« PreviousContinue »
Umba: There have been reports that Zaire wants to establish itself in Angola and Cabinda. These reports are jokes; they are false. We are committed to the principle of a free Angola. We have plenty of natural resources in our own country. We have no reason to harbor territorial designs on Angola.
The Secretary: I interpret your views to mean that, being a neighbor of Angola, you want to see a government that is at least not hostile to you established in Angola; that economic factors do not concern you; that it is rather the human elements that count.
Umba: Before leaving, I would like to express appreciation for the support you and the Department of State have given to our Ambassador here in Washington. I am most gratified for your receiving me.
The Secretary: May I assure you that President Mobutu is always welcome in the United States, and that President Ford attaches very great importance to the relations between our two countries.
100. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to
the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
Washington, September 19, 1974.
Mobutu's Request for Material Support to Holden Roberto
1. In line with the request made to you on 12 August 1974 by Umba di Lutete, Foreign Minister of Zaire, on behalf of President Mobutu, for material help to Holden Roberto of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), we plan to increase substantially our present payment of [less than 1 line not declassified) to Holden Roberto (less than 1 line not declassified]
2. We intend to keep these payments fairly low but high enough to assure President Mobutu that we are sympathetic to his concern about the future regime of an independent Angola. The exact amount would be subject to some negotiation with Roberto, but we would expect it to
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Outside the System Chronological File, Box 1. Secret; Sensitive.
2 See Document 99.
be not more than [less than 1 line not declassified] We would explain the payments to Roberto as designed to help him during a critical time of his career (1 line not declassified)
The overthrow of Marcello Caetano's government in Portugal on April 25, 1974, led to a series of negotiations between the metropole and the African liberation movements. President Antônio de Spínola's July 27 speech regarding the independence of Portugal's African territories provided the catalyst for an unofficial cease-fire and the formation of transitional governments in Mozambique and Angola.
An agreement with the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was reached September 6 and signed September 7 in Lusaka, Zambia. The principal provisions provided for complete independence on June 25, 1975; the formation of a transitional government, appointed by FRELIMO and the Portuguese Government; and a formal cease-fire. The transitional government was sworn in September 20.
Negotiations with the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), were hampered by continued dissension among the leadership. A two-year plan for independence, released August 10 by the Portuguese Government, proposed a coalition government comprised of representatives of the liberation movements and the white Angolan community. The Provisional Government would hold elections for a Constituent Assembly that would draw up a constitution, after which the Assembly would be dissolved. Elections would be held for a Legislative Assembly, and a government representing the Angolan people would be established.
The proposal was immediately rejected by the FNLA, and internal dissent within the MPLA threatened to fracture the organization and dilute the MPLA's influence. A series of meetings, mediated by the Organization of African Unity and various African leaders, enabled the groups to resolve their differences. An official cease-fire agreement was reached with the FNLA on October 14 and the MPLA on October 21. UNITA had already ceased hostilities June 17. All three movements became legal political parties and established headquarters in Luanda. On January 5, 1975, the liberation groups announced they had established a united front, an important prerequisite for independence negotiations with Portugal to proceed.
An agreement was signed January 15, 1975, between the liberation movements and Portugal, providing for Angolan independence on November 11 and equal representation in a transition government that would take office on January 31, 1975. A High Commissioner was appointed to represent Portugal's interests until independence. The transitional government was responsible for organizing elections and drafting the fundamental law, which would remain in effect until a constitution was drafted. The agreement, signed at Alvor, Portugal, became known as the Alvor Agreement.
102. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, January 23, 1975.
40 Committee Decisions
At a meeting of the 40 Committee on 22 January 1975 it was decided that:
• The Department of State would obtain our Ambassador's views regarding CIA's proposed Portugal operations.
• Covert support for Holden Roberto was approved in the amount of dollar amount not declassified]2
(Omitted here are decisions unrelated to Portuguese Africa.)
Rob Roy Ratliff Executive Secretary The 40 Committee
Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Intelligence Committee Report File, 40 Committee, January 22, 1975. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted on January 23. Distributed to Clements, Sisco, General Brown, and Colby.
Handwritten notes on the portion of the record of the meeting pertaining to a proposed program in Angola stated: “This matter has been resolved by the Secretary's decision to limit our covert action in Angola to continuation of a subsidy to Holden Roberto." (Ibid.)
103. Memorandum of Conversation?
Washington, April 19, 1975, 3 p.m.
Kenneth D. Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia
Office call on the President
Secretary Kissinger: I told the President that the Zambians seem to come at times of crisis. Foreign Minister Mwaanga came here last August during the Cyprus affair and now President Kaunda is here when we have problems in Southeast Asia.
President Ford: I am delighted to have you here. I have been looking forward to this chat and to seeing you this evening. I would be grateful if you would give us your comments and views on the situation in southern Africa. It is an area which I have not personally visited. At some time I hope to be able to pay a visit. President Kaunda: May I express to you my own personal grati
I tude and that of my colleagues and Mrs. Kaunda for the wonderful way in which you have received us. Fortunately, we have no bilateral problems and for this we have to thank our two ambassadors. I think our bilateral relations are very good indeed.
President Ford: I would agree. They are in excellent condition.
President Ford: I understand you have been working with Vorster and others to resolve the situation.
President Kaunda: As I told Secretary Kissinger, we need your help and I say this not in any critical way. I want to draw your attention to future prospects in the area. For a long time, in fact ever since 1966, we have been trying to urge greater attention to the area. I believe the
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 102, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The time listed on the memorandum is 3 p.m.; however, the President's Daily Diary records the meeting starting at 3:22 p.m. and ending at 4:20 p.m. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary's Office) Kaunda visited Washington April 18–21.
U.S. and others in the West should examine the problems in a search for solutions. Otherwise, events may overtake you and the U.S. could find itself even fighting on the side of the racists.
We in Africa fought for independence against colonialism. We did not allow ourselves to be taken over. There was a buffer between us and the communists. I have discussed this with your representative in Zambia before the coup in Portugal. At that time I urged your country to support the liberation movements in the Portuguese territories. I said Portugal was your ally in NATO and an ally against communism. But I believe you must examine the motivations of liberation movements. They counted on the support of the anti-colonials. This is an underlying and historical factor. I am not apportioning blame. But I hope that you can see the right thing has been done in southern Africa.
As regards the leaders in Mozambique: The Secretary of State has just now asked us in Zambia to speak to FRELIMO. We will do this. I can tell you from our experience that these Mozambicans want to be independent. They have been helped by China and Russia, but they are no-one's puppets.
President Ford: I understand they want to be independent.
President Kaunda: Other countries supplied arms but FRELIMO fought and achieved its independence. Angola gives us problems. I am authorized by President Nyerere and my other neighbors ...
Secretary Kissinger: Does Mobutu also agree?
President Nyerere and I agreed to seek the suggestions of President Mobutu on Angola. We went to Kananga in Zaire. After all the issues were laid out, we asked Mobutu to brief us. He said he did not arm Roberto to kill Angolans, but to defeat colonial power and to bring peace to Angola. How do you see the situation now, we asked Mobutu. What means exist for a practical solution? I was straightforward.
President Ford: Are there three major contending forces in Angola?
President Kaunda: Yes, FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA. UNITA was more or less on its own. We did not support it, but we did not ignore it.
Secretary Kissinger: Where did it find its support?
President Kaunda: (rather vague) On the outside. We almost ignored Jonas Savimbi, the president of UNITA. Our colleagues had ignored Savimbi in the past, but this time he emerged as someone who could save the situation. Mobutu said that Neto of MPLA would not accept Roberto as president of a free Angola. Holden Roberto of FLNA would not accept Neto. The only chance we had of putting someone forward to the OAU with the possibility of acceptance was to suggest