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paragraph 4 of resolution would divide the Council, fail to fulfill their intended purpose and thus operate to detriment both of people of South Africa and of UN. Would have been better to concentrate on reaffirmation of SC's past resolutions on arms to South Africa and to seek more effective implementation of these.
6. Dept is eager to ensure that there is no misunderstanding of our abstention on this resolution. Addressees should express US hope that host governments will appreciate reasons for abstention and of importance we attach to a continuing dialogue with host government, in the capital and in New York, on ways in which our countries can cooperate to advance the objectives of UN Charter with respect to South Africa.
After a review of this matter, the President has decided to continue fully to implement the UN Security Council Resolutions regarding trade with Rhodesia. The President has therefore directed that the United States Government continue to refuse to license import of Rhodesian goods by any firm which entered into a transaction after the effective date of the Executive Order prohibiting such imports. The Presi
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda. Secret; Nodis. Haig initialed the memorandum. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence.
dent has also directed that the Department of State initiate forthwith an active effort-in concert with the United Kingdom—to insure better compliance by other industrial nations with the Rhodesian embargo. In this regard, the President wishes that particular attention be paid to more careful scrutiny of nominally non-Rhodesian chrome imports.
In the interest of reducing undue hardship on American firms arising from our implementation of the embargo, the President has decided that:
1. Contingent upon confirmation by the Treasury Department that the facts are as stated by Union Carbide, a "hardship exception" license should be granted to Union Carbide for the importation of the 150,000 tons of Rhodesian chromite ore for which it had paid prior to the effective date of the Executive Order prohibiting such imports.
2. U.S. firms with assets in Rhodesia will be permitted to sell those assets to any buyer.
3. The Treasury Department will insure that all U.S. firms affected by the Rhodesian sanctions or by Rhodesian currency restrictions are aware of all tax relief provisions available to them under existing United States laws and regulations.
The Under Secretaries Committee will periodically review the domestic and international supply situation on chrome, and call forthwith to the President's attention any change which threatens our strategic needs for this commodity. For this purpose, representatives of the Secretary of Commerce and the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness shall be members of the Committee.
Henry A. Kissinger
National Security Decision Memorandum 811
Washington, August 17, 1970.
The Vice President
Implementation of Arms Embargo on South Africa and Portuguese African
After a review of the implementation of the arms embargo relating to South Africa and the Portuguese African territories, the President has directed that the United States will continue to adhere to the pertinent 1963 Security Council Resolutions and will, on appropriate occasions, affirm its intention so to do.
The President is concerned with the delays that have attended the handling of applications for "gray area" export licenses. The President has therefore directed that such applications in future will be handled as follows:
1. Non-lethal dual-use items which are preponderantly employed for civilian use will be licensed to either civilian or military buyers. Such items will generally not be manufactured to military specifications, and will not have any direct and clear application in combat, or to internal security operations. Items on our "Munitions List” are automatically excluded from this category.
2. Non-lethal dual-use items which are preponderantly used by military forces, but which do not have a clear and direct application to combat or to internal security operations, will be licensed for sale to civilian purchasers for civilian use, and may be licensed to military buyers upon the recommendation of the Department of Commerce and
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda. Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2 In an August 10 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger summarized the review of the implementation of the arms embargo and offered a series of recommendations which served as the basis for NSDM 81. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 291, Memoranda to the President, July-August 1970)
with the concurrence of the Department of State. Such items will generally be built to military specifications.
3. Whether preponderantly employed for civilian or military use, dual-use items with a clear and direct application to combat or to internal security operations (including aircraft suitable for troop transport), will not be licensed to military buyers. Such items may be licensed for sale to civilian purchasers for civilian use, only upon the recommendation of the Department of Commerce and with the concurrence of the Department of State.
In accordance with the above guidelines, the President has directed that:
1. Licenses be issued for the sale of Lear jets to the South African Defense Forces.
2. Licenses be issued for the sale of Cessna dual-engine 401s and 402s to the South African Defense Forces.
3. Licenses will not be issued for the sale of Cessna single-engine 180/185s to the South African Defense Forces.
4. Licenses will not be issued for the sale of Lockheed Orion P-3Cs to the South African Defense Forces.
5. Licenses will not be issued for the sale of L-100 transport aircraft to the South African Defense Forces.
The President wishes special care taken to avoid these decisions being related to the current consideration being given by the Government of the United Kingdom to the sale of maritime defense equipment to South Africa. The President has therefore directed that the security classification of this document be scrupulously observed. The President has also directed that his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee together determine and agree upon the procedures for informing members of Congress, interested American companies, and the South African and Portuguese governments of the decisions reflected herein.
Henry A. Kissinger
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
Washington, September 10, 1970, 2349Z.
148716. Subject: Rhodesia. Ref.: CA 4706, September 4, 1970 (Notal).
1. During discussions with HMG concerning NSC decisions on Rhodesian sanctions, Embassy requested touch on separate subject possible future Anglo-Rhodesian talks to find acceptable solution present impasse. Embassy may draw on following points in making its presentation.
2. Rhodesia is clearly British problem and responsibility. We also recognize there many roadblocks in way of reaching acceptable accord with Salisbury. But as we have been and are involved with the problem, we would like to share with HMG some reflections on possible British initiatives this area:
3. As none of Rhodesia's neighbors appears to feel comfortable with present situation, might there be virtue in HMG seeking their views (principally in Lisbon, Lusaka and Pretoria) before entering again into direct negotiations with Smith with the attendant full glare of public attention and African criticism. While Zambians and South Africans might not rpt not find it possible publicly to acclaim an acceptable compromise settlement, privately they and the Portuguese might have suggestions on ways to move the issue off dead center toward solution with which they could live. (FYI. We are not rpt not optimistic that another direct approach to Salisbury will be any more productive than the earlier "Tiger” or “Fearless" negotiations unless other affected players can be brought into act in some meaningful and constructive way. We also concerned that should new talks fail, HMG might tend to ease sanctions enforcement, leaving difficult choices to USG. End FYI.)
a. Although we have no way gauging probable Portuguese reaction, it occurs to us HMG reviewing future of Beira patrol and in view indications of Portuguese interest and involvement in European developments (British entry Common Market and Portuguese aspirations in
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FT 11-2 RHOD. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bruce; cleared in draft in AF/E and 10/UNP; cleared in AF/S, EUR/ SPP, and EUR/BMI; and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Lisbon, Lusaka, Pretoria, Cape Town, and USUN.
2 In Airgram CA-4706 to London, September 4, the Department instructed the Embassy to explain decisions to grant the hardship exception for Union Carbide and to allow the sale of Rhodesian assets before advancing proposals to make sanctions more effective. (Ibid.)
3 Document 39.