some minimum state of peace until independence in November. And for the present at least, breaking the peace is in the MPLA's interest and not that of MPLA's opponents.

TENTATIVE BUDGET-THROUGH 1975

[12-page table not declassified]

109. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa1

Washington, June 13, 1975.

RESPONSE TO NSSM 224:

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA

[Omitted here are a title page and table of contents.]

I. Introduction and Summary

In response to NSSM 224,2 this study analyzes the current situation in Angola and attempts to project the future trends in the soon-to-be independent territory. It weighs US interests and objectives, the involvement of other third countries, and sets forth options on which United States policy could be formulated.

The study finds the situation in Angola unstable, with continuing factional strife between the contending nationalist parties probable. The presence of Portuguese military forces and perhaps also the recognition of the need to appear ready for independence have kept the contenders from pushing the conflict to the point of full civil war. The point of greatest danger in this regard will be immediately after independence when the Portuguese forces are withdrawn and before the government in power has had opportunity to consolidate its hold.

Neither of the major liberation movements, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) or the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) commands military superiority over the other. The FNLA has been the stronger throughout most of the period

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, InterAgency Intelligence Committee Files, Angola NSSM 224 Papers. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.

2 Document 105.

of insurgency, but during recent fighting the MPLA has more often come out on top. The third movement, The National Movement for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), is militarily much weaker than either of the other two groups.

Of the three party leaders, the MPLA's Neto, a Marxist poet, has the greatest intellectual stature. Jonas Savimbi, of UNITA, has appeared of late to be the most pragmatic and practical of the three and is also reputed to be the most articulate and well-informed on current events. The FNLA's Roberto is an anti-communist and close associate of Zairian President Mobutu. Roberto refuses to go back into Angola from Zaire, where he has long lived in exile. His prolonged residence in Zaire appears to hurt the FNLA's chances.

Portugal's primary objective seems to be to cut her losses and to get out of Angola completely and as rapidly as possible. Neighboring African states have provided financial and military assistance to the liberation movements. For ideological reasons, Congo supports the Marxist-oriented MPLA, while Mobutu has backed the FNLA. Both the Congo and Zaire have their eyes on the Cabinda enclave, primarily because of its petroleum riches and strategic location.

The Soviet Union has long backed the MPLA, and there is evidence it has lately provided the movement with considerable new military equipment. China has had some associations with all of the movements in the past, but is now most closely associated with the FNLA, to which it has supplied military equipment as well as some training.

Because of its important petroleum deposits and large coffee production, Angola is one of black Africa's richest countries. The country's agricultural potential is great-two-thirds of its arable land is not now being cultivated-and significant deposits of other minerals add to the promise of a bright economic future for the country. Angola will, of course, need development assistance for many years to come, primarily because it has such a small pool of trained manpower.

There may be a role for the OAU or the UN in promoting internal stability in Angola or in helping resettle refugees, particularly with respect to Roberto's efforts to move three-quarters of a million Angolan Bakongo back into the country from Zaire where they now live in exile. It should be noted, however, that it is unlikely that the OAU-which strictly avoids interference in the internal affairs of its members-will want to take on the Angolan problem, and so far only UNITA has shown any interest in appealing to the UN for help with their troubles.

A FNLA and/or a UNITA regime would be somewhat easier to deal with than a MPLA government and would probably more readily encourage an interest in mutually beneficial ties. Even so, Savimbi and Roberto are nationalists, who would want to control (or even national

ize) Angola's resources, practice non-alignment, and accept aid from all countries, and support Third World causes.

An MPLA regime would probably try to put the party's socialist doctrines into practice. But practical nationalists might postpone the application of some measures, since even a socialist Angola might well accept foreign investment. Political relationships would not be very cordial; we would probably have the arms-length relationship we have with, say, Algeria or Somalia.

In spite of considerable press coverage in Angola, little public feeling on the subject seems to have been generated in the United States. Congress has shown some awareness of the situation in the former Portuguese colonies as they approach independence and has appropriated modest amounts of assistance for them. As yet there is no substantial Congressional sentiment regarding US policy toward Angola. It can be assumed, nevertheless, that there would be strong Congressional opposition to any US involvement in support of one of the contending factions.

The study presents three options for US policy:

-Neutrality, under which we would make no commitment of US prestige or resources to influence the course of events in Angola.

-Active promotion of a peaceful settlement which, by reducing the chances of a continuing armed conflict, would create a situation in which we believe the FNLA and UNITA might better be able to compete with MPLA.

-Providing support designed to help ensure the continued viability of the FNLA and UNITA, with a view to preventing the MPLA from gaining power.

[Omitted here are sections 2-9 and an annex.]

110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanzania1

Washington, June 16, 1975, 2300Z.

140867. Subject: Secretary's Message to Machel. London for Asst Secy Davis. Refs: Lourenco Marques 636, Dar 2108.2

1. Following is text of Secretary's letter to Machel. Do not repeat not use until authorized by separate message from Assistant Secretary Davis.3

2. Text: Qte Dear President Machel: It gives me pleasure to congratulate you upon your return to Mozambique, which will soon become a new member of the family of nations. It is particularly opportune to welcome the independence of your new country as we in the United States approach the 200th anniversary of our own independence. As President Ford said in his toast to President Kaunda during a White House dinner on April 19, "We view the coming independence of Mozambique, Angola and the island territories with great satisfaction. The United States stands ready to help the emerging countries, and to provide what assistance we can."

I am also pleased to inform you, on behalf of President Ford, that the United States plans to recognize the new government of Mozambique upon independence on June 25, and to enter into diplomatic relations with it.

It has been our custom, in welcoming other countries to independence, to close our consular posts in their countries and to establish Embassies, subject of course to the concurrence of the new government. Subject also to your concurrence, we would like to name an Ambassador to be resident in Lourenco Marques. If you agree, the President would send the name of his candidate to you for agrément. Upon your agreement, the President would publicly announce his intention to nominate him to that post. As required by our Constitution, the United States Senate would then be asked to confirm the nomination. While we anticipate no unusual delays, it will take some time to complete this process.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Arenales (AF/S) and approved by Mulcahy (AF/S). Repeated Immediate to London and Lourenco Marques.

2 In telegram 636 from Lourenco Marques, June 16, Walker proposed several alternative methods for delivering Kissinger's message to Machel. In telegram 2108 from Dar es Salaam, June 16, Carter agreed to deliver the message. (Ibid.)

3 Repeated attempts to deliver Kissinger's letter to Machel proved unsuccessful. In telegram 659 from Lourenco Marques, June 19, Walker informed the Department that he delivered the letter to Chissano's Chief of Cabinet Amaral. (Ibid.)

In order that we be represented in Mozambique from the beginning of its nationhood, I therefore propose that our present Consul General, Mr. Peter C. Walker, be accredited as Chargé d'Affaires, ad Interim, until arrangements are completed for the arrival of our Ambassador. As you may know, Mr. Walker arrived in Mozambique in July 1974.

The United States in turn would be happy to receive news of your plans for entering into relations, and would welcome your initiative to establish an Embassy in Washington and to accredit an Ambassador.

I look forward to friendly and mutually beneficial relations between our two governments and peoples. Best regards. Signed Henry A. Kissinger. End text

The Secretary: I really have few instructions to give you—since I know what I want. I don't really care what AF thinks. I just want you to do what I tell you or there's no sense in your going.

I think we've mishandled Mobutu and the whole area. I have not given too much attention to it, so it's partly my fault. Mobutu looks at the Congo in 1960 and that [then] what we're doing in Angola now where the Communist influence is greater than it was in the Congo in

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 102, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive. Initialed by Bremer. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.