and signing final judgment, immediately on the certificate being given.

BOULBEY v. BELL.
New trial.

that on a certain day the plaintiff was requested to receive the money from certain cabmen, and amongst

This was an action of indebitatus assumpsit, for others one Beauchamp, but he did not nor would receive the said money, whereupon the defendant discharged him.

Cases cited: Ames v. Lettice, (6 M. & W. 216); Hobdale v. Miller (2 Scott, N.S. 163); Little v. New-money paid. ton (1 M. & G. 976).

Jervis, Q.C. in support of his rule, admitted that he could cite no direct authority in his favour, but contended that it must be taken that the verdict was given at the time the arbitrator gave his certificate, and not when the trial was had. The certificate was, in fact, the verdict, and if so, the defendant had all the first four days of the next Term in which to move, and the plaintiff could not proceed to sign judgment until after that time.

Cases cited: Cheetham v. Sturtivant (12 M. & W. 515).

By the COURT.-This rule must be discharged. The question shortly is, whether the verdict is to be considered as delivered at the time of the trial, or when the arbitrator sent in his certificate. We think it is to be considered as a verdict delivered by the jury at the trial. It is clear that the plaintiff could not, after the trial, elect to be nonsuited; and for all purposes of form the verdict is delivered at nisi prius. The parties agree that the jury shall give a certain price, subject to be reduced by the arbitrator if he think fit. The defendant cannot complain of any hardship, and if we interfered we should do great in justice. Rule discharged with costs.

Monday, April 20.

LOWRIE v. DOUGLASS AND Others.

New trial.

Plea, non assumpsit.

At the trial the contract was proved by a paper,
which was put in, in the following form :-"On or
before the 23rd I undertake to pay a call of 21. 5s. per
share on the five shares in the Grimstead and East
Sheffield Railway, sold by you, on my account, on the
28th of July last, pledging myself to sign the necessary
transfer of the shares." It was objected that this
document required an agreement stamp; it was, how-
ever, admitted in evidence, and a verdiet found for the
plaintiff, leave being given to the defendant to move
for a nonsuit.

Martin, Q.C. now moved accordingly.-There were
other points in the case, one of which was, whether or
not it was requisite for the vendee of shares in a rail-
way to tender to the vendor a transfer-deed, duly
stamped, for the vendor to sign, under 8 Vict. c. 16,
s. 14.
Rule nisi.

KEARSLAKE . COLE.
Nonsuit.

This was an action against the defendant for money paid to his use. Plea, non assumpsit. It appeared that Kearslake, who was a partner in the Commercial Bank of England, at Birkenhead, had become surety to the Bank for all advances made to Cole up to 5007. Cole, some time after this, became embarrassed, and was in debt to the Bank 1,1007. His creditors, however, agreed, on his assigning all his property for their benefit, to take a composition; and the Bank and also the plaintiff were parties to the deed. The Bank received their proportion of the composition, upon which Kearslake paid them 500l., as the sum he had been answerable for, and then brought the present action against Cole to recover the money, as money paid to his use. A verdict having been found for the plaintiff,

This was an action against the defendants, as common carriers, for not safely carrying certain barrels of pearlash, whereby the same was wholly lost. The facts were, that the pearlash had been shipped on board a vessel of the defendants' at a foreign port, to be delivered in London. The bill of lading was in the usual form, and undertook to safely carry, "the perils of navigation excepted." The ship arrived in the London Docks on the 1st of July, 1845, when the Martin, Q. C. now moved for a nonsuit pursuant crew were discharged, and "lumpers" engaged to to leave reserved, on the ground that Kearslake, by unload the ship, which was partly done, when, by being a party to the composition deed, had discharged some mismanagement, she was overset, and the Cole from his liability as to the 5001., for it was a debt pearlash destroyed by the water. The question made then owing, but if not it was clear that the surety at the trial was, whether this was a "peril of naviga- was released from his liability by the Bank taking tion." The learned judge who tried the cause the composition, and he had no right to pay the mothought it came within the protection of the exemp-ney to the Bank and then seek to recover it of the tion in the bill of lading, and directed a verdict for debtor Cole, who had denuded himself of everythe defendant, giving the plaintiff leave to move to thing to get rid of his liabilities. enter a verdict for 2271. 3s. 11d. the value of the pearlash, if the Court should be of opinion that he was entitled to recover.

Jervis, Q.C. now moved accordingly, and contended that it was clear that this could not be a peril of the sea by which the goods had been lost, for the voyage had ended and the crew were dismissed. He cited Thompson v. Whitmore (3 Taunt. 227); Fletcher v. Inglis (2 B. & A. 315.) Rule nisi.

BRADLEY V. TONGE,
New trial.

Rule nisi.

This was an action on the case for maliciously causing the plaintiff to be arrested on an affidavit of debt, under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 3. The verdict was for the plaintiff.

Martin, Q.C. now moved in arrest of judgment,
on the ground that the declaration was informal,
as it was not therein alleged that the affidavits, on
which the order to arrest had been obtained, were
it was nowhere alleged that the defendants knew
false, but only that the statements therein were false;
them to be false.

Cases cited: Hensworth v. Fowkes, 4 B. & Ad.
449.
Rule nisi.

HUGHES V. MANN and OTHERS. Motion to set aside a judgment. Atherton moved for a rule, calling on the plaintiff This was an action on a special agreement; verdict to shew cause (in three actions by and against the same for the plaintiff, damages, 40s. parties) why the judgment as against one of the deIt appeared in this case that the defendant had in-fendants, George Malilieu, should not be set aide with curred various liabilities, and become indebted to a costs. He stated, that at the trial of these causes all considerable amount to the plaintiff, whereupon he the defendants but Malilieu were represented by counundertook to convey a certain estate to the plaintiff in sel, but that the causes as to him were undefended; discharge of these liabilities. He failed to do this, when the causes were called on, an arrangement was and the present action was brought on the special entered into between the counsel for the plaintiff and agreement. At the trial the value of the estate was the counsel representing the other defendants, to take proved, and it was contended that that should be the a verdict for the plaintiff, on which judgment had measure of damages. The learned judge, however, been signed against all, including Malilieu. This, it who tried the cause directed a verdict for 40s. giving was submitted, was irregular, as he was no consentthe plaintiff leave to increase it to any sum the Court ing party to such arrangement. should think fit.

Whately, Q.C. now moved accordingly, citing Hopkins v. Graysbrook (6 B. & C. 61). Rule nisi.

tiff.

FINLAYSON. PILBROW. New trial-Misdirection. In this case a verdict had been found for the plainM. Chambers now moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, and also on the ground of misdirection.

The misdirection complained of was, that the learned judge did not direct the jury at all as to the effect of one part of the evidence given.

By the COURT.-How can you move for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, when there has been no direction at all? The motion for a new trial stands in the place of a bill of exceptions; now there is nothing here to except to. Rule refused.

HARRIS v. COLLEY.
New trial.

Rule nisi.

This was an action on a special agreement.
The declaration set out, that the defendant, who
was a cab keeper, had agreed to let, and the plaintiff
the defendant was not to give the plaintiff notice to
to take, a certain house, at the yearly rent of 201. and
quit so long as he paid the rent to defendant. It was
further agreed that the defendant was to employ the
plaintiff as his foreman to collect the money from the
cabmen, for which the plaintiff was to receive a sum
not exceeding 11. 1s. per week. The breach set out
was, that the defendant would not, in pursuance of
this agreement, continue to employ the plaintiff, so
long as he retained possession of the said house, but,
not pay him the said sum of 11. 19. per week. The de-
on the contrary thereof, discharged him, and would
fendant pleaded, amongst other pleas, that it was the
plaintiff's duty to receive the money from the cabmen
frequenting the defendant's yard when requested, and

Replication, de injuriâ.

At the trial it was proved that the plaintiff had been called and requested to come to the yard and receive the money of several cabmen, and that he refused to come; but the witness would not swear whether or not he mentioned the name of Beauchamp to the plaintiff, as a man whose money he was to receive; whereupon it was contended, on behalf of the plaintiff, that the plea was not proved, and Platt, B. who tried the cause, so ruling, the plaintiff had a verdict, damages 601.

Martin, Q. C. now moved for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, and contended that it was not at all material that the name of the man should have been mentioned. Rule nisi.

Thursday, April 23. TENNANT v. PARKER. Semble-In an action of trespass, the defendant paid 61. into court; on a replication of damages ultra, the plaintiff had a verdict for 11. Held, that this was not a recovery of more than 40s. by verdict of the jury, so as to entitle the plaintiff to his costs. This was an action of trespass for an illegal distress. The defendant paid 61. into court, but the plaintiff replied damages ultra.

At the trial, the plaintiff had a verdict, damages 20s.

Gunning, now moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence.

PARKE, B.-I thought the Cl. ample, but I can hardly say that the verdict was a perverse one. There was evidence on which they might act.

ALDERSON, B.-They have only recovered 20s. damages; that will not carry costs, so you are not much hurt.

Gunning.-But it is said by the Master that peradventure this is a recovery of 71.

PARKE, B.-This is not a recovery of 40s. by a verdict of the jury; they cannot get their costs. Rule refused.

GATHERCOLE v. MIALL.

In an action brought by a clergyman against the publisher of a newspaper for a libel, the subject-matter of the libel complained of was an article containing a severe comment on certain sermons preached by the plaintiff in his parish church, and also on the printed rules of a charity established by him in the parish. Held (on a motion for a new trial), that evidence might be given of the receipt of copies of the paper containing the libel by various persons, not to shew malice on the part of the defendant, but to shew the extent of the mischief to the plaintiff's character. Held, also, that as the charity was a private one, established by the clergyman, his conduct in framing the rules by which it was regulated was as much protected from comment as the acts of a private individual in the ordinary affairs of life.

Semble Alderson dubitante; Rolfe dissentiente. that a sermon preached by a clergyman in his parish church, in the ordinary discharge of his duty, is equally protected from comment.

This was an action of libel, brought by the plaintiff (who is the vicar of Chatteris) against the defendant as publisher of the newspaper called The Nonconformist. The case was tried at the last assizes for the city of Cambridge, and the libel complained of was an article reflecting very severely on the conduct of the plaintiff in the pulpit, in preaching violent sermons against the dissenters (who were a numerous body in his parish); and also on his conduct with regard to his breaking up a clothing society which had existed in the parish for some years, and forming another under the name of "The Chatteris Church Clothing Society;" this society was formed on the principle of the exclusion of the dissenters from any participation in the benefits of the society, and the rules (which were printed) classed the dissenters with "drunkards, schismatics, adulterers, opium-eaters, and other persons committing deadly sin." These words had also been very severely commented on in the article which formed the libel complained of. At the trial the plaintiff proved that the defendant was the responsible party to be sued, by evidence from the Stamp Office in the usual way, and then proposed to give evidence that a copy of the paper containing the on the day after the publication. This was objected to, libel had been received at the Chatteris reading rooms first, on the ground that it was not shewn to be sent by the defendant, and secondly (as it was proposed to give parol evidence of its contents), that no sufficient search had been made for it; it was, however, admitted. When the plaintiff's case had closed, Mr. Serjeant Byles, who conducted the defendant's case, proceeded to contend that the comments of the defendant upon the sermons preached by the plaintiff and the rules dant was justified in his comments. drawn up by him were quite fair, and that the defenMr. Baron Parke, however, interrupted the learned serjeant, and ruled that comments of that kind by the press upon unpublished sermons were not justifiable, nor were

Upon

they upon the rules of a private charity.
this the learned serjeant did
not press
that
Fart of his defence, or give any evidence of
any particular sermon. When the learned Baron
summed up the case to the jury, he laid it down to
them that it was his opinion that unpublished ser-
mons were not to be made the subject of comment,
but stated that it was not necessary to decide the
point in the present case, as no evidence had been
given of any particular sermon preached by the plain-
tiff. With regard to the question of the charity, he
distinctly laid it down that the conduct of the vicar
of a parish in the administration of a charity esta-
blished by him was not to be made the subject of
criticism and comment by the public press. The
plaintiff had a verdict, damages 2007.

Wilde, Serjt. now moved for a new trial.-First, it is submitted that the evidence with regard to the newspaper alleged to have been received at the newsroom at Chatteris was improperly admitted. The evidence given was, that a paper having the name of The Nonconformist, and dated the 7th of January, 1846, was received at the news-room, but there was no evidence whatever to shew that the defendant sent it there, upon which the evidence was objected to by the defendant's counsel. [PARKE, B.-I did not receive it as evidence of malice, but to shew the circulation of the paper, and so the extent of the mischief to the plaintiff's character.] But I submit that it is not competent to the plaintiff to give this evidence, unless the sending is traced to the defendant; for it may be that the plaintiff hextended the circulation himself to increase the damages. Then parol evidence of its contents was improperly received, as there was no sufficient search proved. The witness, who was the president of the rooms, proved the receipt of a paper called The Nonconformist, but did not know what became of it; he had not got it, and did not know where it was; on statement this parol evidence of its contents was received; now how could this be evidence against the defendant to influence the damages?

question which was never submitted to the jury, who
were told by the learned Baron that there was no
right to comment at all. It is impossible not to feel
that whatever falls from so eminent a judge must
greatly influence a jury, and control a counsel in the
exercise of his discretion in the conduct of the case.
Here an opinion was expressed at one time, which
went to exclude both sermons and regulations from
criticism; but nothing can be more public than ser-
mons delivered in a large parish, and regulations
concerning the administration of the charity within
that parish. They are both subjects of public inte-
rest, and were therefore fairly open to criticism.
PARKE, B.-Do you mean to contend that if I, in
my private capacity, chose to establish a charity,
print rules, and administer my bounty in an exclu-
sive manner, that the press have a right to comment
on it?

Wilde. That may be questionable, but here the public are concerned; this is a parish with 5,000 parishioners, and the example of the vicar is calculated to have great influence in his parish, and surely the public have an interest in these 5,000 persons. The rules are set forth as "under the patronage of the vicar;" how can this be said to be a private act? upon the whole case, then, it is submitted, both on the question of misreception of evidence, and also on the ground of misdirection, there should be a new trial. PARKE, B.-Before my brothers give judgment I again beg to state, that I never meant to bind myself to the opinion I had expressed in the course of my brother Byles' speech, as to the exemption of sermons, although I had then, and still have, a strong opinion that they ought to be so, unless they are printed, and so made public property by the clergyman; but when I came to sum up, I expressly guarded myself, and did not lay it down so broadly, as it was unnecessary to decide the point, which never arose in this case, for no sermon was proved. With respect to the rules of the club, I did not think that they afforded any occasion which could justify any comment being made on them. I so directed the jury, and it is for the Court to say whether I was right or wrong in so doing. POLLOCK, C. B.-We are all agreed that in this case there ought to be no rule. The rule is moved for on two grounds: first, misconception of evidence, and, secondly, misdirection. Now, as to the first ground, the defendant was proved to be the proprietor of the Nonconformist newspaper, and a paper containing the libel was put in and proved; it was then proposed to shew that other papers containing the libel were in circulation. This was done not to shew malice, but the exPARKE, B.-The evidence was admitted by me tent of the injury to the plaintiff's character. A witto show the circulation, and not malice by the de-ness was called, who took upon himself to say that he fendant; and the question is, whether the fact that a copy of the paper containing the libel, and printed by the defendant, which gets to the reading room, is not evidence to shew the extent of the damage to the plaintiff's character by the circulation.

PARKE B.-I only received it as a copy of such a paper as that proved to be published by the defendant. The libel was read to the witness, and he stated that the paper he received contained such an article.

POLLOCK, C. B.-Suppose this was a caricature, which is more easily identified then a paper, surely it would be enough for a person to say "I saw a copy of this caricature which has since been burnt." Wilde.-I am not prepared to admit that that would be evidence against the defendant of a libel circulated by him.

Wilde. I contend this is an unauthorized circulation by a third party, for which the defendant is not liable. Then as to the libel itself, it is no part of my duty to contend that the plaintiff is not entitled to a verdict, but let him recover damages commensurate with the libel. I contend that the jury should have been told by the learned Baron that the libel was a comment on sermons and facts of great public interest, and if they thought that the defendant had exceeded the bounds of fair and proper criticism, that they should give damages for such excess. My Brother Byles, in his address to the jury, was submitting this view of the case to the jury, when he was interrupted by Mr. Baron Parke, who laid it down that a sermon, if not printed and published, could not be made the subject of remark.

summing up, he expressly drew the attention of the learned counsel to the fact, that no sermon had been proved. On this ground alone I think the rule may be refused as to that point. As to the rules of the charity, I quite agree that licentious comments can. not be applied to such. When a work is published criticism is invited; but here the question is, whether a parochial charity, with the vicar at its head, and confined in its application to certain parties, may be made the subject of licentious criticism. It is enough to apply the ordinary rule to this case, namely, that every body may comment on every thing if truth and justice be observed, and I therefore think that as that rule has been transgressed there is no ground laid for a new trial.

ALDERSON, B.-I am of the same opinion. But although I think there ought to be no rule, yet if the question had been, simply, whether sermons are open to criticism, I should have doubted about refusing it. At the same time, I am by no means sure that I should not have agreed with my brother Parke's view on that subject. I think that this rule ought to be refused on the first ground most clearly; and as to the misdirection, if my brother had told the jury, that to observe on sermons preached by clergymen was not within the law, I should have doubted very much whether I could adopt that direction; though I might ultimately have come to the same opinion which my Lord Chief Baron and my brother Parke entertain. It seems to me that the distinctica between the right to comment on public and private matters and men is very difficult of comprehension; where the limits are I do not exactly see, or where they begin or end. You may comment on a judge or an actor as such. You may say a julge is not clear, or an actor is not fit to represent certain parts, but you cannot observe on their private cha racters and conduct. I do not exactly see where the limits are to be pointed out. I think you may say, perhaps, that a man is a bad preacher; the dulness of a sermon is a very proper subject of comment and public opinion. Perhaps you have no right to comment on the doctrine contained in a sermon, for there is a proper Court which has cognizance over unsound doctrines put forth in sermons. Now, this act of preaching a sermon is done in the ministerial public capacity of a clergyman. He is bound to preach, and that is why I doubt whether he is liable to comment on that score; but as to the administration of a charity established by him in his parish, that is no part of his public duty; he differs, therefore, in that respect, in nothing from any other private individual who may institute a charity within his parish, and select the objects of participation. Such acts are protected from comment as the acts of private individuals; and thong every man may comment on privace enarities, he must do su in the same way when they are conducted by a clergyman as by any other private individual. Á clergyman differs in nothing from any other man by reason of that character, and is no more open to comment than any other private person is. For these reasons, therefore, I think this rule must be refused.

saw a paper in the news-room and proposed to give evidence of its contents, on the ground that it was lost. Now in all these cases the evidence as to the loss must vary; if a paper or document of importance is said to be lost, this may call for evidence of considerable search before parol evidence is admissible; but, on the contrary, as to that which is merely like waste paper, small search will suffice. In the present ROLFE, B.-With regard to the point, as to the case search was made in the reading-room, where the admission of evidence, I entirely agree with the rest paper ought to have been, and it could not be found. of the Court; and after the way in which the Lord They could not be expected to ask all the various Chief Baron has stated his reasons, it would be mere people who frequented that room if they had it; so pedantry in me to put the same reasons in different the paper must be taken to be lost. It is then said words. Then as to the misdirection, I think this must that it was not shewn to be circulated by the defend- be taken to have been a formal direction to the jury as ant, and therefore he is not liable for the mischief it to the charity, though not so as to the sermons, for may do. Now the paper was printed by the defend- my brother Parke corrected himself afterwards. The ant, and issued by him, and wherever found he must question then is, whether my brother was right in be held responsible for the mischief done by it. On telling the jury that this charity was such as not to these grounds, therefore, I think that the evidence entitle the defendant to the privilege of commenting was rightly received. The second point, on misdirec- on its rules as he might on any public acts. It was tion, proceeds on the objection that my brother Parke argued at first as though the direction had been, that laid down the same rule of law with regard to sermons the policy of having charities from which dissenters which are preached and the regulations of the charity were to be excluded was not to be discussed at all. club, as that which is applicable to private conversa-But that was not the way in which it was put at the tion and the private characters of individuals, while trial. If it had been, I should have gone along with it is contended that they both justify remarks passed Sir T. Wilde in contending for a right to comment on on them, with truth and justice, provided they such a policy. That is a public act which would warare honest and bona fide; and that such re- rant observation, and I may take this opportunity of marks can be justified under the general issue. Sir T. saying, that, in my opinion, comments on public ser. Wilde has argued this as a case of great importance, mons would have come within the category of public and it is undoubtedly one of vast and grave importance. acts. That point, however, does not arise in this He contended that the law ought to allow public case; for the observation was expressly withdrawn opinion to operate on these subjects, on the ground from the jury. But as to the rules, I think it most that public interests demanded a supervision of them. preposterous to say that the conduct of a clergyman I certainly agree that all measures of a public nature in administering a charity is not within the category ought to be subject to comment, and that all bond of public acts on which fair comments may be made. fide and honest remarks on public parties ought to be These comments, however, were not fair. There is PARKE, B.-At all events, I am confident that allowed; but we must take care not to allow that no pretence for saying that they are; and as this was whatever I said did not operate to prevent Mr. Ser-feeling to carry us along when the interests of the a mere private administration of charity, I think it is jeant Byles from offering proof. protected from comment, though we may doubt the propriety of the course adopted by the defendant.

PARKE, B.-What I said has been misunderstood. I certainly interfered in the course of my brother Byles' address, with the view of saving time, and I might then have said that sermons were not the subject of remark; but when I came to sum up the case to the jury, I expressly withdrew that question from them, as one which it was unnecessary to decide, for it did not arise, although I entertained, and still entertain, a strong opinion, that a sermon does not afford any justifiable occasion for comment.

Wilde. It was useless to tender evidence of sermons when the opinion of the judge was so clearly against this evidence being admissible; and I contend that the defendant had a right to comment within certain limits, which has not been submitted to the jury.

public are pressed, with the object of pushing that Wilde.-Then as to the charity: that is, I contend, doctrine too far. The commentator may comment a public act. The rules are printed and given to the on everything, provided truth be the foundation, and world. The rules commence with a perverted text justice the superstructure of his comment, and that of Scripture; and Mr. Gathercole tells us we are to doctrine must be applied to the two questions which do good to all the world, but not to dissenters, have been raised to-day. I must say that I for one adulterers, or murderers. This is his interpretation go along with my brother Parke. I think that a of charity. How is this to be corrected? If you say sermon preached by a pastor to his congregation that the press may not correct such injustice as this may be made the subject of comment, fettered by the by public comment, a great public injury is inflicted. rule that you do so with truth and justice. Mr. The article complained of may, perhaps, exceed the Baron Parke, however, did not exclude any proof of bounds of fair and proper criticism, but that is a la sermon, and in the course of the cause, and of the

PARKE, B.-I wish to add a word or two as to the question whether I was right in saying that no occa. sion was afforded by the plaintiff's conduct respecting the rules of the charity to warrant the comments of the defendant. I certainly entered more fully than I would have done under ordinary circumstances into the law of libel in this case, and having done so, I intimated to the jury that I thought these rules afforded no occasion which could render the com ments of the defendant excusable; I at the same

time told them, that if any such occasion had been
given, the defendant might resort to it under the ge-
neral issue. As to the sermons, I entertained a
strong opinion that a clergyman, by preaching verbal
sermons, did not make them public property, as when
he was preaching a sermon in the ordinary discharge
of his duty as a pastor in his parish church. I thought
that that afforded no sufficient occasion for comment,
and, with all due respect to the judgment of my
brother Rolfe, think so still; however, in this case,
the point does not arise, as 1 never so directed the
jury.
Rule refused.

NICHOLS V. STANWAY.
Motion in arrest of judgment.
This was an action by the plaintiff as indorsee of
a bill of exchange.

Chilton, Q. C. now moved an arrest of judgment on the ground that it was not shewn on the face of the declaration that the bill was a negotiable instrument transferrable by indorsement; it was not stated to be payable to bearer or to order. Rule nisi.

BOWEN v. HODGES.
Motion for nonsuit-Evidence.

tion; and that if an information upon oath was not
necessarily to be inferred from the declaration, the
plea in justification need not aver it. He cited Sweet-
apple v. Jesse (5 B. & Ad. 27); Kelly v. Partington
(5 B. & Ad. 645); Clarke v. Postan (6 C. & P. 423);
Basten v. Carew (3 B. & C. 649). [PARKE, B.-
What does the expression "charged with felony be-
fore a magistrate" import?] Not necessarily that
there was an information upon oath.
Rule to shew cause.

HUGHES v. BUCKLAND.
The owner of land, and of a fishery, who takes into
custody parties fishing in the night-time, at a spot
adjoining to, but beyond the limits of, his estate, is
entitled to notice of action under the stat. 7 & 8 Geo.
4, c. 29, if he acts bonâ fide, and with reasonable
grounds for believing that he so acts under the au-
thority of that statute.

This cause was tried at the Carnarvon Assizes before Parke, B. It is was an action of trespass against the defendants, being the gamekeepers and servants of Colonel Pennant, for seizing the nets of the plaintiffs, and taking them into custody. The defendants pleaded not guilty, under stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29. In an action by an attorney for his fees for passing the At the trial, it appeared that at the time of comdefendant through the Insolvent Court, the retainer mitting the alleged trespass, the plaintiffs were not was proved by a copy bearing the seal of the Insolvent actually within the limits of Colonel Pennant's proCourt, and given by the officer of the court under 1perty, but within a very short distance (a foot or & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 105. two) of such limits, and that Colonel Pennant was Held, that the retainer which was filed in the court likewise owner of the adjacent fishery, though not of was such a "proceeding" as was contemplated by the precise locus in quo. that section, and therefore the copy was properly ad mitted in evidence.

Held also, that it was not incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the delivery of a signed bill to the defendant before he could recover, and that 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 37, had not altered the rule of law in that respect. This was an action on an attorney's bill tried before the sheriff.

The declaration was for work, labour, and materials, and money paid in passing the defendant through the Insolvent Court. Verdict for the plaintiff.

The question was, whether, under these circumstances, the defendants were entitled to notice of action, and had a right of venue pursuant to the provisions of the above-mentioned statute.

The learned baron held that such notice was necessary, and the verdict was accordingly entered for the defendants, with leave to the plaintiffs to move to enter the verdict for them, if the Court should think fit, with damages, which, to prevent the necessity of a new trial, were assessed by the jury.

Townsend cited Rudd v. Scott (2 Sc. N. R. 631), and was then stopped.

POLLOCK, C. B.-It is not necessary to advert to the numerous cases which have been cited in the course of the argument. It is our duty to endeavour to ascertain the meaning of the statute, the provisions of which have been so much discussed, and to give it such a meaning as may render its various clauses consistent. This will be done by holding, that persons who honestly, though mistakenly, do an act in pursuance of the statute, are protected. In every act there are three ingredients,-time, place, and circumstance. Now a magistrate who acts at the wrong time, or under circumstances which do not entitle him to act, is clearly protected (Cann v. Clipperton); why then should place be considered more important than time or circumstance? The present case is like that of a magistrate who acts as such out of his jurisdiction. Moreover, sec. 75 expressly protects the present defendants, as persons acting in pursuance of the statute, and having reasonable grounds for the belief that they were acting within and under its authority. Even if the words of the 63rd sec. had been repeated in the 75th sec. I should still think that this rule ought to be discharged.

ROLFE, B.-I confess that I have, during the argument, changed the grounds on which my opinion was founded. I at first thought that Colonel Pennant was entitled to protection as owner of the fishery close adjoining to the locus in quo. I now think that all persons are so entitled, under the 75th section, who are sued for any act done bond fide in the belief that they are so acting in pursuance of the statute, though this protection must be confined to those who knew what the provisions of the Act were, and thought the particular circumstances of the case brought them within those provisions. This view will explain, and is in accordance with what Patteson, J. said in Hopkins v. Crowe (4 A. & E. 777.) PARKE, B.-The words "in pursuance of this Act" apply to persons believing bond fide that they are authorized under the Act. Rule discharged.

Saturday, April 25.

ADAMS v. NORTON. Motion to set aside a writ of accedas ad curiam. ant to shew cause why the writ of accedas ad curiam Cowling moved for a rule calling on the defendsued out in this case should not be set aside. He stated that the action was one in a Court of Constated that he had an affidavit which set forth that science, and the judgment was for the plaintiff; he also the statute under which the Court acted was in all respects like the Acts usually regulating the practice different to that of the Courts of Common Law, the of Courts of Request, and that, as their practice was writ of accedas ad curiam would not lie.

Yardley (with whom were the Solicitor-General Woolrych now moved for a nonsuit on several and Townsend) now shewed cause against the rule grounds: first, he contended that it appeared at the which had been obtained to enter the verdict for the trial that the plaintiff had a partner, and therefore he plaintiffs, pursuant to the leave reserved. If Colonel ought to have been joined in the action; and that, Pennant had reasonable grounds for believing, and although there might be an arrangement between did bona fide believe, that he had the exclusive right the partners that one should conduct this business, of fishery at the locus in quo, which was the opinion yet this he contended did not alter the question. both of the learned judge who tried the cause and of (Arden v. Tucker, 4 B. & Ad. 815.) [PARKE, B.- the jury, the defendants were entitled to the protecThere is abundant evidence on the sheriff's notes to tion of the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29. Here Colonel shew that the contract was made with the plaintiff Pennant had the right of fishery in a part of the same alone, and that the defendant knew nothing of the other water wherein the plaintiffs were fishing, though he partner.] Then the evidence by which the retainer was not actually the owner of the precise spot. It is was proved was improperly admitted. The document submitted that he is, nevertheless, within the meanput in was a copy of the retatuer, and bore the stamp ing of the 35th section of the above statute. The of the seal of the Insolvent Court. It was put in Judgment of Patteson, J. in Hopkins v. Crowe (4 under the 105th sec. of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, the original A. & E. 774, 777), will be relied on by the other side, retainer having been filed in the Insolvent Court; but the current of authorities is in favour of the debut it was submitted that a retainer was not such a fendants. It must be borne in mind that the plain-V. document as was contemplated by that section, which tiffs, at the time of the alleged trespass, were en- it merely required the officer of the Insolvent Court to gaged in taking fish in the night-time, and within a give copies (under the seal of the court) of the "pe-foot or so of Colonel Pennant's property. The cases tition, vesting order, schedule, order of adjudication, which decide that magistrates and other officers are In an action of debt, for use and occupation, where no and other orders and proceedings." Now this, it is protected who act wrongly, or even beyond their contended, is no "proceeding" within the meaning jurisdiction, but bona fide and with reasonable sum certain has been agreed on to be paid for rent, of the Act. grounds for believing that they have jurisdiction, and it is not necessary to have a writ of inquiry, but the are entitled to act, apply to the present case. plaintiff may sign final judgment, and issue execution v. Gunston, 4 Doug. 275; Prestidge v. Woodman, 1 at once, subject to an application to the Court by the B. & C. 12.) defendant, if the plaintiff take too much.

PARKE, B.-As this document is furnished by the officer of the court, I think we must infer that it is such a "proceeding" as he has power to furnish under the section referred to. Here a certified copy was produced, and I think it is a proceeding of which a copy is properly grantable by the Insolvent Court.

Woolrych.-Then it was not proved that any signed bill was delivered. [PARKE, B.-That can only be taken advantage of by a proper plea.] But the late Act 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 37, enacts that no attorney shall commence any action for his fees until one month after the delivery of his bill signed. **PARKE, B.-It is not necessary to prove that in the first instance, but only when the point is raised by a plea.

By the COURT.

Friday, April 24.

Rule refused.

GARBETT V. YARBOROUGH. Libel-Sufficiency of justification. In this case, which was tried before Platt, B. at the last Shrewsbury Assizes, Keating moved for a rule to shew cause why the verdict which had been found for the plaintiff on certain of the issues should not be entered for the defendant; or, why there should not be a new trial. This was an action on the case for libel, the alleged libel being contained in these words, which were proved to have been written by the defendant: "I understand that a warrant was applied for yesterday for the plaintiff, and I sincerely hope that he is by this time in custody." The question now brought before the Court was, whether the plea of justification was sufficient without containing an express averment that an information, on oath, had been laid before the magistrate for obtaining the

warrant.

Keating argued that it was not necessary to prove the fact of an information upon oath; that the warrant might have lawfully issued without such informa

(Bird

POLLOCK, C. B.-A magistrate, although bound
to act within his jurisdiction, need not enter into nice
questions respecting the limits of property.
PARKE, B.-The question is, whether the word
"owner" must be strictly construed, in order that
the party may be entitled to the protection given by
the 75th section of the statute.

Yardley referred to Daniel v. Wilson (5 T. R. 1),
Cook v. Leonard (6 B. & C. 351), and was then
stopped by the Court.

Cases cited: Scott v. Bye (9 Moore, 649); Bates
Turner (10 Moore, 32); Tingle v. Raslon (ib. 171).
should have been a writ of false judgment.
It was also contended that, if any writ could issue,

HUGHES v. STEWARD.

Rule nisi.

In this case the declaration was in debt for use and

occupation, and, a plea having been put in too late, the plaintiff signed final judgment.

Willes now moved to set aside the judgment on the fixed sum had been agreed on to be paid by the deground that it was irregular. He stated that no fendant for the premises, and therefore there ought to have been a writ of inquiry before the plaintiff was entitled to sign final judgment.

PARKE, B.-Your application is at least a half century too late to my certain knowledge.

LAMB V. SMITH.

Rule refused.

POLLOCK, C.B.-That is not necessary. My exJervis, Q.C. and Welsby, in support of their rule.perience has always been, that if you proceed in debt The cases respecting magistrates and other officers you may issue your execution for what sum you will be found to go to this extent only, that when a please, subject to an application to the Court if you take too much. person fills that particular character to which protection is intended to be given by some particular statute, he is entitled to the protection and immunities thereby afforded, even though he exceeds the authority delegated to him by law, provided he had reasonable grounds for believing that he had jurisdiction, and was entitled to act. (Bird v. Gunston, 4 Dougl. 275; Prestidge v. Woodman, 1 B. & C. 12; Jones v. Williams, 3 B. & C. 762; Greenway Hurd, 5 T. R. 553; Daniel v. Wilson, 5 T. R. Beechey v. Sides, 9 B. & C. 606; Ballinger v. Ferris, M. & W. 628; Butler v. Ford, 1 Cr. & M. 662; Wedge v. Berkley, 6 A. & E. 663; Norris v. Smith, 10 A. & E. 188; Cann v. Clipperton, 10 A. & E. 582; Pratt v. Hillman, 4 B. & C. 269; Bush v. Green, 4 B. N. C. 41.; Lidster v. Borrow, 1 Per. & Dav. 447.) In all the cases which have been cited on the other side, it will be found that the party protected has been authorised to act in virtue of some particular character, eo nomine: the principle of those cases does not apply here.

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They also cited Weller v. Toke (9 East, 364); Jones v. Gooday (9 M. & W. 736).

Motion to set aside a plea of non-joinder.
herein. The residences of the parties who it was al-
G. Pollock moved to set aside a plea of non-joinder
leged by the plea ought to have been proved in the
action, were set out both in the plea and the affidavit
verifying the plea, and the present application was
made on an affidavit which stated that inquiry had
been made at the places which were set out in the
plea as the residence of three of the persons so named,
and they were not known there.

Case cited: Whally v. Golding (9 Dowl.)
Rule nisi.
NEW TRIAL PAPER.
BEETON U. TIMS.

Action to recover back a deposit-construction of a

condition of sale. Where objections to a title of an estate are to be taken within a limited time after the delivery of an abstract

the day of trial, the Court will dispauper him, and at the same time direct him to pay the costs of the day. The plaintiff in person shewed cause against a rule calling upon him to shew cause why he should not be dispaupered, and why he should not pay the costs of the day, he having withdrawn the record. The present action was commenced on the 20th of May, 1844, and issue was joined on the 22nd of April, 1845, and notice of trial given for the sittings after Trinity Term; this notice was afterwards countermanded. On the 7th of January, 1846, the plaintiff obtained an order to sue in forma pauperis, and gave a fresh notice of trial for the first sitting in Hilary Term following. The cause having been made a remanet to the sittings after Term, it was put into the paper for the 5th of February, on which day the plaintiff withdrew the record. On the 31st of March, he gave a fresh notice of trial for the second sitting in this present Easter Term. The affidavit of the plaintiff stated that the record was withdrawn at the sittings after Hilary Term in consequence of being unable at the time to prove the handwriting of the defendant; the affidavit further stated, that the record was again withdrawn on the day of trial, at the second sittings in this Term, by the advice of counsel, in order to add another count.

T. W. Saunders, in support of the rule, contended that the plaintiff's own affidavit shewed that his conduct had been most vexatious, in having once countermanded notice of trial, and twice withdrawn the record on the days of trial, and this, as the defendant's affidavit shewed when the defendant had brought up witnesses from Bristol, and had instructed counsel that if the plaintiff could do this with impunity he could go on putting the defendant to endless expense in the same way.

WIGHTMAN, J. thought the conduct of the plaintiff clearly vexatious, and that the rule should be made absolute. Rule absolute.

the plaintiff signed judgment as for want of a plea:tify that the verdict so found do stand." The second
Held, that he was regular in so doing.
issue he found for the defendant, and reduced the
verdict to 31. 18s. 11d. This rule was obtained on the
ground that there being seven issues in all, the arbi-
trator had disposed of only four. (Kilburn v. Kilburn,
13 M. & W. 671; Morgan v. Thomas, 9 Jur. 92;
Stonehewer v. Farrer, 14 L. J. N. S.Q. B. 122.)

F. V. Lee shewed cause against a rule to set aside
two orders of Mr. Justice Cresswell, and why the
sum of 97. 98. paid to Mr. Lewis, the defendant's
attorney, should not be repaid to the plaintiff. It
appeared that the writ of summons in the present case
was served on the defendant on the 6th of March,
that the defendant duly appeared on the 13th, not-
withstanding which the plaintiff appeared for him on
the 16th, and on the same day filed his declaration,
and served notice of the same. That on the 18th the
defendant took out a summons to set aside the appear-
ance entered by the plaintiff, and all subsequent pro-
ceedings, on the ground of an appearance having been
entered by the defendant in due time, whereupon an
order was made by Mr. Justice Cresswell in the
terms of the summons; that on the 23rd, the said
order not having been served, the plaintiff signed
judgment, and gave notice of taxation for the follow-
ing day; that later, on the said 23rd, the defendant's
attorney served the order for setting aside the appear-
ance as aforesaid; that on the same day the defen-
dant took out a summons to set aside the judgment,
on the ground of irregularity, the former order setting
aside the appearance still existing, and no declaration
having been delivered. Upon the hearing, Mr.
Justice Cresswell made an order, whereupon the
sum of money mentioned in the rule was paid
as and for the costs of these irregularities. The
present rule was obtained on the ground that,
inasmuch as the order for setting aside the ap-
pearance was not served until after the period
for pleading had elapsed, it was waived, and the
judgment signed was consequently regular, and
the order of Mr. Justice Cresswell for setting it
aside wrong.
It was now contended, first, that the
appearance entered by the plaintiff was a nullity, and
could not, therefore, be made the foundation of the
subsequent proceedings; second, that if not a
nullity, but merely an irregularity, the defendant still
was in time in serving the order, since he served it
within six days after it was made, and the plaintiff
well knew of its existence.

and I always treat these cases as such. That being
so, the party is bound to take steps promptly. The
application of the cases cited is this, that when a
party is in danger of a step being taken, he should
take measures to prevent it. Now, in this case, the
order not being served before the other party were
entitled to take the next step, it was served too late,
and this rule must, therefore, be made absolute.

Monday, April 27. AMADIO V. SHOWELL. Quare, whether when one party obtains a judge's order, but neglects to serve it, the other can obtain a dupliLush, contrà, argued that the defendant, in allowcate thereof, and proceed upon it? ing so long a period to elapse before serving the Ball moved to set aside the judge's order, together order, namely, a period beyond that allowed for the with the judgment and execution thereon. It ap- next step-his pleading-he had virtually abandoned peared that an action having been commenced in this his order. That this being merely an irregularity, case, certain terms were agreed upon by the respective and not a nullity, the defendant was bound to have attorneys for its settlement, and it was arranged that served his order before the expiration of the period the defendant should give a judge's order for the pay-for taking the next step. (Charge v. Farhall, 4 B. ment by instalments of the debt and costs, with the & C. 865; Kenny v. Hutchinson, 6 M. & W. 134.) usual power to enter up judgment, and issue execution WIGHTMAN, J.-This is merely an irregularity, in default of payment. In pursuance of this arrangement the defendant's attorney drew up such an order, and attended at the office of the plaintiff's attorney for the purpose of serving it; but finding the plaintiff's attorney not there, the order was not served. On shewing the defendant the order, the latter expressed his disapprobation at the terms, and requested that it might not be served. The order was accordingly not served. After this, the plaintiff's attorney went to the judge's chambers and obtained a duplicate of such order, and in due time signed judgment, and issued execution thereupon. It was now contended that the plaintiff's attorney was wrong in the course he had adopted; that until the order was actually served the defendant had a right to abandon it, in which case the only course open to the plaintiff was to take out a summons himself, with the view of obtaining an order upon the consent filed, and that it is only where an order is actually served that the opposite party can obtain a duplicate original from the judge's clerk. (Lush's Practice, p.806.) Rule nisi.

ADDISON v. WILLIAMS. Judgment as in case of a nonsuit-Sufficiency of affidavit in shewing cause. Wilson shewed cause against the rule herein for not proceeding to trial pursuant to notice, and he offered a stet processus. The affidavit of the plaintiff's attorney, upon which he shewed cause, stated that on the 18th of February last the deponent was accosted in the highway by the defendant, who demanded, in an insulting manner, why deponent did not go on with the action; and that he further said that deponent might "law him as much as he liked," but he could get nothing besides his body."

Hance, contrà, argued that this was no evidence of insolvency, and that the plaintiff ought to be compelled to proceed.

Rule absolute.

COLEMAN v. HOLMES.

New trial-No evidence to go to the jury.
Miller shewed cause against a rule obtained by
Wise, to set aside the verdict herein, and for a new
trial. The case was tried before the under-sheriff for
Middlesex, when a verdict was returned for the
plaintiff for the full amount claimed, 187. 15s. In
opposition to the rule, it was contended that the ver-
dict was correct.

Wise was not called on, his lordship being of
opinion that there was no evidence whatever to sup-
port the verdict.
Rule absolute.

Wednesday, April 29,

Before Mr. Justice COLERIDGE.
ADAM v. ROWE.

Award, motion to set aside.

To a declaration containing three counts, the defendant pleaded, first, non assumpsit and three other pleas; the cause being referred, the arbitrator found for the plaintiff on the first, third, and fourth issues, and for the defendant on the second. Held, on an objection to the award, that the first plea raised three distinct issues (one on each count), upon which, therefore, the arbitrator had not decided that the award was good, one issue in fact only having been raised upon the three counts, each of which the arbitrator must be taken to have decided for the plaintiff. Mellor shewed cause against a rule to set aside the award of the arbitrator in this case, on the ground that he had not awarded upon all the issues. This was an action in which the declaration contained three counts: first, goods sold Tuesday, April 28. and delivered; second, money lent; third, an account MAPLE v. WOODGATE. stated. The defendant pleaded, first, non assumpsit, Where a plaintiff enters an appearance for the defendant except as to 291. 11s. 1d.; second, as to that sum, a in ignorance that the latter has already appeared, tender; third, except as to the said sum, a set-off; that is an irregularity, and not a nullity, and the and fourth, as to the said sum, payment. Upon defendant must take advantage of it in due time. these pleas issues were joined. The cause was referred Where such an appearance was set aside by a judge, to arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded as follows: but the defendant omitted to serve the order before" As to the issues, firstly, thirdly, and lastly joined, the period for his pleading would have expired, and I find and certify for the plaintiff, and I find and cer

WIGHTMAN, J. thought that sufficient was shewn to call upon the defendant to accept the stet processus. Rule discharged, unless the defendant accepts a stet processus.

It was now argued that, notwithstanding the declaration contained three counts, upon either of which the plaintiff may have recovered, yet as the first plea of non assumpsit was pleaded to the whole declaration, it raised but one issue, and not several issues, and that the arbitrator had therefore disposed of all the issues, and that this case was therefore distinguishable from Kilburn v. Kilburn.

Lush, contrà, contended that the arbitrator had not decided upon all the issues; that the plea of non assumpsit raised three distinct issues, one upon each count of the declaration, and that this case was not distinguishable from that of Kilburn v. Kilburn.

But

COLERIDGE, J.-I think Mr. Mellor has suc-
ceeded in pointing out a material distinction between
this case and Kilburn v. Kilburn. In that case there
was no finding on any distinct issues; here, however,
there are four issues on the record, each of which is
found by the arbitrator. We must give a liberal con-
struction to the language of the arbitrator. Nobody
can doubt that by the first issue he meant all that
was comprised within the plea of non assumpsit, and
there is therefore a finding upon that issue.
then it is said that that plea raises distinct issues;
and I grant that it does; but if it is suggested that
the arbitrator may have intended to have found on
one count in the declaration, and not on another,
there would have been something in the argument;
but it is clear that he meant to find for the plaintiff in
respect of all the causes of action in the declaration.
The only difficulty in such cases is as to the costs;
but, as he finds for all the matters, the difficulty does
not arise. Without, therefore, impugning any of the
authorities cited, I think I ought to discharge the rule.
Rule discharged.

BUSINESS OF THE WEEK.
Friday, April 24.

STINTON . BLOXAM.-Cockburn moved that the costs of

the first trial herein, which was in the plaintiff's favour,
might be set off against the costs in the second trial, which
terminated in favour of the defendant, the Court having
given no directions as to these first costs.-WIGHTMAN, J.
would speak to the other judges.
Cur. adv. valt.
tachment against this gentleman for not delivering his bill
of costs, pursuant to a judge's order.

Re HAYWOOD, Gent, One, &c.-Addison moved for an at-
Rule nisi.
Re UNWIN, Gent.-Willes moved to discharge the rule
obtained against Mr. Unwin herein. No one appearing to
support it,
Rule discharged with costs.
for leave to enter an appearance for the defendant sec. stat.
WROTH. LORD WILLIAM PAGET.-Whigham moved
it appearing that he had received the writ in a letter and
acknowledged it; the affidavit, however, not being conclusive
as to the defendant's handwriting, the motion stood over for
such further evidence.

JEFFERIES . MAY.-T. W. Saunders applied, on behalf of the plaintiff, to change the venue herein from Middlesex to Bristol.

Rule nisi. DOE dem. BODY v. Cox.-Lush moved to set aside thejudgment signed on the award of the arbitrator herein, and the award itself, on the ground that the said arbitrator had exceeded his authority. Rule nisi.

CARPENTER v. Dick.-Francillon moved for a rule to tried before the Under-sheriff of Gloucestershire, on the enter a nonsuit or for a new trial in this case, which was ground of misdirection, and the verdict being against evi dence. (Mortimer v. Wright, 6 M. & W.) Rule nisi.

REG. v. ROBERTS.-Unthank moved for a certiorari to remove a coroner's inquisition for manslaughter, together with the depositions, into this court, and for a rule to admit the defendant to bail in the country.

Application granted.

Saturday, April 25. WROTH v. LORD WILLIAM PAGET.-Whigham having. obtained an affidavit verifying the defendant's hand-writing, obtained a rule to enter an appearance.

REG. v. THE SOUTH EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.Godson, Q.C. moved for a rule for a mandamus commanding the above company to pay to the paymaster of the forces the sum of 10,000/. pursuant to their Act of Parliament, for the improvement of the river Rother. Rule nisi. HENDERSON AND OTHERS v. DALMAINE.-Wise moved for a distringas to compel appearance. Granted. ment herein against the sheriff on payment of costs. BUTLER . Ross.-Gray moved to set aside the attach

Rule nisi.

REG. v. THE JUSTICES OF THE ISLE OF ELY.-Couch moved for a mandamus, directing the above justices to enter continuances and hear an appeal. Rule nisi. ferred with the Court, who thought that no order ought to STINTON V. BLOXAM.-WIGHTMAN, J. said, he had conbe made as to the costs of the first trial.

NEWMAN . JOHNSON.-Thomas moved for a new trial,
on the grounds of the verdict being against evidence, and
upon affidavits shewing surprise. The action was tried
before the Under-sheriff of Middlesex.
Rule nisi.
rule herein for enlarging the peremptory undertaking.
PRICE V. JEFFERIES.-Wise shewed cause against the
F. Edwards, contrà.

Rule absolute on payment of the costs of this rule.
Monday, April 27.

Ex parte BULL.-Allen, Serjt. moved for a habeas corpus
to bring up the applicant, now a prisoner in York gaol,
upon a commitment by one of the Commissioners of the
Leeds District Court of Bankruptcy, in order that he may be
discharged for defects apparent upon the face of the warrant.
Rule nisi.
REG. v. THE GUARDIANS OF THE OLDHAM UNION.
Tomlinson moved to make this rule absolute; no cause being
shewn,
Rule absolute.

1