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Regarding Namibia, UN Security Council resolution of last December put a deadline at the end of this May for action for South Africa.
Secretary Kissinger: The U.S. supported this.
Minister Mwaanga: May is just around the corner. What do we do if South Africa fails to act?
Secretary Kissinger: We are making some representations to South Africa at this moment.
Minister Mwaanga: Our President's position will be weakened if it is not supported.
Mr. Chona: The OAU at Dar gave us an important gate or opening for a compromise solution on Namibia. The African members of the Council on Namibia have been tasked with making contact with South Africa.
Ambassador Mwale: Timing is important.
Secretary Kissinger: We can give better attention the first week in June.
President Ford: I look forward to seeing you this evening. I have just come from Concord where we began the first of a series of celebrations of the 200th anniversary of our revolution. We have great sympathy for others who have followed along the same footsteps toward freedom and liberty.
President Kaunda: We hope you will come to Africa and visit us.
Minister Mwaanga: We hope Secretary Kissinger will take up the long-standing invitation to visit Zambia.
Secretary Kissinger: I will try to come to Africa within the next year and if I do, I will come to Zambia.
4 Security Council Resolution 366, December 17, 1974. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1974, pp. 166-167)
104. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford
Washington, May 5, 1975.
Recognition of Mozambique and Establishment of Embassy at Lourenco Marques
In accordance with an agreement reached on September 7, 1974, between Portugal and representatives of the nationalist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the Portuguese territory of Mozambique is to become fully independent on June 25, 1975.
This country of 8.7 million people comes to independence after an eleven-year guerrilla struggle against Portugal. FRELIMO, its principal liberation group, now dominates a Portuguese-headed transitional government, and believes that its efforts were largely responsible for ending colonialism in all of Portuguese Africa. Much of black Africa shares this view. In terms of our overall relations with Africa and of our bilateral interests in the countries of southern Africa, I believe it important that we establish diplomatic relations with Mozambique shortly after independence.
Mozambique probably will be recognized promptly by most other nations, and undoubtedly will apply for UN membership soon after independence.
If you approve US recognition of Mozambique, I will seek an early opportunity to notify the FRELIMO leadership of this fact and of our intentions to establish diplomatic relations at the Embassy level. Recommendations
That you approve US recognition of Mozambique immediately upon its attainment of independence scheduled for June 25, 1975.
That you approve raising our Consulate General in Lourenco Marques to an Embassy on June 25, 1975.2
That you sign the letter at Tab IP which will be dated and delivered to the Head of State of Mozambique June 25. Paul Theis has cleared the text.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 3, Mozambique. Confidential. Sent for action.
2 Ford initialed his approval of both recommendations.
3 The letter at Tab I as approved and signed was sent to Machel on June 25. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 3, Mozambique)
National Security Study Memorandum 224
Washington, May 26, 1975.
The Secretary of Defense
United States Policy Toward Angola
The President has directed a study of United States policy toward Angola. The study should analyze United States interests and objectives in Angola in both the immediate and post-independence future. The study should then project the possible ranges of political evolution in Angola, both before and after independence, and propose options for United States policies that take into account United States interests and objectives.
The study should examine, among others, the following elements:
- The potential for increased civil strife, or civil war, in Angola and its impact on the transition to independence;
-The relative political, economic and military strengths (and their political orientation) of the three independence movements and their leadership;
-The role of Portugal and neighboring African states, including South Africa, as well as an assessment of likely efforts on their part to shape the future of Angola;
—The extent of the involvement, past and future, of the Soviet Union and China in political developments in Angola;
-The prospects for and likely pattern of economic development in Angola and its need for development assistance or for aid in settling refugees;
-Possible role of international organizations (e.g., UN, OAU, UNICEF, and UNHCR) in promoting stability in Angola and providing other assistance (e.g., refugee relief and resettlement); and
-Likely Congressional and public attitudes toward alternative United States policies.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSDMs and NSSMs, Box 2, NSSMs File, NSSM 224. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa and be forwarded by June 30, 1975 to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for review by the Senior Review Group prior to consideration by the President.
Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General George S. Brown; and Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.
Also Present: Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Lt. General John Pauly, William G. Hyland, Captain Joseph Gleason (USN), and Carl Duckett
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.] Item 3-Angola
Mr. Colby explained that there were three independence movements—one supported by Mobutu and headed by Roberto, to whom we are already giving support; one headed by Savimbi, with whom we have had some contact in the past but to whom we are giving no support now; and a third, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola headed by Neto, who is receiving Soviet support. The latter also has Chipenda, who has broken with Neto. What CIA's paper suggests is that we give (dollar amount not declassified) support to the second group-to Savimbi—to strengthen it.
Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only.
2 Not found.
Dr. Kissinger said we don't want to make the same mistake we did in Chile-to give money to everybody and then lose to the Communists.
Mr. Colby said that the hope was to get Roberto and Savimbi to work together.
Dr. Kissinger asked who was best for us.
Mr. Colby added that his main shortcoming was that he was not in the country.
Mr. Sisco said he went along with help to Roberto, but he was concerned about the "spray tactics" in CIA's paper, proposing to give aid to several individuals. We should realize that the (dollar amount not declassified) would not be the end, that Savimbi would be back for more and want arms. We are for Roberto and believe that he will come out on top.
Dr. Kissinger asked if all were for Roberto. He explained that he had asked for papers from State, and instead of policy statements or recommendations he only got a weeping response.
Mr. Sisco acknowledged that there was some division within the African Bureau, but that he and Mr. Hyland had gone over this recently and there was agreement that Roberto was likely to come out on top.
Dr. Kissinger said that if we wanted Roberto to win, why didn't we work with Mobutu-he's ruthless and will get the job done.
Mr. Colby said that it was the Agency's belief that he was erratic lately.
Dr. Kissinger asked what our policy was. He explained that he had asked State for policy papers but that they would not give him an opinion. He was of the impression that they were saying not to do anything
Mr. Sisco said he thought that might be the best course—that everything is going our way so we don't need to do anything.
Dr. Kissinger said they don't say anything. We have Kaunda telling us that Savimbi is going to win; the Portuguese Left is backing Neto; Mobutu wants Roberto. We can concede; not do anything and let nature take its course.
Mr. Sisco said that was close to his view. Angola is not of great importance.
Dr. Kissinger said we can't let the Communists win there.
3 An apparent reference to a May 7 briefing memorandum in which the Department advised against direct involvement. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 102, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File)