wait on the commodore for that purpose, he gave up his prospects in Egypt, abandoned his property in that country, constituted Mr. Eaton general and commander in chief of his forces, and with such an army as he was able to raise and support, marched through the Lybian Desert, suffering every hardship incident to such a perilous undertaking, and with his army commanded by General Eaton, aided by O'Bannon and Mann, three American officers, who shared with him the dangers and hardships of the campaign, and whose names their country will forever record with honor, attacked the city of Derne, in the regency of Tripoli, on the 27th day of April, 1805, and, after a well-fought battle, took the same, and for the first time planted the American colors on the ramparts of a Tripolitan port. And in several battles afterwards, one of which he fought without the aid of the Americans (they having been restrained by orders, not warranted by any policy, issued, as appears, by Mr. Lear, the American consul), defeated the army of the usurper with great slaughter, and, without the hazard of a repulse, would have marched to the throne of Tripoli had he been supported by the cooperation of the American squadron, which in honor and good faith he had a right to expect. The committee would here explicitly declare that, in their opinion, no blame ought to attach to Commodore Barron. A wasting sickness and a consequent mental as well as bodily debility had rendered him totally unable to exercise the duties of commanding the squadron previously to this momentous crisis, and from which he has never recovered, and to this cause alone may be attributed the final failure of the plan of cooperation which appears to have been wisely concerted by the Government and hitherto bravely executed by its officers.

But, however unpleasant the task, the committee are compelled, by the obligations of truth and duty, to state further that Mr. Lear, to whom was intrusted the power of negotiating the peace, appears to have gained a complete ascendency over the commodore, thus debilitated by sickness, or rather, having assumed command in the name of the commodore, to have dictated every measure; to have paralyzed every military operation by land and sea, and finally, without displaying the fleet or squadron before Tripoli, without consulting either the safety of the ex-bashaw or his army, against the opinion of all the officers of the fleet, so far as the committee have been able to obtain the same, and of Commodore Rodgers (as appears from Mr. Lear's letter to the Secretary of State, dated Syracuse Harbor, July 5, 1805), to have entered into a convention with the reigning bashaw, by which, contrary to his instructions, he stipulated to pay him $60,000, to abandon the ex-bashaw, and to withdraw all aid and assistance from his army. Although a stipulation was made that the wife and children of the ex-bashaw should be delivered to him on his withdrawing from the territories of Tripoli, yet that stipulation has not been carried into execution, and it is highly probable was never intended to be. The committee forbear to make any comment whatever on the impropriety of the orders issued to General Eaton to evacuate Derne five days previous to Mr. Lear's sailing from Malta to Tripoli to enter on his negotiation, and the honor of the nation forbids any remarks on the unworthy attempt to compel the ex-bashaw and General Eaton to give up and abandon their conquest, by withholding supplies from the army at Derne, eight days previous to the commencement of the negotiation; nor will the committee condescend to enter into a consideration of the pretended reasons assigned by Mr.

Lear to palliate his management of the negotiations, such as the danger of the American prisoners in Tripoli, the unfitness of the ships for service, and the want of means to prosecute the war. They appear to the committee to have no foundation in fact, and are used rather as a veil to cover an inglorious deed than solid reasons to justify the negotiator's conduct. The committee are free to say that, in their opinion, it was the power of the United States, with the force then employed and a small portion of the $60,000 thus improperly expended, to have placed Hamet Caramalli, the rightful sovereign of Tripoli, on his throne; to have obtained their prisoners in perfect safety, without the payment of a cent, with assurances, and probable certainty, of eventual remuneration for all expenses, and to have established peace with the Barbary powers, that would have been secure and permanent, and which would have dignified the name and character of the American people.

Whatever Hamet, the ex-bashaw, may have said in his letter of June 29, 1805, to palliate the conduct which first abandoned and then ruined him, the Senate can not fail to discern that he was then at Syracuse, in a country of strangers to his merits and hostile to his nation and religion, and where every circumstance conspired to depress him, which, together with the fear of starving, left him scarcely a moral agent.

Upon these facts and to carry into effect the principle of duty arising out of them, the only remuneration now left in the power of the United States to make, the committee herewith present a bill for the consideration of the Senate. The committee are confident that the legislature of a free and Christian country can not leave it in the power of a Mohamedan to say that they violate their faith, or withhold the operations of justice from one who has fallen a victim to his unbounded confidence in their integrity and honor.

(Ex. Jour., vol. 2, pp. 4, 9, 15; Annals, 9th Cong., 1st sess., 185.)

April 19, 1806.

On the message transmitting correspondence between the ambassador of Tunis and the Secretary of State Mr. Baldwin reported as follows:

Resolved, That the communications accompanying the message of the President of the United States, of the eighteenth instant, be returned to him, and that he be requested to renew negotiations with the envoy of the bey of Tunis, and endeavor, by amicable adjustment, to settle differences which are stated to exist between that regency and the United States, and to redress the injuries and aggressions which the bey complains of having received from the squadron and agents of the United States in the Mediterranean, contrary, as he says, to the express provisions of the treaty, more than nine years subsisting between us, so far as he may deem it conformable to justice and the common usage of civilized nations in their intercourse with the Barbary powers, or the honor and interest of the United States may require.

(Ex. Jour., vol. 2, pp. 34; Annals, 9th Cong., 1st sess., 245–247.)

THIRTEENTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION.

July 27, 1813.

Mr. King, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, made the following report:

Your committee, to whom was referred the several motions with reference to the executive proceedings of the Senate in regard to the proposed treaty of peace with Great Britain under the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, and the nominations of Albert Gallatin, John Quincy Adams, and James A. Bayard as ministers plenipotentiary to negotiate such treaty, together with other executive proceedings of the Senate, beg leave to report, and to recommend the adoption of, the following resolutions:

Resolved, That the journal of the executive proceedings of the Senate be, from time to time, published, excepting such parts thereof as may have been ordered by the Senate to be kept secret.

Resolved, That the messages of the President of the United States, and the proceedings of the Senate, concerning the nominations of Jonathan Russell as minister plenipotentiary to the Court of Sweden, and of Albert Gallatin, John Quincy Adams, and James A. Bayard as envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary to negotiate and sign a treaty of peace with Great Britain under the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, to negotiate and sign a treaty of commerce with Great Britain, and to negotiate and sign a treaty of commerce with Russia, be published.

THIRTEENTH CONGRESS, THIRD SESSION.

February 23, 1815.

On the message of the President transmitting copies of correspondence at Ghent, Mr. Bibb reported as follows:

That it is inexpedient to print the said documents, or any part of them, and that they ought to be kept secret.

(Ex. Jour., vol. 2, p. 621.)

FOURTEENTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION.

December 15, 1815.

On the commercial convention between Great Britain and the United States, Mr. Bibb reported as follows:

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate do advise and consent to the ratification of the convention to regulate the commerce between the territories of the United States and of His Britannic Majesty, concluded at London, on the third day of July, one thousand eight hundred and fifteen; subject to the exception contained in the letter and declaration of Anthony St. John Baker, His Britannic Majesty's chargé d'affaires, dated the twenty-fourth day of November, one thousand eight hundred and fifteen.

(Ex. Jour., vol. 3, p. 6.)

January 9, 1816.

On an act concerning the convention to regulate the commerce between the territories of the United States and His Britannic Majesty, Mr. Bibb reported as follows:

Be it enacted and declared by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That so much of any act as imposes a higher duty of tonnage, or of impost on vessels and articles imported in vessels of Great Britain, than on vessels and articles imported in vessels of the United States, contrary to the provisions of the convention between the United States and His Britannic Majesty, the ratifications whereof were mutually exchanged the twenty-second day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fifteen, be, from and after the date of the ratification of the said convention, and during the continuance thereof, deemed and taken to be of no force or effect.

Approved, March 16, 1816.

(Senate Jour., pp. 32, 57, 258; Annals 14th Cong., 1st sess., 36; Stat. L., vol. 3, p. 255.)

February 15, 1816.

On the resolution of Mr. King, recommending to the President that he further pursue negotiations for additional treaty with Great Britain, Mr. Bibb reported as follows:

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the consideration of the following propositions

1. Of opening and establishing on a satisfactory footing the navigation, trade, and intercourse between the United States and His Majesty's colonies in the West Indies, and on the continent of America.

2. Of reopening to the United States the navigation of the River St. Lawrence, between the northern boundary and the city of Quebec; of opening to them the navigation of that river between Quebec and the ocean; and obtaining for the trade of the United States in that quarter, by the grant of a suitable equivalent, place of deposit on either bank of the St. Lawrence, within the province of Lower Canada. 3. Of abolishing the duties imposed on goods and merchandise exported from His Majesty's European dominions to the United States, or of reserving to them a right to countervail the same by other and adequate duties, and of placing the vessels of both parties on the same footing in respect to the amount of drawbacks.

4. Of agreeing on and establishing adequate stipulations for the protection of American seamen from British impressment.

5. Of defining the cases which shall alone be deemed lawful blockades.

6. Of enumerating the articles which shall alone be deemed contraband of war.

7. Of providing suitable regulations for the prosecution of neutral trade with the colonies of the enemies of either party.

8. Of protecting the vessels and merchandise of each from loss or damage by reason of the retaliatory decrees of either against a third power

Submit the following report:

The view which the committee have taken of the subject renders an

examination of the propositions, in detail, unnecessary. They have confined their inquiries to the considerations

1. Whether there be any circumstances which call for the proposed advice; and

2. Whether there be not serious objections to the interference of the Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations.

In relation to the first branch of inquiry it is deemed important to ascertain whether the Executive has duly attended to the objects comprised in the resolutions; and whether the advice of the Senate will furnish aid to his future exertions.

By recurring to documents in possession of the Senate it will be seen that the most unremitted efforts have been employed to obtain satisfactory arrangements upon the points concerning which the advice is proposed. The committee need not refer to the volumes of instructions and correspondence which have been published. They will advert only to the late negotiations at Ghent and London. The attention of the Executive appears to have been directed in those negotiations to two objects-peace and commerce; and authority was given to our ministers to form a treaty for each. By the letter of April 15, 1813, they were instructed to provide against impressment and illegal blockades; to restrict contraband of war to its just limits; to remove restraints on our commerce with the enemy's colonies; to prohibit the seizure of our vessels returning from an enemy's port laden with innocent articles, on the pretext of their having carried contraband of war, or on their passage from one port to another, or from the port of one independent nation to that of another; to exempt our merchant vessels from the necessity of sending their boats with men and papers aboard a British ship of war for the purpose of search. This instruction provides in explicit terms for Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the resolutions, and by obvious inference for No. 8; for if neutral rights are defined and secured in the instances above specified, the injury suggested in that number could never occur.

The letter of April 27, 1813, which, with other documents, accompanies this report, and which authorized the negotiation of a treaty of commerce in the event of concluding a treaty of peace, directs the attention of our ministers to all the objects of the motion. They are instructed by it to endeavor to open to our commerce every part of the British dominions on a footing of reciprocity and equality, and are referred, in aid of their own experience and knowledge of the subject, to the light to be derived from the treaty of 1794 and its effect on the general commerce of the country; to the instructions given to Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, of April 17, 1806; to the project of a treaty signed by them on the 31st of December of the same year, and to the subsequent remarks and instructions of the Executive respecting it. By this instruction every subject which could be considered a proper object of arrangement between the United States and Great Britain was committed to the American ministers and all the light which the labor and talent of preceding times had afforded was communicated as their guide.

The correspondence between the ministers of the United States and those of Great Britain at Ghent and London and the communications of the former to the Department of State furnish satisfactory evidence that no effort which belonged to either negotiation was neglected and that the failure to arrange the subjects embraced by the resolutions was owing to the manifest indisposition of the British plenipotentiaries to concur in any satisfactory stipulations concerning them. If, there