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I'd be delighted to meet him, or Sithole. We're not interested in pitting one faction against another.

Nyerere: We have the same interest. We tell them we don't support


Kissinger: The Bishop is in the United States now.

Schaufele: He's there for two weeks for a Methodist Conference. Nyerere: Maybe he'll meet you in Washington! Maybe after you made your speech, you'll be more acceptable. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Maybe he'll recruit me into his movement. [Laughter] Nyerere: That will be the first sign that your statement was acceptable. Or he'll reprimand you.

Kissinger: What sometimes happens is people meet me privately for a very friendly conversation and then reprimand me publicly. Nyerere: Not only me!? [Laughter]

Kissinger: In Latin America, one leader told me very privately he was very concerned about Cuba. Then the next day he said the opposite on television.

Nyerere: They're very democratic in that hemisphere. They have to say different things in public and in private. Here we're not so democratic. We say the same thing publicly as we say privately. [Laughter] Actually, Brezhnev has it easier than Ford.

Kissinger: Not really. Ford has a problem this year, but he'll win. Brezhnev has 15 colleagues he has to worry about, and maneuver. [Laughter] Reagan is a former movie actor; he doesn't know what he's saying, but he says it effectively. [Laughter]

Spain: He could be a very good Ambassador. [Laughter]
Kissinger: So he'll just read his instructions. [Laughter]

Any Ambassador who wants to get even finds a cable—they're all signed by me—that they leak to the press.

Nyerere: Sometimes I read in the papers—“President Nyerere sent a message." I don't remember sending any message!

Foreign Minister Kaduma: At least you have confidence in us. [Laughter]

Nyerere: There is nothing that I do that isn't in the newspapers. Now you will have dinner with the Foreign Minister. He'll make a speech at you.

Kissinger: Will it be very revolutionary?

Nyerere: [pauses]: Not very. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I'll see you tomorrow.

Nyerere: Tomorrow we'll watch a parade. It will not be very long-40-45 minutes. Then we'll meet at the State House. I think I'll have one or two of my colleagues.

Kissinger: Very good.

Nyerere: And you can tell us all about American policy. We always want to know what worries you.

Kissinger: And we'll have our economic minister [Robinson] tomorrow. Thank you very much.

[The meeting ended.]

195. Memorandum of Conversation1

Lusaka, April 27, 1976, 9 a.m.


Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia

Elijah Mudenda, Prime Minister

Rupiah Banda, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Seteke Mwale, Zambian Ambassador to the U.S.

Grey Zulu, Secretary General, U.N.I.P.

Mark Chona, Special Assistant to the President for Foreign Affairs

Peter Kasanda, Deputy to Mark Chona

Ruben Kamanga, Chairman, Sub-Committee on Political, Legal, Constitutional and Foreign Affairs United Nat'l Independence Party Central Committee

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Charles W. Robinson, Deputy Secretary of State

Jean M. Wilkowski, U.S. Ambassador to Zambia

William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs

Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff

Harold E. Horan, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council (Notetaker)

Kaunda: I want to welcome you, Mr. Secretary, to Zambia, and I know that my colleagues had the opportunity to extend their welcome yesterday on your arrival. We would like you to know that this is a very welcome visit. You are the second Secretary of State who has visited here, and we also had a visit by Vice President Humphrey.

Kissinger: How long did he speak? (Laughter)

Kaunda: Quite a short time. (Laughter) Mr. Secretary, when I was in Washington last year and met your President,2 I said that southern Africa was at a turning point and that the situation was very worrisome

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 99, Geopolitical File, Africa, Trips, 1976, Apr.-May, Resource Book. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Horan. The meeting was held at State House. Brackets are in the original.

2 See Document 103.

indeed. We have been operating as a team cooperating on two common programs, and I will explain in more detail in our enlarged meeting. I will confine myself here to what I see of the solutions your Government might wish to participate in.

As far as Rhodesia is concerned, we don't see any solution to the problem as long as Smith is there. His record shows that we have to get Vorster involved because he is Smith's colonial master in the area, but still the only solution is for Smith to get out. But how do we do this? We don't know, but we have to work together to find a way. We have to fight and the African countries are backing the liberation groups to the hilt. Smith depends very much on the white settlers, and we would like to believe that the Western Governments can support moves to erode that support. If the British, French, West Germans and others would help to underwrite the certain financial losses that some of the settlers might suffer, this would accomplish an outflow of the settlers if they would then see they could go to places like Australia to begin a new life. We would also like to believe that the United States could pressure Vorster to be more cooperative now that Mozambique has closed its borders. South Africa is the key to Rhodesia. I know that your Government fears Russian and Cuban interference in Rhodesia, but I also know of no African leader who has spoken of this possibility. We do not want to see outside interference at all, and we would not like to see outside support for factions in Rhodesia. They should be left alone; that is the only way to avoid an Angolan situation in Rhodesia. Once the United States Government understands the problem clearly I see no chance of outside interference.

On Namibia our stand is clear, and the role the U.S. should play is most important. In defying the United Nations, Vorster is saying that Namibia is his. We do not want Bantustans in Namibia but one government, nor do we want to see interference from the outside there, but the delays in independence make that possible. The role you can play is to put pressure on South Africa to respect the decision of the United Nations. Your influence on South Africa is important, and you could use it to make Vorster see sense. If he does not, there will be fighting and dying.

South Africa itself is an independent African state which is not a colonial power, and we accept that fact. We do not, however, accept apartheid, and we support those who are struggling to change apartheid. Once again, the United States has a great deal to do with changing the situation in South Africa. South Africa exists because of western commerce and investment.

Whether in Rhodesia, Namibia or South Africa, African leaders have never said they were chasing away anybody. We are all Africans, and the whites in South Africa have their own right to live in their own

country. But the issue of southern Africa is a question of life and death. For you, Mr. Secretary, the question for your decision is what you want to do to make life more meaningful for all. Your decision to come here shows that you want to find solutions to the southern African problems.

Kissinger: Thank you for your kind remarks. The warmth and friendship that you and your delegation have shown me has meant a great deal to me. You are admired in my country for your courage and wisdom. We remember well your remarks in Washington on the principles of equality and your call on us to live up to these principles.

We have come through a difficult period in the United States, but we have made our decision. I don't make ceremonial visits, and I am here to develop a program. A few years ago it was said that we have no Middle East program, but events belie that statement. While it is true that within the United States there will be resistance to my speech today, we have made our decision. We are totally behind majority rule, and we will work with the four presidents. You appreciate, of course, that we cannot make public statements calling for armed struggle. In any case, I hope you agree that any struggle must end in negotiation.

We will use our economic and diplomatic pressures on Rhodesia. My speech3 appeals to Vorster to bring an end to apartheid and set a timetable for the independence of Namibia. I hope that African leaders will find an opportunity to emphasize the positive in our position so that we will not be caught in a crossfire of criticism.

As for Zambia, we respect you as one of the intellectual and political leaders, and we appreciate the cooperation we have received in certain matters. We want to assist in your development, and after I return to Washington we will look at new programs of assistance to Zambia.

If foreign intervention is kept out of southern Africa, the United States can give you its maximum support. I appreciate your idea of the need to help the settlers find new homes, and we are prepared to assist economically in such a program. It is important for the four presidents to refer to minority rights and for any constitution to protect those rights. This will not keep many settlers from leaving, but it is important for us psychologically. We have told the British, by the way, that we will cooperate in any resettlement effort. There is no longer any ambiguity. We support you.

We see it as a practical matter. The first problem to tackle is Rhodesia, then Namibia and lastly South Africa. We need South Africa's help in solving the other two problems, although I have stated in

3 See footnote 3, Document 194.

my speech that apartheid must end. Of course, we have no problems with you or your Government, Mr. President.

We are prepared to have normal relations with Mozambique, and I hope to see a representative of that country in Nairobi. There is no organized hostility against Mozambique in the United States, although some see it as a Soviet satellite.

Let me thank you once again, Mr. President, for receiving me and my delegation and for your warm hospitality.

196. Memorandum of Conversation1

Grafenau, West Germany, June 24, 1976, 9:30 a.m.-1:15 p.m.


South Africa:

Balthazar Johannes Vorster, Prime Minister

Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Amb. Bernadus Gerhardus Fourie, Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Roelof Frederik Botha, Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent

Representative to the U.N.

Gen. Hendrik Johannes Van Den Bergh, Director, Bureau for State Security and
Security Adviser to the Prime Minister

Amb. Sole, Ambassador to the FRG


Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department

William E. Schaufele, Jr. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Amb. William Bowdler, Ambassador to South Africa

Robert L. Funseth, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations, and

Spokesman of the Department

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[The Secretary and the Prime Minister conferred privately from 9:30 to 11:36 a.m., while the other members of the two delegations held

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 344, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, June-July 1976. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held at the Hotel Sonnenhof. Brackets are in the original.

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