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reaction, and (b) military realities rule out a black victory at any stage. Moreover, there are reasons to question the depth and permanence of black resolve. Recently there has been a decline in the level of insurgency. Neighboring black states—vital to successful guerrilla activity, will choose to preserve their own security in the face of inevitable punishing white retaliation at an early stage of any significant guerrilla warfare.

(3) The Possibility of U.S. Influence Toward Evolutionary Change

No Influence: Some contend that we can neither reform the whites nor restrain the blacks. Racial repression is deeply ingrained in the whites—the product of tradition, economic privilege and fears for their survival. These attitudes are not amenable to the kinds of influence one nation exerts upon another through peaceful international relations. Only isolation and stronger forms of pressure (i.e. force or mandatory economic sanctions backed by blockade) could have any impact.

Yet, they argue, without some change in the whites we cannot hope to influence the blacks to accept “peaceful evolution" as a substitute for force. The blacks will see such advice as a fundamental U.S. betrayal of their cause.

A related school of thought believes that in this sensitive area any effort by the U.S. to exert influence on internal policies could retard rather than stimulate the natural dynamics of change in the white-dominated societies.

Some Influence: Others argue that our tactical encouragement of economic and social forces already at work within the white regimes can constitute marginal but important influence for change. That influence, however, can be exerted only subtly and over several years. We should not give up whatever chance we have—through contacts with whites as well as blacks—to defuse the dangerous tensions in the area and to demonstrate the alternatives to the disastrous racial policies of the white regimes. Exposure of these regimes to the outside world is necessary if there is to be peaceful change. Isolation of the white societies has only intensified repressive policies. Moreover, external efforts to force change by pressure or coercion have unified the whites and produced an obdurate counter-reaction.

(4) Importance of Political vs. Other Tangible Interests

Political Interests: Some argue that racial hostility as a reaction to centuries of white predominance is a relatively new political force in the world, gaining power and effectiveness as the developing countries become independent and control access to their own territories. We cannot foresee exactly when race will become a major factor in the international power balance, but that time is coming. It is equally clear that the racial repression by the white regimes in southern Africa is now the most volatile racial problem on the international scene.

For the non-white states, they also argue, the reckoning of support on the racial issue in their time of weakness will determine their friendship or hostility for the U.S. a generation hence when their importance in world politics may be substantially greater. Thus failure to demonstrate an appreciation today of African aspirations may eventually (a) forfeit great influence to the communist powers, who have taken a clear position in support of black states and liberation movements and (b) jeopardize our strategic and economic interests in non-white Africa. Any anti-U.S. or pro-communist reactions, however, are unlikely to be either solid or early, and many black states are very aware of the dangers of association with the communists.

Other Tangible Interests: Others reply that our interests in the white states of southern Africa-albeit having a relatively low priority among such interests worldwide-are clearly worth retaining at their present political cost. These interests include access to air and naval facilities for which alternatives are expensive or less satisfactory, a major space tracking station, and significant investment and balance of trade advantages. Our political concerns and other interests may be accommodated because (a) the great majority of non-white states in Africa and elsewhere will put their own immediate self-interest ahead of penalizing us for our interests in the white states, and (b) even the most directly involved black states (Zambia and Tanzania) will temper their reaction because our continued good will and support for their cause will be important, and they know it. In any event other countries will judge our standing on the racial issue worldwide by the outcome of the racial problems in the United States.

II. Present Policy The aim of present policy is to try to balance our economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states with the political interest of dissociating the U.S. from the white minority regimes and their repressive racial policies. Decisions have been made ad hoc, on a judgment of benefits and political costs at a given moment. But the strength of this policy-its flexibility—is also its weakness. Policy is not precisely recorded. And because there have been significant differences of view within the government as to how much weight should be given to these conflicting factors in any given instance, certain decisions have been held in suspense “pending review of the over-all policy"-e.g., visits of naval vessels to South African ports enroute to and from the Indian Ocean or Viet-Nam, export licensing of equipment for South Africa, Angola and Mozambique, which might be used either for military or civilian purposes, participation of South African military personnel in Department of Defense correspondence courses.

This policy seeks progress towards majority rule through political arrangements which guarantee increasing participation by the whole population. Tangible evidence of such progress has been considered a precondition for improved U.S. relations with the white states. In the case of South Africa, the following are illustrative of the types of actions which that government might take to improve relations with the U.S.:

A. Bilateral. Permit assignment of non-whites to U.S. Embassy and consulates. Non-discriminatory treatment of U.S. naval personnel and merchant marine crews ashore. Non-discriminatory visa policy. Permit more South African non-whites in U.S. exchange programs. Facilitate U.S. official access to non-white areas of South Africa and South West Africa.

B. Internal. Eliminate job reservation and abolish pay differentials based on race. Recognize African labor unions as bargaining units. Abolish pass laws and repressive security legislation. Move towards qualified franchise for non-whites.

C. Regional and International. Recognize UN responsibility for South West Africa and permit UN presence in territory; cease applying repressive legislation there. Withdraw economic and paramilitary support from Rhodesia. Give generous customs treatment to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Expand exceptions to apartheid in cases of visiting non-whites such as sportsmen and businessmen.

(It is realized that most of the foregoing are unrealistic under present circumstances, but they illustrate the directions in which change might be sought.)

Following are the actions taken toward the different countries and areas which, in sum, constitute our present policy toward southern Africa:

Republic of South Africa

We maintain limited but formally correct diplomatic relations, making clear our opposition to apartheid. In the early 1960's the U.S. played a leading role in the UN in denouncing South Africa's racial policies. We led the effort in 1963 to establish and we continue to support the UN arms embargo on South Africa. We have avoided association with the South African Defense Force except for limited military attaché contacts. We supported the UN declaration that South Africa's mandate over South West Africa had terminated, and calling for it to withdraw and to acknowledge direct UN responsibility for the territory. On the other hand, we have acted on the premise that the problems of South Africa and South West Africa do not justify either the use of force or the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions, in part because there is no evidence that these actions would be efficacious. Moreover, we have sought to avoid the involvement of any U.S. military forces which might be required for such measures. Negro personnel have not been assigned to the U.S. mission and consulates in South Africa.

We have supported efforts to protect the legal rights of victims of discriminatory and repressive legislation in South Africa and South West Africa. This has involved aide-mémoires, attendance at trials to assure international observation of certain legal and judicial practices, and cooperation with private groups in the American bar to reinforce in South Africa traditions of respect for the rule of law. We also have sought to deepen our identification with the non-white majorities through personal contacts, public appearances and our exchange program. We have sought to support through the UN and private agencies humanitarian relief for South African and South West African victims of repression.

There is limited overflight and landing activity by U.S. aircraft in South Africa. Except for three emergencies, there have been no U.S. naval ship calls in South African ports since early 1967, pending a review of policy towards South Africa. We rely heavily on the NASA tracking station near Johannesburg, particularly for planetary missions, but at the same time maintain less satisfactory alternate facilities outside South Africa in case it becomes necessary or desirable to close the station. The future need for the DOD tracking station at Pretoria is under review. The tentative conclusions are that the station is no longer required for research and development of missiles. We enjoy very profitable economic relations with South Africa despite the official approach of neither encouraging nor discouraging investment (apart from the Foreign Direct Investment Program) and keeping trade facilitative services in low key. EXIM loans are not authorized, but export guarantees up to five years are permitted, subject to review for political implications. In general, the restrictions imposed on our economic relations with South Africa, especially the constraints on EXIM financing, may have limited somewhat the growth of our exports and investment there. Profit prospects in South Africa, however, attract U.S. business regardless of official endorsement.

Southern Rhodesia

The U.S. voted for the Security Council resolutions of December 1966 and May 19683 which imposed mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia on the basis of a finding of a threat to the peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Executive Orders implementing

3

Resolution 232, adopted December 16, 1966 (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1966, pp. 116–117); Resolution 253, adopted May 29, 1968 (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968, pp. 152-154).

the sanctions program were issued in January 1967 and July 1968 under authority of the UN Participation Act of 1945.4 (Although Portugal and South Africa have assisted Southern Rhodesia, the U.S. has not supported the extension of mandatory sanctions to them.)

The mandatory sanctions program was devised by the British as a compromise between the use of force, which they were unwilling to contemplate largely because of domestic considerations, and doing nothing, which would have jeopardized their relations with the black African states and other Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth. The United States cooperated with the U.K. largely for the same reasons. We also anticipated that failure to devise peaceful means to influence the Smith regime toward a satisfactory settlement would encourage extremists and dangerous instability in the area. Although it was recognized from the start that the sanctions program would be an imperfect instrument there was a tendency to overestimate the effectiveness of sanctions, which have been weakened by numerous and sometimes large (South Africa and Portugal) loopholes. Similarly, although there was awareness that the convenience of certain economic interests would be disrupted through sanctions, there was a tendency to underestimate the extent to which criticism, both political and economic, would multiply with the passage of time and evidence of the program's lack of success.

The U.S. has continued to recognize British sovereignty in the colony, and refused to support the use of force by either side to the dispute. We maintain a reduced staff at our Consulate General in Salisbury which continues to operate under exequaturs from the British Crown. With the Southern Rhodesian determination to declare itself a republic, increasingly negative reactions may be anticipated from African nations to our continuing presence in Salisbury. The Consulate General provides citizenship and welfare services to approximately 1,100 American residents, three-fourths of whom are missionary families. Portuguese Territories

Our approach to Angola and Mozambique is influenced by countervailing factors. On the one hand Portugal is a NATO ally to which we currently supply about one million dollars in military assistance and whose islands, the Azores, we find important for use as a naval and air base. On the other hand we sympathize with the aspirations of the Angolans and Mozambicans for self-determination.

4 Executive Order 11322, signed January 5, 1967, and Executive Order 11419, signed July 29, 1968.

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