Duff: But can he be trusted?

Kissinger: Why do we care? If he accepts all the terms. Once the agreement is signed, a new government is constituted. It is that government which organizes the elections, not Smith. To be plausible, it will be headed by a black.

Duff: But the agreement should lay out the principles on which majority rule will be done—majority rule within two years, entrenched rights. Would there be an intermediate stage, where Smith says he recognizes what has to be done and urges his fellows to accept and then resigns?

Kissinger: I don't mind that.

Duff: That could be one way to do it.

Kissinger: I think it's very important to keep the threat of Smith's resistance to get this done. It's the prospect of a five-year guerrilla war. Crosland: That's with the three peaceful Presidents.

Kissinger: Yes, with the three peaceful Presidents. Machel, one doesn't know. He may not be so tough but one has to assume it.

What is your present best estimate on the financial side? What do we have to commit to per year?

Duff: £50-60 million a year over 20 years. It depends on how much in fact one has to pay out in pensions. For the people who stay, the Rhodesians can pay the pensions. I think £2,000 million total.

Kissinger: How much will you be expected to assume?

Crosland: Whatever we can't persuade you and the Germans to assume. [Laughter]

Kissinger: We'll have a hell of a time in the Congress.

Lord: How many countries will be involved?

Crosland: The Germans will contribute a bit. The French may do a

token bit, just to establish their standing.

Kissinger: The Germans will contribute in Namibia—it will help— but their contribution won't be spectacular in Rhodesia.

Duff: South Africa will contribute.

Kissinger: No. He said he would not. Not money.

Duff: But many are Afrikaners.

Kissinger: Maybe it was not his last word, but I didn't press him. Crosland: The trouble is, we have to make these expenditure cuts for no objective reason—because of that fresh-faced young Harvard man of yours.

"That is, Kaunda, Nyerere, and Khama.

Kissinger: Parsky! First of all, he's Princeton [Laughter]. I don't think we can do more than 50 percent of it.

If you can give us your best estimate of how that curve will run.
Duff: We don't have to tie it to requests. We could limit it per year.
Lord: But wouldn't it be front-loaded?

Kissinger: But their scheme is designed to increase the funds if they stay. But there might be a mass exodus.

Duff: Less money, more quickly.

Lord: Then it is geared to certain groups.

Duff: We may have to come off that.

Kissinger: Would Canada contribute?

Crosland: The white Commonwealth might contribute, certainly if resettlement became a problem. Certainly at that point. Whether they would contribute to the initial fund, I don't know.

Kissinger: Let us know what the Germans and French say.

Duff: We will. Through the Embassy.

Kissinger: Do it through the State Department people here.
Crosland: When does Schaufele get back?

Kissinger: The end of next week. But we will give you interim

reports.

We will have something from [his meeting with] Kaunda tomorrow or Saturday.? I'll let you know on the yacht.

Namibia

Crosland: Anything else, Henry, on this? Or have we taken it as far as we can?

Kissinger: Namibia. You know what we are doing on Namibia. Crosland: I don't know if we have a total meeting of the minds. Duff: We are a little worried about Vorster's proposition. I told this to Bill Schaufele. Our feeling is that moving the Windhoek Conference to Geneva won't be sufficient to get SWAPO.

Kissinger: This grew out of Nyerere's letter. He said we should move it to Lusaka and he would see to it that SWAPO dropped its claim. So we put it to Vorster. He agreed, but not to Lusaka.

Duff: We are not sure.

7 Telegram 1750 from Lusaka, July 8, reported on Schaufele's meeting with Kaunda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840083–0723)

8 Telegram 2093 from Dar es Salaam, June 6, transmitted Nyerere's letter to Kissinger. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, Box 26, June 6–13, 1976, Latin America Tosec (1))

Kissinger: What else would have to be done?

Duff: Probably call it a different conference. I agreed with Bill Schaufele that we had 2 different perceptions. We will hear from Schaufele next week.

Kissinger: It is not an American scheme. I think it will be difficult to sell another conference to Vorster, at least until the end of August. Duff: We have an official in Windhoek who has been trying to soften them up there. He's in fact talking to Schaufele today in Lusaka. Kissinger: What does your official say?

Duff: He reports cautious interest among the ethnic groups in Namibia. There is one thing that does bother us-that this same official was told that the South Africans are working on a statement for use in the UN in August. We feel that August would be too late.

Kissinger: I agree. But I don't think Vorster has told too many of his people. Of course, Namibia and Rhodesia don't have to be done together. But certainly before the UN debate.

Duff: Probably you are right, sir. The South African Foreign Ministry doesn't know all that is in their Prime Minister's mind.

What have you told the French?

Kissinger: I've discussed it with Giscard, who told me explicitly not to raise it with the Foreign Office. At Puerto Rico, when the President tried to raise it with Sauvagnargues present, Giscard steered it away. Which means Jim should raise it with Giscard ...

Crosland: Without Sauvagnargues.

Duff: On Namibia, we have always acted tripartitely.

Kissinger: On Namibia, I have told them very little, only that there is an idea to move it. Nyerere has raised it with a number of the EC-9 countries.

Duff: Yes. This is where we got a number of different interpretations.

Kissinger: Giscard didn't know the subject very well. So we discussed it only briefly. Perhaps because he wanted to talk with Sauvagnargues first, or because he wanted to discuss it without Sauvagnargues.

The President and Giscard had a breakfast, and when the President raised it he pointedly steered it away. We have not gone into it with the French in such detail.

Crosland: Okay?

Kissinger: Okay.

Crosland: Thank you very much.

Kissinger: You like short meetings.

Crosland: This is short? An hour?
Rodman: An hour and ten minutes.
[The meeting concluded.]

198. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford1

Washington, August 5, 1976.

Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass on to you the following report of his meeting with Prime Minister Callaghan.2

"I had a breakfast and meeting Thursday with Callaghan for almost two-and-a-half hours at Number Ten Downing Street. We talked mainly about Southern Africa.

"Callaghan told me he praises you to every American who comes through London, and he expressed confidence you would win. He was confident also about his own domestic economic situation. He will announce tomorrow that Britain has cut its inflation down to 12.8 per cent (roughly in half). I told him his new economic program was a courageous decision. He felt that with this program, with the unions' continued cooperation, and with the on-schedule development of North Sea oil, they would be on their feet.

"We then turned to Rhodesia. Callaghan thought we were up against heavy odds; Britain had been living with the problem for over ten years. But he was ready to cooperate. America's active involvement and South Africa's cooperation were two big new factors on the positive side. He repeated the British fear that Ian Smith was a hard man to crack, and quite skilled in maneuvering and evasion. I said that for this reason we all had to move fast. Callaghan agreed.

"We then worked out the following scenario:

-First, we will complete work on the economic package that U.S. and British experts have been putting together, the guarantees to induce the whites to stay in a majority-ruled Rhodesia. This should be finished early next week.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 91, Geopolitical File, Africa, Chronological File, August 1-5, 1976. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Ford initialed the first page of the memorandum.

2 Scowcroft received the report in a telegram from London, August 5. (Ibid., Box CL 266, Cables File, Kissinger, Henry, May 26-August 6, 1976)

-Secondly, the British will draft necessary legislation to assert British authority over Rhodesia. The South Africans regard some transitional period and some British presence as essential. Callaghan is fearful of a formal British authority that implicitly commits him to use British troops if necessary to back it up; he is, however, willing to have Parliament confer legal authority on a council of interested parties in Rhodesia to negotiate the way to independence and majority rule, with a civilian British presence to monitor the negotiations.

-Third, we will draft documents which will secure African, South African and international agreement to the new political arrangements.

-When these are complete, which should be in about two weeks, I will send Bill Rogers and Bill Schaufele to give Nyerere and Kaunda a general idea and obtain their overall agreement. The British will send a team of their own to Africa with the same purpose, shortly afterward.

-With the Black Africans lined up, I will take it to Vorster early in September. With his approval, we will then proceed to put the arrangements into effect rapidly with the Black Africans.

"We reached general agreement also on Namibia, i.e., to move the Constitutional Conference from Windhoek to Geneva, invite SWAPO, and give a terminal date for independence. The British, having no responsibility, would like to move faster. But this is the maximum Vorster will take now. The British have agreed to keep at least silent on their preferences.

"Callaghan and I agreed our two countries would proceed jointly on these issues from here on."