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BOOK XV. question was, whether she should continue so. Mr. Fox at last could not succeed in a treaty, and CHAP. II. why? Because Bonaparte was a great general, wielding the forces of a military state; and, however reluctant Mr. Fox was to plunge Europe into war, he never would have agreed to what would derogate from the just claims of his native country. Mr. Burke, who had read more than all other men, whose deep study of history had given him almost the power of prophecy, and rendered him that great political doctor who could understand all the symptoms of public diseases, and who saw in the struggles of nations, which others supposed the effects of returning health, only the access of fever; he, in his prophetic views, admonished and warned the world. With Mr. Burke's authority, with Mr. Fox's practice, and with the opinions and conduct of others whom it would wear out a day to name, he was against a treaty founded on the chance of Bonaparte's giving liberty to France, at the certain hazard of the independence of Europe. If we had no right to dictate a government to France, we had a right to say to France, "You shall not choose a government, the object of which is to raise all your strength against Europe." As to the government of Louis the XVIIIth, which he should rather speak of as interrupted than subverted, it was mildness itself compared to that of Bonaparte. It was free under it to discuss all questions of church or ministry, or political or religious intolerance, and the same of government and philosophy, and toleration advanced under it, and there was at least an amenity in France that rendered a great nation amiable. It was now proposed to subject that race of people to a severe oriental despotism. There was a sort of monstrous unreality in the revived system of government, that stated nothing as it is, and every thing as it was not. The whole state was corrupted. He would ask, whether by treaty they would confirm in the heart of Europe a military domination, founded on a triumph over civil rights, and which had made the experiment of governing a great nation without any religion, and which aimed at governing Europe by means of breaking oaths and deposing the king? If they would agree to confirm that system, if they would degrade the honor of England, if they would forget the value of morals, and despise the obligations of religion, if they would astonish all our allies by such a confirmation, would not Europe exclaim against us, and say, "You have kindly assisted and generously contributed to our deliverance; and do you at the most urgent moment fall back? In vain have you so long opposed and borne up against the flying fortunes of the world, in vain have you taken the eagles from the hands of the invaders, in vain have you snatched invincibility from the standards of the foe! Now, when all

Europe is ready to march, are you, who were in the front before, the foremost to take the lead in desertion? In truth we are not now to consi der the money we had spent, but the fortunes we had kept. At the least, we were now asked to keep up a peace with a war-establishment. Our resources, certainly, were not eternal; but we had yet greater resources than all the other nations, Recollect that money was only one part of strength. The name and the part which we had borne precluded us from taking a second place. When we ceased to be first, we must be last; when we descended from our exalted rank, we should become nothing.

Sir F. Burdett admired the eloquence of the right honorable gentleman, but thought his exaggerations equal to those imputed to the French. He had not convinced him of the justice or expediency of the war. The detestable principle

of the assassination of Bonaparte was held out. The allies themselves had shown but very little faith. They had in twenty years repeatedly broken their treaties with Bonaparte and with us, though they had sometimes been all in alliance with us, and at others all in alliance with him. Russia had opposed us in an armed nentrality against what we called our maritime our_maritime rights; Prussia had seized on those hereditary dominions of the King of England, which we had converted into a kingdom. As to views of liberty from Bonaparte, what hopes of liberty, religious or civil, were to be found in the conduct of the allies? Recollect the invasion of Poland, the destruction of its government, and the scenes of carnage and blood that ensued, and the march of the allies to play the same game in France. Was not the name of the Bourbone formerly sy. nonimous in this country with perfidy? One historian, speaking of Louis XIV. said, that he never wanted a pretence to break treaties. The French emperor and the other sovereigns were much upon a par on this subject, and he was sorry to say, that on the breaking the peace of Amiens, the grounds of war by this country were not placed so as to justify us. All the crimes committed could not be imputed to Bonaparte. All the other great continental powers were aggral dizing themselves, and obliterating smaller states, and handing over millions of people to different governments. Saxony was, without regard to her rights, consigned over to Prussia. Every small power that bore a name that looked like freedom was obliterated. We went first to war to assist the Dutch about the opening of the Scheldt, and now we had done what was most abhorrent to them, by placing them under a king and of our own making. Was he the public choice! -In fact, Bonaparte would from these circum stances find alliances in Belgium, in Holland, in Saxony, in Genoa, in Italy, and in Poland

if opportunity occurred to avail himself of them. In this rotten state, all Europe saw declarations broken in the most shameless manner. He could not pretend to prophesy on the events of war, but, at any rate, we should entail on ourselves incalculable burthens. It was said that Bonaparte seized Spain, and established the worst of despotism. What bad happened in Spain? Good God! We had engaged in treaties which, if not literally binding us to her freedom, leagued us with the patriots. We took them by the hand, praised their valor, fought side by side with them, for an object common to English and Spaniards, had all their resources at command, and they submitted to an English commander. How did we perform our engagements? We abandoned them, and eveu gave money to the odious and contemptible tyrant Ferdinand VII. to subvert the constitution; and

CHAP. 11.

1815.

he had persecuted the patriots, one of whom was BOOK XV. even denied refuge in an English fortress. He believed the military despotism in France was more pleasing to the foreign powers than a free constitution, and perhaps was so also to our government. Believing that every people had a right to choose their own government, he was neither for forcing liberty or despotism on France by war; and, wishing to avoid a war, on such a principle of interference, he should vote for the amendment.

Mr. W. Wynne argued, that the past history of Bonaparte fully proved him to be incompetent to any thing like the spirit of an honorable

engagement.

Messrs. Ponsonby, Plunket, Tierney, and others spoke on the subject, when the house divided-Against the amendment, 331-For it, 92; -Majority for war, 239.,

HAVING thus detailed the measures which were adopted by the allies for the purpose of dethroning Bonaparte, it will now be proper to consider the means by which he expected to be able to defend and support himself. These means were of two descriptions: In the first place, he endeavoured to raise as large a military force as possible; and, secondly, he used the most strenuous means to rouse the people in his favor; so that they might be induced to act as they had done at the commencement of the revolution. His ministers were, undoubtedly, men of great talents; and some of them men of great influence with the people. The collecting and equipment of the army were committed to the care of Carnot and Davoust. The regular army at this time consisted of between 3 and 400,000 men, of which about 100,000 were assembled on the frontiers of Belgium, 40,000 on the Rhine, 30,000 at Chamberry, 10,000 in La Vendée, and about the same number at Bourdeaux. The remainder were distributed in garrisons, or were on march to join the different corps. It has appeared surprising

to many, that the French army was not more numerous, particularly as upwards of 300,000 prisoners had returned to France during the year 1814. It is, however, easily accounted for. The Bourbons, finding that the disposition of the troops were hostile to them, and also that the finances were not sufficient to support a numerous army in time of peace, had taken all the means in their power for reducing it. For that purpose, all the young soldiers were discharged; and a vast number of foreigners, such as Italians, Germans, Dutch, and Belgians, after the treaty of Paris, were picked out and assigned over to their. respective sovereigns. By this means the French army, which, on the abdication of Bonaparte, consisted of upwards of 400,000 men, was reduced before the end of the year to 175,000. The exertions of Bonaparte and his ministers, therefore, must have been great, to have added, in the short space of two months, 200,000 men to the army. Indeed, there is every reason to believe, that if the allies had not been quick in their preparations, a few months more would have swelled the num

BOOK XV. bers of the French army to a most enormous

CHAP. III.

1815.

amount.

The present amount of the French army, it is evident from the statement which we have given of the opposing force of the allies, was by no means adequate to the support of Bonaparte, even if France had been tranquil and well-disposed towards him. But this was far from being the case. In the west, particularly in La Vendée, the royalists were very numerous and daring; they were headed and encouraged by La Roche Jaqueline, of a family long noted for hatred to the revolution, and attachment to the Bourbons. For the purpose of producing a counterbalance to the royalists of Brittany, a federal compact was proposed to the five departments of that province, of persons devoted to the emperor and the national cause, who were to form a part of the national-guard. Accordingly, confederacies were formed in several parts of Brittany, the members of which professed "to consecrate all their means to the propagation of liberal principles ;-to support the public spirit during the present crisis, and to oppose all disorders;-to maintain public security in the interior, and to march to all places in the provinces which might be threatened by foreign and domestic foes. To employ all their influence and credit to keep each other in the line of his duty to his prince and his country; to bear succour effectually and promptly at the first requisition of the public authority;-to defeat all plots against the constitution and the emperor; -and to lend one another mutual assistance and protection according to events." Emissaries were sent into the suburbs of Paris, to induce the inhabitants to enter into similar confederations, and thus to set a patriotic example to the other cities of the empire. The invitation was quickly obeyed, and 15,000 men soon enrolled themselves, and demanded arms. Similar confederacies were formed in many other parts of the empire. On the 14th of May, Bonaparte reviewed a number of regiments of the line, the nationalguards of Paris, and the fedéres of the suburbs. When he appeared in front of the line, an orator, deputed from the federates, addressed him in an harangue, of which the following is an extract.

"Sire! We received the Bourbons with indifference and apathy, because we love not kings imposed upon us by the enemy.-We received you with enthusiasm, because you are the man of the nation, the defender of the country, and because we expect from you a glorious independence and judicious freedom. We come to make a tender of our arms, our courage, and our blood, for the safety of the capital.

"The most part of us have combatted under your orders. We are almost all old defenders of our country. Our country may, with confidence, place arms in the hands of those who have shed

their blood in her cause. Give to us, sire, arms in her name. We swear, in your presence, to fight only in our country's cause and in your's. We are not the tools of any party, nor the agents of any faction. We desire only to preserve the national honor, and to render the entrance of the enemy into this capital impracticable, in the event of its being threatened with a new insult. Conquerors by our own courage and your genius, we shall resume our toils with joy and alacrity; and we shall be better able to appreciate the blessings of peace when we shall obtain, as the price of twenty-five years of sacrifices, a constitution, liberty, and the monarch of our choice.

"Sire! you will triumph. We rejoice by anticipation at a victory so legitimate, and at the glorious and permanent tranquillity which will be the fruits of it. Yes, sire, we have an assurance that when our enemies shall announce the chimerical hope of prescribing laws to us, you will love peace as you love glory. We shall be indebted to you for liberty and happiness; and all France, now ready to fight if necessary, will love you as a good king, after admiring you as the greatest of warriors."

The emperor listened to them with the greatest courtesy, and thus replied:

"Soldiers and Federates! I returned to France alone, because I reckoned on the affection of the peasants through the whole of France, and the artisans of the principal cities. My expectations have not beeu deceived.

"Confederated soldiers! I see you around me with pleasure. You have robust arms and brave hearts. I accept your offers. I will give you arms. You shall form the light troops of the Parisian national-guard, to which, in conjunction with you, I commit the defence of my capital.

Tranquil as to the result of the contest, I shall proceed to the frontiers to manoeuvre the army, and to defend our territory if the kings shall dare to attack it. The honor of the French, the rights of the people, and my throne, are under your keeping, and under that of the people of the country and the villages. We will cause the national sovereignty and independence to be respected."

When he concluded, the air was rent with acclamations, and the federates dispersed, proud of the honor which they had received, and burning to prove their zeal in the emperor's cause.

The emissaries of Bonaparte were actively employed in every part of Europe, transmitting intelligence of the state of public opinion, and the preparations of the allies, or executing his secret orders. Two ludicrous instances of the detection of his agents occurred at Brussels.

The members of a French family were arrested at the hotel Bellevue, in consequence of the discovery that a letter was inclosed in the collar of their dog, involving some interesting facts re

lative to the state. This animal was to have been dispatched with a servant on the ensuing day as courier extraordinaire.

A young lady of condition soon afterwards arrived at the same hotel, with a suite of domestics. As one of her household passed along the saloon of the hotel he was recognised by an officer as an active adherent of Napoleon. Information was immediately given at the police-office, and proper persons were dispatched to inquire into the affair. As the police-officers entered the lady's apartment, they observed a man, habited as a peasant, coming out of her chamber, with a small brown loaf under his arm. On perceiving the unwelcome visitors he hastily descended the stair-case, chanting "Vive Henry Quartre !" and keeping his right eye in an inquisitorial direction over his shoulder. When the officers entered the lady's room she was reading a letter, which she instantly tore in pieces. On gathering up the fragments, it proved to be a dispatch from the principal agent of the French government. It is needless to add, that the lady and her attendants were immediately carried away and properly disposed of.

When the seeming peasant had been secured below, he wanted to give his loaf, with an air of charity, to a miserable looking woman who was begging in the street; but the officers, suspecting from his great solicitude to get rid of his bread, that there was something more than ordinary in the affair, seized the loaf, and, on breaking it, discovered several letters for Paris, one of which was directed to Napoleon himself.

The discontents in France evidently increased, and open insurrections burst out in many of the departments. In Languedoc, Bretague, and Anjou, numerous armed bands appeared, and contended with various success against the forces of Napoleon. Yet the general feeling of the people, though their enthusiasm was considerably abated, was evidently in his favor. They suspected and feared him, but they feared yet more the return of their former masters, backed by the force of united Europe. The new proprietors especially felt that their security was inseparably connected with the cause of Napoleon.

Fouche, the minister of general police, at length presented a report to Bonaparte, notifying the disorders which had occured in the departments of the west and north, and recommended that effectual measures should be taken for their prevention and suppression. "France," says Fouche," considered in a general point of view, presents an imposing spectacle, and the most favorable dispositions. She wishes for peace, but she will not sacrifice her glory and her independ

ence.

She wishes, as in 1792, to enjoy civil liberty and all the advantages of a representative government; but, enlightened, by experience, she fee is that this enjoyment cannot be assured to her,

CHAP. III.

1815.

in 1792, she is internally agitated by a party BOOK XV.` which has relinquished none of its pretensions; but which has neither the same strength nor the same influence; which is incessantly complaining of the rigour of which it has been the object, but ought to recollect that it provoked it by its intrigues, its resistance, and its fury. "Whence, in fact, sprung those terrible laws levelled against the emigrants, the insurgents, and their families? Was it not from the necessity under which the national assemblies found themselves to punish improper attempts, to put a stop to plots, to break off correspondences, against which the ordinary laws were insufficient? The lessons of the past seem thrown away. The men to whom you wished to restore a country, who owe to you the political state and the repose secured to them-these men, sire, whom your majesty endeavoured, during the first twelve years of your reign, to reconcile to the nation, seem to have determined on separating themselves from it, and renouncing your favors. Hitherto the police of your empire has confined itself to watching their motions; in several places it has been obliged to protect them from popular resentment. The police, instituted for the benefit of all, knows no local antipathies, nor the faults which the prince has forgotten. Destined to repress attacks made on social order, it does not violate principles by taking its fears for suspicions, and its suspicions for facts. It has not, therefore, prematurely attacked the personal liberty of those whom it could not but presume to be in conspiracy against the public liberty. So far from fettering the independence of writers, it has recalled into the polemical career those whom shame and fear had removed from it. It has derived from this moderation, and from its respect for the laws, the immense advantage of enlightening the nation on the subject of its real dangers and its true interests; of diminishing, by publicity, the importance which falsehood and calumny gain from mystery and secrecy; of acquiring a knowledge of the focusses, the springs, the agents of intrigues, and suffering them to frame and hatch their plots unrestrained by any perceptible vigilance. Now, however, it is time to put a stop to the machinations that are practising. Emigrations are beginning; a secret correspondence is established abroad and organised at home; committees are forming in the towns; and endeavours are used to spread alarm over the country.

"If, when such symptoms were manifested for the first time in France, the evil had been stifled in its birth; if, instead of confining itself to threats, and following the dictates of a lingering indulgence, the government had employed all the power with which it was invested, the country would not have been hurried on to the brink of

1815.

BOOK XV. violent measures to which the governments of those days were forced to have recourse, and CHAP. III. which the importance of circumstances could scarcely justify. For the rest, real disorders seem to be the result of the manoeuvres which are observed. In one commune of the department of the Gard an assemblage of persons have for a moment hoisted the white flag. Some armed bands have appeared in the departments of the Maine and Loire, and the Lower Loire. In the Calvados women have torn the tri-coloured flag of a commune. Seditious cries have been raised; some acts of rebellion have taken place in the departments of the north. In that of the Cotes du Nord, a mayor has been massacred by the old Chouans. These crimes fill the places where they are committed with alarm. I know that they are connected with the endeavours that have been made for a year past, to revive revolutionary animosities, and re-kindle civil war. They do not depend exclusively on the political change which has just been effected without impediment; they do not threaten the safety of the state; they do not even characterise a party subsisting and formed. Certainly those who attack property and perpetrate assassination, those who break all the bonds which unite them to France, and devote her to the sword of foreigners and domestic discord-those men have in them nothing French. They may follow the opinions and second the wishes of some accomplices: but they have no partizans. All good men, all the friends of order and peace, whatever may be their political views, all detest the atrocity of such acts; they have all an interest that such disorders should not spread, and they wish that they may be repressed with a severity capable of putting a stop to them. I do not propose to your majesty to take extraordinary measures, or to exceed the bounds of constitutional power. Some months since the tribunals punished shouts of "vive l'empereur!" with transportation and four years banishment; those of "vive le roi !" are now not prosecuted, or punished only by measures of mere police; this moderation is the sign of power. But the tribunals cannot, upon other points, remain undecided and uncertain without failing in their duty, and without destroying that concert of views which animates the people and the government. Already, in several communes of France, have the purchasers of national domains, whose tranquillity is not threatened, provided soldiers, armed at their expense, for the safety of all. The Breton youth have renewed the federative compact of Pontivy in defence of the throne and country. This generous devotion cannot remain without praise, without imitation, and without support. The national-guards are every where organizing. To secure internal order, there is no need, therefore, of any thing more than to call forth the existing laws, to determine their ap

plication, and to make public their penal dispositions."

In consequence of this report, Napoleon, two days afterwards, issued the following de

cree:

Art. 1. "All Frenchmen, except those comprised in article 2d of our decree of amnesty of the 12th of March last, who are at present out of France, in the service of or with either Louis Stanislaus Xavier Count de Lille, or the princes of his house, are required to return to France, and notify their return within one month, conformably with the articles 7, 8, and 9 of our decree of the 6th of April, 1809, upon pain of being prosecuted in terms of said decree.

2. The officers of judicial police, comprising the prefects and mayors, shall give in to our altornies-general a statement of the names, surnames, quality, and abode of persons domiciliated within their district, who they think come within the meaning of the preceding article.

3. 66

We require our attornies-general and imperial to prosecute without delay the authors and accomplices in all intercourse and correspondence which shall take place from the interior of the empire with the Count de Lille, the princes of his house, or their agents, in all cases in which the said intercourse or correspondence shall have for their object the plots of manoeuvres specified in the 77th article of the penal code.

4." Every person convicted of having removed the tri-coloured flag, placed upon the steeple of a church, or any other public monument, shall be punished conformably to article 257 of the penal code.

5" The communes which shall not resist the removal of the tri-coloured flag, done by an assemblage of people, shall be prosecuted according to the law of the 10th Vendemaire, year 4, relative to the responsibility of communes.

6. "Every person convicted of having any rallying-signal, except the national-cockade, shall be punished with a year's imprisonment, conformably to the 9th article of the 27th Germinal, year 4, without prejudice to the penalties imposed by article 91 of the penal code, in the cases provided by that article.

7. "The prefects shall cause to be re-printed and posted the first chapter of the first title of the third book of the penal code.-The same shall be done with the second and third of the third section of the same title and book.

8. "Our cousin, the prince-arch-chancellor, charged with the portfolio of the minister-of-justice and our minister of general-police, are charged, each in his proper office, with the execution of the present decree, which shall be printed in the bulletin of laws.

(Signed)

"NAPOLEON.”

At this period, it is said, that overtures were