and municipal corporations of either nation or of any other political subdivisions of the Chilean or Peruvian Governments. Twenty-one. Legislators and aldermen. Twenty-two. Officials, superintendents and teachers in the public schools. Twenty-three. Officials, superintendents and inspectors of the public markets. Twenty-four. Secretaries, stenographers, clerks, assistants, and employees of every nature and kind who coöperate or collaborate or assist in the work entrusted to the officials, superintendents, or others mentioned above. Twentyfive. Officials and employees whose duty falls within the scope of the present paragraph or includes some of the duties of the army, navy, carbineers, secret or other police, the secret service or the gendarmerie, even though such duty falls also within the scope of paragraph (B) of this article.

(B) The several registration and election boards will treat the following government officials or civil employees (provided they do not discharge, in part, the duties of the government officials or civil employees mentioned in the preceding paragraph) as not included within the scope of the phrase quoted at the beginning of the present article, to wit:

One. Officials and employees of the Arica Lapaz Railway. Two. Officials and employees of enterprises of a private nature, despite their receiving subsidies from the public treasury. Three. Secretaries, stenographers, clerks, assistants, and employees of every nature and kind, who coöperate or collaborate or assist in the work entrusted to the officials, superintendents, or others, previously in the paragraph mentioned.

(C) The several registration and election boards will treat all government officials and civil employees whose status is not fixed by the two preceding paragraphs of the present article as being within the scope of the phrase quoted at the beginning of the present article. The true status of such officials and employees will be determined as promptly as practicable by the appeals board, in the event of appeals being taken. 2. Chile appealed from the finding and decision of the Plebiscitary Commission with respect to the classes of government officials and civil employees enumerated in items numbered 11, 12, 13, 16, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of paragraph A of said Article 5; and also from the refusal of the Plebiscitary Commission to include officials and employees of the telegraph and postal service among the classes enumerated in paragraph B of said Article 5. Chile further appealed from the refusal of the Plebiscitary Commission to reconsider and modify Article 159 (subsequently renumbered as Article 123) of the regulations, but on February 13, 1926 withdrew the appeal as to that article.

3. Peru appealed from the finding and decision of the Plebiscitary Commission with respect to the classes enumerated in items 1, 2 and 3 of paragraph B of said Article 5.

4. The Arbitrator has received and duly considered all of the documents referred to in the resolution of the Plebiscitary Commission certifying the said appeals and also such other documents as have been transmitted to him pursuant to the Order of February 11, 1926.

NOW, THEREFORE, the Arbitrator DECIDES:

1. That the appeal of Chile in so far as it concerns said Article 159 (renumbered as Article 123), having been withdrawn, be and it is hereby dismissed of record.

2. That the finding and decision of the Plebiscitary Commission as to all other matters involved in the pending appeal by Chile, that is to say with respect to the classes of government officials and civil employees enumerated in items numbered 11, 12, 13, 16, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of paragraph A and with respect to the officials and employees of the telegraph and postal service which the Plebiscitary Commission refused to include among the classes enumerated in paragraph B of said Article 5 of the registration and election regulations adopted on January 27, 1926, be and the same are hereby affirmed.

3. That the finding and decision of the Plebiscitary Commission as to all matters involved in the appeal by Peru, that is to say with respect to the classes of government officials and civil employees enumerated in items 1, 2 and 3 of paragraph B of said Article 5 of the regulations be and the same are hereby affirmed.

The Plebiscitary Commission, Tacna Arica Arbitration, in the exercise of its duties and functions under the award, hereby formulates and declares its findings and conclusions as follows:

One. Pursuant to the terms of the Treaty of Ancon the plebiscitary territory has remained and still remains subject to Chilean laws and authority. In these circumstances the creation and maintenance of conditions proper and necessary for the holding of a free and fair plebiscite as required by the Treaty and the Award constituted an obligation resting upon Chile. This obligation has not been discharged, and the Commission finds as a fact that the failure of Chile in this regard has frustrated the efforts of the Commission to hold the plebiscite as contemplated by the Award and has rendered its task impracticable of accomplishment.

Two. As the result of its experience and observations throughout the course of the plebiscitary proceedings the Commission has the settled conviction that the further prosecution of the plebiscitary proceedings in an effort to hold the plebiscite as contemplated by the award would be futile.

The Commission can not ignore its paramount duty under the award to hold only a free and fair plebiscite as contemplated by the treaty and the award and not to hold a plebiscite which would not be in accord with the intent of the Treaty and the Award.

The Plebiscitary Commission accordingly decides, upon the grounds above stated;

First, That a free and fair plebiscite as required by the Award is impracticable of accomplishment;

Second, That the plebiscitary proceedings be and they are hereby terminated, subject however to the formulation and execution of such measures as may be required for the proper liquidation of the affairs of the Commission and the transmission of its records and final report to the Arbitrator.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES*

Progress and the Constitution. By Newton D. Baker. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925. pp. 94. $1.25.

This little book is composed of three lectures delivered on the William H. White Foundation at the University of Virginia.

After a brief sketch of the distinctive characteristics of the Constitution and a definition of Progress, Mr. Baker considers their relations in the three fields of Institutions, Industry, and Foreign Relations.

Progress, as defined in this book, is identified with "change," "whether for better or for worse." There are, the author recognizes, "just a few ultimate moralities" which do not change. "But the atmosphere in which these moralities must function does change"; and so, without setting up any goal or standard, Progress is considered as a condition of change too rapid and too fundamental for old modes of thinking and acting to keep up with it.

Among institutions the popular conception of the office of the President, the relations between the Senate and the President, the status of the Vice Presidency with reference to succession, the contact between the Cabinet and the Congress, and the development of an Administrative Department of Government present phases of "Progress," in the sense that the original intentions and interpretations of the Constitution either do not at present apply or furnish a basis of general agreement.

In the lecture on "The Constitution and Industry," the effect of the introduction of the factory system and the application of steam to transportation are traced with clearness, felicity and effectiveness, occasionally lighted up with a flash of humor. The social and economic necessity for the extension of control over commerce and industry by the Federal Government is well illustrated in the wider interpretation of the so-called Commerce Clause of the Constitution and the decisions of the Supreme Court here cited with regard to subjects of which the founders of our Government could have formed no conception. "The police power," Mr. Baker concludes, "is a great and wholesome, indeed, a necessary power, but it has definite limits and we must not permit it to be used to change our whole political theory, by tolerating gradual and piecemeal attacks upon the constitutional guaranties.'

In his discussion of "The Constitution and Foreign Relations," President Wilson's Secretary of War may be expected to have some personal views. It is only just to record the fact that he expresses them with a reserve and an effort to be considerate that are creditable to his sense of fairness and his courtesy.

The JOURNAL assumes no responsibility for the views expressed in signed or unsigned book reviews or notes.-ED.

Mr. Baker appears to believe that our constitutional limitations in respect to the conduct of international business occasion many embarrassments. He does not, however, point out how these might be avoided, unless it might be by limiting the advice and consent of the Senate to the decision of a majority rather than to the decision of two-thirds of the Senators. To support this view he cites a passage written by Secretary Hay to his friend Henry Adams in a private letter, in which the Secretary, in a somewhat irritated mood as the context shows, considers it a "mistake of the Constitution," that his treaty could not have been ratified "in twenty-four hours" by a majority of the Senators. Secretary Hay felt the same way about the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty and hesitated to propose to the British negotiator the changes advised by the Senate. Nevertheless, he became reconciled to this and produced a much improved treaty which was adopted by the necessary two-thirds vote.

Referring to the Treaty of Versailles, of which Mr. Baker says, "The major part of the discussion of the treaty in the Senate had no relation whatever to any American interest," he concludes: "A majority of the Senate could have been gotten at almost any time to ratify the treaty, but twothirds could not be gotten, so that literally half a dozen Senators blocked the reorganization of the world."

Adhering closely to the record, what the Senate did with the Treaty of Versailles, which in its Covenant of the League of Nations was meant to force the United States to accept certain obligations in "the reorganization of the world" which were held to exceed the powers which the Constitution accords to the Government it creates, was to reduce those obligations by reservations as a condition of ratification.

Mr. Baker overlooks the fact that, so far as the Senate was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles failed of ratification because a majority of the President's party voted against it. That majority would, no doubt, have voted for ratification without reservations of any kind; that is, a party majority "could have been gotten at almost any time" to give its consent to unqualified adoption of the President's policy! But what is the object of Senatorial "advice and consent"? Is it not to give the political opposition a chance for expression? It is frequently the case that a majority of the Senators belong to the President's party and are politically controlled by him. Is not this a sufficient reason why a mere majority should not express the voice of the Senate in matters of such vital interest-and sometimes interests which differently affect the different States-as those involved in treaties? And, to submit the question to a practical test, does the country as a whole at present really regret that it was a two-thirds vote that was necessary to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, or would it prefer that the "majority of the Senate which could have been gotten at almost any time" should have been able to ratify that treaty "without the dotting of an i or the crossing of a t"? DAVID JAYNE HILL.