General demurrer. the demurrer; but the Court, having intimated a Channell, Serjt. who abandoned the argument. BUSINESS OF THE WEEK. EVANS . WATSON.-Byles, Serjt. moved for a rule, call- Rule to shew cause. SARGENT v. WRIGHT.-Allen, Serjt. moved to enter up judgment upon a warrant of attorney, more than a year old. Rule absolute. (with him J. Brown), shewed cause. Talfourd, Serjt. in Rule absolute for a new trial, upon payment of costs. case, GIBBONS v. ALISON.-Channell, Serjt. (with him Bovill), shewed cause. Shee, Serjt. (with him Petersdorf), in support of the rule for a new trial. The action was case for maliciously holding to bail. The judge who tried the cause, though he thought that want of reasonable and probable had left both that question and the question of malice for the cause was not proved, had declined to decide that point, and jury. After argument upon the facts, the Court now thought that the judge ought to have held, and to have told the jury, that there was was no reasonable or probable cause for holding the plaintiff to bail. suited upon a trial that came before my brother Cresswell at the Liverpool assizes, a rule to shew cause was granted why such nonsuit should not be set aside and a new trial had, on the ground of misdirection. The declaration stated that the plaintiff was possessed of a house, and that the defendants were possessed of large quantities of dangerous gas, and that the defendants took so little and such had care of the gas, that it passed into the house of the plaintiff, and exploded and damaged the plaintiff's house. The defendants pleaded the general issue, "not guilty," and the learned judge ruled, on the evidence brought forward, that the injury was not occasioned by the neglect of any duty cast by law upon them, the defendants. We think, on the facts proved at the trial, such direction was right. The plaintiff was the owner of a house which had been let out to successive tenants, the last of whom had been in possession for about two years, the house having been supplied with gas by the defendants during the whole time of his Rule to shew cause. TILT. LOANES.-Sir Thos. Wilde, Serjt. moved to put tenancy by means of pipes and fixings, which were off the trial, upon affidavits that material witnesses were put up and fixed within the house at the expense of abroad. Application granted. the plaintiff-the landlord-and all of which were his WALLIS v. BROWN and ANOTHER.-Byles, Serjt. shewed property. The last tenant had quitted the house aside the appearance entered for one of the defendants. The cause against the rule obtained by Allen, Serjt. for setting about ten days before the explosion took place. Pre-question turned entirely upon the credit due to the different viously to his quitting, he gave notice to the company affidavits. Rule discharged. that no further supply would be wanted by him, and SUMMERS . OGDEN.-Dowling, Serjt. moved for a rule, requested them to remove the lamp from the dining-calling upon the plaintiff to shew cause why the Master room, which was his property. The plaintiff left the should not review his taxation, on the ground that the Master house in the care of a servant on the 28th of March, judge's order, which the plaintiff had failed to obey, a rule ought to have allowed the defendant the costs of making a and there was no appearance of the pipe having been of Court. left improperly, and there was no smell of gas in the house. No explanation was given as to the mode in which the escape of the gas, or the explosion which took place on the 8th of April, was occasioned; but it might fairly be inferred that the inside pipe between the gas-meter and the burner had been cut by some wrong-doer, who had entered the house during the time it was empty, and during the interval between the days. The mode by which the gas was conveyed to the house was a tube or pipe, which communicated with the main in the street, and which passed through the outer walls into the meter, and from thence supplied two lamps in the house, which were fitted up with proper stop-cocks fitted to each. There was a stop-cock to each between the inside of the wall and the meter, of which the tenant had the key, and he could stop the gas entering the house altogether, if such stoppage was required; but the company had no stop-cock to the gas at the outside of the meter. On the part of the plaintiff, it was contended that it was the duty of the defendants, on notice by any tenant of the house that the supply of gas was no longer wanted, to turn off the gas completely from the house; that they had no right to introduce the gas into the house after such notice, and that if an outer stop-cock in the street was absolutely necessary for the purpose, it was their duty to have provided such stop-cock accordingly; and if such duty was cast by law on the defendants, the direction of the learned judge was undoubtedly wrong, as no such stop-cock was provided. On looking at the Act under which this company was formed, no such direction appears to have been given to the company by the legislature, though it appeared in evidence that a different company had been formed in the same town, and that such company had used an outer stop-cock in the same way, but they had no authority, as it appears to us, to do so; and as the legislature is silent on this point, the common law would impose no precise duty on the defendants, or any other duty than that which is expressed in the doctrine generally held, the duty of using proper and sufficient care in the supply of gas. Now, looking to the liability of the defendants in this point of view, it appears to us that the injury sustained by the plaintiff is not solely attributable to the want of due care on the part of the defendants, but that the plaintiff has, by his own voluntary aid, been contributory to it himself. The plaintiff knew that the pipe which brought the gas into the house still remained as before, with the stop-cock in the inside of the house, which would prevent the gas from being supplied to the house, if properly turned off; and the house be- PRICE ET UXOR U. JAMES.-Channell, Serjt. moved for ing without a tenant, was under his own charge and a rule for the plaintiff to shew cause why the rule for a new care. We think, therefore, the plaintiff was himself trial should not be discharged. The rule for a new trial, upon wanting in ordinary care, in not seeing that the stop-there had been no service of the rule, and no appointment payment of costs, had been made absolute last Term, but cock in the inside was closed, which would effectually to tax costs. Rule to shew cause. have prevented the gas from escaping; and this defence COULTHAS . Bowes, Clerk.-Talfourd and Channell, appears, as we think, open to the defendants, under the Serjts. (with them O'Malley and Wells), shewed cause general issue, on the decision in the case of Bridge v. against the rule for a new trial. Sir Thos. Wilde and Byles, The Grand Junction Railway (3 M. & W. 244). We, Serjts. (with them Prendergast), supported the rule. therefore, think the nonsuit right, and the rule for setting it aside must be discharged. Rule discharged. Friday, May 29. Rule absolute. the plaintiff, and no one appearing for the defendant, Channell, Serjt. for the defendant, admitted that he could Judgment for the plaintiff. Rule absolute. Saturday, May 30. TOWERS U. TURNER.-Channell, Serjt. moved for a rule One of Rule refused. Argument adjourned. ELY U. SMITH.-Byles, Serjt. moved for a rule to shew Rule to shew cause. Cur, adv. vult. DOE dem. HARRISON, Clerk, v. HAMPSON.-Dowling, DOE dem. BAILEY and OTHERS v. FOSTER.-Channell, Serjt. (with him Bovill), shewed cause. Byles, Serjt. (with him Ogle), in support of the rule. Argument adjourned. Tuesday, June 2. Re BULL.-Allen, Serjt. moved for a rule calling upon one of the Commissioners of the District Court of Bankruptcy at Leeds, and upon the gaoler of York Castle, to shew cause The application was substantively the same with that made why the bankrupt should not be discharged from custody, in the Bail Court in the same case in last Term (Law T. Vol. VII. p. 117), and met with the same result. Rule refused. DOE dem. BAILEY v. FOSTER.-Argument concluded. (Reported in another part of this paper.) Rule discharged. PIGGOT V. EASTERN COUNTIES RAILWAY COMPANY.Channell, Serjt. (with him Bovill) shewed cause. Shee, Serjt. in support of the rule. It was an action on the case for negligence, whereby some stacks of the plaintiff had been set on fire by sparks from the steam-carriages of the defendant. Evidence had been received, that on occasions different from that upon which the negligence was said to have taken place, large sparks had been thrown by the engines to a considerable distance. It was objected, upon moving for a new trial, that this was evidence of misconduct upon the part of the defendants at different occasions from that which furnished the present action, and therefore inadmissible. Upon evidence, the rule was granted. The judge who tried the case this point, and upon the ground that the verdict was against now reported that the evidence had been given to shew that the steam-carriages were capable of throwing sparks to the distance at which the stacks stood from the railway. The case was argued on the other point. Rule discharged. Wednesday, June 3. RIKY . PRESTWICK. Rule to shew cause. DOE dem. BLOOMFIELD V. EYRE.-Channell, Serjt. (with him Willes), for the plaintiff. Tulfourd, Serjt. (with him Bovill), for the defendant. Cur, adv. vult. JOLL and ANOTHER V. STEWART.-All the paper books having been delivered by the plaintiff, and the defendant not ment of the Court. having paid for his copies, Manning, Serjt. prayed the judg Judgment for the plaintiff. HAYWARD U. BENNETT.-Byles, Serjt. for the plaintiff. Talfourd and Channell, Serjts. for the defendant. Cur, adv. vult. REEVES V. GROOM.-Talfourd, Serjt. moved to set aside proceedings, on the ground that the defendant had not been the appearance entered for the defendant, and all subsequent served with process. Rule to shew cause. Thursday, June 4. SMITH and ANOTHER, Executors, v. EARL OF CHARLE VILLE.-Channell, Serjt. moved for leave to sign judgment in the sci. fu. herein. He mentioned that the affidavits were entitled as this motion is, and not in the original action which had been brought by the testator. Application granted. SAME. EARL OF MORNINGTON.-Channell, Serjt. made a similar motion to the above. Application granted. FRANCIS V. DODSWORTH.-Manning, Serjt. moved for a rule to shew cause why the demurrer or rejoinder to the replication herein should not be set aside for duplicity. Rule to shew cause. GALLY. ROUND.-Shee, Serjt. (with him Bramwell) have supported the rule. After reading the report of the was to have shewn cause. Byles, Serjt. (with him Lush) to judge who tried the case. Rule discharged. TEMPEST V. KILLNER.-Talfourd, Serjt. (with him Cleas by) for the plaintiff, consented to have the verdict reduced to 251. Byles, Serjt. (with him Atherton) for the defendant.. Rule accordingly. BOWLBY U. BELL.-Byles, Serjt. (with him Archbold), shewed cause. Channell, Serjt. (with him Atherton), in Cur, adv. vult. support of the rule. ment upon a plea of nul tiel record to an action on a judg- 11 Geo. 1, whereby it is ordered that issues are to be entered COURT OF EXCHEQUER. Construction of 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 100-Tithes--What is a modus within the meaning of the words "DE MODO DECIMANDI." tithes, and came before the Court on a motion for a This was an action of debt for not setting out new trial on the ground of misdirection. At the trial it appeared that the plaintiff was the rector of the parish of Ford, in which parish there were certain lands belonging to the defendant and his ancestors. of tithes claimed to be due to the plaintiff in respect of those lands. The action was brought to recover triple the value The defence set up was, that a modus of 401. had been from time immemorial, and still was, payable by the lord of the manor of Ford to the parson in lieu of tithes, and that the tithes were paid to the lord. The payment of this modus was proved for 63 years, and also that the lord had enjoyed the tithes during that time, whereupon the learned judge directed the jury that the case fell within 3 & 4 Wm. 4. c. 100, and the jury found for the defendant. Sir F. Kelly, S.G., Sir Thos. Wilde, Q.S., Knowles, Q.C., and Crompton, shewed cause, citing Pigot v. Heron (Cro. El. 595, 1 Moor. 483); Dykes v. Thompson (1 Wood, 513, Eagle & Y. 692); Phillips v. Prytherick (4 Wood's Decr. 73, 3 E. & G. 1273; Pigot v. Simpson (Cro. Eliz. 763); Stamford v. Donbar (13 M. & W. 822). Watson, Q.C., Addison, and Manisty, appeared to sup port the rule. The arguments appear so fully in the judgment, that it is unnecessary to set them out here. Cur, adv. vult. JUDGMENT. The LORD CHIEF BARON.-In this case, which was heard before my brothers, Parke, Alderson, Rolfe, and myself, on Thursday and Friday last, the principal question was elaborately argued by the learned counsel on both sides. That question was, whether the prescription or right under which the defendant insisted on his non-liability to tithes in kind to the plaintiff, the rector, was a modus exemption, or discharge of tithes under the 2 & 3 Wm. 4, c. 100, s. 2, and rendered, therefore, valid by user for two incumbencies, and three years for a third, and such further time as would make sixty-three years under the provisions of that Act. We are all of opinion that it was not a modus exception or discharge, and consequently that there must be a new trial. The jury found that the defendant and his ancestors had, during the term mentioned in that statute immediately preceding the commencement of the statute, held and enjoyed the lands in respect of the title for which the action was brought, freed and discharged of title by reason of a payment to the lord of the manor of Ford of an annual sum of 40l. payable as and for payable, &c from time immemorial in lieu and compensation of all manner of tithes within the said manor; and that it was part of the same custom that the lord, in consideration of the payment of 401. should leave to him, his heirs, and assigns, a tenth of all titheable matters in the said manor, or any part thereof; and upon this finding, with reference to which the opinion of my brother Rolfe was given on the trial, the question arises, whether it be within the statute or not. The right they have claimed, if it has existed beyond time of legal memory, would (subject to an objection which will be afterwards noticed) be valid upon the principle laid down in the cases of Pigott v. Heron (Croke, Eliz. 519; Moore, 483); Pigott v. Simpson (Croke, Eliz. 763); Philips v. Prytherick (3 Eagle and Young, 1273); and Dykes v. Thomson (Eagle and Young, 692); and though in the first-mentioned case of Pigott v. Heron, according to the report in Croke, the Court appears to have treated the prescription as consisting of two parts: the first, a modus by the lord for himself and his tenants, to bar the parson from demanding tithes in specie; and the second, a prescriptive right in the lord to have the tenth thereof, &c. not as tithes, but a temporal right, analogous to a rent service of his tenants; yet the judges of the court, in the subsequent case of Pigott v. Sympson (Croke, Eliz. 763) and Lord Coke's statement in the Bishop of Winchester's case (2 Coke, 45 and 46), put the decision upon a different ground, and treated the prescription as giving the lord a title, by the special matter to title as such, as appurtenant to his manor, with a right to sue for them in the spiritual Court, and this appears to us to be the true principle of this decision. The prescription gives a title to the lord to the tithes themselves lying in the manor, and the only payment to the rector is the principle or prescriptive rent (as it is termed in Dykes v. Thomson), given as the, or compensation for the, parcel of tithes; and this view of the case was evidently taken by the House of Lords on the appeal from the decree of my brother Alderson, reported in 11th Clark and Finnelly, their Lordships having treated the claims of the defendant, not, as properly speaking, a modus, but a claim of title to a parcel of tithes as against the parson, and therefore they reversed the decree; a court of equity not lending its assistance in a case of dispute of title to the tithes; this being, therefore, a prescription title to a parcel of tithes, and the immemorial payment, a prescriptive rent for them, the Act appears to all of us not to apply; the pension is not a modus according to the legal definition of that term, De modo Decimandi, 13th Coke, page 12. It is not given in satisfaction of tithes, for the occupier has always been liable to pay tithe, and has paid them either by render or retainer, though not the rector; a modus and a liability to pay tithe in kind for the same land cannot co-exist; they are perfectly inconsistent; nor do we think that this is a modus in the sense of that -term, as used in the Act, for we see no reason to believe that the framer of the statute used it in any other than its proper sense; and this appears by section 1, which provides that if a modus has been paid for thirty years, it may be defeated by shewing the payment of tithes in kind, that is, the payment to any one; and the word must be used in the same sense in the subsequent part of the clause, so that a modus in the sense given by the Act is as inconsistent with the render of tithe, as it is according to its proper legal acceptation; and it is clear that this is not an exemption "or discharge," the lands of which the title is claimed in this suit being liable to the payment of tithe according to the alleged prescription. In truth, there is a contest between the lord and the rector as to the tithe to a parcel of tithes admitted to be due from the occupier to some one; the statute never was meant to apply to disputed tithes, to the ownership of tithes, or to make a bad tithe to a parcel of tithes good. It was enacted, in cases of the occupier who had not paid tithe in kind at all, but been totally exempt, or had paid something in lieu of it, for a long period, and relief is given by shortening the time of prescription, and thus facilitating the proof of his title to exemption, or to pay tithe otherwise than in kind. We all, therefore, think that there must be a new trial, when the question to be decided on the whole evidence will be, whether the payment of 401. a year was immemorial or not. If it should be proved to be such, the question will arise whether the prescription for the lord and his assigns to take the tithes be good, a point which has not been fully argued before us, and upon which we do not feel called upon to give any opinion in the present stage of the proceedings. Therefore, the rule for a new trial must be made absolute. Rule absolute. BROWN v. WILKINSON. In an action against the owner of a ship for an injury to another vessel by collision, the measure of damages recovered may be commensurate with the value of the ship doing the injury at the moment the injury is caused. This was an action brought by the plaintiff to recover compensation from the defendant, as owner of a certain vessel which had come in collision with a ship of the plaintiff, and had done her considerable injury. The defendant having suffered judgment by default, a writ of inquiry to assess damages was executed before the Secondary, when a verdict was given for the plaintiff for 2591. which was the full amount of the injury done. Upon this a rule was obtained by Fish, calling on the plaintiff to shew cause why the verdict should not be set aside, and a new inquisition had, or a verdict entered for nominal damages, on the ground that the damages were excessive. The grounds for this motion were, that the 53 Geo. 3, c. 159, limited the damages to be recovered to the value of the ship inflicting the injury, and the freight then accruing due to her owners. Now in this case, the vessel doing he injury had, at the time she inflicted the injury on the plaintiff's ship, given herself a deathblow, and had immediately sunk; it was therefore contended, that her value at that time was to be the amount of damages, and as she had received her death-blow, it could be but nominal. Watson, Q. C. and James, now (Feb. 11) shewed cause, and contended that the measure of damages was to be taken at the time of the collision, and not afterwards; that it must be taken, in fact, at a time when, being a floating body capable of motion, and governed by the defendant's agents, she committed the tortious act for which compensation was sought; they also contended that as the defendant had suffered judgment by default, he could not now raise this defence, but should have done so by a prope plea. Martin, Q.C. and Firsh, contrà. JUDGMENT. Cur, adv. vult. is to be liable in case of single loss, and restricts the liability to that value simply when there are several losses; it gives the right to the parties who can present a description of their value to have it apportioned among the several claimants. The statute, in the event of one loss only, does not give the shipowner a right to file a bill, and to go to a court of equity to decide on the value of the ship, but it leaves the amount of damages sustained to be settled by a court of law, and hence in the present case the defendant must be liable to some amount, and must shew only some amount or some value of ownership. At what time the value was to be established, if the matter was res integra, is a question that is not one of much doubt; the Court of Queen's Bench have already decided that the value was not to be calculated at the time of the commencement of the voyage, but at the time of the loss; and in so doing, they have not adverted to the circumstances that arise from several losses. Then the statute in this section clearly contemplates some value to be paid into court; and if there are several losses at the time, and what loss as to value, is to be given. This section is not considered by the Court in W-v. Dixon (2 B. & Ald. 2), and probably if it had been adverted to, it would have said that is the value at the commencement of the voyage, which is that which naturally would be the amount of the shipowner's insurance, and which would be the same whatever the number of accidents there might be during the voyage, and that would have been the value contemplated by the statute. From the practice in the Court of Admiralty, no light can be thrown on this question, for that Court has another and different jurisdiction. But with regard to the question whether the value is to be taken as the measure of liability, as the point has been decided by the case referred to, we pause before we overrule that authority. It is not, however, necessary for this Court to do so; for we think, according to the true meaning of that decision, that the value at the time of the loss to which the damages are restrained, is the value at the moment the loss commenced by the collision with the defendant's ship, when the injury is inflicted, and that cannot be reduced by the consideration that the defendant's vessel is about to founder, at which time it really is of no value. It would be to exempt the defendant altogether, which the statute does not contemplate under any circumstances. Now, in this case, it is immaterial whether we take this value, or the value of the defendant's vessel at the commencement of the voyage, as the limit of the damages to be given; for the present, we think that the verdict given is correct, and that the rule must be discharged. Rule discharged. LAW v. THOMPSON. Where plaintiff's particulars of demand claimed a sum of money to be due for plaintiff's services as clerk to the defendant; and by his amended particulars the plaintiff claimed the amount as due for his services, "after the rate of 2001. per annum;" and at the trial the evidence shewed a sum to be owing from the defendant to the plaintiff for services performed by the latter, such services to be paid for by a certain per-centage on the defendant's business: Held, that there was a material variance between the particulars and the case established by the evidence, and that the plaintiff ought to have been nonsuited. Joseph Browne shewed cause against a rule which had been obtained by Jervis, Q.C. to enter a nonsuit in the above case-the rule having been moved on the ground that the plaintiff's particulars of demand were not supported by the evidence. The action was in assumpsit, and by his particulars the plaintiff claimed the sum of 4501. for his services as clerk to the defendant from August 1837, to Oct. 1839, inclusive. The defendant applied for further particulars, and in his amended particulars the plaintiff added the words, "after the rate of 2001. per annum." The pleas were, non assumpsit, the Statute of Limitations, and a set-off; and by the plea of the Statute of Limitations, the plaintiff's claim was reduced to the sum of 1001. for which amount the verdict was given; but the evidence established a claim on the part of the plaintiff for commission, to be estimated by a certain per-centage on the amount of business done by the defendant in each year. PARKE, B. now delivered the judgment of the Court.-In this case, the plaintiff sued the de. fendant, as the registered owner of a certain brig, for negligence and improper navigation of his vessel, by which the plaintiff's vessel was injured. The Court gave judgment by default; at the inquisition, the jury assessed the damages at 2511. Mr. Fish moved, in Michaelmas Term last, for a new inquiry on the ground that by the same strike that did the damage to the plaintiff's vessel, the defendant received her death wound, and soon after sunk. The defendant contended that his vessel was of no value at the time of the plaintiff's loss, and that by the 53 Geo. 3, c. 159, s. 3, the damages ought to have been merely nominal. In this (Hilary) Term cause was shewn by Mr. Watson, who sub. mitted that the rule should be discharged, and the case was fully argued. It was contended that the object of the statute, the 59 Geo. 3, c. 159, s. 3, was to give to British shipping all the protection in navigation from loss that foreign states extend to theirs. This protection goes to the extent of permitting the owner, at the end of a voyage, to give up the vessel in its then state, with a full satisfaction to the parties, and if it be lost the owner is altogether exempt from the benefit of insurance beyond the surplus. Supposing the act to have been framed on this principle, and to have this effect, we ought to know the time it happened, the defendant's vessel having been totally lost immediately after the defendant was really exempt from all liability. If this argument Joseph Browne.-There is no doubt that in this case were well founded, the consequence would be, the de- the plaintiff was bound by the wording of the amended fendant ought to plead; at the same time the total particulars, but the question is, whether or not the loss is matter of defence to the action, although defendant was misled by them. [ALDERSON, B.— the judgment by default admits all liability to A salary is totally different from a payment by compay some damages. But the argument cannot mission at so much per cent.] It is submitted that be supported. It may indeed be true the legislature, the defendant was not damaged by the incorrect mode by giving relief by a series of statutes on the subject, of stating the claim. [ALDERSON, B.-The princiending with the 53 Geo. 3, had the former statutes ple on which you make your claim is wrongly set in view, and proceeded in their spirit, but they have forth; the contract between the parties for a payment not introduced the liability in the provisions of this by way of salary would be quite different from a constatute. There is not a word in the statutes protect- tract to pay a per-centage.] If the defendant has ing shipowners from all liability if the ship is lost, been misled by the plaintiff's particulars, the proper whatever the result be, or to take away the benefit course is for him to bring that fact under the notice to any parties of insurance under any circumstances of the Court by affidavit; here no such affidavit is prowhatever; all that they have done is to restrict the duced. (Hurst v. Watkins, 1 Camp. 68; v. Bower, liability of the shipowner to the value of the ship and ib. 69, note.) If it appeared to the Court, either by freight at the time, but no more. The Act specifies affidavit or from the nature of the misstatement, that the value shall go to the extent to which_the owner│the_defendant was, or must necessarily have been misled, the Court would, no doubt, hold that the plaintiff was bound by his particulars. (Lambirth v. Roff, 8 Bing. 411.) At all events, the rule should be for a new trial, with leave to the plaintiff to amend his particulars. Jervis, Q.C. and Crompton, in support of the rule. -In Mahon v. Ward (Law T. Jan. 1846), there was no substantial variance; here there is. It is not indispensable that there should be an affidavit by defendant that he was misled. Many cases occur in which the judge would nonsuit; but in which the defendant, knowing, as he must do, what the contract really was, could not have been misled. PLATT, B.-Suppose a declaration with two counts for goods sold and delivered, and for freight, and suppose the particulars are for goods sold and delivered only, that would not be sufficient. Here the defence prepared would be materially influenced by the particulars, because the Statute of Limitations would apply differently according to the nature of the contract between the parties; that is, whether the plaintiff's claim be for a salary or for commission. (Holland v. Hopkins, 2 B. & P. 243.) POLLOCK, C.B.-In this case there is a substantial variance between the case set up at the trial and the plaintiff's particulars; a payment by way of commission is very different from a payment by way of salary. I think the plaintiff ought to have been nonsuited; but as the jury have found a verdict for the plaintiff, which is stronger than an affidavit of merits would have been, there should be a new trial, on payment of costs by the plaintiff. ALDERSON, B.-In determining whether the particulars in any case are sufficient, we must consider not merely whether the defendant has, in fact, been misled, but whether they were calculated to mislead him; that is, whether a reasonable man would, under the circumstances, be probably deceived by the particulars-that is the true test. ROLFE, B.-I concur. The question is this, are the particulars calculated to mislead? It has often been held, that particulars were sufficient, which, although wrong, were not calculated to mislead. PLATT, B. concurred. Rule absolute for a new trial, on payment of costs by the plaintiff. The plaintiff to be at liberty to amend within a week after taxation. Saturday, May 30. In an action for goods sold and delivered, the particular delivered was for goods bargained and sold: Held no variance. This was an action for goods sold and delivered, money lent, and on account stated. The particulars were for goods bargained and sold. A verdict having been found for the plaintiff, tion, a sixth would be taken off; it is therefore neces- Wednesday, June 3. SPECIAL PAPER. A plea in abatement is bad which states that the debt Plea, in abatement-That the debt was contracted Crompton, in support of the demurrer, was stopped by the Court, who called on first issued, would have relief in some shape or other. Torts are, in their nature, joint and several; and Lord Ellenborough's dictum, as cited from Campb. R. is extra-judicial and incorrect. This dictum, it is true, has been adopted by Mr. Chitty, in his work on Pleadings, but it is not supported by any authority. Here the party first sued should have pleaded in abatement. As he omitted to do this, it remained for the present defendant to plead in abatement. Prior to the statute 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, only one action against all jointly could have been brought if the parties had taken the proper steps. That Act was framed without reference to the rules of pleading, and the object of the 8th section was to prevent the injustice and embarrassment which were so frequently occasioned to a party suing, by reason of his nonjoinder of all the contracting parties. This Act has nothing to do with the present question, and, independently of its provisions, I hold this plea to be bad. ALDERSON, B.-The defendant ought to have pleaded in abatement; and, on the other party being made a co-defendant, a plea should have been pleaded of the pendency of the action previously commenced against him. This would have been a good defence as to both the defendants. ROLFE, B.-King v. Hoare has no bearing on this case; that was decided on the principle that the prior action had proceeded to judgment. The rule transit in rem judicatam was held to be applicable. PLATT, B.-If there were execution against one of the defendants only, he could of course sue his co-defendants for contribution. It is quite true that the law, according to the cases cited, will not permit a double vexation, but here the defendants in the two actions are different persons. There must be judgment for the plaintiff. Judgment for the plaintiff. STEADMAN v. HOCKLEY. certificated conveyancer has no lien on deeds sent to him, and in respect of which business is to be done by him. This was an action of defiuue, to which the defendant pleaded that he was a conveyancer duly certificated under the statute, and entitled to fees as such -that the deeds sued for were delivered to him for that he did - Bramwell, who appeared in support of the plea.If the Court hold this plea to be bad, the decision will tend to encourage a multiplicity of actions on joint contracts, and will put it in the plaintiff's power to cause great vexation and embarrassment to the contract of parties; the rule of law, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causâ, appplies emphatically to such a case. [ALDERSON, B.-How so? That maxim would apply if this defendant were sued jointly with the other party in the action previously commenced; but it does not apply where the two actions are against different parties. POLLOCK, C. B.-You ought to have pleaded the nonjoinder in abatement first, and when the plaintiff had issued his writ, and declared against both the contract of parties, you might have pleaded the pendency of the former action, which would have been good.] If this plea is held to be bad, an absurdity will be occasioned by the stat. 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, s. 8. That section enacts, that "no plea in abatement for the nonjoinder of any person as a co-defendant shall be allowed in any court of common law, unless it shall be stated in such plea that such person is resident within the jurisdiction of the court, and unless the place of residence of such person shall be stated with convenient certainty in an business to be done respectively by bim affidavit verifying such plea." Now, if an action this business, and that a sum of money was due and were brought against one of several joint contractors, owing from the plaintiff to him for and in respect of of whom one was abroad, the party sued could not such work and labour, and that defendant was enplead in abatement, by reason of the above enact-titled to hold the deeds for the money so due and ment, and the plaintiff might consequently bring owing. To this plea the plaintiff demurred specially; the separate actions against the other parties residing plea did not set out any agreement between the parties, within the jurisdiction of the Court. The observa- or any custom by virtue of which a lien could be tions of Alderson, B. in King v. Hoare (13 M. & W. claimed; the question therefore was, whether the 494, 498), are strong in my favour. There it was held common law recognized the lien contended for set up that a judgment (without satisfaction) recovered by the defendant. against one of two joint debtors, is a bar to an action against the other; there the learned baron intimated that a creditor cannot, in the case of a joint contract, have several suits against the different parties to such contract. [ALDERSON, B.-Why cannot the defendant here plead in abatement? If he did so, the plaintiff would probably discontinue the first action.] He must in the first place apply to the Court for a rule to discontinue. [POLLOCK, C. B.-Yes; but that is grantable ex debito justitia.] In an action in form, ex delicto, it is submitted that a plea framed like the present would be good, and there the defendant could not plead in abatement. [POLLOCK, C. B.-You may sue each of several joint-stock proprietors, but a judgment recovered against one would be an answer to a second action.] Boyce v. Bailiffe, (1 Camp. 58, 2 Cas.); Boyce v. Douglas (cited ib. n.); Earl of BedThis was an action of debt on an attorney's bill. ford v. Bishop of Exeter (Hobart, 137); and the judgPlea-That no bill was delivered. ment of Holt, C.J. in 1 Shower, 75, are authorities in Replication, as to a portion of the amount claimed-support of this plea. [ALDERSON, B.-This plea that a bill was delivered; and as to the residue, a personal delivery of the bill to the defendant. The rule was moved on the ground that the court in which the business had been done was not specified. Jervis, Q. C. and Simon, having shewn cause, Martin, Q. C. and Hugh Hill, in support of the rule for a nonsuit.-The plaintiff was bound to deliver a bill of costs shewing clearly the nature of the transaction in respect of which the business was transacted for which the claim was made; it must be such that the party charged may know, on looking at the bill, whether the charges made in it are correct or not. This must be so, because those charges are different in the different courts; and unless this information be given in the bill, the defendant could not judge as to the propriety of referring the bill to taxation, or whether, if referred, a sixth would be taken off or not. They referred to the remarks of Lord Denman, C. J. in Martindale v. Faulkner (10 Jurist, 161), and the statutes 2 Geo. 2, c. 23, s. 23; 6 Vict. c. 73, ss. 7, Pearson moved for a nonsuit, or a new trial, on the ground of a variance between the declaration and particulars of demand, and contended that the plaintiff had no right to give evidence of goods sold and delivered under a particular for goods bargained and sold. ALDERSON, B.-This is no variance; goods sold and delivered are necessarily bargained and sold; no child could be deceived as to what he had to meet Tuesday, June 2. Rule refused. ENGLEMART v. MOORE. It is necessary in an attorney's bill that the court in which the business is alleged to have been done should be stated. 37, 42. of the pendency of another action depends on the prin- By the COURT.-The bill ought to contain a state- POLLOCK, C.B.-This plea is bad. The same ment of the court in which the business was done, not party is not, in this case, twice vexed for the same necessarily in the heading of the bill, but in some cause of action, and the maxim which has been so part of it. The object of the statute is, to allow the much relied upon does not apply; when a contract is plaintiff a month for consideration, as to whether he joint and several, each of the contracting parties may had better refer the bill then to taxation or not. Un- be sued upon it, but then the debt or damages can dess the name of the court is stated, it would be im- be only once recovered by the plaintiff. All the depossible for the defendant to know whether, on taxa-fendants, except that one against whom execution was Bovill, in support of the demurrer, remarked on the inconvenience which would result if such a lien as that set up by the plea were allowed; he cited Scarfe v. Morgan (4 M.& W. 270, 282); Saunderson v. Bell (2 Cr. & M. 304); Eyre v. Shelley (6 M. & W.269, 274). Claridge (4 Taunt. 807), and contended that a right Udall, in support of the plea, referred to Hollis v. to lien existed wherever an article was bailed, under circumstances bringing it within the 5th Act of Parlia ment mentioned in Coggsv. Barnard (Lord Raym.909). Unless from the nature of the thing bailed there would be something inconsistent with a lien. He also cited Jackson v. Cummins (5 M. & W. 342); Poucher v. Norman (5 D. & R. 648); Ex parte Grove (3 B. N. C. 304); Phillips v. Robinson (4 Bing. 106); Leeds v. Hancock (4 C. & P. 152). The Court, however, without hearing Bovill in reply, gave judgment for the plaintiff. Judgment for the plaintiff. BUSINESS OF THE WEEK. calling on the plaintiff to shew cause why the defendant Rule absolute. HEAD U. SAYER.-V. Lee moved to set aside the judgment Rule nisi. herein on the ground of irregularity. CLARK v. LEVI.-Ogle moved for leave to plead the bankruptcy of the plaintiff. This had been refused by Mr. Baron Platt at chambers, on the ground that it was not an issuable plea. He cited Wallis v. Hallett (5 Bing. N.C. 465). Rule nisi. Cur. adv. vult. BENHAM U. WILKINS.-Crowder, Q. C. in support of the demurrer; Willes, contrà. Cur. adv, vult. Thursday, May 28. Rule nisi. Friday, May 29. LAURIE V. DOUGLAS. Tuesday, June 2. In the matter of GEORGE SALTER.-Jones moved for a rule, calling on George Salter, an attorney, to shew cause why he should not account to the Overton Friendly Society, in Denbighshire, for money received by him on behalf of the society, by whom he had been employed as attorney. Rule to shew cause, NEW TRIAL PAPER. lock, C.B. at the last Sittings in London. The question Rule discharged. HILLS v. CROSSLAND.-This was an action of trespass, but involved no point of the slightest interest to the profes sional reader. Rule absolute for a new trial, unless the plaintiff consents to enter a stet processus within a week. BICKLEY U. BOYDELL. Wednesday, June 3. SPECIAL PAPER. Monday, June 1. CLUTTERBUCK v. HULLS. An attorney of the Courts at Westminster was arrested F.V. Lee shewed cause against a rule for discharg- Miller, contrà, argued that the defendant had suf- part, and must be taken to mean intentional neglect; and that, as in the present case it appeared that the plaintiff had really intended to try his cause, he was entitled to the indulgence which he sought on payment of the costs incurred. Rule absolute; the plaintiff peremptorily to go to trial at the adjourned sittings after Term, and to pay the costs of the day, including the sum moning and returning of the special jury, and of this application. BUSINESS OF THE WEEK. HOME v. BARNEET.-Wordsworth moved to set aside the In the matter of the arbitration of REECE . THOMAS.→ v. Williams moved to set aside the award herein. Rule nisi. Ex parte The late SHERIFF OF BRECON.-M. Smith moved to set aside the attachment against this party with costs, or for a stay of all proceedings. Rule nisi, REG. v. BRIDSON and ANOTHER.-Petersdorff moved, on the return of the certiorari herein, to quash the order of petty sessions. Rule nisi. Friday, May 29. REG. v. EATON and ANOTHER.-Couch moved to re-open a rule and make it absolute, the terms of the rule in the of money. cause enabling him to do so on default of payment of a sum Rule opened and made absolute. REG. V. THE TOWN COUNCIL OF LICHFIELD.-Whateley, Q.C. shewed cause against a rule for enlarging the time for the return to the mandamus herein. Whitmore, contrà. Rule enlarged upon terms. against discharging the defendant out of custody. Miller, CLUTTERBUCK v. HULLS.-F. V. Lee shewed cause contrà. Cur, adv. vult. HARTLEY V. MILBURN.-Unthank shewed cause. T. W. Saunders, contrà. The judgment in Healle v. Baldwin; Roxburgh v. Blunt; Roxburgh v. Broke; and Roxburgh v. Thomson, followed that in HENRY . GOLDNEY, above reported. There was no argument, the point being the same in each case. TORRE V. WEST.-The judgment in this case followed contrà. BAIL COURT. Thursday, May 28. (Before Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN.). BEALE v. SHARP. Where a defendant absconds to avoid his creditors generally, the Court will (upon the proper calls and appointments being made) grant a distringas to compel an appearance, though it does not appear that the defendant has absented himself to avoid the plaintiff in particular. Miller moved for a writ of distringas to compel an appearance under the following circumstances. The usual calls and appointments had been made, and the writ left with the wife of the defendant, who stated that, nine weeks before, her husband had absconded with a considerable sum of money to avoid his creditors, to whom he was much indebted. It was now submitted, that notwithstanding there was no direct evidence that the defendant kept out of the way to avoid the process of the plaintiff in particular; yet, as he was keeping from home with the view of evading his creditors generally, it amounts to the same thing. (Channing v. Cross, 9 Dowl. 118; Archer v. Brindley, 9 Dowl. 38.) Application granted. Saturday, May 30. BURROWS v. GABRIEL AND OTHERS. A party attending for the purpose of serving a writ of summons saw a person whom he understood to be a servant, and gave her the copy, intending afterwards to apply for a distringas, and did not, therefore, indorse the writ within the three days, as required by the rule of Court. It afterwards appearing, that the person to whom the copy writ was so delivered was the defendant, the Court granted leave to enter an appearance without such indorsement. JUDGMENT. as follows:-It seems to me that the defendant is Tuesday, June 2. ROGERS v. VANDERCOMBE. Rule discharged upon a peremptory undertaking. DAVIS v. JONES and ANOTHER.-Jervis, Q.C. moved for Rule nisi. trial herein (which was tried before the judge of the She- riff's Court, when a verdict was found for the defendant), on LIPSCOMBE v. TURNER.-T. W. Saunders shewed cause Cur, adv. vult. peremptory undertaking in this case, and for leave to enter a Wednesday, June 3. REG. v. THE COMMISSIONERS OF EXCISE.-Martin, Q.C. moved to discharge the rule for a mandamus obtained herein last term, and for a fresh rule, some error having been made in the former application. Rule nisi. DEER U. RAPSDEN.-Crowder, Q.C. moved to dispauper the plaintiff (for vexatious proceedings), and for the costs of the day, in not trying his action pursuant to notice. Rule nisi. REG. v. CHORLEY.-Moody moved for a certiorari to remove an indictment, found at the last Taunton Assizes, for civil side at the Assizes, to the end that there may be a speobstructing a footway, in order that it may be tried on the Writ granted. CHEATHAM . SPILSBURY.-Gray moved for a rule to set aside the appearance entered sec. stat. and all subsequent proceedings, on the ground that the defendant was not served with process. M. Smith shewed cause against a rule to discharge Charnock moved for a distringas to compel an ap- remove from the Dorset Sessions an indictment found there against the defendant for giving false answers, under the 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76, s. 34 (the Municipal Corporation Act), at the municipal election for Bridport. Writ granted A Bankrupt and Insolvent Courts. Thursday, May 14. (Before Mr. Commissioner EVANS.) Re THOMAS KNIGHT. commissioner may not properly adjourn the hearing of a disputed adjudication beyond the time allowed by the statute. Thomas Knight appeared on the fifth day after ser vice of the adjudication, under a fiat in bankraptey issued against him, to shew cause against its validity, on the ground that an act of bankruptcy was not suf ficiently proved. The objection was allowed. Turner, for the petitioning creditor, proposed to prove other acts of bankruptcy, and asked for an adjournment of the hearing, in order to enable him to produce witnesses, citing 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122, s. 23. sioner had no power to adjourn the hearing, the five Cook, for the bankrupt, objected that the Commis. days allowed by the statute having elapsed. Summary. payable out of the proceeds of the land before any INEQUALITY OF STAMP DUTies. The stamp duties levied under the head of deeds and instruments in 1844, amounted to 1,646,3651.; but a portion of this sum being derived from other sources, ought to be deducted before the burden affecting real property in that respect can be correctly esti mated. The committee, moreover, wish to direct particular attention to the important evidence given by Messrs. LEGISLATORS have been keeping holiday Senior, Stewart, and Baxter, on the unequal pressure like all the rest of the busy world. imposed by the various Stamp Acts on dealings with real property. The last-named witness, Mr. Baxter, says, the stamp upon a 501. sale (calculating a certain length of conveyance), would amount to twelve and a half per cent.; on a 1007. sale to five per cent. ; on a 3007. sale to two and a half per cent. ; on a 500l. sale to 17. 14s. 3d. per 1001.; and above that sum one per Imperial Parliament. PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTED. Friday, May 29, BILLS READ A SECOND TIME. Northern and Southern Connecting Railwaay Metropolitan Sewage Manure Company Great Leinster and Munster Railway (No. 1) Carlow to Kil- Great Leinster and Munster Railway (No. 2) Kilkenny to British Guarantee Association Friday, May 29. BILLS READ A THIRD TIME. Birkenhead Small Debts Wakefield, Pontefract, and Goole Railway Birkenhead, Lancashire, and Cheshire Junction Railway York and North Midland Railway, Leeds Extension Midland Railway, Erewash Valley Branches Lancashire and North Yorkshire Railway REPORT OF THE LORDS COMMITTEE ON THE BURDENS ON LAND. THE resolutions with which the Committee have summed up their report have been already presented to our readers. They allude briefly to divers plans which had been suggested for diminishing the cost of conveyancing. We now extract from the body of the report itself the paragraphs relating to Law Reforms recommended, as they have an immediate interest for the readers of the LAW TIMES. BURDEN OF TITHE COMMUTATION. cent. COST OF CONVEYANCING. The transfer, moreover, of real property is subjected by law to other difficulties, expenses, and inequalities, of a similar character. According to the evidence of the same witness, the expenses, including stamps, upon a sale of 507. value, amount to no less than thirty per cent; upon a sale of 1001. value, to fifteen per cent.; upon a sale of 6001. value, to seven and a half per cent.; upon 1,500l. five per cent. The committee are convinced that the marketable value of real property is seriously diminished by the tedious and expensive process attending its transfer. Nor is it only in the transfer of real property that the pressure of this burden is felt. It is a work of time to raise money on landed security, and the law expenses incident to the transaction are a considerable addition to the interest on the sum borrowed. The transfer of the debt or mortgage is also attended with serious expenses to the mortgagor; the process of discharging the land from one loan, and subjecting it to another, being both heavy burdens upon the proprietor. Mr. Baxter gives the following evidence on the expenses attending mortgages:-"A mortgage for 501. would cost, in stamps and law expenses, thirty per cent.; a mortgage for 100l. would cost twenty per cent.; a mortgage for 4501. would cost seven per cent.; a mortgage for 1,500l. would cost three per cent.; a mortgage for 12,500l. would cost one per cent.; for 25,000l. it would cost 15s. per 1007.; and for 100,000. it would cost 12s. per 100l." LEGACY AND PROBATE DUTY. rated as improved land, on the net rent a company of carriers would give for the occupation of the same; and, as the rents of a railway would depend materially on the profits derived from the carrying trade on it, the profits are taken as a guide to arrive at the net rent. Mills are rated on the same principle, namely, the rent for which the mill, with its appurtenances, would let. Considering the changes occasioned by the creation of real property, as well as those taking place in the relative value of different descriptions of real property, the committee need scarcely point out the advantage as well as justice of periodical and uniform valuations. SHORT FORMS AND REGISTRATION OF deeds. The committee earnestly request the attention of the House to the important evidence of Mr. Stewart, on the evils proceeding from the length of deeds connected with real property; and while the committee acknowledge the benefit of the act passed last session respecting satisfied outstanding terms and short deeds, they are at the same time anxious to impress on the House the necessity of a thorough revision of the whole subject of conveyancing, and the disuse of the present prolix, expensive, and vexatious system. The committee have received evidence on the advantages of a registration of deeds in Scotland and Ireland, and on the great facilities afforded by means of similar institutions to dealings with real property in foreign states. The committee, however, limit themselves to the expression of their opinion, that a registry of title to all real property is essential to the success of any attempt to simplify the system of conveyancing. Such a report from such a quarter cannot fail to lead to early and considerable changes materially affecting the interests of the Profes sion. ARREST IN EXECUTION.-In the proposal by Mr. Serjeant Manning to the Lord Chancellor for the amendment of the law of bankruptcy, and insolvency, the question of retaining arrest in execution is considered. The learned serjeant is of opinion that it is "inexpedient" in its present form. He says, "The propriety of allowing arrest in execution at the mere will of the judgment creditor has been so often discussed, that I do not trouble your Lordship with a repetition of the arguments which have been used upon the subject. It appears to be an inconvenient mode of getting at the property of the debtor, where there is property, and it often operates as a great hardship and oppression where there is none. It is true that it not unfrequently happens that the assets of an insolvent debtor are too artfully covered to be capable of being brought within the reach of any process against property, or of being affected by any legislative provision for transferring the property of the debtor to an assignee; and it is equally true that coercion by imprisonment of the person is at present Freeholds are exempt from legacy and probate duty. the only mode by which such assets can be effectually The committee have not been able to ascertain the reached. Imprisonment, however, often fails in prohold property; but they feel it their duty to draw ment which now exists for concealing property, in the exact amount of legacy and probate duty paid by lease-ducing the necessary discovery, whereas the induceattention to the fact, that leaseholds are not only liable belief that it may bereafter be safely produced and to the stamp duties on dealings with the property inter enjoyed without disturbance under the false name of vivos, but also to the probate and legacy duty. Nor after-acquired property, would, it is conceived, be in The committee are of opinion that the tithe com- can the committee avoid reminding the House, that a great degree removed by the establishment of a mutation rent-charge operates as a burden on the legacy duty is paid in every case where the testator continued modified liability on the part of the debtor. land which is subject to it; inasmuch as a certain has devised his lands to be sold; and, according to Imprisonment for debt can have only two legitimate amount measured in produce must be paid, whatever the evidence of Mr. Baxter, a solicitor of very great objects in view-the protection of the creditors against may be the nature of the cultivation or the return practice, nine wills out of ten in the middle ranks of the malversations of the debtor, and the protection of made by it. The value of the crops, without reference life convert the whole land into personalty for the the public against a recurrence of misconduct on the to the natural qualities of the soil, being taken into purpose of division. The evidence of Mr. Pressly part of the debtor and others. It is conceived that, tends to confirm the previous evidence of Mr. Baxter, upon the adoption of the enactments now suggested, consideration in fixing the basis on which the commutation rests, lands, which by artificial means were that a considerable portion of the legacy duty is raised the dangerous power of imprisonment at the sole disrendered highly productive during the seven years on on freeholds devised to be sold for the purpose of divi-cretion of the creditor may be safely abolished, withwhich the commutation is based, have become in con- sion. The witness states that Mr. Trevor, the controller out regard to the formal distinction which now presequence permanently liable to a heavy rent-charge. of the legacy duty, estimates it (the portion raised on vails between debts secured by judgment or other Mr. Weall in his evidence states, that the high farm-freeholds devised to be sold), at five-twelfths of the matter of record, and debts which are not so secured. ing introduced at great expense in the parishes of amount. Assuming the legacy duty to be 1,200,0001. Debtors who have misconducted themselves, and Beddington and Wallington had raised the tithes he estimates the proportion of duty arising from real those who, upon reasonable grounds, are suspected of during the years preceding the Commutation Act from estate at 500,000l. I think," the witness continues, an intention to defraud their creditors, will be secured "he has put it too high. I do not think that more both for the preservative and for the penal jurisdiction 3s. 6d. per acre to 7s. and 8s. per acre. Mr. Bennet remarks, that the heaviest wheat-lands have the than a fourth, or scarcely a fourth, of the 1,200,000l. of the court, and means will be afforded, as well to heaviest tithes upon them; thus imposing the heaviest legacy duty arises from land." The witness, however, protect creditors against the dissipation, alienation, charge where cultivation is the most expensive. Mr. does not include leasehold property in his calculation; or concealment of that which is in truth their proCramp says, the tithe in the parish in which he re- which, being liable to both probate and legacy duty, perty, as to punish the misconduct by which their sides amounts to 17s. 6d. per acre; and Mr. Blamire, must be added to the above-mentioned estimate, before losses have been occasioned." Mr. Serjeant Manning in answers 2,524 and 2,525, confirms the evidence of we arrive at the full portion of the legacy duty arising is of opinion that arrest upon process of execution preceding witnesses, that the rent-charge amounts, out of the proceeds of the land. upon judgments in civil actions should be permitted in some cases, to more than one-half the rent; that only where such judgments are founded upon a one-third is not an unusual proportion; and that malicious, wilful, or fraudulent act or omission, there are some rare cases where the rent-charge is injurious to the person, to the reputation, to the proequal in amount to the whole rent. On the supposiperty, or to some domestic relation of the plaintiff. tion of a continued reduction in the amount of proThese views are opposed to those of Mr. Commis ceeds derived from capital invested in the cultivation siner Law, in 1840, as expressed in his Report on the of the land, it is self-evident that titheable land would Law of Bankruptcy and Insolvency, wherein he debe abandoned sooner than land which is tithe-free; The question having been raised as to the principle scribes a debtor as a "wrong doer." Mr. Serjeant and though the landowner has no claim whatever to adopted in rating railways to the poor-rate, the com- Manning speaks of that report as an able one, and the property of the tithe-owner, the tithe itself would mittee have examined Mr. Coode and Mr. B. Russell containing valuable information, of which he had in that case have the effect of diverting capital from on the subject; and it appears from their evidence availed himself. The question of “arrest in execu its cultivation. The committee, therefore, submit to that the uniform principle of assessing all fixed pro- tion" is one of some importance, and should be wellthe consideration of the House the fact that 4,500,000l.perty at the net rent or clear amount at which it can considered before it is interfered with. In strict levied under the Tithe Commutation Act becomes he let, has not been departed from, Railways are morality a debtor is a "wrong daer," but by brand LAW OF SETTLEMENT, REMOVAL AND RATING. The agricultural witnesses complain also of the restriction in the choice of labourers imposed on the farmer by the law of settlement; and Mr. Coppock, the clerk of the Stockport Union, bears evidence to the hardships and expenses occasioned by the present state of that law. |