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In addition to training refugees to play useful roles some day in their home countries, SASP and EATP have had the instrumental effect of demonstrating U.S. concern for the problems of refugees from the white dominated areas and of legitimizing contacts between representatives of the U.S. government and those of the liberation movements which nominated training candidates. Although most of the liberation movements appear to be sincerely interested in keeping ties open to both the West and the Communist world, the curtailment of SASP and EATP has therefore had the practical effect of restricting the basis for our communication with the movements. It has also increased their dependency upon Communist sources of support for educational training as well as military aid. This, in effect, works against one of our principal policy goals vis-à-vis the liberation movements. That is, influencing them to move away from over-dependence on Sino-Soviet assistance. Portuguese Trends:
One of the key policy initiatives of the Portuguese Government of Prime Minister Caetano is his constitutional amendment giving a measure of autonomy to the overseas territories. This development has potentially important consequences for another aspect of U.S. policy affecting the liberation movements, that is, our hope that Portugal will recognize the long-term advantages of a policy of self-determination for its African territories. One of the purported purposes of this constitutional amendment appears to be to make some gesture toward self-determination without in any way turning over political control to the blacks. (Lisbon 1622)3 The implicit danger is that eventual administrative autonomy in the Portuguese territories could result in the establishment of new Rhodesias. Moreover, as a result of growing U.S. investment in Angola, our facilities in the Azores, and our NATO ties, the United States is identified with the Portuguese in both their and insurgent eyes.
The principal conclusion of this assessment is that the cumulative effect of a number of recent ad hoc decisions and international developments affecting U.S. relations with the African liberation movements may be to impart an unintended direction to our overall policy. A number of options, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, for adjusting and/or reaffirming this policy should be considered. These include:
3 Not found. For details on the constitutional amendment, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971-1972, pp. 24855-24856.
1) recognition of the importance of the liberation movements as symbols in Africa and as channels for Soviet and Communist Chinese influence and a decision that the United States accordingly should:
a) continue discreet contact with the movements' leadership; b) continue to provide educational and humanitarian assistance to refugees;
2) provision of discreet help to pro-western leaders and their movements short of providing arms and military equipment;
3) avoidance of any contact with the liberation movements as being inconsistent with our policy opposing the use of force in providing a solution to southern African problems.
The following are possible courses of action relating to options one and two:
1) adoption by all U.S. diplomatic posts in Africa of an agreed plan of action for handling contacts with liberation movement leaders;
2) consideration of alternatives to SASP and EATP for providing U.S. assistance to the refugees and maintaining contact with their leaders, if such educational programs are either impractical or inadvisable (feeding and health programs through volunteer agencies are suggested as possible alternatives).
3) efforts to influence the liberation movements to adopt non-violent methods of promoting their cause—to convince them that they will rally more international and governmental support in Western countries by such methods and that peaceful methods will be more effective in accomplishing independence.
Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National
Washington, January 17, 1972.
Rhodesian Chrome and the Byrd Amendment
On January 1, it became illegal for the US Government to prohibit imports of Rhodesian chrome. This was the effect of the Byrd Amend
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Rhodesia, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the first page indicates the President saw it.
ment to the Military Procurement Act.2 When Rhodesian chrome enters the US, we will be in violation of UN mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia. On December 30, the State Department (Tab A) proposed that you take one of three actions to preclude such a violation. Treasury (Tab B), Commerce (Tab C) and OEP (Tab D) all disagreed with State as do Peter Peterson and I.3
(1) Prohibit Soviet Chrome for Six Months.
State's favored alternative is that you ban Soviet chrome for six months so that we can go on legally prohibiting Rhodesian chrome during this period, which may be long enough to see the British end sanctions. State says you have ample authority to do this under the UN Participation Act. Treasury disagrees, noting that while you have legal authority to enforce UN sanctions, these are against Rhodesia and not against the USSR. Commerce does not argue the legalities but feels that a restriction against the USSR could seriously jeopardize the possibilities of increased trade with the USSR. State on the other hand feels that any damage to relations with the USSR would be limited. If we wanted to circumvent the Byrd Amendment this might be the simplest way. But it would carry some risk for our Soviet relations before your Moscow trip. I therefore would not recommend it.
(2) Remove Chrome From the List of Critical and Strategic Materials.
State suggests you remove chrome from the list of strategic and critical materials—and so make the Byrd Amendment inapplicable to it-based on the fact that chrome is in ample supply. OEP, which has primary responsibility for administering the strategic list objects strongly. General Lincoln of OEP believes that chrome remains a strategic material, and that if we tamper with our standards for identifying such materials, we will jeopardize our whole stockpile policy. This would endanger pending stockpile disposal bills on the Hill which OMB hopes will yield us $600 million. Commerce comments that removing chrome from the list would be an evasion of the Congressional intent. I agree. Such a transparent device to thwart Congress would undoubtedly get us into trouble on the Hill.
2 See Document 55.
3 Tabs A-D are attached but not printed. Tab A, Department of State proposal, December 30, 1971; Tab B, Department of the Treasury paper, "Implementation of the Byrd Amendment Rhodesia Chromite," January 4; Tab C, Department of Commerce paper, "Implementation of Byrd Amendment," December 30, 1971; Tab D, Office of Emergency Preparedness paper, "Implementation of the Byrd Amendment on Rhodesian Chromite," January 4.
(3) Ask Congress For a Six Month Delay
This appears to be the least objectionable idea, but Congress is out of session and could probably not act quickly, if at all, when they return. Furthermore, the whole sanctions program will probably die this Spring when the UK and Rhodesia finalize their settlement. Even if we wanted to ask the Congress for a delay, we would have to implement the Byrd Amendment in the meantime.
I think we should simply implement the Byrd Amendment as Congress intended to allow imports of Rhodesian chrome. This is obviously not the time to restrict our trade with the USSR, nor can I see jeopardizing our stockpile program or raising an unnecessary storm on the Hill for acting against Byrd's Amendment.
Following this course of action will require changes in Executive regulations.
That we comply with the spirit and sense of the Byrd Amendment and instruct Treasury to draw up the necessary regulations to allow the importation of chrome. Pete Peterson concurs.
Alternatively, you may wish to follow one of the courses recommended by State:
Prohibit Soviet chrome imports for six months No
Remove chrome from the strategic and critical list. No
Seek a six-month delay from Congress No
* The President initialed his approval of this option. On January 21, Kissinger informed Rogers, Connally, Stans, and Lincoln of the President's decision. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Rhodesia, Vol. II)
Memorandum From Robert Hormats and Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, January 24, 1972.
Nuclear Power Reactor Sale to South Africa
GE has recently inquired informally about the possibility of a $50 million direct Ex-Im credit to finance the sale of a nuclear power reactor for South Africa. Under present guidance, Ex-Im provides insurance and guarantees up to a maximum of 10 years but has not provided direct credits since 1959. The amount and form of Ex-Im participation would be a quantum jump from this. In addition, the character of the project would cause political problems in the rest of Africa. Thus, for political reasons it is desirable to avoid using Ex-Im credits to finance this sale.
A more acceptable alternative, which we, State, and Ex-Im favor, is to have the Private Export Funding Corporation (PEFCO) provide the financing using Ex-Im Bank guarantees only. PEFCO has already extended credits for nuclear power plants in Taiwan, Italy and Brazil. Although this approach would not be immune from criticism—since PEFCO would rely on Ex-Im guarantees—it maintains the distinction between USG guarantees and USG credits. Ex-Im is anxious to approach PEFCO on this matter if GE pursues the question further, and would like to get your view on this issue.
That you approve the PEFCO financing approach.2
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 744, Country Files, Africa, South Africa, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Peterson.
2 Haig approved the recommendation for Kissinger.