Secretary Kissinger: We'll get some French planes in there. Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Next week is Christmas, so it will be at the end of next week or over the weekend. Minister Bula: Tell my Ambassador. We will try to have the Ambassador present his credentials next week. Secretary Kissinger: Good. Minister Bula: We thought we should have a new Ambassador in Washington. What do you think? Secretary Kissinger: It's up to you. I didn't know the old one. Secretary Kissinger: We picked the best man. We want you to be happy. Minister Bula: Have you briefed him on Angola? Secretary Kissinger: He knows all. Minister Bula: Can you help us with communications? Secretary Kissinger: That I am sure we can do. Minister Bula: We are trying to counteract the Nigerians. Minister Bula: They told me it was because South Africa is inside Angola and they want to get them out. Secretary Kissinger: We will get them out when the Russians are out. We don't want the South Africans in there. Minister Bula: For the time being we don't want them to get out. We will be Machiavellian. Let the South Africans use their forces and we will then use this to get the Africans to get the Russians out. That's my opinion. Talk will not settle anything. The Russians won't leave. We'll continue to attack South Africa and we will condemn the Soviet Union too. Secretary Kissinger: That's what you did at the last General Assembly. Minister Bula: And we will do the same thing at the OAU. Secretary Kissinger: Tell your President that the French President and I have agreed on joint action. We will do our best. We also talked to the Chinese3 and they will be more helpful. I will talk to the German and Italian Ministers. Minister Bula: It is not good for your people to come. 3 Both Kissinger and Ford discussed Angola with Chinese officials during the summit in Beijing December 1-5. See Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, Documents 134–136. Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I agree. Minister Bula: Let the Germans, Italians and French come. Minister Bula: Then no one will complain about the armaments. them. Minister Bula: I will tell my President. Secretary Kissinger: Give my best regards to him. Minister Bula: Next week your man will come. Secretary Kissinger: He will be there the end of next week. The French Government will probably contact you Friday or Saturday.* Minister Bula: The French will be helpful. Secretary Kissinger: They are great admirers of you. Minister Bula: I saw them, and they said wait until they see whether President Ford will help Zaire. Secretary Kissinger: Yes, on Friday or Saturday the French will come to you. (The Minister then briefly talked about the situation in Brazzaville. It was agreed that Zaire would keep Ambassador Cutler informed about developments.) Minister Bula: Let the South Africans know that we will be attacking them as well as the Russians. We will be comparing the Soviets to Hitler in 1939. that. Secretary Kissinger: You are a devil. Minister Bula: History has no place for losers. You once told me remembered. Secretary Kissinger: I didn't think you Minister Bula: Yes. Let the South Africans know that this is just our way of showing up the Russians. Secretary Kissinger: Keep up your courage. We will send somebody. You look tough. Minister Bula: We will continue to attack the Soviet Union in speeches. Today I was talking about imperialism in the West and in the East. The Yugoslavs are afraid of our propaganda against the Soviet Union. I say that we have to do this. We are convinced the Soviet Union is trying to destroy us. Secretary Kissinger: And that's why we are helping. We are only sorry that it took so long. Minister Bula: Please keep trying. 4 December 19 or 20. 150. Memorandum of Conversation1 Paris, December 17, 1975, 5:15-5:37 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Rupiah Banda, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff SUBJECTS Angola; Rhodesia [Photographers were admitted briefly.] Kissinger: How are things in Zambia? Banda: The struggle continues, as they say in Mozambique. Banda: Very well. Kissinger: How is his singing? Banda: He still sings! Kissinger: When I go to Africa, I look forward to visiting Zambia. I'm thinking of March. Chona: That's the best month for Zambia. Kissinger: Should I go to Mozambique? Banda: You shouldn't worry about Mozambique. Kissinger: What's going on in Angola? All I know is what Moynihan says. [Laughter] I'm going back and I'll get him under control. Banda: Not just him but the other one, too. What's his name? Kissinger: Bennett.2 I've already reprimanded him. It is unnecessary and untrue. Above all unnecessary. Our UN mission will unify Africa. [Laughter] What is your view on Angola? Banda: We still think they should stop fighting, and efforts toward a government of national unity should be made. Some in the OAU believe one group can win but we don't. Because each one is entrenched 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 344, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, September-December 1975. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held at the U.S. Ambassador's residence. All brackets, except those indicating the omission of material, are in the original. 2 William Tapley Bennett, Jr., Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations. in its area. UNITA is very popular in the South. And we believe Soviet intervention is very dangerous and would set the whole area on fire. All external forces should come out. Kissinger: Should we make such a proposal? Banda: We would support that. The Tanzanian government newspaper attacked our President today, immediately after the visit of our President there yesterday. Our President and Samora Michel visited there and we thought they had agreed to stick to the common line. Kissinger: What do you think that means? Banda: It means we each have to stick to our own position. Our question is: Will you continue to see that Soviet arms are balanced? Kissinger: Yes. Banda: In spite of the [reported Senate subcommittee] vote? Kissinger: Yes. That was a minority vote of one committee. We will see to it that the Soviet force will be balanced, and then seek a negotiation. You can tell your President that. We have made a decision for another [dollar amount not declassified] Banda: What about something directed to the internal organization of the country? So the vote won't be steamrolled by one side. Kissinger: We need your advice. Make a proposal to us. I wish in retrospect we had listened to your President when he was in Washington.3 3 Chona: What about a radio station? They have a very powerful radio. We need one. Kissinger: We'll look into that. That should be possible to do. Banda: If the OAU does meet-now it is for January 12—at that point we will all call for the withdrawal of all Soviet, South African and Cuban forces. Because the Soviets have been there and done more work in training cadres, the other units may be at a disadvantage. Could anything be done to train them? Kissinger: Between now and January 12? Banda: And after. Kissinger: The President of France said he'd send 1,000 men down there. It is difficult for us to do because of our domestic situation. 3 See Document 103. Chona: It will be necessary for you and France to make a diplomatic offensive. Kissinger: We are sending a diplomatic note to every African country-except those that are lost-about what we think about Soviet support and the MPLA. Banda: I talked to Mr. Garba of Nigeria. He said there was pressure from you. I said we don't see it that way. I said we have had some notes which were very candid. While the Soviets are really pressurizing us. Kissinger: How do you explain Tanzania? Banda: Tanzania sent a note to Zambia and others and said it was because of South African involvement. But Samora Michel said this decision should not have been arrived at without consultation between heads of state. Mozambique was not happy about it. According to our President, they agreed they would support the call for all outsiders to get out. Yugoslavia said they'd support it too. Should we believe that? They said they're there so the MPLA doesn't go totally Soviet. Kissinger: That may be partly true. I think your position is the correct one. You should stick to it. We will balance the Soviet arms. Banda: We will support a ceasefire, getting all foreign forces out, getting all foreign arms out, and a government of national unity. Kissinger: Should we call a Security Council meeting for that? Banda: Wait for the summit meeting. After 11 November we think it is legal according to the Charter to consider that Angola is liberated and that all three liberation movements are political parties; therefore, no state has the right to choose one or the other. That is interference in its internal affairs. Kissinger: That's a good point. [To Rodman:] We should put that in our note. Chona: We could have recognized one of them as a liberation movement before November 11, but after November 11, we've lost that right. Kissinger: That's right. That's a good point. Banda: On Zimbawe, we think this is a very important period. We are optimistic because we feel the conference has resulted in agreement that they will talk about majority rule. So this is the psychological moment to bring the greatest pressure on Vorster and Smith. Because it In a September 3 letter to Ford, Kaunda sought U.S. Government pressure on Rhodesia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom to facilitate the resumption of negotiations on majority rule for Rhodesia. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 4, Zambia) |