Sisco: What can we do to prevent spreading these things all around the Senate Foreign Relations Committee? Kissinger: Sparkman has no authority to direct you (Colby) to report to anyone. You don't work for Sparkman. Colby: I know that. Hyland: They had all the details about this effort at the briefing. Kissinger: We can't have that. Unacceptable. Hyland: Moose is unacceptable. He is hostile toward the Administration. I don't see why he was included. Kissinger: (To Colby) Talk to Sparkman. I'll back you up. Hyland: Moose wanted to know how this project started-did CIA submit it, what others thought of it... Scowcroft: We don't have to report on who supports something and who doesn't; that's executive privilege. Sisco: We don't. Colby: Pat Holt was the only staff member I talked to. When I briefed Clark, he specifically requested that Moose be present. Kissinger: Moose is unacceptable. He's gone so far he doesn't even like me. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.] 124. Telegram From the Consulate General in Mozambique to the Department of State1 Lourenco Marques, August 20, 1975, 1030Z. 899. Subject: Mozambique-U.S. Relations. Ref: Lourenco Marques 860.2 1. We received the following letter addressed to Consul General Peter C. Walker from GPRM Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Quote The 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Repeated Immediate to Blantyre, Dar es Salaam, Lisbon, London, Lusaka, Mbabane, and Pretoria, and repeated to Gaborone, USUN, CINCLANT for POLAD, and CINCEUR. 2 In telegram 860 from Lourenco Marques, August 12, Consul General Peter Walker informed the Department that he had told Chissano in a letter of his imminent departure and named his deputy, Randolph Reed, as the new senior representative in Mozambique. (Ibid.) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Mozambique, in face of your letter of August 12, 1975, would like to remind you that: 1-Your consular functions in the Mozambican territory have ceased as from the 24th June 1975. 2-The People's Republic of Mozambique does not recognize any representation of the Government of the United States of America in Mozambique until such time when diplomatic or consular relations will be established between the United States of America and the People's Republic of Mozambique. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly demands your office to immediately stop any consular business which it might be undertaking. None of the consular representatives of the United States of America who were in Mozambique before the 25th of June 1975 are allowed to continue representing their government in Mozambique. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advises them to leave the country as soon as possible: Lourenco Marques, 15th June 1975 (sic) initial illegible. End quote. 2. Letter referred to in para 1 is that delivered per reftel on Walker departure. 3. If we interpret last paragraph correctly GPRM is instructing all U.S. officers who were in Mozambique prior to June 25 (all of us) to depart soonest, although no deadline given. We will attempt to obtain clarification through Senator Clark if he is received by high level GPRM officials. Otherwise, propose sending letter to Foreign Minister Chissano as follows: Quote We acknowledge receipt of letter 259/75 from your Ministry dated June 15 addressed to Mr. Peter C. Walker, who departed Mozambique August 19. In view of the serious implications of the letter for U.S.-Mozambique relations, we would appreciate clarification of the last two paragraphs of the letter requesting the departure of U.S. consular representatives who were in Mozambique prior to June 25, 1975. Specifically, we wish to know whether this is a request for the departure of all American staff members of our official mission in Mozambique, every one of whom was in Lourenco Marques prior to June 25, or only those who were specifically given consular exequatur by the Portuguese Government. Sincerely, Randolph Reed. End quote. 4. If interpretation para 3 correct, we recommend evacuating all American staff and their effects overland to South Africa. We would seek GPRM escort of vans and other vehicles which AmEmbassy Pretoria may be able to arrange to pick us up. 5. We are proceeding to destroy files. 6. Request instructions soonest.3 Reed 3 In telegram 918 from Lourenco Marques, August 22, Reed reported on a dinner meeting between Senator Clark and Chissano. The Foreign Minister said that Mozambique "expected all the top consular personnel (Codel interpreted this to mean Consul General) to depart prior to independence and that replacement should not be sent until agreement on diplomatic or consular relations reached with new GPRM government." Chissano informed Clark that he was working on documents to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. (Ibid.) The United States and Mozambique established diplomatic relations on September 23, and the Embassy was opened on November 8. 125. Memorandum for the Record1 Washington, August 20, 1975, 3 p.m. SUBJECT 40 Committee Meeting, 20 August 1975, 3:00 p.m. Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George Brown; Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby. Also Present: Director of INR William Hyland; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. General John W. Pauly; Assistant to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Lt. Colonel Robert C. McFarlane. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs L. Bruce Laingen was present for Item 1; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs James G. Lowenstein was present for Item 2; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Edward W. Mulcahy, Chief, Africa Division, CIA, James M. Potts, and NSC Senior Staff Officer for Africa Harold Horan were present for Item 3; Deputy Chief, Europe Division, CIA, [name not declassified] was present for Items 1 and 2. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.] 1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on August 21. 3. Angola Kissinger: Are we still playing around with lifting Portuguese out of Angola? Sisco: We told Carlucci that we could offer the Portuguese help.3 Kissinger: Depending upon what their policy is. We're not a charity organization. Sisco: We'll remind Carlucci. Kissinger: They want us to help with the lift, but before we help we want to know what their policy is toward Angola. Sisco: It would destabilize the situation... Kissinger: Don't use that word. Let the record show that the word "destabilize" is banned and was not said here. Sisco: Well, would continue the evolution of deterioration in Angola. Kissinger: In this we can get both—we need an excuse to ask the Portuguese what they are going to do in Angola. Clements: How are we going to help? With an air lift? Kissinger: Fuel, expediting acquisition of a 747 they are trying to purchase. Hyland: The 747 is in the mill, but they want it now. Kissinger: We can slow up if we have to, as leverage in Lisbon to discuss Angola. Clements: Darn good idea. Colby: (Continued briefing.) Sisco: It looks to me as if Kaunda is getting a little scared. Colby: He's scared of being tainted with CIA. Kissinger: Okay by me, just so Savimbi gets the arms he needs. Colby: (Continued briefing.) Kissinger: I must say that when you guys get started with something, you really can produce. Clements: Right. Those armored cars. We've been discussing those where, when, if we can get them ... Mulcahy: Who is going to pay? Clements: Right; they cost [dollar amount not declassified] to [dollar amount not declassified] each. 2 Not attached. 3 In telegram 197494 to Lisbon, August 20, Kissinger instructed Carlucci to inform Costa Gomes that the United States was prepared to assist in the evacuation of refugees from Angola to Portugal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) Potts: Mobutu had agreed to deliver 12. We were told that the lead time was such that we couldn't make the boat. If we can do so, we should. Colby: I'm getting to that. We've spent most of the money the Committee authorized; we're running out of money. Kissinger: What do you need? Colby: There are three choices. We can piddle around which will take about [dollar amount not declassified] Kissinger: No. That won't do. Colby: We can go for a concerted, continuing effort at [dollar amount not declassified] Or, we can go all out to win the war, and that would cost about [dollar amount not declassified] Kissinger: You're not seriously suggesting the [dollar amount not declassified] Colby: No. But my problem is that we are running out of money. By the end of June we had about [dollar amount not declassified] Kissinger: Has the Committee ever considered bank robberies? Colby: This will be the first time we have run out of funds in the Reserve in all our experience. There's some money going in, but more is going out. Kissinger: Isn't any new money added? Colby: [21⁄2 lines not declassified] Clements: You want more dollars put in. Colby: Yes. We had [dollar amount not declassified] and spent [dollar amount not declassified] already. Kissinger: Is any new money going in? Colby: No. We need to take [dollar amount not declassified] out, and we were talking about other draws from the Reserve just 10 minutes ago. We are going to end up with less than [dollar amount not declassified] for the rest of the fiscal year. I think we should go to the Congress and ask for [less than 1 line not declassified] for Angola. Kissinger: Why not? What do you think? Hyland: We've already given about [dollar amount not declassified] We've given them quite a bit already and they haven't done too much with it. I'd want to see some more solid results. Kissinger: When do you need an answer? Colby: Well, they've already marked up, but it's not too late... |