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50.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate
General in Cape Town'

Washington, May 14, 1971, 0136Z.

83977. Subject: Diggs Rejoinder on Segregated Facilities in South Africa. Ref: State 72440 and 75658; Tananarive 673.?

1. In response to letter sent him along lines State 75658, Congressman Diggs has replied with following telegram.

2. “Dept's letter dated May 6 regarding Ambassador Hurd unsatisfactory.” South African press report which I have indicates Ambassador had already accepted invitation to attend opening of Malan Opera House in Cape Town. Fact that he later arranged to be out of the country irrelevant. Do not agree that policy cannot be devised which will permit our mission representatives to visit segregated facilities if the conduct of official business is necessary in the strictest sense. Any use of facilities outside of this narrow context represents complicity with apartheid policy. We cannot say that we deplore the degradation of apartheid in such facilities and then turn around and use said facilities without admitting hypocrisy, particularly if such use is related to unofficial business. Use of American-controlled facilities on a nonsegregated basis is morally correct and therefore hardly releases us from criticism. I fully realize the restrictive dimensions of this proposal, but it would not compare with the restrictions imposed by the racist South African Government upon its non-white citizens and foreign visitors."

3. Unless Embassy has other suggestion, we not planning comment further on Opera House inauguration in response to Diggs but will confine comments to his proposal re non-use of segregated facilities. While we appreciate manifold problems latter would pose, we believe it would be useful to consider whether there are not some areas in which abstention from visits to or use of segregated facilities by US personnel could be achieved without counterproductive results. Would appreciate Embassy views and specific suggestions re this possibility.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 14 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Nelson on May 12; cleared in AF/P, H, and AF; and approved by Crosby. Repeated to Pretoria, Durban, and Johannesburg. A handwritten note reads: "Cape Town for Embassy."

2 Telegram 75658 is printed as Document 49. For telegrams 72440 and 673, see footnotes 2 and 3 thereto.

3 Letter from Abshire to Diggs; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 14 S AFR.

4. Would also appreciate information about tenth anniversary celebration events at which SAG will expect US official representation and which might present further problems.

Rogers

51.

Telegram From the Embassy in Cameroon to the Department of State

Yaounde, May 16, 1971, 1230Z.

1406. No distribution outside Department. Subject: US Diplomatic Policy in South Africa. Ref: State 085175,085174.? From Assistant Secretary Newsom.

1. While perhaps not having all details, I am assuming from reftels that Chairman Diggs has raised further matter our general policy toward attendance segregated gatherings in South Africa following our response on Malan Opera House opening.

2. Obviously we cannot keep doors open for meaningful contacts with all elements in South Africa if we are to avoid all segregated gatherings or facilities. We can, however, seek draw distinction between those events such as Malan Opera House opening which become particularly identified with apartheid and those events which are normal and necessary part of diplomatic courtesy. I believe Ambassador Hurd in his option has suggested appropriate approach re anniversary; I suggest we agree.

3. Assuming reply Chairman Diggs required, I suggest we make brief response, emphasizing that this administration, as have all previous administrations believes U.S. can most effectively exercise influence and keep doors open for contacts between citizens both countries by maintenance diplomatic relations. Since nearly all events and facil

3

1

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 14 S AFR. Confidential; Priority; Limdis.

2 In telegram 85174 to Yaounde, May 15, the Department requested Newsom's comments on telegram 486 from Cape Town; see footnote 3 below. Telegram 85175 was a repeat of telegram 486 from Cape Town. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 14 S AFR)

3 In telegram 486 from Cape Town, May 14, Hurd suggested one way to keep U.S. association with South African anniversary events low key was to attend only the banquet and ceremonial speech. He argued that a total boycott would "offend and alienate government we are trying to influence.” (Ibid.)

ities in country segregated to some extent, policy of non-attendance such events would restrict our contacts with colored, Indian and black groups as well as white. U.S. representatives, however, are under instructions to use appropriate discretion in cases of events which by their special character are particularly identified with the apartheid system in order leave no doubt regarding our continued attitude of abhorrence toward such a system.

4. Carter may wish supplement letter by oral briefing of Chairman pointing out very limited U.S. attendance South African anniversary events and stressing significance our diplomatic presence in facilitating contacts all elements population.

Hoffacker

52.

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council
Interdepartmental Group for Africa'

Washington, June 1971.

[Omitted here is a title page.]

Swaziland: Policy Planning Paper

A. U.S. Interests in Swaziland

1. Swaziland, as a stable nation based on racial equality and in close contact with its white-dominated neighbors, is an influence for moderation and evolution away from racial repression and minority white rule in southern Africa.

2. Total direct U.S. investment in Swaziland is relatively quite small. There is a U.S.-owned fruit canning factory (Libby), and construction is about to begin on a U.S.-owned radio station.

3. Swaziland is of negligible importance to the United States as a supplier, although it is the world's fifth largest exporter of asbestos and also exports iron ore and coal. B. U.S. Objectives Over the Next Five Years

1. Optimum political independence and stable relations with South Africa.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 SWAZ-US. Secret; Noforn.

2. Economic development and viability.

3. Continuation of the UK and the UN as major sources of economic and technical assistance as well as increased assistance from the IBRD and other western countries.

4. Expanded relations with the states of black Africa.

5. Continued pro-western orientation and support for U.S. positions in international bodies.

C. Swaziland's Objectives Vis-à-Vis the United States

U.S. assistance in achieving:

1. A prosperous economy with maximum benefits for all the population.

2. Rapid development of technical and academic education.
U.S. support for:

3. Increased political and economic independence from South Africa.

4. The achievement of racial equality throughout southern Africa.

5. Securing the respect of black African states for Swaziland's independence and their appreciation of the unique problems it faces with regard to South Africa.

D. Recommended Courses of Action

1. Conclude and implement the proposed loan of $2.2 million to the Swazi Government to be used in conjunction with British financing on agricultural development projects. Provide technical assistance to the Rural Development Areas program in conjunction with the AID agricultural equipment loan and British assistance.

2. Continue to encourage private U.S. industry to invest in Swaziland, making maximum use of OPIC.

3. Encourage other donors or private sources to investigate ways to develop direct air services among the BLS countries and other nearby countries.

4. Continue the Peace Corps program.

5. Identify key younger government officials and politicians and expand leader grants to them.

6. Seek to exert a liberalizing influence on the present establishment to counter the trend toward alienation of young educated persons and the growing labor force in the money economy.

7. Continue--and expand if possible--present programs for educational and technical assistance and training.

8. Increase Swaziland's U.S. sugar quota.
9. Maintain a small information and cultural program.

53.

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council
Interdepartmental Group for Africa

Washington, June 1971.

[Omitted here is a title page.]

Botswana: Policy Planning Paper A. U.S. Interests in Botswana

1. Botswana, as a stable nation based on racial equality, led by a highly-respected President, and serving as a bridge between white-dominated Africa and black Africa, is an influence for moderation and evolution away from racial repression and minority white rule in southern Africa.

2. American Metal Climax holds a major share in a copper/nickel mining venture in which about $100 million are expected to be invested. U.S. Steel has a substantial interest in a prospecting company looking for additional ore deposits.

3. Although U.S. trade is negligible, Botswana has commercially exploitable deposits of copper, nickel, diamonds, manganese, antimony, and sulphur which could become important for the United States.

B. U.S. Objectives Over the Next Five Years

1. Optimum political independence and stable relations with South Africa.

2. Economic development and viability.

3. Continuation of the UK, the UN, and the IBRD as major sources of economic and technical assistance as well as increased assistance from other western countries.

4. Expanded political and economic relations with black Africa, in particular Zambia and East Africa.

5. Completion of the Shashe Complex Project and the successful launching of the mining industry based on it.

6. Improvement of the road link with Zambia.

7. Continued pro-western orientation and support for U.S. positions in international bodies.

1

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 BOTSWANA-US. Secret; Noforn.

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