cany

"the immortal names of Maria Theresa, of Joseph, and of Leopold, are still recollected with sentiments of admiration and gratitude." In the conclusion, Marshal Bellegarde contrasts the promises of the French revolutionists, when they first entered Italy, with what they actually did. "Your too ready credulity to the promises of French democracy has already caused your ruin: be now more prudent, because, with the experience of the past, your folly will be more serious: and co-operate, under all circumstances, with the docility of your character-with that reflection, the fruit of intelligence, and that attachment to your sovereign, so worthy of your heart, for the maintenance of order, and the defence of your country and of the throne."

The Grand Duke of Tuscany at this time quit ted his capital, and retired to Pisa, and on the 6th the Neapolitans entered Florence, which was evacuated by the Austrian general, Nugent. The latter retired to Pistoia, whither he was followed by the Neapolitan general, Pignatelli, who made repeated attacks on the Austrians, in all of which he was repulsed with loss, and this was the limit of the advance of the Neapolitans on that side. Their main army, under the immediate direction of King Joachim, was in the meantime pushing forward towards Ferrara; and it being considered by the Austrian generals as of essential consequence to defend this point, Baron Frimont ordered the Lieutenant field-marshal Mohr to advance from the tête-du-pont of Occhio Bello, and make an attack upon the enemy. This was effected on the 12th by Mohr, whilst Count Neipperg threatened the flank of the Neapolitans; and its success was such, that they were driven from all their works, and Ferrara was delivered. The retreating Neapolitans were pursued towards Bologna. General Bianchi had at this time driven the invaders from Carpi, and had recovered Modena; so that the vicinity of the Po was entirely freed from the Neapolitans. The latter continued their retreat at all points. On the 16th the van of the Austrian army entered Bologna, which bad been hastily abandoned by Joachim. It was now manifest, that whatever were the wishes of the Italians for independence, no co-operation could be expected on their parts; and that the grand scheme of uniting Lombardy against the Austrian dominion, and forming a powerful diversion in favor of Bonaparte in that quarter, was beyond the talents of Murat with a Neapolitan army. From Bologna the pursuit was continued by the Austrian division under Count Neipperg, which successively occupied Imola, Faenza, and Forli. A large corps of Neapolitans being entrenched at Cesena, the count made an attack upon it on the 21st, and a brisk action ensued, after which the position was abandoned, and the

On the 21st, General Millet de Villeneuve, BOOK XIV. chief of the Neapolitan staff, sent the following letter to the Austrian commander, for the purpose of obtaining an armistice:

"General,-The King of Naples, in the just uneasiness respecting the security of his states, which the negociations at Vienna excited in him, and after the unexpected events which seemed likely to renew the coalition of the European sovereigns against France, thought that he ought again to occupy, and that he had a right to occupy, the line which he held during the last war, in consequence of a formal convention signed by Generals Nugent and Livron, which he has not renounced by any later stipulations, and from which the Neapolitan army retired merely in consequence of a conventional arrangement. His majesty flattered himself that this line would be given up to him without difficulty, and perhaps no hostilities would have taken place, if your excellency had received the communications which were prevented by unforeseen accidents. As the Austrian troops at Cesena had fired upon the Neapolitan troops, the king could not but believe that it was by your orders; and that your excellency had positively received from your court instructions to act in a hostile manner towards him. As soon as his majesty saw himself engaged in war, against such a great power, without having intended it, he thought it necessary to make use of all the resources which had long since been offered him in Italy, and the extension of which he did not even farther attempt to realise. The movements of your army towards Bologna, Ferrara, and Modena, are known to your excellency; while they were executing, the king saw, by communications with Lord Bentinck, that the hostilities commenced against him were not the consequence of a settled plan, because the English general stated that he had received no notification on the subject; but at the same his majesty saw that England, with which he desired to remain at peace, might take a part in the war if it were continued. This double information excit ed a wish that a reconciliation with the Austrian court might be possible. His majesty, therefore, signified to Lord Bentinck his intention of making a retrograde movement; and he would have proposed an armistice to your excellency, had he not feared that such a proposal might have been considered as a manoeuvre to check the activity of the military dispositions against his army, at the moment when it began its retreat.

"Now that the king finds himself with his whole force in the line which he thought fit to choose; now that he has sufficiently proved that his movements were not compelled, and that he is fully master of them, his majesty authorises me to acquaint your excellency, that he has required

CHAP IX.

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(Signed) "MILLET DE Villeneuve."

The chief of the staff of the Austrian army returned the following answer:

"General,-When his majesty the king assembled his army in the Marches, as all his preparations announced the plan of a war, the imperial Austrian court, which was absolutely ignorant of any cause for these armaments, required an explanation concerning them; and as they seemed to be directed against the Legations, which were occupied by its troops, it added the declaration that any violation of this territory would be considered by it as a formal act of hostility.

"It was not, therefore, a few musket-shot at Cesena that decided the question of war; it was the act of the king, in advancing with his whole army into the territory of the Legations occupied by the Austrian troops; it was his proclamation published at Rimini on the 30th of March.

"The views and sentiments professed in that proclamation must serve the king as a standard to judge of the reception that his new proposals for an agreement will meet with. At the same time that, by order of the commander-in-chief of the Austrian army in Italy, I have the honor to answer the letter which you addressed to him on the 21st of April, I am also charged to add, that the commander-in-chief has received the most positive orders to continue the operations with vigour, and therefore is not authorised to check their course by an armistice; that, however, he has not delayed a moment to ask orders from superior authority respecting the proposals contained in your dispatch.

"I have the honor, &c. "Head-quarters, April 24."

It cannot be doubted, that the Austrian emperor and his allies were well-pleased that they had so good a plea for dethroning one whose possession of a crown, conquered from its hereditary owner, made a breach in their system of restoration.

It was, however, the opinion of many in England, that Murat had been very ill-treated, as it was understood that the allies had determined on dethroning him previously to his going to war. The subject was at length brought before parliament on the 2d of May, when Earl Grey made a

motion in the house of lords for copies of the negociation carried on between the British go vernment and the Neapolitan government, with a view to bring before the house and the public the engagements which had been entered into with that power, and the justice or injustice of the proceedings with regard to it. The Earl of Liverpool said, that every information proper to be supplied would be afforded. Murat having at tacked the allies, the armistice with him was at an end.

Earl Grey observed, among other things, that by the armistice concluded between Great Britain and Naples, on the 3d of February, the entire sovereignty of Naples was clearly guaranteed to Murat-it was in fact a treaty of alliance, depending on two stipulations; indemnity to Sicily, and co-operation with the allies. The indemnity, however, was not to come from Naples, but from the allies; and as to the co-operation, it was notorious that the military proceedings of Murat bad relieved Austria from a great pressure, and had enabled her to act with a successful vigour against France; for he had occupied Tuscany, taken Ancona after a siege of eight days, and had reached the Po. These proceedings bad compelled the viceroy of Italy to act on the defensive, though he had an excellent army of 45,000 men to oppose to the Austrian one of 30,000 and if Murat bad joined the viceroy with his force, Vienna would have Vienna would have been open to themAustria could not have acted with vigour against France-and most probably the allies would not have succeeded. It seemed, therefore, much too late to come forward and say that Murat had not acted with due cordiality. Without any treachery on the part of Murat, his co-operation might not have been so active as was expected. But if his character was such as now represented, considering the dangerous state of Italy, it was the height of impolicy to have suffered him to remain, to set fire to the combustibles accumulated in that country. So that a strong case, in the face of things, appeared to be made out against ministers; and then came the letter to Lord Castlereagh from the Prince of Benevente-a letter, which had no doubt been read by most of their lordships with the deepest shame, proving that though we were not disposed to open and manly proceedings, we were quite ready to adopt ali such as were secret and underhand :-" I repeat," said his lordship," that no doubt all your fordships have seen this extraordinary letter, and have seen it with feelings of resentment for the injured honor, for the humiliation and shame of the remaining character of this country, so deeply involved, and so much more so if it were written not merely on the writer's own notion, but as the reply to some preceding communication from the British minister. I trust, my lords, that that was 7

not the case. I trust that that letter is attributable only to the masterhand that is skilled in such productions; for in the worst transaction of the worst period of the worst government that ever existed in the vilest deceit, the most infamous perfidy, the foulest erime that ever occurred -in the blackest record of fraud and imposture that is to be met with in the annals of the world, nothing can be found more flagrant and heinous -nothing more hateful for its treachery-nothing more contemptible for its baseness. Still in that paper not a word was said of the King of Naples having forfeited his sovereignty by his conduct. All that was said was, that although he could not be attacked through Italy, he was assailable by sea; and, the writer, with a degree of insult to his correspondent which it was difficult to conceive how a British minister could bear, concluded that Lord Castlereagh had authority from his court to assent to the proposed measure, and if not, requested that he would obtain it."

The subject was also brought before the house of commons, on the same evening, by Mr. Horner, who, in a speech of considerable length, took the same line of argument as that so ably pursued by Earl Grey in the other house.

As the speech of Lord Castlereagh, in reply, is of considerable importance, from the information it conveys, we shall give the leading points. After some preliminary observations he proceeded thus:-In consequence of the conclusion of a treaty between Austria and Marshal Murat, he transmitted an instruction from Basle to Lord William Bentinck, dated the 22d of January, 1814, informing his lordship of the terms of the treaty, by which Marshal Murat was to bring into the field a corps of Neapolitan troops, not less than 30,000, and intimating the prince-regent's pleasure, that his lordship should suspend hostilities against Naples on the part of the British government. Before that order, however, reached Lord William Bentinck, his lordship had authorised a person to conclude an armistice with the government of Naples, from his knowledge of the suspension of hostilities. The next step in the negociation was a letter which he dispatched to Lord William Bentinck, dated Chatillon, February 21, in which he communicated to his lordship, that the British government had never liked the measure, but being taken they were, willing to act up with the Austrian government; and that Murat, by giving indemnities to the King of Sicily, might secure his own dominions. The house should understand, that the engagements of this country with the King of Sicily were only to secure the general interests of Sicily as an ally; there was nothing as a sine qua non with respect to Naples. In point of honor, the government of this country was only bound to Sicily in the same manner as when Lord Lauderdale was at

CHAP. IX.

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Paris, at which period the Sicilian family were BOOK XIV. taught to expect the protection and good services of England; but it was not an obligation. If, with good policy, we could have secured Naples to Sicily, we ought to have done so; but the particular interests of Sicily were not to be put in competition with what the security and tranquillity of Europe might require. In the month of August, Austria wished to open negociations with Marshal Murat. Negociations passed, and his majesty's ministers gave full power to Lord Aberdeen to become a party to them. The basis of the negociations was, not that Murat should remain at Naples, but that some dominions should be given to him as an equivalent. In October, a representation was made by the Austrian government, that Murat would not listen to such terms, and that as the connexion with him was essential to the operations of the campaign, they proposed that Murat should remain at Naples, and that the Sicilian family should look to some other quarter for indemnities. They urged the impropriety of forsaking general purposes for remote interests; and his majesty's government feeling for the ge neral policy, however reluctant they might be in other respects, gave their concurrence, if Murat continued to make it a sine qua non, that he should remain at Naples, provided he fulfilled his engagement of joining the allies, and a suitable indemnity was given to Sicily. Now his majesty's ministers might plead either or both of these conditions in bar of the charges against them; but, with respect to indemnity, the Sicilian family never could be hurt, There was, however, no authority whatever for Lord William Bentinck to consent for Sicily; there was never the slightest disposition in that noble lord to answer for any thing but his own government. Sicily refused an indemnity, and, therefore, the condition was not performed as far as related to her. He then came to the other question, namely, whether Murat, by a proper disposition of his forces, had entitled himself to an execution of the assurance of the treaty. The honorable gentleman had referred to the nature of his communications to Lord William Bentinck on the 1st of April. Those communications were founded on the dispatch of the 21st of February; and when Lord William Bentinck gave the substance to Murat, he accompanied it with a declaration, on his part, of what he thought had been Murat's conduct antecedent to it; and his opinion' was, that he had acted up to the spirit of his engagements. The honorable member had alluded to a misunderstanding between Murat and Lord William Bentinck; but it was the deliberate judgment of Lord William Bentinck, that the conduct of Murat was not consistent with those considerations which this country required. As far as his (Lord C.'s) knowledge went, he was not aware that there existed

CHAP. IX.

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1815.

BOOK XIV. the slightest difficulty on the part of the Austrian government till the treaty was ratified in the way that Murat desired; there was no suggestion of alarm, so far as the Austrian government was concerned. It was not enough, however, to say that the opinion given by Lord William Bentinck, on the 21st of March,-it was not fair to say, that it referred to transactions at the time of the ratification of the treaty. Lord William Bentinck communicated to Marshal Bellegarde what bis opinion was how Murat had executed his part of the engagement. He evidently meant to qualify the conduct of the British government, and said, that they did not know the conduct of Murat when that authority was transmitted. On the 25th of March, long after the treaty had been ratified, and when Murat might have destroyed those unfavorable opinions which Lord William Bentinck had formed, that noble lord made use of the following language: " It is now necessary to consider the conduct of Murat. Has he fulfilled his engagements with Austria? Has be not acted rather as a friend to Bonaparte? Was it not the policy of a deserter to throw his whole force into the scale? He could expect no favor from Bonaparte: but is it not the language of all his officers, that Italy should be united, and that be should be the head? Finally, is there any man in Italy, or any in the Austrian army south of the Po, who has any confidence in him? He is only waiting to place himself on the strongest side." Such was the opinion of Lord William Bentinck on the 25th of March. The honorable gentleman had stated, that it was the true policy of this country to resist all suspicions between Murat and the allies. At Chatillon, he consented that Murat should remain at Naples, and he hoped the honorable gentleman would feel, that through out this transaction there was no disposition to entertain improper jealousies of the conduct of Murat. In his letter of the 3d of April, from Dijon, he endeavoured to argue down all the suspicions of Lord William Bentinck, because he felt that if we were not prepared to break with Murat, we should inspire him with more confidence. But Lord William Bentinck, who was nearer the scene of action, was better able to judge of his intersions. He (Lord C.) thought, however, that it was better to exercise an excess of confidence, than an excess of jealousy; and all his arguments were thrown into the scale in favor of Murat. The house might be assured, there fore, that there had been no failure of exertion on his part. It was towards the close of the month of March that the allies entered Paris. The noble lord arrived thither in the beginning of April, and he was not sure whether the letter of the 23d of March reached him there, or at Dijon. It made, however, a considerable impression on his mind, that the conduct of Murat had not been

such as the allies expected; but he thought that if the question_rested solely on the opinion of Lord William Bentinck, it would not form a justifiable cause of breaking with Murat. While he was at Paris, however, he had an opportunity of having a communication with a person, which amounted to a moral conviction that Murat had not honorably fulfilled the engagement on bs part. He certainly had taken the earliest oppor unity after his arrival at London, to inform the Neapolitan agent, that the conduct of Murat appeared to him to have been inconsistent with bis engagements. He stated the same thing expressly to the Duke of Campochiaro at Vienna, and told him, that on that account the question of Naples must be left free and open for the discussion of Congress. At the meeting of the Congress there were two sets of ambassadors, each appearing in the character of representatives of the King of the two Sicilies. He would agree with the honorable gentleman, that if nothing had occurred to shake the good faith of Murat in the perform ance of his engagements, then it would have been the duty of this country to uphold the right of Murat to the kingdom of Naples. He, however, conceived his pretensions to have been completely merged, and that the whole question should be reserved for the consideration of the Congress, It was a question altogether of the utmost diffi culty to determine; and the only point that all the ministers could agree upon was, that this question should be reserved for the last point which the Congress were to determine. In point of fact, no act of Congress had taken place on this subject up to the period of Murat's aggres sion. He had always fairly stated to Prince Talleyrand, as well as the other ministers, that the British government held itself free upon this point. He thought it very probable that it was in consequence of his stating frankly and expli citly to the Neapolitan minister, that he conceiv ed the claim of Murat to be annulled by his conduct, that that minister communicated to him a very detailed memorandum, endeavouring to justify the conduct of Murat. This document did not at all shake the moral conviction in his mind of the duplicity and bad faith of Murat. Although he was himself possessed of sufficient documents to support his opinion, yet he referred this document to an officer who had commanded the advanced-guard of his army, and who had still better opportunities of judging of his conduct than he had. than he had. The officer to whom he alluded was General Nugent, who had so much distin guished himself in the present war, as well as in the last. He was a man of the highest honor and character, and of such consummate judgment in military matters, that be expected from him not merely an opinion but a detailed and reasoned opinion. He was not disappointed in his expec

tation-General Nugent had examined this document, paragraph by paragraph, and in his answer to it had made out a most complete case, not merely of military inactivity on the part of Murat, but of a most skilful management of his troops to defeat the objects which had been agreed upon by the allies, and, in one instance, to facilitate the escape of a considerable body of the enemy. He had not, however, relied merely on the opinion of General Nugent, but had also taken the opinion of Lord William Bentinck, who, being at that time near the spot, had good opportunities of judging. Lord William Bentinck had informed him, by a letter, that he conceived that the object of Murat was very clear," that he wanted to hold the balance in his own hands, to keep possession of Italy south of the Po, and then to throw his weight into the scale which appeared most likely to preponderate." Prince Talleyrand also told him, that he had the clearest proofs that long after Murat had been negociating with the allies, he was also in direct negociation with Bonaparte for the possession of Italy south of the Po. It is true that Bonaparte, not then thinking so humbly of his fortune, treated his proposal with the utmost contempt, and talked of Murat as a madman and a fool. It appeared that even in the month of February last year, the Queen of Naples was in direct communication with Bonaparte, and made proposals to him on the part of her busband. As to the merit that was claimed for his not joining the viceroy, the fact was, that he could not join him, as their pretensions were incompatible. He, in fact, claimed about half of his vice-royalty. The house would now see the cruel situation in which ministers had been placed. They had been reviled in every corner of the country for supposed breaches of faith, which the gentlemen on the other side so confidently charged them with. He trusted that he had been able to collect sufficient documents to prove to the house and the country that there had been no breach of faith on the part of the British government. He admitted that the honorable gentleman had fairly and properly, this night, said that the case was a prima facie one, and called for some answer or inquiry. He thought, however, that any man who had the least value for the honor and character of his country, or the government under which he lived, should, even if there was a prima facie case of breach of faith, suppose that the government would be able to give it an answer, and justify their conduct. Ministers, however, had been most violently attacked by other gentlemen in that house, upon some loose documents that had got into their hands, and before the time had arrived when they could go into their justification. As he had wished to get possession of what documents he could find respecting the con

1815.

have a search made in the bureau of Paris. A BOOK XIV. diligent search had been made, and very important documents had been found. He should now CHAP. IX. read to the house many extracts of the correspondence which had been found, that passed at that time between the Princess Borghese, Bonaparte, and the King and Queen of Naples. He should also read extracts to prove the opinion of the French constituted authorities on his conduct. From the first letter, which was from the Princess Borghese to Bonaparte, dated Lucca, February 14th, he read the following extract :-"The King of Naples is in a great agitation. He is astonished that the viceroy should have retired from the banks of the Adige, and hopes that he has not forgotten the benefits he had received from your majesty." The second letter which he should read was from Bonaparte to the Queen of Naples, and was dated Nangis, the 17th of February. At the time this letter was written, Bonaparte did not despair of his fortune, and treated Murat in the stile of a master. This letter contained the following expressions; "Your husband is a brave man in the field, but more cowardly than a woman when he has been a month from the field. He has no moral courage. He should know, that what he has he can only hold by me, and with me. When he quitted the army without orders, and ever since, he has been doing me as much mischief as he could. I may, however, yet pardon him. Recal him to a sense of his duty, and let him watch for a favorable moment to shew me that he is not as ungrateful as he has been pusillanimous" He should next read an extract from a letter from Fouche to Bonaparte, dated Lucca, February 18. This letter stated, "That the king was sick with grief: that he felt thoroughly the circumstances in which he was placed, and that the English and Austrians reproached him with too much attachment to his imperial majesty." He then read an extract of a letter from Eugene Beauharnois to Bonaparte, dated the 28th of February. This letter expressed," That the viceroy had the strongest hopes that the King of Naples would not add to the wrongs he had been guilty of towards his imperial majesty by firing at his troops." He next read an extract of a letter from the French consul at Ancona, which had no date, but was certainly written about the same time. That letter stated the substance of the conversation between him and Murat. "The King of Naples told him, that necessity alone compelled him to join the allies. The maritime strength of England was always threatening his states with invasion, and his people were discontented at the stagnation of trade. He said that it was agreed that his army was never to fight against Frenchmen." The next letter which he had to read was a very curious document: it was a letter from Bora