an opportunity to insinuate, that these indisputably belong to her. This opinion will be fostered with care, till the smothered flame rekindles, and flags bearing political mottos are again displayed on the

ocean.

We now proceed to examine the Canadian frontier, most exposed to the ill effects of this degrading treaty. The Americans well knew the

1815.

advantages they possessed, improved the oppor- BOOK XIII. tunity, and established numerous settlements, at points most calculated to annoy the British, in case of war. Detroit, Ogdensburgh, Sacketts Harbour, Oswego, Plattsburgh, Blackrock, and Buffalo, all attracted notice during the late contest; and the advantages which the enemy gained over our fleets, may be primarily attributed to their possessing those places. But there are many other important out-posts, which have as yet remained unnoticed, affording the Americans either peculiar facilities for aggression, or for the maintenance of a superior navy on the lakes and waters of Canada. Cape St. Vincent, situated at the debouchure of Lake Ontario, threatens to cut off the communications between that lake and the river St. Lawrence. Kingston Ferry, in its vicinity, Chaumont, Bromville, Waterton, Henderson, Ellisborough, and Mexico, all near the mouth of the lake, may be powerfully employed for the same purpose. Michillimackinac, in the narrows between Lakes Huron and Michigan, equally guards both, and prevents all communica tion from one to the other. Fort St. Joseph, on the river of the same name, which flows into Lake Michigan, affords security for the building of vessels; Miami Bay, Sandusky, and Cunningham Islands, with several capes along the streights of Erie, obstruct the passage from Lake St. Clair to Lake Erie. The Miami river, flowing through Indiana, gives facility to an irruption from that part of the United States territory given to the soldiery. Detroit is well situated, either to command Lake St. Clair, and the water communications between that lake and Erie, or to make an incursion into Essex, against the posts of Sandwich, Amherstburgh, and Malden; and Fort St. Clair commands the river of that name, running from Lake St. Clair to Lake Huron. In the river St. Lawrence, abundance of stations, either are or may be taken up, for the purpose of destroying the small craft employed thereon, and cutting off all communication between Montreal and the Upper Province, St. Regis, Massena, Louisville, Madrid, Ogdensburgh, Morriston, Oswegatche, and Alexandria, with several islands affording either strong military positions, or posts of annoyance.

On Lake Champlain, are Champlain to guard the entrance, Plattsburgh, Peru, Wilsborough, Crown Point, Ticonderago, Skeensborough, Fairhaven, Benson, Orwell, Bridport, Burlington, &c. while the British have only, to defend the water communication, Forts Chambly and William Henry; the former about midway, the latter at the confluence with the St. Lawrence.

On an attentive perusal of the above summary, and examination of the map, it will be clearly seen, that Canada can never be really safe, while the United States possess these frontiers, founded

BOOK XIII. on the treaty of 1783, and guaranteed by the late disgraceful one at Ghent, It will also be appaCHAP. XI. rent, that the American territories of Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana, are most advantageously 1815. situated to command Lakes Superior, Michigan, Huron, and Erie; while Lake Ontario and the river St. Lawrence, running from thence three parts of the way to Montreal, are completely lined with settlements and ports which tempt the enemy to make incursions, and render it almost impossible, in the present state of the two frontiers, to guard sufficiently against them. It would be easy for an enemy, holding Sacketts Harbour, Ogdensburg, and St. Regis, to descend upon Montreal; but to send a reinforcement up the river, from Montreal to Kingston, would be a work of great labour and difficulty. The evils of this were severely felt several times during the late war. Again, the falls of Niagara intercept the water communication between Montreal and Lakes Erie, Huron, and the adjoining districts, which must ever be disturbed in time of war; for while the Ohio and Michigan territories are on their flank, and hostile fleets scour the Lakes, what prospect have these fertile regions of ever rising in importance, so long as the enemy can direct all his force against them, without their being able to obtain reinforcements from Kingston, or Montreal, except very slowly? Hence a British army stationed, there might be soon outnumbered, and defeated before any succour could arrive; and, provided the enemy commanded Lake Ontario, even that would be entirely precluded. Thus the Americans could invade at several points, while at present the British would be able to reinforce only at one, and even that a very precarions one. Supposing the above-mentioned district included in the angle between Lakes Ontario, Erie, and Huron to be perfectly cleared, and the towns of London and Oxford populous and extensive, there would be no security for them, so long as America commanded the Lakes: for a combined movement might be made on them from the four different points of Burlington Bay, in Lake Ontario, Otter Creek, in Lake Erie, the river Thames, in Lake St. Clair, and the Riviere Du Sable, in Lake Huron. Such a movement, if well conducted, would succeed like Generals Amherst, Prideaux, and Wolfe's celebrated expedition against the provinces.

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May not Canada then complain, with justice, that her interests not being understood, have been sacrificed, by permitting the means of desolating her most fertile districts to remain in the power of her enemies, who, if their boast be accomplished, will keep the mastery of the Lakes?—in which case, they will at all times have access to the lower provinces, unless large fleets and numerous forts are built and maintained at a great expence.

Whatever may have been the motives that induced the British plenipotentiaries at Ghent to ratify the treaty of 1783, and amuse themselves and the Americans with proofs of a scrupulous regard to the laws of nations, they were very ill-timed. If the attack on Copenhagen is vindicated on the plea of necessity, surely a departure from the precepts of the civilian would have been justifiable in the pacific negociations with Ame rica. Denmark was at peace; the United States at war with us, and for the real purpose of possessing Canada. Her finances were inadequate to prolong the struggle, and Britain should have extorted the cession of a line of demarcation, necessary to the security of that country, against which the force of the enemy had been directed. If she had not obtained the whole line of coast along the lakes, the principal posts, such as Oswego, Sacketts Harbour, Detroit, and Buffalo, should have been insisted on peremptorily; while, by express stipulation, the enemy should have been deprived altogether of having a fleet on the lakes, or limited as to the force and number of their ships. At the same time they might have continued to enjoy an uninterrupted commerce, and to have covered the lakes with peaceable craft as before, though it would have been wiser, and ultimately more humane, to shut them out entirely from any participation in the benefits arising from trade on the lakes; since they converted what were intended as peaceable depôts of commerce, into military and naval stations.

If the enemy had refused to treat on such disadvantageous terms, Britain should have changed the aspect of the war on the Canadian frontier from defensive into the offensive, and attacked each of the strong holds with an overwhelming force, which would have ensured success by making resistance useless.

As things now stand, this country must build a large fleet on the Lakes Ontario, Erie, and Huron; and not yield to the Americans in exertion, who will strain every nerve to establish a superior force, and who construct their ships with surprising rapidity. Should we succeed in the superiority of ships, equal exertions should be made to furnish them with men. It was proved by Sir G. Prevost's general order, that there were only fifty British seamen on-board the fleet defeated by the Americans on Lake Erie; the remainder were British soldiers, Canadian militia-men, and santry, who had to contend against one thousand picked American seamen, sent for the express purpose of manning the hostile fleet.

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The principal posts should have been obtained either by treaty or force of arms, as points, whose possession would have placed in our hands those facilities for an invasion of the states which would be calculated to overawe and deter them from again disturbing our repose. In particular, the

following should all have been secured: Oswego, which commands the routes to New York, by Liverpool, Albany, or Onandago, Oxford, Rochester, and Hudson's river; to Philadelphia, by Onandago, Jericho, Harmony, Stockport, and the river Delaware; and to Baltimore, by Salina, Port-Watson, Troga-Point, and the Susquehana river. Crown Point and Ticonderago are keys to New York, by the route of Sandy Hill, Greenwich, Waterford, and Hudson's river. Skeensborough also is the key to the great road on the eastern bank of Hudson's river, leading to New York. The inhabitants of the provinces, aware of the above circumstances, and knowing the importance of Oswego, anxiously expected that a large force would have been directed against it, that its reduction might have been secured. No doubt there must have been cogent reasons for not making the attempt: these are mysteries not to be explored by vulgar eyes; but certainly considerable diappointment and discontent prevailed in the provinces in consequence.

But Sacketts Harbour is still of greater importance than either of the afore-mentioned places. Its convenience as a naval station has been fully proved by America; while its fatal efficacy, in blockading the entrance to Lake Ontario from the river St. Lawrence, has been most painfully experienced by us. With this peculiar fitness for offensive operations, it is likewise a key to New York by Harrisburgh, Leyden, and thence either by Trenton, Utica, and the Mohawk river; or else by Renesen, Johnstown, Waterford, and the

1815.

Hudson's river. Such is the line of frontier op- BOOK XIII. posed to the British settlements; and it can never be sufficiently regretted, that the treaty of Ghent CHAP. XI. guarantees the full possession of these to the United States. Was it supposed that such " perfect reciprocity" would conciliate the affection of the Americans, or convince them that Britain desired peace from motives of humanity? Such conceptions may exist in an English cabinet, but they are not suitable to a Transatlantic climate.

From a review of the premises advanced, a just conclusion may be drawn, that the present peace is not founded on terms of such perfect reciprocity as has been represented. It is most decidedly adverse to Great Britain, since the rival nation enjoys all the credit, and profit too. This treaty, moreover, declares to the world, that any nation who chooses to insult us, may hope to do it with impunity. It has left our provinces in the same defenceless state it found them: what few advantages were gained, are to be given up. And it has given the Americans the opportunity of placing themselves in a more imposing attitude in future. Under all the circumstances in which it now stands, this country should take wise precautions, by strengthening the Canadian frontier, many of whose strong points should be immediately fortified, such as Long Point, or North Foreland Point, Pelé, or South Foreland, and Landguard Point in Lake Erie; Nicholas' Island, St. Peter's Head, Amherst Island, Burlington Point, and Gibraltar Point, in Lake Ontario.

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BOOK XIV.

BOOK XIV.
CHAP. I.

1814.

CHAPTER I.

State of Parties in France. Proceedings of the Chambers at the Close of 1814.-Discussion on the
Emigrant Property.-Ordinances of the King.-Civil List.—Biographical Sketch of Louis XVIII,

We must now proceed to notice the affairs of Europe, and particularly those of France. The state of parties in that country towards the close of the year 1814, was such as indicated the existence of wide differences in opinion and interest among large classes of the community; and although in a well-established government, and among a people of sedate character and temperate feelings, it is found by experience that such diversities may prevail without materially endangering the public tranquillity, yet, under the rule of a dynasty restored, after long intermission, in consequence of foreign conquest, to the throne of a nation distinguished by the vehemence and promptitude of its emotions, there was sufficient reason to apprebend that secret discussions could not long subsist without bursting into a flame. Some trying questions had been agitated in the legislative chambers, particularly those relative to emigrant property, and the censorship of the press, which, though carried in them by decisive majorities in favour of the court, were differently looked upon in the political circles of Paris and the provinces. But it was in the military class that feelings existed the most dangerous to the security of the Bourbon government. With scarcely any exceptions, both officers and soldiers retained a high sentimental attachment to the man who so long had led them to glory and victory, and under whose banners, notwithstanding recent disasters, they fondly regarded themselves as destined to retrieve their own importance, and the honor of their country. The imperial rank which he had been still suffered to preserve, maintained his titular dignity; and his position at Elba, separated only by a narrow space of sea, kept him in constant view, and allowed a ready intercourse with his partizans.

Before, however, we proceed to the return of Napoleon from Elba, it may be interesting to take

a brief review of the proceedings of the French chambers at the close of the year, and particularly with respect to the emigrant property. One of the greatest safeguards of the throne of Louis arose from his declaration that property should be respected: but while this declaration was satisfactory to those who had purchased estates, it was of course distressing and unpopular to the emigrants. They naturally expected that on the restoration of Louis they would be put again in possession of their property. This, however, could not be done completely; and even the proposal to restore the unsold estates created great alarm and apprehension, as it was imagined by many that it was a preliminary step to restoring all the estates of the emigrants.

The first time it was introduced in the chamber of deputies was in a report from the committee of petitions, reciting the substance of a petition, delivered by a certain Dame Mathea, which stated, that she had acquired, by purchase, emigrant property, which she was peaceably enjoy. ing, when two publications appeared, one entitled, "A Letter to Louis XVIII. on the Sale of National Property," by M. Falconet, advocate; the other entitled, "The Restitution of the Property of Emigrants considered," by M. Dard, advocate; the effects of which were, to excite doubts as to the validity of her purchase; and she therefore prayed the enactment of a law to clear up this uncertainty. The member who gave this report (which was probably a contrivance) made a speech to show the dangers that would accrue from any attempt to infringe the laws which had sanctioned and confirmed the sale of confiscated property; and concluded with moving a resolution to the effect, that the chamber having heard the report on the petition, and considered the various (recited) laws by which such sales had been confirmed, had decided that the complaints

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