We are coming out of it. But we have these two right-wing candidates. But they will lose. What I can do is state certain principles that will develop their own momentum, and implement certain policies that will develop their own momentum.

You know revolutionary movements better than I do. But to me it has always seemed partly a psychological problem-at some point the minority gives up. Next Tuesday,* Smith will have no way to believe we will help. As long as no non-African countries get involved. But you and your colleagues have said they won't.

I will call on neighboring countries to close their border with Rhodesia. What do you think?

Nyerere: This is a first class idea. First class. Seretse [Khama, President of Botswana,] is calculating the costs.

Kissinger: I'll call on them—not by name—to do it, and pledge U.S.

assistance.

Nyerere: First class.

Kissinger: I'll say that South Africa can prove it is an African country by not supporting Rhodesia. And I'll talk about giving assistance to African countries.

Nyerere: First class.

Kissinger: What do you think of President Machel? I wanted to meet with him, but what about meeting him at UNCTAD?

Nyerere: You will get to meet some of their people at UNCTAD. Kissinger: It is no use to me, but I thought it would be demoralizing to Smith if I had visible contact with black leaders. I'll be in Nairobi on the 4th, 5th, and 6th. Senior people—the President or whoever. They wouldn't have to say they are there to meet me.

Nyerere: I'm not sure I can get their President, but I'm sure I can get their senior people. You have mentioned three things, which are very important.

Kissinger: I'll have given the speech.

Nyerere: Right. But these three things you said: The minority regimes can't expect support from the US. You have already said that. Second, that the US is not trying to build its own "leadership group." Kissinger: Exactly.

Nyerere: That is very important.

Quite frankly, for us and Zambia and Mozambique, this is the new fear. Not so much that you will support the white regimes, but that you

are trying to build up something of your own-I said this to the British-to say "it's ours."

Kaunda even met with Vorster personally. We knew what the African reaction would be. We knew what South Africa wanted-a friendly buffer if a settlement is achieved. We knew this, but we wanted majority rule. The objectives weren't the same but we wanted majority rule. But it failed because Smith isn't ready. Now we support the liberation fighters. But we are the same people. Don't think now we are enemies of the British. I said this to the British.

Kissinger: What I would appreciate from you, Mr. President. I may not understand everything that happens, or everything that you are told by others. So if anything happens that you have a question aboutwe will set up a channel. The sort of thing this Observer correspondent says is childish [See Tab A].5 We have no interest in backing one group against others, or against you, and we won't do this.

In Angola we got into a situation where, quite frankly, it seemed to us that the Soviet Union... If the Soviet Union had given the freedom fighters support, we would have done nothing. But when it came to massive equipment and outside forces, we had to view it as big power bases. I had the impression you weren't happy. You don't have to

answer.

Nyerere: Oh, I'll answer. We don't want the big powers in Africa, entrenching themselves. When one does, the other will.

Kissinger: Inevitably.

On Southern Africa, we will be influenced heavily by your thinking. We will have to do it one step at a time. First, Rhodesia, then Namibia, and only then can we take on South Africa. We need their help on Rhodesia, and their toleration in Namibia. But in my speech I'll say we look to the end of discrimination in South Africa at a definite date—even in South Africa.

You were summing up your three points.

Nyerere: Second was the United States is not going to support factions.

Kissinger: Peter [Rodman]. Add this to the speech. There's something in there already, but we'll sharpen it.

Nyerere: Third is calling for countries surrounding Rhodesia to close their borders.

Kissinger: Yes.

Nyerere: This is first class.

Kissinger: You won't tell our press tomorrow? Because ...

5 Tab A is not attached.

Nyerere: No. I won't give your speech!

Kissinger: We'll get it to you on Tuesday morning.

Nyerere: Those three will make me very happy.

Kissinger: I'll say we will work to repeal the Byrd Amendment, on chrome. And we'll give help for the refugees.

Nyerere: Very fine.

Kissinger: We have a ten-point program. I won't speak for you, but I can say we discussed it.

Nyerere: Tomorrow [at the press conference], I will express our position fully-so it's understood by you and your colleagues. Our fears and our hopes. I won't expect you to say in your answer things you're saying in Lusaka.

Kissinger: You are meeting our press tomorrow, and I'm delighted. It would be helpful if it doesn't look like my speech is yielding to you. It's better if it's our free decision.

Nyerere: First class. I understand.

Kissinger: You can say you're satisfied, or you're hopeful, or whatever.

What about Mozambique?

Nyerere: We helped build Frelimo. It was us and China.

Kissinger: And you noticed we never opposed it.

Nyerere: Our relations are very friendly. We don't have the same system as they do. We didn't fight a guerrilla war. We agitated a little— it was very British. [Laughter] They don't fully understand what's happening in Mozambique.

Kissinger: Nor do I. [Laughter]

Nyerere: But we get on very well with them. They very much respect the Chinese for building Frelimo.

Kissinger: We respect the Chinese.

Nyerere: But you see we disagreed with the Chinese on Angola. The Chinese Ambassador was sitting right here. I said we have to disagree. It is very painful for friendly countries to disagree. We differed with Zambia too. It was very painful.

Kissinger: Of course, we agreed more with Zambia.

Nyerere: Yes, you agreed with my friends more than I did! Can we still remain very friendly, even if we disagree? We disagreed with Zambia and the Chinese, but we move on.

You spoke of my friend Machel. Their system isn't ours.
Kissinger: You said you'd send a message to Mozambique.

6 See Document 56.

Nyerere: I'll send a message, and the message might be actually your statement in Lusaka. I'll say they should send someone-the Foreign Minister.

Kissinger: It should be a political person, even though the meeting is...

Nyerere: ... economic.

Kissinger: I'm giving a speech [at UNCTAD] because this is the only way to give impetus to it, and in our government. I could have sent the Economic Under Secretary, but I wanted to do it.

Nyerere: I'll make a proposal to the Foreign Ministers in Mozambique, in Zambia, and in Botswana-and to make it easier, my Foreign Minister Ibrahim-could be in Nairobi.

Kissinger: Your Foreign Minister?

Nyerere: Oh, yes. My Foreign Minister will be with me [in Europe]. I'll send someone else.

Kissinger: It would be very helpful if after I've made this speech... How will it happen?

Nyerere: I'll let Mr. [Ambassador] Spain know.

Kissinger: Good. To let you know, I can do it Tuesday afternoon or all day Wednesday.

Nyerere: So you'll speak on Tuesday? On Tuesday I'll contact the President in Zambia and Mozambique and say that in view of your statement, wouldn't it be useful to meet with you on the following Tuesday? It will be the first visible sign of a response.

Kissinger: Excellent.

Nyerere: I'll let Mr. Spain know.

Kissinger: So we don't have to approach them.

Nyerere: You don't have to approach them. Good.

[Everyone gets up to leave.]

Kissinger: I can't tell you how much I've wanted to meet you.

Nyerere: The feeling has been mutual.

[At 7:58 they proceeded to the large meeting room, where Nyerere introduced his colleagues to the Secretary's party. Everyone is seated. Nyerere offers wine, but the Secretary demurs.]

Nyerere: You're a teetotaler!

Kissinger: Yes. I almost never drink.

Nyerere: I was a teetotaler. Until the victory in Mozambique. I never dealt with Portugal. I never knew Portuguese wine. Then Samora

7

Kissinger delivered a speech on global economic development on May 6 in Nairobi. (Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1976, pp. 657–672)

[Machel] discovered stacks and stacks of wine in cellars there. He sent it to me. So they'll serve it to you. [Laughter]

Since Samora sent it to me, I call it "Samora." [Laughter] I always say: "Bring me Samora." [Laughter]

Kissinger: How did Frelimo get started?

Nyerere: How did it get started? I used to go to the United Nations as a petitioner. This country was a trust territory under the UN, administered by the British. Twice I came to the United Nations. On one trip I met Dr. Mondlane. He had been teaching in the United States, but was then working for the UN. And we discussed liberation. I said: "Why don't you come to Dar es Salaam, instead of working for the UN, and work for the liberation of your country?"

So he came in 1962. There were several organizations. [The President's colleagues recite a number of names]. Mondlane helped put them together into a front for the liberation of Mozambique— FRELIMO. It was really a coalition of small parties. They started with agitation. That was all we knew, from our experience. They tried it, but it wasn't enough. Then they started fighting—a year after the formation of the OAU.

Kissinger: But where did Machel come from?

Nyerere: Machel was one of the freedom fighters. When they came together, Machel was there. He was a hospital assistant-a dispenser. He escaped and came here and was recruited and came into the Army, and became the leader of the armed force. When Mondlane was assassinated.

Kissinger: Oh, Mondlane was assassinated?

Nyerere: He was assassinated here. The same thing happened with

Cabral.

Kissinger: Do you have any idea who did it?

Nyerere: It was planned by the Portuguese, with infiltrators.

When he was assassinated, they came together to find a new leader. They were divided, as the politicians now fighting in Rhodesia. But at the Congress, the fighters came, so they chose Machel.

Kissinger: Senator Percy, whom you met, and who met Machel, was very impressed.

I'm seeing Nkomo in Lusaka, just to show the symbolism of meeting with someone from the Liberation Movement. I tried to meet the Bishop. He requested the appointment, and now he's made a statement [denouncing me].

8 Abel Muzorewa.