by experience anywhere. They have not only been prepared with relative haste, they are consecrated to relatively indefinite ends, and they are warped and deflected from those ends by the exigencies of group control. The end aimed at by the League of Nations is "Peace;" that aimed at by the Permanent Organization of Labor, is "Social justice;" that aimed at by the Permanent Court of International Justice, is "Justice under law." Who will undertake to say that any one of these ends has been clearly defined? "Peace," in this scheme, is to be preserved by armed force; "Social justice" is to be sought in the interest of labor; "Justice under law" is to be arrived at by a court from which an improved and adequate law has been deliberately withheld.

These aims are deflected in each case by a special group control,—in the field of international peace by the League, to the exclusion of non-League members; in the field of industry by the Labor Organization, which emphasizes a single social interest; and in the field of justice by the League's Court, in which only members of the League, original or actual, participate.

As to the Permanent Court of International Justice, Mr. Harriman declares: "It is obvious that the Court is not a body independent of the League, but is the body which exercises the judicial power of the League just as the United States District Courts, created by Congress, exercise the judicial power of the United States" (p. 52); and he supports this view by the following:

A court is "A body in the government to which the administration of justice is delegated."

The term "court" is often loosely used. Tribunals of arbitration are not true courts, whether they are special tribunals or the Court of Arbitration organized by the Hague Conventions. The Permanent Court of International Justice, however, is not a tribunal of arbitration, but is a true court, because it is a body in the governments of the League of Nations and of the Permanent Organization of Labour to which the administration of justice is delegated by those governments. Being a true court, it administers the law of the two governments of which it is the judicial body.

Citing Chief Justice Marshall, "The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign power," Mr. Harriman declares:

The jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, accordingly, is a branch of that which is possessed by the League of Nations and the Permanent Organization of Labour as independent sovereign powers. It has frequently been asserted that the Permanent Court is not a judicial branch of the League of Nations, but "an independent judicial body." Such a statement is merely a statement that the Permanent Court is not a court in the legal sense of the term.

And he concludes: "If a decision of the Permanent Court of International

Justice is not an act of the League of Nations, it is not a judicial decision, but the mere expression of an opinion by the members of the Court."

Is it true then that the League of Nations possesses sovereign power, and if so in what degree?

The author enters deeply into this subject, treating, in distinct chapters, of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Powers of the League of Nations and of the Permanent Organization of Labor.

Mr. Harriman finds in these organizations traces at least of sovereign power, but he hesitates a little with regard to the application of the expression "super-state" (p. 48). His best justification for applying it to the League of Nations would perhaps be found, not in what the League can do to its own members, who have voluntarily accepted its obligations, but in what it claims the right to do, under Article 16, to states that are not members, in absolutely prohibiting their trade with a culprit member. By what authority, unless it is its own independent sovereign will, does the League override and annul the previously accepted legal rights of neutrals? There is perfect consistency between the author's assertion that the Permanent Court of International Justice is a "true court," and his effort to find the attributes of sovereignty in the League. His conclusion is, no sovereign, no court; but, given a true court, there must be a sovereign. And if it is the League's Court, then the League is a sovereign power!

No doubt the idea of a court implies some relation to a government, or at least to governments. But why not to many governments as well as to one government, to many sovereignties as well as to one sovereignty? Mr. Harriman goes so far as to say:

Certain opponents of the League admit their willingness to participate in a "World Court" which is not the League's court. . . . In the legal sense of the term persons who oppose a League court are opposed to any real court. . . . It seems reasonably clear that the Permanent Court of International Justice is the judicial body of the League of Nations, and is a true court and that its judges, however elected, are officers of the League of Nations. Persons who object to the Court on this ground, and demand a court independent of the League, are really objecting to any true international court, because a court without a Government is a legal impossibility (pp. 140-141).

The court in question is without doubt the League's court, because it has been created by the League in execution of an article of the League's Covenant, and is so named in the Statute of the Court; but does it follow from this that a "World Court" can not be created by several governments independently uniting to create it? Do they first have to create a sovereign league of some kind, in order to create an international court? Why may not several sovereignties combine to create a court?

Mr. Harriman appears at this point to have raised a controversial issue which it is not possible to discuss fully in this notice, but which will undoubtedly attract attention.

Can the whole relation of courts to governments be determined by so simple an expedient as Marshall's definition of "the jurisdiction of a court"? The Mixed International Courts of Egypt, with a dozen nations cooperating, have been in operation for fifty years. Would the Court aimed at by the project framed at the Second Hague Conference not have been a "true court," without any league, if a way had been agreed upon to appoint the judges? Why then must an opponent of the League's Court be opposed to any real court? The ground of objection to the League's Court is usually not that it is not a true court,—although as at present organized it is merely a tribunal for voluntary appeal,-but that the Permanent Court of International Justice is molded in the image of the League and its structure and powers are determined by the League's Covenant, the First Part of the Treaty of Versailles, which the United States has definitively refused to ratify.

Important remaining chapters of this book are those on "The Obligations of Members;" "Sanctions;" "Rights of Members;" "Rights of Individuals;" "Diplomatic Immunity;" "Mandatories;" and "Constitutional Amendments."

So far as the present writer has observed, the author of this book does not explicitly state, beyond what has been quoted from the Preface, in what definite particular the Constitution of the United States is at the cross roads.

It is, however, made perfectly clear that while the Constitution marks out for this nation a straightforward course of independent development, the international organizations here described and analyzed invite the United States to embark upon a line of future action involving unknown and incalculable deviations from the course so plainly indicated by the Constitution, which nowhere contemplates a surrender or a transfer of the powers which, under its safeguards and limitations, the people have confided to the Government of the United States.

An appendix contains the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Permanent Organization of Labor and the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

DAVID JAYNE HILL.

The Reawakening of the Orient and Other Addresses. By Sir Valentine Chirol, Yusuke Tsurumi, Sir James Arthur Salter. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925. pp. vi, 176. Index. $2.00.

The title of this volume is, as the title of most of the collected essays of the Institute of Politics must be, somewhat misleading. Anyone who expects to find even rumors of the stirring of the mutilated dragon of China will be disappointed. The East begins in this volume with Morocco and Egypt. Sir Valentine Chirol, in what are very close approximations to chapters from his book, The Eastern Question, takes the "Reawakening of the Orient" no

further than the boundaries of Egypt and the Sudan and of British India. It is very simply and very cleverly done, and there are some interesting asides on Turkey and the Near East. The problem of Egypt in its relations to England and to the British Sudan is put with some candor as to the economic background of the control of cotton and of the fertilizing waters of the White and Blue Nile. The résumé of the history of India under British rule and influence is interesting but elementary. The complications are honestly faced, even those that arise from the existence of two great and not always friendly religions in India, and from racial prejudices widely held in the empire against Indian immigration or equality of citizenship. Perhaps it was too much to expect in a necessarily popular exposition anything of the economic setting of Indian civilization, which has been recently summed up in brilliant fashion by an Indian economist.1 Yet it is certainly more relevant to the difficulties of British rule than the caste system or even the clash of religions. Speakers before the Institute of Politics almost inevitably appear as apologists for their own nationalities. It is not strange that Sir Valentine should omit mention of the struggle of Indian nationalists to get control of fiscal policy and tariff rates, given the huge part that army expenditure and opium culture play in the former, and a struggle with Manchester in the latter.

Mr. Tsurumi is both more enlightening, and more interesting to Americans, in his descriptions of "The Liberal Movement and the Labor Movement" in Japan. He is perhaps unduly optimistic in his appraisal of the possibilities of liberalism. He himself feels that the American Immigration Act of 1924 was the most serious blow in years to Japanese liberalism, and he goes to the length of asserting that it has delivered over a promising labor movement into the hands of the Russian Bolshevist agents and their allies in Japan. The liberals naturally lost face in their policy of settlement by diplomacy, and the extremists of the labor movement could point to the exclusion clause as the natural result of capitalistic economy. To the liberal it was a slap in the face; to the radical, a welcome proof of the revolutionary socialists' interpretation of diplomatic history.

The analysis of Japan's new attitude toward China, a retrocession from her "vigorous foreign policy" to one of placation, is not less interesting. Whether or not "Japan's Cultural Work in China," which is tantamount to peaceful economic penetration behind a smoke-screen of modern propaganda, will be abandoned in the face of the most recent chaos in China, the fate of Mukden may bear witness. Apparently there has been a change of policy, if not a change of heart.

The third division of the volume has only the most indirect bearing on the Orient. Sir James Salter is interested in Europe first of all, and his whole thesis as to "The Economic Causes of War" is that Europe is an economic unit and that the last war and the present period of reconstruction have adequately demonstrated the folly of "an overnationalized system." 1 Economic Conditions in India, by P. P. Pillai.

As a good European, he is anxious to ground the new system of the League on a sound understanding of the necessity of internationalizing the questions of surplus population and raw materials. Here he speaks as a good Briton, too; but it is curious that his contribution should be so totally blind to the economic threats in a reawakened Orient, titled as the volume is in which his essay appears-curious and disillusioning. May that not be the history of the next war? While the friends of the League keep their eyes on the boiling pot in Europe, the whole lid may be blown off in the East.

W. Y. ELLIOTT. Das Völkerrecht. By Franz von Liszt, 12 ed., by Dr. Max Fleischmann. Berlin: 1925. pp. i-xx, 764.

The work of von Liszt has long been favorably received. The first edition appeared in 1898 and the 12th in 1925. Von Liszt died in 1919, and this edition is edited by Professor Max Fleischmann of the University of Halle. Von Liszt intended in all editions to present international law as a system from the German point of view, and Dr. Fleischmann endeavors to maintain the spirit of von Liszt. In the eleventh edition, even though prepared in 1917 when war was general, von Liszt had shown a spirit of hopefulness for international law.

To the well known earlier editions, new sections have been added on such subjects as have since the death of von Liszt become newly or more significant. These sections touch on the World War, mandates, aërial matters, mixed international courts, protective measures for health and general well being, laws of war, rights of neutrals, reparations and other results of war. Naturally, plebiscites, submarines, reprisals, war zones, private property in war, and the recent doctrines of contraband and blockade receive attention.

In some points Dr. Fleischmann indicates disagreement with von Liszt, but in the main he has elaborated the work of the author, and brought it up to date. This is particularly true in the matter of bibliography.

The appendices of source material of about 170 pages cover a variety of subjects. Some of these documents will have for other than illustrative purposes only a temporary value. Here appear President Wilson's message to Congress of January 8, 1918, the Russo-German Convention of Rapallo, April 16, 1922, the German-Bulgarian Consular Convention of September 29, 1911, and like documents.

The index has been made much more full to correspond with the text. GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON. Superstition or Rationality in Action for Peace? By Prof. A. V. Lundstedt. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1925. pp. 239. $4.50. Literature critical of the foundations of what is termed the Law of Nations is growing in a manner which must soon challenge the attention of the masters of this science. Recently was published The Lawless Law of Na