the side with the long-range weapons has dominated in every fight. MIGs will be a new factor and be a big psychological blow. The Redeye missiles would help there. Scowcroft: Are MIGs there? Potts: No, Luanda. [less than 1 line not declassified) the MIGs but we have reports (less than 1 line not declassified) Scowcroft: An alternative would be to send a team in and take them out on the ground. That would be effective and less expensive. Fish: Yes, and they are only 15 miles from Kinshasa. Potts: Well, the problem is that we have to deal with the local people. We can't get them to go in and do anything. They talk about it, and they say they are willing but nothing has been done. So when we talk about a team, we would need something better than we have. The working group's first consideration was to try to get the MIGs before they became operational. Colby: We need to stir up the African countries and to get them involved. Mulcahy: We might get Amin. about yet. Scowcroft: Maybe we should send Moynihan to talk with him. Colby: Even if we take the planes out, we are in a no-win position-just buying time. Brown: If MIGs are there, they will have a dramatic effect. If we tried to take them out air-to-air it could take a couple of years. Colby: [142 lines not declassified) may not get them soon. Nelson: If you are talking about a ground raid, you are talking about a lot of work. Lots of planning and training has to be done, and we don't have the assets to conduct such an operation now. so he Scowcroft: Well, what is feasible—something more feasible than sending 15 aircraft to Zaire? The Redeye would make a difference. Colby: Even that would really be short term. We might knock one or two down and it would have an effect. Brown: Is the U.S. label on this equipment still a problem? Fish: You know, the British Blowpipe is about the same as our Redeye. We could buy some from them. Potts: [1 line not declassified] Fish: The Israelis have the Strellas. They have about 100 to 200. We wouldn't need more than 50 or so. Ingersoll: Can they handle those? Potts: Well, we don't need to get the Israelis in. We are trying to maintain our influence, and if we get the Israelis in, too, it would make more trouble. Brown: The Israelis don't need to go in. We can just buy them from them and ship them in. Fish: We can fly them down. Scowcroft: [1 line not declassified] We have the momentum now and the question is, how do we keep it up? Colby: I think we've not yet seen the Cuban effect. Colby: It is a big African problem, and we ought to get them to take action. Another (dollar amount not declassified) won't solve the problem. Scowcroft: I'm not sure that an African political effort will work either. Colby: It might do some good to get them to try to get out the Soviets and Cubans. Ingersoll: What's the lever? Nelson: The Africans haven't said much about U.S. or South African intervention. Scowcroft: Any political power over the Soviet Union must be limited. Ingersoll: We're not in a good position. Horan: There's the report of Nigeria's refusal to allow the Soviet Union landing rights. Nyerere would want to know what was going on; Amin has broken with the USSR-so it is not all hopeless. Scowcroft: That's right. State should push, but that should not be the only string in the bow. Ingersoll: We should go ahead with the [dollar amount not declassified] Colby: On page 5 (referring to a working group paper which had not been distributed to the Committee principals—a report: "Working Group on Angola,” 13 November 1975, Working Group Paper No. 92)5 we are talking about what would be needed—[less than 1 line of text not declassified] Scowcroft: Most of this deals with response to the MIGs. Colby: Here's what you've got to counter (pointing to chart)—$81 million from the USSR and the presence of Cuban troops. Scowcroft: But we've been countering that, and successfully. Colby: We've not had the impact of the Cubans yet. I think that will come at the end of the month. Potts: They put the best Cubans and armor up North and we've seen the effect in Cabinda. Scowcroft: Before you said it was hopeless ... Scowcroft: You said it would cost [dollar amount not declassified) to win. Well, you've spent (dollar amount not declassified) so if we gave you another (dollar amount not declassified) you ought to be able to bring it off. Now what would it take? Cutler: As I look at your list, you have here the 15 fighter aircraft which we won't give, so maybe the total is more than you really need. Colby: Matching the USSR is the real problem. 5 Not found. Scowcroft: But what you show they've put in has been done over the last 18 months. Potts: It does not include ammunition, while our figures do. Mulcahy: And we have to spend (dollar amount not declassified] for transport, too. Potts: A problem is the South African requests for help, they want help to pay some mercenaries and they will need some help for air defense. Ingersoll: Now is not the time to let down; get the dollars and move ahead. Scowcroft: Can we agree to work up something that will keep us in the ball game? Colby: Yes, we can draw up something beyond the (dollar amount not declassified] We need the [dollar amount not declassified] right now, but let us come back with estimates about additional needs to keep us in the ball game. Fish: In the long run, you say (dollar amount not declassified] but can they absorb that much? Ingersoll: We need to maintain our position. Scowcroft: We are really talking about time—the work on the political option ought to go full out. Fish: Are we willing to put in 50 CIA officers for leadership? Brown: Aren't there some Portuguese mercenaries we could recruit? There must be some who have a heart for Angola and want to help out, who know the language, and work well with the Angolans. Potts: [less than 1 line not declassified) Colby: The problem is, if we get more South Africans we get more political trouble. Ingersoll: Their being there is not out yet? Scowcroft: You'll work up options; we okay the SA-7's; the (dollar amount not declassified] subject to OMB scrubbing, okay? Prepare two or three levels enough to stay alive with options on how to get the dollars. Colby: An option to put CIA into an action role, and can we turn to State for the political program? Ingersoll: Yes. Potts: We want to try to keep South Africans in the game, (less than 1 line not declassified] Scowcroft: The President has decided to give the South Africans an ocean surveillance system, and this is a departure from our posture. Ingersoll: Sonobuoys, not the other system? Scowcroft: We are not going to advertise it as a change, but the South Africans will see it as a new position. Colby: (less than 1 line not declassified) Horan: The South Africans have an interest in this themselves; they asked for help but when we didn't give it they stayed because of their own interests. I believe we should approach this very cautiously. Mulcahy: Forty-five other countries would be up in arms. 6 See Document 79. |