Director Colby: We have [dollar amount not declassified] left of the last [dollar amount not declassified] authorized, and have [dollar amount not declassified] more in reserve. We can have another [dollar amount not declassified] from the cost of the aircraft. We can stuff missiles back into our inventory.

President Ford: Bill [Colby], spend every dime you can.

Brent Scowcroft: We can have an NSC working group under Bill Hyland figure out ways to spend the money.

Secretary Kissinger: If we keep going and the Soviets do not think there is terminal date on our efforts and we threaten them with the loss of détente, we can have an effect.

Director Colby: There has been some fluttering among the Soviets. They have some trouble in their Foreign Ministry. [Laughter] President Ford: Let's exploit this.

[Omitted here is discussion on SALT.]

164. Backchannel Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Ambassador to Zaire (Cutler) and [recipient not

declassified]1

Washington, December 23, 1975, 0443Z.

WH 52556. Deliver at opening of business.

1. At earliest opportunity you should tell President Mobutu that we have exerted our influence in friendly countries to obtain some help for Angolan effort. Without specifying countries involved, other than in general area of Middle East, you should inform President that we are encouraged to believe he will receive some significant help within next several weeks.

2. You should take advantage of this happy news to insert idea that we consult with him and his advisors on an effective military program to use any new funds that might become available.

3. FYI: One of our concerns is that any monies not simply disappear. Thus we are keeping a line on any transfers in countries that have indicated they might be forthcoming. While we have not pinned down

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 103, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive.

a commitment or any specific figures, we are encouraged to believe about [dollar amount not declassified] might become available.

4. We will keep you informed. Because of extreme delicacy of this matter, we will not indicate countries involved. But you should understand that this is not a transfer to the US, or transfer of US equipment. Our role was simply political one of stimulating assistance.

165. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to Secretary of State Kissinger1

Washington, December 23, 1975.

SUBJECT

South African Decision to Withdraw from Angola

1. [11⁄2 lines not declassified] the South African National Security Council decided on the evening of 23 December to withdraw South African troops from Angola. The timing of the withdrawal is not definite pending consultations beginning 24 December with the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and possibly with President Mobutu. [11⁄2 lines not declassified] emphasized that the withdrawal will be orderly, and that the service hoped to obtain the concurrence of the FNLA and UNITA.

2. [less than 1 line not declassified] the South Africans probably intend to withdraw before the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting now scheduled for the second week in January. By withdrawing before the OAU meeting, the South Africans hope that UNITA and the FNLA will be free to deny the presence of South Africans in Angola and to invite on-site inspection. The South African withdrawal timetable might be adjusted, depending upon the results of consultations with the FNLA, UNITA and President Mobutu.

W.E. Colby2

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 103, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A note that reads "Urgent" is attached to the memorandum. A copy was sent to Scowcroft.

2 David H. Blee signed for Colby above Colby's typed signature.

166. Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State1

Kinshasa, December 27, 1975, 1915Z.

11014. For the Secretary and Mulcahy from Schaufele. Subject: Angola: Meeting with Mosutu.

1. I met with President Mobutu for an hour and a half this morning, December 27, at his country residence. Also present were his chief advisor, Bisengimana, Foreign Minister Bula and Ambassador Cutler.

2. I began by explaining the purpose of my trip: to consult personally with several key African leaders on Angola, to explain our position and assure them of our continued resolve to oppose foreign intervention, and to exchange views on ways by which the OAU might facilitate a negotiated settlement in Angola. I said we wanted to consult with Mobutu as a first step, and then reviewed with him the substance of the points which I intend to make with the governments I would be visiting. I said I would also be seeing a number of our Ambassadors from other African countries and would instruct them to make the same points to their respective host governments. Mobutu expressed agreement with my presentation and satisfaction that we were taking such an initiative at this time.

3. With respect to our own efforts in Angola, I said that despite problems with the Congress we remained determined to resist Soviet military intervention until a peaceful solution could be worked out. I noted that the issue had by no means been played out in the Congress, and if necessary the administration was prepared to renew the battle when Congress reconvenes next month. For now, however, we have sufficient funds to meet present military requirements.

4. Mobutu said the Congress' action posed serious problems, both from the standpoint of limiting prospects for additional help and the adverse effect on the attitudes and will of others trying to help. Of even greater concern, he went on, was the question of Zaire's own security in the face of Soviet threats not only to the south in Angola but also on other sides-in Cabinda and Congo Brazzaville. While the Soviets poured military equipment into those areas Zaire remained essentially unprotected: none of the country's vital areas-Inga Dam, the copper belt, the capital, the ports—had any protection from military attack.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 7, Zaire-State Department Telegrams, To SecState-Nodis. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

Nor did Zaire have any means for making its own armaments. While the Soviet Union and its friends "guaranteed" continued support "until the end" to those threatening Zaire's security, Zaire had no such assurances. I expressed understanding of Mobutu's concerns, assured him we would continue to do our best to help, and discussed in this context our FMS and economic assistance programs for the coming year.

5. I then turned to the urgent matter of preventing any additional recognitions of the MPLA before the OAU summit, noting that Zaire was in a position to play a key role in this effort and that we, for our part, were ready to lend support in any way possible. Mobutu reiterated his belief that no more than twenty African states will have recognized the MPLA by the time the OAU convenes, leaving a clear majority with which to work at the meeting. He conceded, however, that the MPLA and its backers were waging a vigorous campaign which had to be watched carefully. Mobutu blamed Algeria in particular for trying to drum up support for MPLA in the name of "non-alignment.” We then reviewed the status of individual states: Cameroon was shaky but visits by both Bula and me during the next few days should help. Chad was also doubtful, but Mobutu (working through Bongo) had assured them of some military assistance as a counter to the Soviets' help. The Nigerians, I said, were worth continued attention since, despite their recognition of the MPLA, they had told us they still supported the idea of a coalition government; Mobutu agreed. On the other hand, Mobutu thought Ghana had caved because of Nigerian pressure and was not salvageable.

6. Comment: Mobutu was obviously concerned about developments in Washington and their effects on both the Angolan effort and our ability to continue contributing to Zaire's own security. However, he was not discouraged and seemed readily to accept my assurances that we have every intention of staying in the game. Somewhat to my surprise, he did not raise the question of South African forces in Angola,2 as I thought he might with a view to seeking our intercession to keep them there. While we did not get into the substance of Mobutu's views on a possible OAU settlement-and I am not sure his thinking has progressed very far along this line or that he concerns himself with such details-it is clear that he views the OAU summit as a major challenge, and opportunity, for movement on the political front. (He did point out that the heavily armed and equipped position of MPLA forces makes cease-fire disadvantageous for the other movements and Zaire.) It is also clear that he shares our concern for holding the line on MPLA recognition before the summit. In this connection, Foreign Min

2 See Document 165.

ister Bula will be sent shortly to Zambia and Uganda, as well as Cameroon, to maintain pressure on this issue.

7. I am convinced that, while we can continue to count on Zaire in the military sphere, we cannot look to Mobutu to provide the major impetus for effectively organizing political/diplomatic efforts among friendly African states prior to or during the OAU meeting.

167. Intelligence Alert Memorandum1

NIO 0001-76

Cutler

Washington, January 2, 1976.

SUBJECT

Possible Adverse Consequences of the OAU Summit Meeting

1. The Organization of African Unity will open its emergency session on Angola in Addis Ababa on January 8. The meeting is bound to be a contentious one. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and its supporters will seek to:

-gain for it official recognition from the OAU as the sovereign government of Angola,

-win condemnation of South African and US involvement in Angola,

-justify Soviet and Cuban assistance,

-eliminate support for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).

2. A majority of OAU members has not yet recognized either of the rival Angolan regimes, and most of this majority will seek to avoid a situation where the member states are forced to "choose up sides." This group of states will attempt to encourage a political settlement among the factions within Angola by:

-condemning South African involvement,

-seeking the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel,

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 104, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. The paper was submitted to Scowcroft under a covering memorandum from Colby on January 3.