5. Unrestricted pursuit of tangible interests would result in greater restrictions on future actions. 6. Does nothing to deal with problems of potential violence in region. Option 2 Premise The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies and through more substantial economic assistance to the black states (a total of about $5 million annually in technical assistance to the black states) help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change. Our tangible interests form a basis for our contacts in the region, and these can be maintained at an acceptable political cost. General Posture We would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states. We would begin by modest indications of this relaxation, broadening the scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to some degree in response to tangible-albeit small and gradual-moderation of white policies. Without openly taking a position undermining the U.K. and the UN on Rhodesia, we would be more flexible in our attitude toward the Smith regime. We would take present Portuguese policies as suggesting further changes in the Portuguese Territories. At the same time. we would take diplomatic steps to convince the black states of the area that their current liberation and majority rule aspirations in the south are not attainable by violence and that their only hope for a peaceful and prosperous future lies in closer relations with white-dominated states. We would emphasize our belief that closer relations will help to bring change in the white states. We would give increased and more flexible economic aid to black states of the area to focus their attention on their internal development and to give them a motive to cooperate in reducing tensions. We would encourage economic assistance from South Africa to the developing black nations. This option accepts, at least over a 3 to 5 year period, the prospect of unrequited U.S. initiatives toward the whites and some opposition from the blacks in order to develop an atmosphere conducive to change in white attitudes through persuasion and erosion. To encourage this change in white attitudes, we would indicate our willingness to accept political arrangements short of guaranteed progress toward majority rule, provided that they assure broadened political participation in some form by the whole population. The various elements of the option would stand as a whole and approval of the option would not constitute approval of individual elements out of this context. Operational Examples -Maintain public stance against apartheid but relax political isolation and economic restrictions against the white states. -Enforce arms embargo against South Africa but with liberal treatment of equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes. -Fuel stops only, or naval visits in South Africa with arrangements for non-discrimination toward U.S. personnel in organized activity ashore; authorize routine use of airfields. -Retain tracking stations in South Africa as long as required. -Remove constraints on EXIM Bank facilities for South Africa; actively encourage U.S. exports and facilitate U.S. investment consistent with the Foreign Direct Investment Program. -Continue sugar quota in South Africa. -Conduct selected exchange programs with South Africa in all categories, including military. -Without changing the U.S. legal position that South African occupancy of South West Africa is illegal, we would play down the issue and encourage accommodation between South Africa and the UN. -On Rhodesia, retain Consulate; gradually relax sanctions (e.g., hardship exceptions for chrome) and consider eventual recognition. -Continue arms embargo on Portuguese Territories, but give more liberal treatment to exports of dual purpose equipment. -Continue discussions with Portuguese on African policy. Be prepared to offer discreet good offices in restoring and improving Portuguese relations with Zambia and the Congo. -Encourage trade and investment in Portuguese Territories; full EXIM Bank facilities. -Establish Southern African Development Fund for aid projects in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland with U.S. Ambassador accredited to three states to be U.S. representative to Fund Council. Consider pos "This would not necessarily preclude individual shore leave. [Footnote is in the original.] sibility of Malawi participation in Fund at later stage, if this appears politically advisable. -Provide bilateral technical assistance to Tanzania and Zambia; continue at least one major regional development project involving them. -Respond to reasonable requests for purchase of nonsophisticated arms but seek no change in Conte amendment. -Official visits for Tanzanian and Zambian heads of state. ---By diplomatic means seek to persuade black states (importantly Zambia and Tanzania) to adopt policy of peaceful coexistence with white regimes. -Towards African insurgent movements take public position that U.S. opposes use of force in racial confrontation. Continue humanitarian assistance to refugees. -Increase information and exchange activities in both white and black states. Pros 1. Would encourage existing tendencies to broaden relations between black states and white and thus reduce tensions-South Africa's new outward policy, Zambia's trade and sub-rosa political contacts with South Africa and Portugal. 2. Would preserve U.S. economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states and would expand opportunities for profitable trade and investment. 3. Relaxation of the U.S. attitude toward the whites could help lift their present siege mentality; and it would encourage elements among the whites seeking to extend South African relationships with black Africa. 4. U.S. diplomatic support and economic aid offer the black states an alternative to the recognized risks of mounting communist influence. 5. Increased aid would also give us greater influence to caution the black states against violent confrontation and give them a tangible stake in accepting the prospects of gradual change. 6. Would reduce a major irritant in our relations with Portugal, and afford the Caetano government opportunity for liberalization. Cons 1. Relaxation of the U.S. stance towards white states could be taken by the whites as a vindication of their policies. Many black states, led by Zambia and Tanzania, probably would charge us with subordinating our professed ideals to material interests and tolerating white-regime policies. This reaction could adversely affect, in varying degrees, our political, economic and strategic interests in the black states. 2. There is a serious question whether pro-Western leaders of the black states could continue to justify their stance to their populations if the U.S. officially declared its opposition to current liberation efforts. Radical and communist states would be the beneficiaries. 3. Unilateral U.S. relaxation of sanctions against Rhodesia would be a highly visible violation of our international obligations and would be damaging both to the U.S. and to the UN. 4. The current thrust of South African domestic policy does not involve any basic change in the racial segregation system, which is anathema to the black states. There is virtually no evidence that change might be forthcoming in these South African policies as a result of any approach on our part. 5. Requires extensive diplomatic and economic involvement in a situation in which the solution is extremely long-range and the outcome doubtful at best. 6. It is doubtful that the additional aid contemplated would be sufficiently great to influence the black states in the direction indicated. Premise Option 3 An effective U.S. role in the region and in Africa requires credibility with the black states. A more active demonstration of interest in the black states of the region is necessary to meet this need and to provide a basis for carrying out with minimum political risk, essential official policies in the white states. We can by so doing meet our minimal requirements in the area and exert a greater influence on the course of events in the black states. General Posture We would begin as soon as possible to improve our position in the black states, including a high-level public statement stressing our commitment to the peaceful advancement of human freedoms and dignity in southern Africa. If progress achieved in the first six months should warrant it, we could consider possibility for steps in pursuit of our minimum necessary economic, strategic and scientific interests in the white states. Operational Examples -Maintain active stance, publicly, officially and in UN against apartheid. --Continue arms embargo against South Africa. -Retain NASA tracking station but with alternative facilities elsewhere. -Neither encourage nor discourage investment; low-key commercial services. -No EXIM loans; insurance and credit guarantees subject to political review. -Encourage Congressional revocation of South African sugar quota and reallocation to less developed African producers. -Encourage U.S. companies to apply liberal employee policies. -Maintain persistent opposition and non-recognition of South African rule in South West Africa. -Discourage U.S. investments in South West Africa; no EXIM Bank facilities. -Take initiatives in UN on behalf of alternatives to Chapter VII sanctions on South West Africa-such as reference to ICJ. Avoid veto if possible. -Support through exchanges and contacts groups in South Africa and South West Africa seeking wiser racial policies and the rule of law; encourage U.S. private organizations supportive of these groups. -Terminate U.S. involvement in Rhodesia by closing Consulate and permitting release of chrome stocks if they would clearly fall under Treasury hardship rule (even though this would violate our UN obligations). Make clear no further transactions with current regime will be permitted. Continue sanctions enforcement. -Continue discussions with Portuguese on African policy. Be prepared to offer discreet good offices in restoring and improving Portuguese relations with Zambia and the Congo. -Maintain embargo on the supply of arms to either side in the conflict in Portuguese Africa. Continue operational naval visits. -Normal trade and neutral policy on investment in Portuguese Territories; continue routine EXIM financing and be prepared to grant major EXIM loans when economic and political circumstances warrant. -Maintain discreet contact with, but give no new assistance (other than educational and humanitarian) to political refugees from Portuguese Africa. -Establish Southern African Development Fund for aid projects in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland with U.S. Ambassador accredited to three states to be U.S. representative to Fund Council. Consider possibility of Malawi participation in Fund at later stage, if this appears politically advisable. -Provide bilateral technical assistance to Tanzania and Zambia; continue at least one major regional development project involving them. |