-Official visits for Tanzanian and Zambian heads of states. -Maintain discreet contact and selective non-military support to liberation groups (other than those from Portuguese Africa). Extend educational and humanitarian assistance to individual political refugees. -Maintain present information and exchange programs in white areas and expand programs in black states. -After a period of six months from the inception of the program to strengthen relations and understanding with the black states, consider the following actions in pursuit of limited U.S. economic and strategic interests in South Africa: -Reconsider EXIM policy. -Flexibility in arms embargo on sale of dual purpose items. -Unclassified military correspondence courses where there is clearly direct benefit to U.S. in resulting contact. Operational naval visits on the basis of fuel stops only or with shore leave restricted to racially integrated activities. Pros 1. Would preserve most of our minimum necessary economic, strategic and scientific interests in the white states. 2. Would afford access to black states of region and improve our standing elsewhere in Africa and with Afro-Asian states at UN. 3. Expanded aid to the black states would enable us to offset criticisms of our necessary activities in white states. 4. Would retain flexibility for future movements towards either white or black states. Cons 1. Preparatory moves in black states might not give clear enough results nor be sufficient to offset African criticism for possible later activities in white states. 2. Association with the white regimes at any time is vulnerable to exploitation by the communists and African extremists. 3. Substantial EXIM loan in Portuguese Territories could cause adverse repercussions in Zambia and Tanzania. 4. Chrome "exception" by U.S. would be in violation of a mandatory provision of the UN Charter and might tend toward further weakening of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Option 4 Premise The situation in the region is not likely to change appreciably in the foreseeable future, and in any event we cannot influence it. Conse quently we can retain some economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states at the same time as we protect our world-wide standing on the racial issue by limiting the nature and scope of our associations with these states and by maintaining present levels and types of aid to the black states of the region. To do so provides us with a posture of flexibility to enable us best to adapt our policy to future trends. General Posture This is a codification and extension of present policy. In the UN and bilaterally we would continue basic opposition to the racial and colonial policies of the white states but seek to maintain correct relations with them. We would retain some military access, scientific installations etc., under conditions which do not imply our condoning of racial repression. In concert with the British, we would stand firmly against the Smith regime, closing our Consulate and continuing sanctions. We would lower the level of public criticism of Portuguese policy in Africa to encourage liberalizing tendencies of the Caetano government. We would give economic aid to black states of the region. We would continue to oppose violent solutions to the problems of the region, and to oppose the outward thrust of South African influence where this strengthens South African domination of neighboring states. Operational Examples -Strict application of arms embargo against South Africa. -Permit U.S. naval calls in South Africa with arrangements for non-discrimination toward U.S. personnel ashore. -Retain NASA station in South Africa but with alternative facilities elsewhere. -Neither encourage nor discourage investment in South Africa, give low-key commercial services, no direct EXIM Bank loans but permit insurance and guarantees of commercial credits. -Support Congressional revocation of sugar quota for South Africa and its reallocation to less developed African producers. -Continue to view South African administration of South West Africa as illegal; urge South Africa to accept UN supervisory authority; discourage U.S. investments, no EXIM facilities. -Support through exchanges and contacts groups in South Africa and South West Africa seeking wiser racial policies and rule of law; encourage U.S. private organizations supportive of such groups. -Follow British lead on representation and recognition of Southern Rhodesia and on UN sanctions program; withdraw consulate. -Maintain embargo on supply of arms to either side in the conflict involving the Portuguese Territories, take neutral attitude on investment and permit EXIM facilities for U.S. exports short of major infrastructural projects. Soften criticisms of Portuguese African policy in UN and bilaterally. -Establish flexible economic assistance programs in the black states of the region permitting the retention of present aid levels. -Maintain discreet contact with African insurgent movements and extend educational and humanitarian assistance to individuals. -Maintain modest information and exchange programs in white-ruled areas (except Rhodesia); expand activities in the black states. Pros 1. Preserves most of our major economic, scientific and strategic interests in the region at least in the short run. 2. Affords access to black states in the region and preserves some standing elsewhere in Africa and with Afro-Asian states at the UN. 3. Retains some flexibility for movement closer to either white or black states, depending upon future developments. Cons 1. Position would be seen as expedient and hypocritical by both sides. Our condemnation of whites hurts us with them, yet fails to satisfy the blacks, exposing us to pressures for more decisive measures. 2. Policy does nothing to deal actively with problem of violence in the area or increasing communist influence. 3. Restrictions on association with white regimes involve some loss of potential U.S. economic and defense assets. Option 5 Premise We cannot influence the white states for constructive change, and therefore increasing violence is likely. Only by cutting our ties with the white regimes can we protect our standing on the race issue in black Africa and internationally. Since our tangible interests are not vital, this is a reasonable price to pay. General Posture We would maintain only minimal relations with the white regimes, emphasizing that improved relations are impossible until they moderate present policies and avoiding actions vis-à-vis these states likely to provoke an adverse reaction in the black African states. This disassociation would be at the official level only: private trade, travel, and other forms of communication would continue, but without USG assistance or encouragement. We would at the same time stress to the black African states the extent to which we were sacrificing certain of our material interests and would make it clear that (1) we had gone as far as we were prepared to go in this direction, and (2) we would not support any violent solution to their problems nor sanctions against the white states (except Rhodesia). We would take positive official stands against racial and colonial oppression. We would afford economic aid to the black states and sell them reasonable quantities of nonsophisticated military equipment. Operational Examples -Strictest application of arms embargo against South Africa. -Prohibit official use of South African ports and airfields except in emergency. -Neither encourage nor discourage trade or investment but provide no commercial services or EXIM facilities in South Africa. -Encourage Congressional revocation of the sugar quota for South Africa, and its reallocation to less developed African producers. -Match diplomatic mission and consulates in South Africa to reduced official relationships. -Make clear that we regard South Africa's continued occupation of South West Africa as illegal. Discourage U.S. investment; deny commercial services and EXIM facilities; hold to minimum U.S. contacts with South African authorities in South West Africa. -Support through exchanges and contacts groups in South Africa and South West Africa seeking wiser racial policies and rule of law; encourage U.S. private organizations supportive of such groups. -Support strict international enforcement of sanctions and maintain non-recognition of Southern Rhodesia; withdraw Consulate. -Limit EXIM Bank activities and official trade promotion in Portuguese Territories. Maintain arms embargo and continue to support self-determination for the Portuguese Territories. -Establish Southern African Development Fund for aid projects in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland with U.S. Ambassador accredited to three states to be U.S. representative to Fund Council. Consider possibility of Malawi participation in Fund at later stage, if this appears politically advisable. -Provide bilateral technical assistance to Tanzania and Zambia; continue at least one major regional development project involving them. -Official visits for Tanzanian and Zambian heads of states. -Open contact and sympathy for aspirations of African insurgent groups short of material support. -Reduce information and exchange programs in white areas to a minimum; expand programs in the black states. Pros 1. Would significantly increase our credibility in black Africa and the UN by demonstrating U.S. is prepared to back its pronouncements on the race issue at some material sacrifices. 2. Would provide maximum leverage to limit Soviet and Chinese influence among liberation groups and in their host countries. 3. Would put white regimes on notice that U.S. is not prepared to bail them out for material or strategic reasons. 4. Would provide a more defensible basis to counter Afro-Asian demands for more far-reaching proposals. Cons 1. It would tend to identify us with the cause of the insurgent movements and would stimulate demands for more far-reaching action. 2. Would sacrifice economic, strategic and scientific interests. 3. We would forfeit economic opportunities to France, the U.K. and other major trading nations who would be unlikely to take similar steps. 4. Might reinforce the siege mentality of the white regimes and their resistance to constructive change. 5. Would make our relations with the Portuguese more difficult. Option 6 Premise The repressive policies of the white regimes are leading to eventual conflict in the region, which in the long run cannot end other than in victory for the African majority. Such conflict would be a tragedy, but for the U.S. to permit communist monopoly of the insurgent struggle would be worse for our long-range interests. Both to obviate a major armed conflict if possible, and to identify with the eventual winners if it is inevitable, the U.S. should now move to active measures to force change in white-regime race policies. General Posture After appropriate diplomatic warnings of our impending action, the U.S. would move to active measures of coercion, short of armed force, against the white regimes. We would try to get maximum UN support for these measures. Our actions would include efforts to ex |