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General in Rhodesia.? He had discussed the situation with several African leaders, and he understood how they felt. On the other hand, there was some thought within the U.S. government that we should continue to have a few people to service the needs of the Americans in Rhodesia. The U.S. had considerable interests there. The Secretary believed that our staff at the Consulate General was now down to three men.

The British Foreign Secretary asked whether we would at least withdraw our people at the time Rhodesia declares itself a republic.3 (Lord Caradon thought this might be in the spring or even earlier.) The Secretary replied that he would recommend to the President that we close our Consulate General when the Rhodesian republic is declared."

Stewart said the Rhodesian issue was a smoldering one which can flame up again in the UN at any time. Lord Caradon observed that the Security Council Resolution on Rhodesia had been unanimous; the fact that the U.S. government continued to have representatives in Rhodesia might give us some difficulties. Ambassador Pedersen pointed out that the SC resolution had been in the form of a recommendation to UN members and was not mandatory.

2 During a January 28, 1970, meeting between Rogers and Stewart, the Foreign Secretary repeated his request for the United States to close the Consulate in Rhodesia. Stewart said that the issue was damaging to "long term policy in black Africa," and was used by “those who wanted a complete reversal of HMG's Rhodesia policy." (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL UK-US)

3 In telegram 102572 to London, June 23, 1969, the Department transmitted its reaction to the June 20 Rhodesian referendum seeking constitutional changes and the establishment of a Republic: “The US regards a referendum in which only 1.1 per cent of the population of Southern Rhodesia approved the results to be a travesty of commonly accepted methods of ascertaining the popular will." The telegram concluded: “The question of the future of our small consular office in Salisbury is under study at the present time.” (Ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 RHOD)

4 A July 22 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon mentions Rogers's recommendation to close the Consulate in Salisbury in response to the June 20 referendum. Kissinger noted Nixon's earlier decision to maintain the Consulate, and requested that the Department of State's recommendation be rejected. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Rhodesia, Vol. I) Nixon reaffirmed his decision to maintain the Consulate on January 15, 1970, but changed his position at the request of the British Government on March 9 (see Documents 25 and 28).

5 Presumably a reference to Security Council Resolution 253 (1968), which was adopted unanimously on May 29, 1968. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968, pp. 152–154) Concerned about the lack of compliance by several member states, the Council revisited the issue in a series of meetings held June 13–24, 1969. A draft resolution submitted by Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, and Zambia on June 19 reiterated many of the points in Resolution 253 (1968), called for mandatory sanctions under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, and called on the United Kingdom to “take urgently all necessary measures, including the use of force" to put an end to the minority regime. The Council voted on June 24 with 8 in favor, 0 against, and 7 abstentions. Without the required majority, the resolution was not adopted. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1969, pp. 119-120)



Paper Prepared by the National Security Council
Interdepartmental Group for Africal

AF/NSC-IG 69-8 Rev. A

Washington, December 9, 1969.

[Omitted here are a title page and table of contents.) Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39:2

Southern Africa

I. A. U.S. Interests in Southern Africa

Our policy positions on southern African issues affect a range of U.S. interests. None of the interests are vital to our security, but they

ve political and material importance. Some of these interests are concrete and evident in the region itself, while others relate to our position in black Africa and the world. The interests can be summarized as follows:

1. Political

Racial repression by white minority regimes in southern Africa has international political ramifications extending beyond the region itself. Politically conscious blacks elsewhere in Africa and the world deeply resent the continuation of discrimination, identify with the repressed majorities in southern Africa and tend in varying degrees to see relationships of outside powers with the white regimes as at least tacit acceptance of racism. Many others in the non-white world tend to share this view in some measure. The communist states have been quick to seize on this issue and to support black aspirations. Thus our policy toward the white regimes of southern Africa affects, though it may not necessarily govern, our standing with African and other states on issues in the United Nations and bilaterally. Depending on its intensity, adverse reaction to our policy in southern Africa could make more difficult our relationships elsewhere in Africa on a variety of matters including U.S. defense installations, over-flight rights and the use of port facilities. The same consideration applies to economic relations: direct investment in Africa outside the white regime states currently totals

Source: National Archives, RG 59, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) and related papers, 1969–1976, Lot 80D212, NSSM 39. Secret. This paper is a revised version of an August 15 study. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-026, National Security Council Meetings, NSC Meeting 12/17/69 Southern Africa (NSSM 39)) The revisions were requested at an October 16 Review Group meeting. (Minutes of a Review Group meeting; ibid., Box H-040, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group Meeting-Southern Africa 10/16/69) The annexes are not printed.

2 Document 6.

about $1.5 billion (of which the greater part is in black Africa south of the Sahara), or about two-thirds of the total U.S. investment in Africa. U.S. exports split about 60% to the black states of Africa and 40% to the white regime countries.

Because of the multi-racial character of our society and our own racial problems, other countries tend to see our relationships with southern Africa as reflections of domestic attitudes on race. This situation is exacerbated by the extension of South African racial discrimination to black Americans who may be refused visas or who are subjected to segregated facilities in South Africa.

If violence in the area escalates, U.S. interests will be increasingly threatened. In these circumstances the U.S. would find it increasingly difficult without sacrificing interests to find a middle ground in the UN on questions of insurgent violence and counter-violence in the region and to resist demands for more positive actions against the white regimes. 2. Economic

U.S. direct investment in southern Africa, mainly in South Africa, is about $1 billion and yields a highly profitable return. Trade, again mainly with South Africa, runs a favorable balance to the U.S. (Our exports to South Africa were about $450 million in 1968 against imports of $250 million.) In addition the U.S. has indirect economic interest in the key role which South Africa plays in the U.K. balance of payments. U.K. investment in South Africa is currently estimated at $3 billion, and the British have made it clear that they will take no action which would jeopardize their economic interests. South Africa produces over 75% of the free world supply of gold. The long-term importance of South African gold sales has been reduced by the creation of IMF Special Drawing Rights but they are nonetheless significant in the international monetary system and very important to South Africa. 3. Defense

Southern Africa is geographically important for the U.S. and its allies, particularly with the closing of the Suez Canal and the increased Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean.

The U.S. uses overflight and landing facilities for military aircraft in the Portuguese Territories and South Africa. Any of a number of contingencies could require U.S. military air transit to the Indian Ocean/ Mid East areas. All but one feasible air route across Africa south of the Sahara would depend upon overflight and, in some cases, landing rights in South Africa or Zambia and Mozambique. The DOD has proposed periodic use of these routes in normal times. However, apart from tracking station support aircraft, the policy has been to request clearance for South Africa as infrequently as possible.

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There are major ship repair and logistic facilities in South Africa with a level of technical competence which cannot be duplicated elsewhere on the African continent. We have not permitted U.S. naval vessels to use South African port facilities since early 1967, except for emergencies. We have made use of U.S. Navy or foreign oilers to refuel carriers transiting to and from S.E. Asia via the Cape of Good Hope. Navy force reductions now call for the deactivation of two Atlantic Fleet and one Pacific Fleet oiler, which will attenuate already meager oiler assets so that, the DOD considers, assignment of oiler support to a carrier transit would seriously degrade our fleet posture vis-à-vis commitments and requirements. Regular use is made of ports in Angola and Mozambique, however, but these ports cannot accommodate aircraft carriers.

The DOD has a missile tracking station in South Africa under a classified agreement, and some of the military aircraft traffic involves support of this station. The future need for the DOD station is under review. The tentative conclusions are that the station is no longer required for research and development of missiles. We also finance a U.K. atmosphere testing station for nuclear materials located in Swaziland which helps us monitor nuclear atmospheric explosions worldwide.

4. Scientific

NASA has a space tracking facility of major importance in South Africa, and overflight and landing rights for support aircraft are utilized in connection with various space shots. The NASA station is particularly oriented towards support of unmanned spacecraft and will be of key significance for planetary missions. We have an atomic energy agreement with South Africa initiated under the Atoms for Peace Program; this relationship is important in influencing South Africa to continue its policy of doing nothing in the marketing of its large production of uranium oxide which would have the effect of increasing the number of nuclear weapons powers.

B. Views of the U.S. Interest in Southern Africa In weighing the range of U.S. interests in southern Africa, there is basic consensus within the U.S. Government:

1. Although the U.S. has various interests in the region, it has none which could be classified as vital security interests.

2. Our political interests in the region are important because the racial policies of the white states have become a major international issue. Therefore, because other countries have made it so, our foreign policy must take into account the domestic policies of the white regimes. Most non-white nations in the world in varying degrees would tend to judge conspicuous U.S. cooperation with the white regimes as condoning their racial policies.

3. The racial problems of southern Africa probably will grow more acute over time, perhaps leading to violent internal upheavals and greater involvement of the communist powers. Though these developments may be years or even decades ahead, U.S. policy should take account now of the risks to our interests and possible involvement over this uncertain future.

There are specific differences of view within the government regarding future trends in southern Africa and the U.S. role in the area. These contrasting views are central to a judgment of U.S. policy options. The following reflect a basic intellectual disagreement within the government in approaching the southern African problem:

(1) U.S. Involvement to Promote Change

U.S. efforts for constructive change: Some argue that racism and colonialism are central issues in African and world politics. The race issue in southern Africa has already led to armed conflict and disharmony which will spread if left unchecked. The U.S. is obligated under the UN Charter to do what we can to promote the non-discriminatory observance of human rights.

Non-involvement: Others reply that our disagreement with the domestic policies of any state should not govern the pursuit of our foreign policy interests in that state. Our concern with internal human rights problems has caused us to ignore serious cross-border infiltration which is a more legitimate UN concern and could lead to larger conflicts in the area. The actions taken against the white states, particularly on South West Africa and Rhodesia, have no valid basis in international law.

(2) Violent vs. Evolutionary Change

Violent Change: Some argue that mounting violence is inevitable unless change occurs and that there is no prospect for peaceful change in the racial policies of the white regimes, embedded as they are in prejudice, religious doctrine and self-interest and bolstered by economic prosperity, particularly in South Africa. The results will be: (a) black guerrilla and terrorist activity on a growing scale within these countries until change occurs, and (b) because of their support of the blacks, the Soviets and Chinese will become the major beneficiaries of the conflict.

Evolutionary Change: Others contend that there will be violence up to a point, since change can only come slowly. But there is some prospect for peaceful change in the white states in response to internal economic and social forces. In any event, peaceful evolution is the only avenue to change because (a) black violence only produces internal

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