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their recognition that evolution away from a colonial relationship ought to be gradual and accompanied by intensified measures to spur development of the African populations. Others are doubtless much less flexible. Nevertheless, we have no reason to suppose that the present leaders of these states would seek in any way to prevent a multiracial solution in the Portuguese African territories.

6. It is impossible to judge the ability of African states to deliver on the promises in the Manifesto but we believe the Manifesto contains positive elements which could provide Portugal with an opportunity to determine whether the interests of the Portuguese on one hand and of the African states and nationalist groups on the other, might ultimately be reconciled. We believe that within the limits of their own needs and commitments, the Zambian and Tanzanian expressions of a desire to achieve a peaceful solution are genuine. We recognize Portugal has publicly stated its eagerness to reestablish normal relations with its African neighbors and believe the Manifesto may provide Portugal opportunities to take positive steps in that direction, or at least to test the willingness of African leaders to discuss the problem.

7. FYI: In making these points, we have sought to address two major aspects of Caetano's earlier assessment (Lisbon 1663). Caetano appears to see black racism as the major motivation of the militant black states. We do not deny that racism is a factor in their political dynamics, but as noted in paragraph 2 above there are other important factors involved and Caetano's conclusion strikes us as too pessimistic, or at any rate, as premature.

8. We infer from Caetano's comments that he foresees a time when the emotionalism which currently characterizes African attitudes toward these problems is likely to wane. We have endeavored to explain why we believe the trends are generally in the opposite direction.

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In answer to the Secretary's question on how he saw the future in Angola and Mozambique, Prime Minister Caetano stated that there were now fifth and sixth generation Portuguese in those provinces. They were building a non-discriminatory society based on a mixed race. This required time. If independence could be granted to these provinces along the lines of the American colonies in 1776 or of Brazil in 1822 there would be no problem as far as he was concerned. However, the type of independence that would satisfy the United Nations was a danger to civilization and would lead to the implantation of communism in that area at great risk to Rhodesia and South Africa. As happens in subversive wars, the problem was the winning of the spirit of the people through economic and social progress rather than the killing of the enemy. Prime Minister Caetano concluded by stating that the Portuguese policy was to make the people realize that the assurances of Portuguese sovereignty were worth more than the uncertainties of an adventure with an unpredictable outcome.

The Secretary stated that he was pleased that Portugal had conveyed the feeling to the outside world that there was some liberalization in Portugal with the continued maintenance of stability. On Africa we hoped to have a fairly practical policy in that we were going to assist African nations in economic development and otherwise. We were not as concerned about the extent of communist penetration as some other nations seemed to be, since the danger compared to prior periods seemed to have lessened. We did see a major problem in the years ahead of confrontation between blacks and whites and this caused

concern.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PORT-US. Confidential; Exdis. Part III of III. The meeting was held at Catalazete Fort. Rogers was in Portugal to meet with Caetano and senior Portuguese officials.

The Secretary stated that he would like to suggest that we understood Portugal's problems and the Portuguese point of view. Just as we intended to be very understanding of these problems and the steps taken, he hoped the Portuguese would be understanding of the problems we faced in the United States, the United Nations, and with other countries. We would prefer to work out a future relationship in such a way that we were not asked or made to appear to either support or oppose Portuguese policies. He added that we were anxious to maintain cordial relations and valued our partnership in NATO. We certainly supported the direction in which Portugal was moving. Prime Minister Caetano replied that while the United States should not have to commit itself to Portuguese policy, there must be many concrete points where Portuguese policy could be supported since these points were in support of world peace.

91.

Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, August 4, 1970, 2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Congo (K) President Mobutu: Portugal and Angola (Part 3 of 5) PARTICIPANTS

Congolese:

H. E. Joseph Desire Mobutu, President, Congo (K)

H. E. Jean-Theodore Umba-Di-Lutete, Minister Delegate at the Presidency

H. E. Evariste Loliki, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Barthelemy Bisengimana, Director of Cabinet of the Presidency

U.S.:

Secretary Rogers

Ambassador Sheldon B. Vance

Assistant Secretary Newsom

John McKesson, Director, AF/C

President Mobutu raised the problem of Angola. He explained that his Government was supporting Holden Roberto, leader of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), while many other Africans were supporting the Popular Movement for the Liberation of An

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 THE CONGO. Secret. Drafted by McKesson on August 10 and cleared by Newsom. The meeting was held in Rogers's office.

gola (MPLA), which was communist-oriented. Mobutu said that there was no question but that Angola would eventually become independent. If independence is achieved with Holden Roberto in command, relations can develop amicably between Angola and the Congo, but if the MPLA takes over upon the independence of Angola, the Congo will have very serious problems all along the extended frontier between the two countries. Within the Organization for African Unity (OAU), Algeria strongly supports the MPLA while the Congo has so far been able to maintain OAU backing for GRAE. In the long run this situation could lead to grave difficulties.

Mr. Newsom stated that we understood the problem and worked with Holden Roberto as much as our relations with Portugal permit. The Secretary said that he was in Lisbon recently and talked to Caetano.2 He did not see much evidence of a change on the part of Portugal but he hoped that there might be eventually. The Secretary stated that we are doing what we can to be helpful. The Secretary felt that Caetano would like to make changes but had to face his own hard-liners. Mr. Newsom noted that the Congo had practical contacts with the Portugese in Kinshasa and he said that we would like to hear any ideas the Congolese might have on how we could deal more effectively with the Portuguese.

Mobutu said that events such as the MPLA being received in Rome by the Pope while Holden's group was kept aside were very bad. This gave a psychological advantage to the MPLA over GRAE which was most unfortunate. Mobutu said that the US should try to persuade Lisbon to negotiate with Holden Roberto. In this connection, Mobutu noted that the Western powers had leverage over Portugal through investments in Angola. The US and other foreign countries were investing in oil and diamonds in Angola and this represented encouragement for Portugal.

2 See Document 90.

92.

Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research1

RSEN-60

Washington, August 11, 1970.

USSR-AFRICA: SOVIETS INCREASING AID TO AFRICAN
LIBERATION FRONTS?

Recent evidence suggests the Soviets may be augmenting their support to various liberation movements in austral and Portuguese Africa (or, at least, may be contemplating such an increase). The margin of increase is not likely to be great, but, even so, may give the various movements a boost-especially if increased assistance takes the form of training cadres in Africa.

Soviet Team Reported to Have Entered Angola. One unconfirmed report has indicated that a team of four to six Soviets recently entered Angola from Zambia and that others may soon follow. The same report alluded to a recent "extraordinarily large" Soviet arms shipment to the Angolan Popular Liberation Movement (MPLA) and to the possibility of a new MPLA training camp to be set up inside Angola. The source of the report speculated that MPLA activities may be entering a new and more active phase.

Conference on the Portuguese Colonies Calls for Increased Aid. While the foregoing report has not been verified, it makes interesting reading when juxtaposed with the proceedings of the June 27-29 Conference in Support of Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies in Rome, sponsored by two Moscow-controlled front groups, the World Council of Peace and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. (Liberation movements represented at Rome were the MPLA from Angola, PAIGC from Portuguese Guinea, and FRELIMO from Mozambique, all members of the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies and steady recipients of Soviet aid). In addition to the boilerplate condemnation of the "colonial war" being conducted by Portugal with the aid of NATO countries, the final resolution called for a campaign of world-wide denunciations of Portugal, and, perhaps more importantly, for an increase in material aid to the liberation movements.

Altered Soviet Assessments. Such calls have been voiced before and have resulted in very little in the way of implementation. This may well be the case again. However, in the wake of events in Libya, the Sudan,

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, Inter-Agency Intelligence Committee Files, Angola-Washington. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Wayne Smith and cleared by Irwin Tobin (INR/USSR and Eastern Europe).

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