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- The immediate and longer-range prospects for Angola with emphasis on the likelihood of continued armed conflict, the chances that either the MPLA or FNLA/UNITA will gain a dominant political role, and the policies and goals likely to be followed in each instance.

—The consequences to the United States of Angola's being governed by those whose interests are inimical to the United States. In this context, the study should assess whether denial of a military victory by the MPLA is essential to the achievement of United States objectives.

—The impact of various outcomes in Angola on United States interests in Africa as a whole, and in particular in the neighboring states, such as Zaire and Zambia, and southern Africa.

— The probability (and extent) of OAU and/or UN intervention, or efforts to influence the conflict.

-The impact on United States interests in Africa and elsewhere of continuing Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola.

—The impact on United States-Soviet relations of continued Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola.

-The interest/concern of other powers—NATO, Germany, France, UK-with United States and Soviet intervention in Angola.

-Whether United States interests warrant support of South African government efforts to influence the outcome in Angola. Evaluate probability and consequence of United States direct or indirect policy change toward South Africa.

Based upon the foregoing assessments, the study should evaluate alternative United States policies toward Angola and present options for achieving United States objectives to include pros and cons for each. The options should take into account the time available for action.

The study should be prepared by an ad hoc group composed of representatives of the addressees and the National Security Council staff and chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State. Knowledge of the study and participation in its preparation should be kept on a strict need-to-know basis. Any additional participation should be specifically approved by the Chairman of the Group. Differing agency judgments should be clearly set forth.

The study should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs no later than January 2, 1976.?

Brent Scowcroft

2 The study was never completed.


Memorandum of Conversation?

Paris, December 17, 1975, 3:30–4 p.m.

Mandungu Bula Nyati, State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and International

Cooperation, Zaire
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Minister Bula: They (i.e., the press) say that you will give us arms.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, we will.
Minister Bula: But you have a problem with the Congress.

Secretary Kissinger: So far it's only with one committee.
Minister Bula: Is he (Lord) your assistant?

Secretary Kissinger: He is a close associate and very discreet, so you can speak freely.

Minister Bula: I read that Mr. Davis did not agree with your policy. Is that true?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I noticed you did not let him into Zaire.

Minister Bula: From the beginning we tried to avoid misunderstanding. Neither he nor Mr. Hinton bettered our relations.

Secretary Kissinger: Right. You explained that to me at the United Nations.

Minister Bula: I informed Mr. Hinton that we wished to separate ourselves from the Soviet Union, but he didn't believe us.

Secretary Kissinger: He didn't believe you and did not report it because he was afraid I might do what I did. I did not understand the situation until the end of June, and then we sent Mr. Vance to your President and we began to understand.

Minister Bula: I told my President in March that Mr. Kissinger was not aware of what was going on. Mr. Hinton would say that the Secretary of State said so and so, but I wondered. I gave the full picture to him and also told Mr. Easum.

Secretary Kissinger: He didn't want to believe it either.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 344, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, SeptemberDecember 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at the U.S. Ambassador's residence. Kissinger was in Paris to attend the Conference on International Economic Cooperation.

Minister Bula: I said that if we were not careful the Soviets would send in squadrons and take over Angola in six months. Mr. Easum was optimistic and even said that we should help the MPLA.

Secretary Kissinger: That was foolish.

Minister Bula: I told the President that Kissinger was not aware of this.

Secretary Kissinger: You were right.
Minister Bula: I saw President Sadat last Monday.
Secretary Kissinger: He said that he would support you.

Minister Bula: He will send a military mission to Zaire and see what can be done. It is important that you back him.

Secretary Kissinger: I had dinner with President Giscard yesterday evening and he said he would send a mission to Kinshasa soon.? He said he would move.

Minister Bula: When?

Secretary Kissinger: Very soon, in two to three weeks. He will also send helicopters. When I am back in Washington we will go for new decisions to send you arms. Tell your President not to lose courage.

Minister Bula: The other side is using Katusha (?) [Katyusha] rockets

Secretary Kissinger: I talked to Giscard yesterday. He will send helicopters with cannons and pilots, and the choppers will go after the rockets.

Minister Bula: Did you know that Brazzaville has missiles?
Secretary Kissinger: No.

Minister Bula: We passed the information. They are trying to frighten us. My President wants you to send us some.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe that you get frightened.

Minister Bula: We are not scared. We do need to boost the morale of the troops. Last Friday they blew up a bridge. We believe the Soviets want to strangle us and that is why we want help.

Secretary Kissinger: You will get help in the next two weeks.

Minister Bula: Material help is the key. We need heavy weapons. They believe that the United States will not intervene. When they hear the Congress, they are convinced the U.S. won't intervene.

Secretary Kissinger: The Congress is unbelievable.
Minister Bula: We don't understand all the noise.

2 No memorandum of conversation of the dinner meeting between Kissinger and Giscard d'Estaing has been found.

Secretary Kissinger: There is no excuse. The major thing is that the Executive Branch is backing you. Minister Bula: I will tell my President. I

. Secretary Kissinger: Tell your President that I talked to President Giscard. He is looking for experts. We will finance. He will get people, guns and helicopters.

Minister Bula: How about missiles?
Secretary Kissinger: I will look into that.

Minister Bula: It is urgent. They have Katushas (?) [Katyusha) and are sometimes firing 150 per hour.

Secretary Kissinger: They won't do that once you get helicopters on the battle field. When the rockets are launched they will go after them with their guns.

Minister Bula: They have some missiles.
Secretary Kissinger: Really?
Minister Bula: Yes. Why don't you send missiles?
Secretary Kissinger: I'll see whether we can get the Redeye.

Minister Bula: It is very important. We want to launch a counter offensive. There is already 5,000 people. We need support for the soldiers. Perhaps you could send somebody to Kinshasa to deal with these problems.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay. Can Mr. Medwin(?) do it?
Minister Bula: He can. There is the problem of Congress.

Secretary Kissinger: The Congress will be out of session and will do nothing for four weeks.

Minister Bula: They know about the Americans who work there, even that there are eight.

Secretary Kissinger: Is that true?

Minister Bula: It's not impossible. It's better to have your own people rather than to have a leak.

Secretary Kissinger: It's disgraceful. I have to admit it.

Minister Bula: I can't understand the collective masochism in the United States.

The Yugoslav Minister told me today that we should not worry, there is a gentleman's agreement between the USSR and the USA and before that there will be fighting.

Secretary Kissinger: There is no such agreement. It's not true.

We are thinking of publicly proposing a ceasefire and then stopping of all outside arms. Shall we do this or not?

Minister Bula: Yes, provided you supply arms to Zaire.

Secretary Kissinger: Then there would be no outside arms being sent to Angola.

Minister Bula: We are inside. At the same time diplomacy should be working

Secretary Kissinger: If they accept this proposal ...

Minister Bula: The Soviets won't leave. The Soviet Ambassador said that we have to continue bilateral relations with them and that the Angola problem is an international problem that we shouldn't care about. We said, no, Angola is a problem of security for Zaire and that comes first.

Our problem now is armament.

Secretary Kissinger: We'll do our utmost to speed arms to Zaire the next few weeks.

Minister Bula: You should work with European countries.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, France for example.

Minister Bula: And Italy. You have equipment in Europe. If they come to us with it, no one will see American equipment, and we can prove to Congress that there is no American involvement. I believe European countries are ready to help. Giscard will expect American backing

Secretary Kissinger: At dinner last night I told him that America would back him.

Minister Bula: There's Germany too.
Secretary Kissinger: Let me see. We will approach them.
Minister Bula: They have good missiles, Roelants (?) [Roland).

Secretary Kissinger: I will have to check. It is complicated but we will deal with it.

Minister Bula: For the time being it is better to have the Executive deal through European countries. Nobody will protest if France and Italy come to Zaire with American armament. The other side has Russian T-54 tanks. (He then explained some of the other side's military objectives with regard to Cabinda, a seaport, etc. and what his side was trying to do to organize against this.) We are trying to counter the Soviet Union and we can't let them do all that they want.

Secretary Kissinger: We will counter them and not let them do what they want. First of all we will send someone out to you with a concrete program. I will discuss this with the President.

Minister Bula: He should give us a program. It is a question of time. On Sunday I saw my President for a discussion, and he asked me to tell you that the military situation is very serious. The Katusha (?) [Katyusha) rockets are very powerful; the Germans were afraid of them during the war. We have the men but cannot fight against it.


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