"First, to banish every thing that gave umbrage to the family reigning in France; and, consequently, the principal views would be directed against the despot confined in the Isle of Elba, and against all that were attached to him.

"Second, To prevent a young plant taking root at Parma, whose shoots would always be abhorred and dreaded.

"Third, To purify those thrones that are found so much degraded, and that they should be restored to that species of possessors who are regarded as fit only to occupy them.

"Fourth, To establish an order of things in which their own preservation shall be provided for, and to render it the principal dogma of the new policy to be adopted by the kings of Eu

rope.

"Hence would proceed the great efforts that would be made to bring back to Naples and to Parma the princes of the royal family of France. "From this circumstance, we may learn the necessity of renewing that alliance with Sweden that a sound policy should prescribe to France, as more necessary than it was in the days of Gustavus and Oxenstiern.

"We may also see the propriety of connecting together all the princes, who, during the course of the revolution, have experienced the same sufferings as those of France, and demand for them a justice, the effects of which should be useful to them.

"France, not demanding any thing of the Congress, and at once willing to cover the inferiority of the part she had to play an inferiority very new to her, was obliged to depart from that policy in which she no longer occupied the principal place, in order to recur to those general principles, the discussions of which belonged to the whole world, and to assume the merit of justice of peace to Europe, in place of being able to show herself its regulator. It was this circumstance that produced the connection between France and Austria and Great Britain, and her avowed interference in favor of Saxony. By this means, she formed a principal member of the opposition in favor of Saxony. We cannot but render our homage to the force and the constancy with which the French ministers have defended a prince worthy of all the respect that the purest virtue commands; worthy, from his misfortunes, of the interest of every sensible heart.

"But, in the extraordinary circumstances in which Europe discovered itself to be placed; above all, with the new dangers that the near approach of Russia created; was it well to enter into the discussion of the present and future interests of Europe, by merely considering Saxony as the property of the king, and to show what in

CHAP. V.

1815.

mate, and on which they could not, if a proper BOOK XVI. feeling existed, suffer an attempt to be made? "There were many means of avoiding offence, which we shall point out in a succeeding chapter. "Is it necessary, on this account, to avoid the discussion of the high considerations that commanded the absolute union of Saxony to Prussia? Besides, what have they done for the King of Saxony, in restoring him but the half of his sub'ects and his states? As little for his virtue as his power.

"We may perceive that France made no portion of that resistance to the union of Italy and Austria which she made to that of Saxony and Prussia. However, interest in favor of France, and interest in favor of Europe, were two very different things. The misfortunes of Italy were much greater and more affecting. France, having a wish to make use of Austria against Prussia in favor of Saxony, was obliged to be tender on the score of Italy. This is the effect of that twofold system that we have before indicated. It will perhaps be said, that there was, on the part of Austria, an opinion so decided with regard to this question, that the attempt to alter it would have been ineffectual. France was more fortunate in the attempts she made for the restitution of the dominions belonging to the pope, and to procure an act, called for by justice, and by the rank that catholicism occupied in Europe.

"Since the peace of Westphalia, France has adopted the maxim of exercising a species of protectorate in Germany, in opposition to the house of Austria. Surely she was correct in endeavouring to renew it with the princes and the sovereigns of the empire.

"It is necessary to remark, that there are in Germany three species of states.

"In the first rank, are Austria and Prussia. "In the second, the ci-devant electorates, erected into kingdoms.

"In the third, the petty princes or states, of which there were a great number, and which occupied each their sovereignties, or territories, throughout the whole extent of the empire.

"France had to consider these states in various points of view. Thus she could not regard Austria in the same light as Prussia.

"The former is always sufficiently powerful in Germany. Sometimes the latter is not enough. France ought no longer to view in the same light the two states, so various are their circumstances: thus it is not her province to mingle in disputes perfectly personal between Austria and Prussia. These two powers possess in themselves the means of balancing each other. The interference of France only begins to be reasonable when either of the two should abuse its superiority, in

BOOK XVI. burthen on Germany. Till then they ought to remain uninterrupted.

CHAP. V.

1815.

"But France should have a constant and babitual connexion with the powers of the second order: they form a barrier against the two former states, if they should have any idea of encroachment. France did this for Bavaria in 1778; and she ought always to be ready to do it again for all the states of the second order in Germany, without any distinction as to Protestant or Catholic. All these states are equally necessary to the safety of the empire and that of France.

"With the states of the third order the case is widely different. They do not possess any strength; they can lend no support to any one; they always require it from others. They do little else but render the machine more complicated, and serve to embarrass its movements.

We have no hesitation in saying, that, with regard to them, France should change the system which she has hitherto observed, and did actually support in the Congress. The difference in the events of the times is the reason. When Austria alone governed the German empire, the existence of this multitude of petty princes, who formerly were the sources of anarchy, might have had an useful result. Then too many obstacles could not be created, nor too many impediments offered. At that period France was the only support of the empire against Austria, and the only corrective of the diminutiveness of the German states. But, since the elevation of the Prussian power; since the states of Bavaria, of Wurtemberg, of Hanover, have acquired such an extent of territory, and increase of influence, Austria is sufficiently balanced. The smaller states cannot act against her; it is much more probable that they will act for ber, and that Austria will endeavour to create among them an honorable dependence upon her, and support them against the states of the second order.

"The interests of Germany and France equally require that this country should be relieved from the load of all the little sovereignties that hitherto have been of no use but to their possessors, and they should be incorporated with the states of the second order. This, in proportion as Russia approaches Germany, will become more necessary. The appearance of this new danger should have induced a system of fortifying the German powers, whose care and defence of their common mother is prevented by the consequences arising from the existence of these little states. These powers are, with Austria and Prussia, the rulers of the second order. The reader should not be tired with the repetition of the opinion, that, since unconquerable Russia has taken such a position as to enable her to knock at the doors of the German empire, every thing has undergone a total

change in that country. Instead of being inte. rested in the preservation of the petty states, it is rather for their abolition that we should now seek; for the simplification, rather than the com plication; and for the concentration, rather than the dispersion, of sovereignties, in order to be able to oppose the largest masses to those masses by which they are menaced. New dangers ought to lead us to seek for new safeguards. The French system has been very erroneous ou this subject. But, where its error has been at once the more remarkable and the more melancholy, is in the mode of opposition to Prussia; to give effect to which, she uniformly paid such great

attention.

"In the system which France should establish between herself and Prussia, there are two inva riable principles: alliance and distance. The one gives effect to the other.

"Hence, throughout the whole course of the Congress, France only laboured to put Prussia at a distance, and force her to withdraw to her own frontier. In short, to prevent that which at one and the same time precluded alliance, and created hostilility. This fatal mistake arose from the warmth with which France defended Saxony; for it is impossible not to remark, that, in proportion to her exertions in favor of the latter country, she increased the difficulties she had to encounter in her opposition to the approach of Prussia to the frontiers of France. There have been seen a vast number of notes on the subject of the incorporation of Saxony; but we have seen none on that of the inconveniencies likely to arise from the establishment of Prussia, at the very doors of France, between the Meuse and the Rhine, as well as between the Rhine and the Moselle.

"On ber arrival at the Congress, France found Saxony abandoned by Prussia and Russia, aban doned by Austria, neglected by Great Britain, and by the princes of the empire, who offered ber nothing but vain regrets. In this distressing si tuation it was that France undertook her cause. We have seen her spend four months in setting. all the springs of ber policy at work to increase the number of the defenders of Saxony.

"This system appeared alike contrary to the interests of France, of Saxony, and of Europe.

"First, To France it occasioned the loss of the most necessary of her allies, and indeed it changed her into an enemy. It brought near to her a power that ought ever to have been kept at a distance. It has embittered the minds of the Prussians, whose animosity, so active and fatal to France, has proceeded, in a great measure, from their resentment on the score of an oppos tion that frustrated the object of their most ardent desires. t France remained silent on the inva

sion of Italy by Austria, why did she make such a noise on that of Saxony, of importance to the liberties of Europe, while that of Italy cut it up by the roots?

"Second, The preservation of Saxony in its integrity being demonstrably impossible, but little service could be rendered to her by attaching so much importance to a question, the most fortunate result to which could not preserve her from being torn in pieces. Saxony should either have remained undivided under its own king, or that of Prussia. In fact, why was Saxony divided into two parts? Whom can the half of Saxony, by the side of Prussia, of Austria, and of Russia, serve or assist? In its state of consolidation it would have been lost amidst these three colossal powers. What situation will it occupy in its actual condition? Was it not a fine present to make to the King of Saxony, that of his dominions thus parcelled? Was it very consolatory to his subjects that some Saxons should remain to Saxony and its king, while they had to behold their separation from their fellow-citizens, and the division of their country? Was not the King of Saxony a very happy prince, in the midst of the shreds of his states, and the wrecks of a family, in which he could only calculate on hearing sighs, and witnessing a flow of tears? Was royalty well defended, most honored, by being left on the half of a throne? Let us be candid. It is not the title that makes the king, but the power. We can never conceive how they can reconcile the respect due to royalty, with the trifling consideration assigned to it in some countries. The throne should be raised so as to be seen from afar, and afford an imposing spectacle; in all countries it comes within the definition given of it by Napoleon-"Four bits of wood and a velvet carpet."

"Third, The opposition made by France to the designs of Prussia in favor of Saxony; which, taking from the latter the means of de"fence against Russia, has deprived Europe of its principal defensive point. It has now become the great interest of Europe. The colossal power of Russia has changed all its relations, a circumstance of which we must never lose sight.

"From all this, what has resulted? That Prussia has been rendered hostile to France; that she is weakened in the principal part of her defensive system against Russia; and that Saxony

CHAP. V.

1815.

has been rendered useless either to its own sove- BOOK XV. reign, who no longer possesses power, or to Prussia, who can reckon, for no great length of time, on the good-will of the Saxons. The Congress has taken too good care to catechise them on the subject of the union with Saxony, in order that the Saxons may, in a few years, become good Prussians. Of the probability of this alteration in character and feeling, we may judge by the circumstances that happened at Liege.

"Nothing has occurred to show the proceedings of France in favor of Denmark. This state, that, in the midst of the troubles of Europe, bas, for a century, exhibited an example of all the civil virtues, moderation, temperance, justice, and econony: this country, which has only rendered herself remarkable by the peaceable conquests she has made, by means of her industry and commerce, beheld herself on a sudden enveloped in disputes to which she was, from her character and habits, as great a stranger as by her geogra phical situation. There never was a more noble, nor more impartial conduct, than that which Denmark observed during the whole course of the revolution; however, she has lost her Norwegian dominions, and the very important point of Heligoland. There has only been assigned to her the shadow of an indemnity, notwithstanding the promise she received. The idea which has been evinced of re-erecting the Hanseatic towns, has frustrated the wish she had for two of them, Hamburgh and Lubeck, which, from their locality, appeared to belong to her. We cannot finish this chapter without paying a tribute of respect to the French legation. It was in a situation surrounded with difficulties: inheriting all the errors of French diplomacy for the last twenty-five years, although it was altogether a stranger to them: surrounded by jealousies, coalitions always directed against it, it was necessary for this legation to conduct itself through all these difficulties, and it has effected it with so much ability as to produce the remarkable circumstance, that the power, by far the least considerable as to strength, should have occupied a most distinguished situation; and the voice, which had been esteemed the least able, should have brought Europe to listen to it with the greatest attention: so well did the French negotiators know how to recompense France for the difficulties of the part they had to act, by their personal consistency and distinguished talents."

The situation of Louis, although surrounded with the legal authority of the nation, was at this time peculiarly hard and difficult. His obligations, on one hand, to the allied powers, who had placed him, and still maintained him, on the throne; and, on the other, to his own people, now galled and bound down under the yoke of those allies, produced a conflict of feelings and duties which must have proved extremely harassing. A circumstance, which exposed him to particular mortification, was passing directly in his view: the museum of the Louvre, rendered by a long series of French conquests the richest receptacle of the arts in Europe, was completely stript of its fruits of conquest by the allies. For the circumstances attending this interesting event, we are indebted to the narrative of Miss Helen Maria Williams, who was then on the spot;

"The period was now arrived when a new storm, no less horrible than unforeseen, brooded over Paris. It appears that the allied powers, amidst those rapid and brilliant successes, which, in the year 1814, had rendered them masters of the capital, had not overlooked the chefs-d'œuvre of art which had been wrested from their respective countries by the right of conquest.

"The allied sovereigns, when they visited the gallery of the Louvre, beheld pictures and statues once their own, and saw them noted in the preface of the catalogues, sold at the door, as the fruit of French victories. The Prussians had not failed to observe that pictures, which had decorated the bed-chamber of their beautiful and lamented queen, were then placed in the royal apartments of the palace of St. Cloud.

"There was also a statue in the museum which was known by the name of the Ganymede of Sans Souci. This statue was of bronze, and of the most beautiful workmanship; it was no less perfect than the Belvidere Apollo, and held that reputation in the north. It was erroneously called

a Ganymede, the pose of the arms leading to this mistake; but it is a gladiator, giving thanks to the gods for a victory just obtained.

"The Prassians demanded, in 1814, the res toration of this statue, of two pieces by Correggio, and the pictures of St. Cloud, which had been taken from the apartment of their queen.

"The restitution of these objects became the subject of a most fastidious negociation between M. Blacas and the ministers of Austria and Prus sia. It had been agreed at the peace of Paris, that nothing should be touched that was then exhibited in the museum, and M. Blacas wished to extend this article to all the paintings in the royal palaces. The negociation failed; Paris preserved its statues and pictures; and the Prus sians their regrets, at not having regained the trophies stripped from their queen's apartments.

"The allied armies, in 1815, again crowned the hills around Paris, and a capitulation was asked and granted. The provisionary govern ment demanded that the museum should remain untouched. The allied generals wrote with a pencil, on the margin of this article, non accorde (not granted). This refusal, it appears, did not arise so much from any decision taken with respect to the museum by the Duke of Wellington, who would not prejudge the question, but be cause General Blucher, supported by the public opinion of his country, had, in his own mind, determined upon taking. The article on the respect to be paid to public and private property was loosely worded. The provisionary government were, perhaps, not sorry to have left room for misinterpretation, since the surrender of Paris was unavoidable. The allies assert, that their respect for the monuments of the arts could never be justly applied to the retaking of objects which had at first been seized by violence.

"General Blucher, immediately upon his etrance into Paris, sent a letter to M. Denon, the director of the museum, demanding not only the objects of the last year's negociation with N Blacas, but what was also in the museum. M Denon answered, that it was an affair which must be negociated with his government, and that he would not give them up. M. Denon was ar rested during the night by twenty men, and wa

threatened to be sent to the fortress of Graudentz in west Prussia.

"From this argument there was no appeal. The objects demanded were delivered. This surrender was made in due order, and the Gladiator, the two pictures of Correggio, and some valuable pieces of the old German school, were carefully packed up by the persons employed at the museum. This would have been but a trifling Joss, had not the King of Prussia taken not only what belonged to Potzdam and Berlin, but also to Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle, countries on this side of the Rhine, and therefore not in his possession at that period, on the pretext that these objects belonged to the cathedral, and the municipality of those towns.

"The public mind again became tranquil; it was asserted these acts of Prussian violence had neither the assent of the Emperor of Russia nor of the Duke of Wellington, and it was currently believed, that they had condemned these mea

sures.

"Two months had now passed when the gallery of the Louvre was menaced from another quarter. The King of the Belgic provinces, now united to Holland, had published a constitution in the modern style, that is, on free and liberal principles. It was understood that it had met with a general acceptance, for who would refuse the blessings of liberty? The acceptance, however, was not so cordial as had been generally believed. There was a numerous and respectable class of the nhabitants of those provinces who were not eager o adopt strange doctrines, or suffer them to be dopted by those under their influence.

"The Catholic clergy, in that country, had displayed some energy, twenty years since, when, hreatened with liberal principles, they roused the aithful into insurrection against such innovations y their then lawful sovereign. The emperor, oseph II., who will be ranked in the class of hilosophic princes, was studious to introduce hat he deemed free and liberal principles among is Belgian subjects. But the clergy saw, in oleration, the destruction of religion, and in iberal principles the subversion of the privileges -f the church. They resisted, with force of arms, hose dangerous tenets, and framed for themelves a government exempt from such political eresies.

"A clergy, who had thus put themselves into ebellion, for their good old cause, against a Caholic prince," might well hesitate in accepting the resent of liberty which was now offered them by heir new Protestant sovereign, the King of Holand. Like the cautious high-priest of Troy, who roclaimed his fear of the Greeks and those who ere the bearers of gifts;' so they considered it s a duty to put themselves on their guard against

and narrowly inspect whether mischief might not BOOK XVI, lurk beneath a constitution, which was at least suspicious since it bore the name of liberty.

"This was a knotty affair; it was an easier enterprise for the allies to overthrow the tyrant of the world, and deliver Europe from its bondage, than for a Protestant prince to render himself popular to a Belgian Catholic clergy.

"The English government was highly interested in supporting the authority of his new Belgian majesty. It was, in fact, a kind of common concern. The churches of those provinces had been stript of their principal ornaments, and it was believed that the restoration of the pictures from their bondage, in the museum of Paris, would be an homage rendered to the faithful and the church, and would, perhaps, soften the opposition of its ministers to the acceptance of liberty.

"The public in England seemed at that time to have corresponding sentiments with the government, and to approve the removal of the paintings in sympathy with the Belgic churches.. These two causes led the English minister at Paris to give in a note in their favor to the Congress of the four powers who now governed the world, and who were here assembled. The arri val of M. Canova at Paris, at this period, led the English minister to take the same interest for his holiness the holiness the pope. He represented that the peace of Tolentino could not be the foundation of any. right, since the French, after taking the objects in question, had themselves broken the treaty, and that it was therefore just that the more powerful sovereigns should support the cause of the weaker, which was evidently the case with the pope. Lord Castlereagh furthermore represented the advantages which the arts would obtain by being cultivated at Rome, and that this idea had been so strongly impressed on the French artists themselves, that MM. Quatremere de Quincy, Denon, David, Giraudet, and forty other artists, had signed a petition, before their removal, to the directory, not to displace those objects.

"Those to whom the English minister's observations were known, seemed to consider them as made rather in compliance with a feeling of national jealousy than of strict justice; and, as actions are seldom placed to the account of the principal agents, the ardor of the English cabinet was attributed to the under-secretary, Mr. Hamilton, a gentleman known in the literary world by his travels in Greece and Egypt, and highly interested in the progress of the arts.

"But, however doubtful might bave been the right of the French, after the treaty of Tolentino had been broken, this reasoning could not be applied to the anterior treaty made with the Prince of Parma, which was the first treaty in which there was any article respecting paintings.

CHAP. VI.

1815.