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May I add how extremely grateful I was for your most prompt and helpful response to my message to you about sanctions. It was very good of you to agree to act so quickly.
With best personal wishes,
3 See Document 65 and footnote 2 thereto. Nixon's response was not found.
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the United Kingdom and Togo and the Mission to the United Nations
Washington, November 29, 1971, 1215Z.
215061. Lome for Newsom. Subj: Rhodesia: Godber Visit.
Summary. UK Minister Godber saw Acting Secretary Irwin November 26 to explain terms and next steps Rhodesian settlement, urge desirability withholding judgment until acceptability or nonacceptability to black Rhodesians known, and express hope that when UNSC considers anticipated condemnatory resolutions, there will be enough abstentions to preclude need for UK veto, which would however be used if needed. Godber expressed measured optimism that majority Rhodesians would find settlement acceptable and that whole business could be concluded first half 1972. End Summary.
1. UK Minister of State Godber saw Acting Secretary Irwin November 26 to discuss Rhodesian settlement. Turned over copies of settlement document itself, Declaration of Rights, text of letter from Heath to President, and text Sir Alec Douglas-Home's report to Parliament. Godber explained future electoral provisions in particular detail, and said agreement reached is fully compatible with first four principles under which settlement sought. Compatibility with fifth principle, acceptability to majority Rhodesians, of course remains to be tested. Godber said all HMG asks is that judgment be withheld until commission to be set up to look into this has investigated and made its report.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by George on November 26; cleared in 10 and AF; and approved by Irwin.
2 Document 66.
2. In addition to chairman Lord Pearce, commission will include Lord Harlech and Sir Maurice Dorman plus other members. It will be empowered go anywhere and see anyone in Rhodesia, Godber said, although he said later in response to question it probably would not be given access to persons convicted of criminal as compared political offenses. Once commission is set up, Godber thought it could conclude work in couple of months.
3. If committee reports majority acquiescence, Rhodesian Government is to carry out all steps it has undertaken, and HMG will then do likewise, with process culminating in Rhodesian independence. Godber thought this might all be carried out within first half 1972 (by Easter, he personally hoped). If committee reports majority is opposed to settlement, HMG will bow out of whole thing.
4. Immediate HMG concern is weathering expected storm in Security Council. Godber said there will undoubtedly be resolutions put forward which HMG cannot accept. Will veto if necessary but would prefer see sufficient abstentions to prevent passage, which would mean seven, and hoped US would abstain. Acting Secretary made no commitment on this point.
5. In sum, Godber said this was best possible settlement under circumstances, it should be acceptable to Rhodesian blacks, and he hoped they would be let alone think matter out and express views freely.
6. In response various questions, Godber said (a) HMG absolutely opposed to active UN participatory role in commission, although he could perceive some utility in having UN observers, if of impartial nature--a possibility on which he personally had grave doubts; (b) Rhodesian Government will not retain overriding powers which would permit future independent government renege on agreement. Will revert in some respects to 1961 constitution which contains only standard emergency powers section; (c) HMG would have no truck with any kind of UN action purporting to set up governing body for Rhodesia; (d) if commission reports majority sentiment favorable to settlement, and follow-up actions then taken by both governments, HMG will not request SC to revoke sanctions, but simply inform SC that grounds for sanctions no longer exist; (e) HMG sees little likelihood successful Rhodesian right-wing opposition to settlement; (f) It is difficult predict how long it might take for black Rhodesians to attain voting majority but important thing is that there will be unimpeded progress toward that end, and end is inevitable at some future time.
For a discussion of the Pearce Commission and Southern Rhodesia at the United Nations, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972, pp. 75–77, 118–121.
7. In concluding remarks, Irwin said credibility of commission's report will depend very much on way it operates. Godber agreed, said this is one argument for having UN observers, although HMG has not yet thrashed this question out. Irwin returned to question whether future Rhodesian Governments could be depended on carry out agreement in good faith. Godber said future constitutional changes would require separate majority of both white and black Rhodesians, which should help ensure against reneging by future Rhodesian Governments. If one is thinking of external guarantees of some sort, this means bayonets, which Godber said is out of question.
The cumulative effect of a number of ad hoc decisions and international developments affecting U.S. relations with the African liberation movements may be to impart an unintended direction to our overall policy. This memorandum assesses the current state of U.S. relations with the liberation movements. It suggests a need to clarify our objectives and to develop criteria for choosing among policy options in this
The African liberation movements are targeted at South Africa, South West Africa (Namibia), Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. Most of the liberation movements date
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 AFR-US. Secret. Drafted by Frank R. Golino (AF/PPS) on November 10; revised on December 2. Sent to all African diplomatic posts as an attachment to CA-5713, December 23.
from the period when the greater part of sub-Saharan Africa became independent, that is, the late 1950's and early 1960's.
None of the targeted African countries and territories have a single unified liberation movement. All are represented by at least two and often by more groups (see attached list).? Within each movement there are competing leadership factions. These cleavages have a number of causes including tribalism and Sino-Soviet rivalry.
The principal sources of support for the liberation movements have been the Communist world and the African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity. A strong campaign led by the Afro-Asian bloc has also begun in the United Nations and other international organizations to obtain explicit UN sanction for the liberation movements similar to the approval already contained in the OAU Charter. These pressures have begun to affect US working relationships in nearly all of the UN organizations including such highly technical bodies as the Universal Postal Union and the World Health Organization.
While their goals of independence for the Portuguese African territories, the return to constitutionality and independence on the basis of African majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, independence for South West Africa, and the termination of apartheid and political and legal restrictions on South Africa's non-whites are all close to official U.S. policies favoring self-determination and opposing racial discrimination, we do not support the use of force or violence in pursuit of these goals.
We officially abhor the racial policies of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and continue to hope Portugal will recognize the long-term advantages of adopting a policy of self-determination for its African territories, stressing that Portugal's African policy is an important factor in the West's ability to influence the direction and pace of events in Africa as a whole.
U.S. policy toward the various liberation movements has been to maintain discreet and unobtrusive but hopefully useful contacts, avoiding measures which could be interpreted as hostile to friendly governments. While our ability to assist these movements is severely circumscribed by the fact that we oppose force as a means of promoting change, one of our principal goals has been to encourage, if possible, the various liberation movements away from over-dependence on Sino-Soviet assistance.
2 "African Liberation Movements," attached but not printed.
Programs: SASP and EATP:
Since most of the liberation movements, with the exception of those of Portuguese Guinea, have had serious difficulty in recruiting supporters within their target countries and territories, members have been recruited largely from refugees who have been attracted by offers of education or employment. In an effort to exert a positive and non-violent influence we therefore adopted a few programs beginning in the early 1960's to train Southern African refugees in occupations other than armed insurgency. Our major effort was based on two activities, the Southern African Student's Program (SASP) and the East African Training Program (EATP).
SASP was created in 1961. Its aim is to develop educated leaders from among the young African refugees who have fled white dominated areas and who could be of service to their people if political conditions improve. Since 1961, 511 students have received SASP scholarships. There are 162 students currently in the program and the FY-71 cost was $569,000. As recently as FY-67 the SASP budget was $1,800,000 or more than one half of CU/AF's budget. In an effort to reduce the cost of the program no new students were accepted in FY-68 and FX-69. The program was resumed on a limited scale in FY-70 and it is anticipated that in the future approximately five new scholarships will be awarded annually to graduate students.
The principal difficulty with SASP has been that upon graduation the participants have been unable or unwilling to return to their home countries and other African countries have been most reluctant to receive them. Although more than 150 have gone to independent African countries, arrangements have had to be made for many others to remain in the United States until they can find employment in Africa.
EATP was begun under AID sponsorship in 1963 to provide refugees, who were not qualified for SASP university level scholarships, with secondary educations. Two schools were established: the Kurasini International Education Center in Dar es Salaam, and Nkumbi International College in Zambia. Due to difficulties in attracting students and a decrease in the flow of refugees into Tanzania and Zambia in the late 1960's, a decision was taken by AID to turn the two schools over to the Government of Tanzania in December 1969 for training clerical workers for civil service employment. Nkumbi was turned over to the Government of Zambia in December 1970. Nkumbi is still maintained primarily as a school for refugees and AID has offered scholarships for refugee students there. At present approximately 120 students receive scholarships at a cost of $240,000 per year. Annual intake of new students is expected to be about 25 per year. We also make substantial contributions to UNHCR which devotes much of its resources to southern Africa.